http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=8D10A41B-E05E-44A1-9343-
C50A421D3E9C
 
Inside the Surge                
By
<file:///C:/Program%20Files/Common%20Files/Microsoft%20Shared/Stationery/aut
hors.aspx?Name=Michael Yon> Michael Yon
New York Post | Monday, October 29, 2007 

This week, the U.S. announced that military deaths in Iraq had fallen
dramatically, to the lowest levels since March 2006, a sign that the surge
of troops is working. Officers say increased cooperation from Iraqi
civilians - who are tired of the terrorism and violence - has helped stem
attacks. 

This comes as no surprise to Michael Yon, a writer who has blogged from Iraq
since 2005. Yon, who is supported by donations to his Web site
(michaelyon-online.com), writes about his own observations on the ground
this year, embedded with U.S. troops. 

Statistics in reports about faraway places can blunt the reality of what
those numbers mean. But when it is a bomb in a road you are about to drive
on, it takes on a whole new cast, as I found yet again when I spent most of
May in Anbar Province. 

I visited a former labor camp nicknamed “Coolie Village," or what remained
of it, after a truck bomb locals attributed to al Qaeda had flattened it.
Not surprisingly, the anger and frustration in response to this mass murder
helped the villagers overcome their fear of the thugs who had taken hold of
their community. 

In mid-May, 2007, the Iraqi Army and Police had conducted a “Combined
Medical Exercise" in the village of Falahat, and Iraqi doctors saw about 200
villagers. Two days later, the Iraqi Police opened an outpost at the old
Falahat train station. That was just about the same time I was driving out
to stay with a small team of Marines who were assigned as “MiTT 8" (Military
Training Team 8.) 

The men of MiTT 8 were living with their Iraqi protégées in filthy shipping
containers on a highway. Several months ago they were attacked by a car
bomb. But at about 9 a.m., while I was traveling to their location with
Marines in a Humvee, some Falahat villagers went to the new police station
to report the presence of a culprit they knew was placing bombs on the road.


It happened that quickly. 

Within mere days of opening the station, people spoke up. The Iraqi Police
(some of whom freely admitted to having been recent insurgents) called the
tip into the Iraqi Army living with the Marines of MiTT 8. Our Humvee pulled
up to the small MiTT 8 compound, where we met Staff Sergeant Rakene Lee, who
was dressed for combat, and who was to take the Humvees and lead the mission
to the suspected bomb site. The Iraqi Army was already blocking the road. 

The patrol I was with had nearly run into an IED, except for a tip from
Iraqis in another village, making what could have been my last dispatch. 

JUSTICE TO POWER 

All across Iraq, people are fed up with the abuse of power, even when it
wears the badge of a police officer, even when it's a local hero. 

When I was in the city of Hit this May, I saw firsthand a dramatic example.
Many people in Hit directly attribute the resurrection of their city in
large part to the courage of Iraqi Police General Ibrahim Hamid Jaza, who
took an aggressive stand against the al Qaeda Iraq (AQI) terrorists who had
brazenly made Anbar province a home base and slaughterhouse with their
marketplace car bombs, beheadings and reputation for hiding bombs intended
to kill parents in the corpses of dead children they'd gutted. 

Between shooting people for using the Internet, watching television or other
“moral transgressions" such as smoking in public, AQI's claim of
fundamentalist piety proved to be a thin veneer, quickly eroded by blatant
drug, alcohol and prostitute use. The people of Anbar rejected AQI, but AQI
was still strong and well-armed, so rejection was only a first step. 

General Hamid was one of the brave souls who took an early stand and went
for their throats. In doing so, he demonstrated that the terrorists were
also vulnerable. Some soldiers began to jokingly refer to the general as
“Bufford Pusser" because Hamid literally carried a big stick. But AQI wasn't
laughing; they beheaded Hamid's son on a soccer field in the center of Hit
in 2005. 

About a year ago Coalition forces selected Hamid to be the district chief of
police, confirming his status as a true hero to many Americans and Iraqis. 

But recent signs suggested that Hamid might have flown too close to the sun.
Details of his corruption began to accumulate. It was a stunning development
when, without warning or notice, the U.S. military arrested and detained the
general. 

They had no choice, the evidence was clear. Furthermore, the people of Anbar
had risked reaching out to the Americans, expressing a concern about Hamid
and sharing intelligence to support it. They expected U.S. soldiers to help
solve the problem. And although some feared the arrest would cause the city
to erupt in violent clashes, what happened next is powerful testimony for
how much the area has changed. The next day, Hamid's supporters, and there
were many, gathered in the market square and held an organized and peaceful
protest demonstration, after which they all went back home. 

STENCH OF EVIL 

>From Anbar, I traveled back to Baghdad then to Diyala, where al Qaeda had
announced to the world it would base its caliphate in the provincial capital
Baqubah. I was embedded with soldiers who formed the spear point of the
largest offensive operation since the invasion of Iraq, and I watched as
people from all walks of life came forward to share information that saved
the lives of American and Iraq soldiers and cleared the streets of the al
Qaeda operatives. 

