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Lula Wants His Yellow Submarine



Nuclear-R-Us:
Is Brazil's proposed construction of a nuclear submarine the result of
imperial ambitions
or a matter of diving to the depths of pandering politics on Lula's part?

*       Lula reignites the dream of the military junta: a nuclear submarine
of its own. 

*       Washington derides Iran's and North Korea's nuclear plans but mums
the word when it comes to Brazil 

*       Is the Brazilian navy expecting to be attacked on the high seas by
some far off land, or, is a new militarized geopolitical strategy being
evolved by Brasilia, or, is Lula merely being pressured by his military to
acquire this trophy weapons system which could cost the nation upwards of a
billion dollars, yet do little to augment Brazilian security? 

*       If Brazil goes ahead with its nuclear project, it may violate the
spirit of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. 

*       Who is going to provide Brazil with the necessary technology and
advice it needs in order to successfully develop a nuclear submarine? Russia
or China? Or will it be Brasilia's new sister pact members India and South
Africa, or perhaps Iran with whom it has had a decade-long nuclear
relationship. What will be the roles of the UN, IAEA and OPANAL? 

On July 10, Brazilian President Inácio Lula da Silva announced his intention
to fulfill one of the Brazilian Navy's ultimate dreams: to launch a
nuclear-powered submarine. 



This idea was originally hatched during the era of military rule from the
1960s to 1980s but floundered due to a lack of funds and priority status. It
has resurfaced at a time when there are disturbing signs that much of the
subcontinent may be falling into an unintentional arms race. Criticism is
mounting both within and outside of Brazil regarding whether it would be
wise for the nation to go ahead with this plan, and what does this say about
the Lula presidency. Will it deed itself over to engaging in rhetorical
vertigo about the need to become one of the world's dominant sea powers,
rather than come forth with a sober naval expansion programthat will not
break the bank and nor ignite an arms race. 

As the international community tries to blunt North Korea's and Iran's
nuclear ambitions, Brazil (long rumored to be readying a campaign to launch
an all-embracing effort to obtain a permanent seat on the United Nations'
Security Council), has put forth a plan to construct a nuclear-powered
submarine by 2015. What is alarming about this situation is that Brazil's
decision could risk having a destabilizing impact on the hemisphere because
it doesn't factor in the grave consequences it could possibly generate.

Brazil's Nuclear History
The genesis of Brazil's nuclear ambitions can be traced back to the 1960s, a
time when military governments were a plague on the hemisphere, with the
South American giant being, if anything, a pathfinder for this process.
Nevertheless, the Brazilian military junta that ruled from 1964-1985 never
managed to come up with concrete plans to construct such a
super-sophisticated weapon as a nuclear-powered submarine. According to an
AP story, the navy's nuclear program, which actually had begun in 1979,
already had mastered part of the uranium enrichment process, but it had
lagged in developing and constructing a reactor entirely from Brazilian
technology, according to Navy Admiral Julio Soares de Moura Neto. A July
filing by Deutsch Presse-Agenteur revealed that the nuclear submarine
project was part of a 1975 agreement between Brasilia and the then-Western
German government in Bonn.

Meanwhile, it should be noted that in a recent article, in the Latin
American Weekly Report, Brazil was found to be far behind other regional
countries in terms of its budgetary support for its armed forces: "Brazil's
armed forces are now far behind, by any aspect of comparison apart from
troop numbers, the armed forces of Chile, Peru, and Venezuela." This
obviously begs the question regarding what will happen to the country's
security if Lula decides to allocate the country's scant economic resources
not to a balanced force but for an expensive and glamorous weapon, which
will further neglect the people's direct social welfare needs.

During the period of military rule, Brazil's neighbor Argentina (if
anything, was under a far more draconic military regime), was also heatedly
developing a comparable nuclear program at its remote facility near
Bariloche, Argentina. A Spring 1981 Foreign Affairs article by Gerard Smith
(Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks [SALT]
from 1969 to 1972) and George Rathjens (a Professor of Political Science at
MIT) discussed nuclear non-proliferation, touching on Latin America. The
article mentions the Brazilian-Argentine nuclear arms race which thought to
exist at the time, explaining that "despite U.S. pressures and the
expenditure of considerable political capital, the Federal Republic of
Germany insisted on going ahead with its previous commitments to assist
Brazil in acquiring reprocessing and enrichment facilities. And the FRG and
Switzerland have recently agreed to provide Argentina with a power reactor
and a heavy-water plant."

Ironically, Lula protested the construction of the nuclear submarine during
the military regime, at a time when he was a fiery union leader with solid
leftist credentials, protesting that the country had more important needs
for its citizens than something so expensive. It seems that Lula, along with
new obsessions, has had a dramatic change of heart.

Lula Revives Nuclear Plans
To the surprise of many, whose knowledge of Lula's value system was formed
in the past and who now have come to see him as a parody of the ethical code
to which he once so passionately subscribed, the Brazilian leader now
emphasizes his intention to pursue his military predecessors' nuclear
ambitions. He plans to have the submarine operating by 2015. A July 11 wire
story by Agence France Presse quotes the Brazilian president as saying
during a visit to the Brazilian navy's Technological Center in Sao Paulo,
"Brazil could rank among those few nations in the world with a command of
uranium enrichment technology, and I think we will be more highly valued as
a nation -- as the power we wish to be." There in essence, is the new Brazil
that Lula ululates over; he has been transformed into a different kind of
author with a vastly different script than the one he once daily honored as
the leader of the metallurgical union in the Sao Paulo industrial belt.

Lula's references raise several very revealing insights into the nuclear
submarine project. Among them are: will it be constructed solely by
Brazilian scientists and technicians? Or will scientists by recruited from
abroad as consultants? Does the Brazilian navy possess the necessary skill
to design, construct, test and operate a vessel which goes far beyond the
admirable design and construction technological capacity it has evinced up
to now, even after factoring in all of Brazil's engineering successes and
its commercial triumphs in the fields of aircraft and weaponry fabrication?
Will the crew be sent abroad to gain training on how to operate this kind of
super-sophisticated equipment? What kind of design principles will the
submarine feature? Will it be a replication of another country's nuclear
submarines or will it be a totally new concept? 

While Lula appears to be particularly jaunty when it comes to referring to
the submarine, other Brazilians tend to be desperate, according to O Estado,
as cited by the Latin American Weekly Report: "'For a long time the
government has abandoned the armed forces to its own luck, in a display of
disinterest in national defense and the way of life of Brazilians.' The
newspaper goes on to say that the pitiable situation of Brazil's armed
forces 'does not match the ambitions' of President Lula da Silva to lead
South America in an 'increasingly instable regional strategic environment.'"
O Estado zeroes in on the