In one of my first reports from the still unfolding Operation Arrowhead
Ripper, I wrote: 

Locals, who are increasingly helpful in pointing out and celebrating the
downfall of AQI here, said that during the initial Arrowhead Ripper attack
the morning of June 19th, AQI murdered five men. [U.S. soldiers] found the
buried corpses behind an AQI prison, exactly where they'd been told to look
for the group grave. Locals also directed [soldiers] to a torture house.
Peering through the window, American soldiers saw knives, swords, bindings
and drills. AQI is well-known for its macabre eagerness to drill into
kneecaps, elbows ribs, skulls and other parts of victims. 

During the operation's initial phase, U.S. soldiers encountered about 130
serious IEDs on the way in, but suffered only one fatality in the attack;
Iraqis were pointing to the bombs before they could detonate. 

Over many embeds, stretching out over the course of three years, I've seen
massacres occur before my eyes, and I've heard more stories about the
brutality (and inanity) of al Qaeda than I can or want to remember. 

But one stands out, from June of this year, when I was with U.S. and Iraqi
forces in a small abandoned village near Baqubah. There, in a series of
shallow graves, were the remains of murdered people, among them the
discarded bodies of little children whose heads had been cut off. The stench
was horrific. Even the stock animals were killed and left to rot in the sun.
There was no human or animal left alive in the village. 

Captain Baker, Scorpion Company Commander (5th Iraqi Army), whose men had
the gruesome task of digging up all the graves, told me al Qaeda had taken
the village of al Hamira, which had the apparent misfortune of being located
near a main road, making it ideal for launching attacks on soldiers. Days
after, an Iraqi man told me in a room full of American and Iraqi military
officers, that al Qaeda had “invited" parents they wanted to “influence" to
lunch, and then brought in the body of their baked son. I do not know if the
stories were true, and no proof was offered, but other Iraqis in the area
told similar stories and all seemed to believe it. And, of course, I had
just seen the decapitated heads of children in al Hamira village and smelled
their rotting bodies. The stench of al Qaeda will forever remain with me. 

The level of brutality against ordinary Iraqis throughout Diyala, often
directed against women and children, is what prompted many Sunni insurgent
militia groups to come forward and work with Coalition forces. Some groups,
such as the 1920 Revolution Brigades, were formerly allied with al Qaeda, or
at least willing to facilitate or ignore their attacks against Shia or
Coalition forces. 

The 1920s are deadly, and they had been worthy adversaries for us, but when
al Qaeda control turned to indiscriminate murder of innocent civilians, the
1920s joined forces with the U.S. and Iraqi Armies and together they
practically mopped the streets of AQI in Baqubah. 

Before heading to Anbar in May, I'd spent some time with the soldiers of the
1-4 Cavalry as they converted an abandoned seminary in a dangerous Baghdad
neighborhood into their new home and headquarters as COP (Combat Outpost)
Amanche. I wrote about some early encouraging signs of how the neighbors
might respond to the presence of American and Iraqi soldiers so close by. I
ended an April dispatch with a photograph of LTC James Crider, commander of
the 1-4 CAV, with this caption: “And so we find it here, in the Garden of
Eden, in God's hands through the 1-4 Cavalry from Kansas: the last hope
against genocide in the land between two rivers." 

In late September I received an e-mail update from LTC Crider, which he
allowed me to publish on my Web site. In it, he wrote: “One other example,
recently we had seven IEDs discovered or detonated in a single seven day
span. On every one, we got a phone call from a local national telling us
exactly where it was or we were called immediately after and told who placed
it. For the record, not one IED was effective." 

MAP QUEST 

Today, I'm staying at a small outpost called JSS (Joint Security Station)
“Black Lions" with the 1-18th Infantry battalion. Al Qaeda are so diminished
in this area, according to the commander here, LTC Patrick Frank, that they
are maybe 3 percent of the problem. But JAM (the Madhi Army created by
cleric Muqtada al-Sadr) is the big problem around JSS Black Lion. 

A soldier was blown up and killed about 400 meters away on Thursday evening.
LTC Frank told me the other day that his best weapon system is his cell
phone. Calls come to him (through his interpreter) every day and into the
night, with information from locals about the whereabouts of wanted JAM
members. Many local people are clearly fed up with the violence. Some even
send e-mails with Google Earth maps showing exactly where suspects are, and
they are doing it in real time. 

We'll be sitting there in the TOC (tactical operations center or HQ) and an
e-mail comes in and it's literally a map (or a photo of one) with detailed
descriptions of wanted men and/or caches. And the information is turning out
to be true. I have never seen anything like this before, 

It's becoming almost bizarre how specific the informants are becoming.
Informants have called up saying they are with bad guys right now and giving
their location. Our guys show up and arrest everyone. Hours later, the U.S.
soldiers let the informants go. JAM and AQI are getting slammed in many
areas because local people are sick of the violence and local people trust
Americans to help them end it. 

Where all this can end was suggested to me on Wednesday, when I was at a
large Sunni-Shia reconciliation meeting where more than 80 local leaders
attended and signed an agreement. 

Whether it can be sustained here, or spread to other areas, is in question.
But the resolve of Iraqi people to end the scourge of sectarian violence
that has stalled and scarred their country is not. 

 



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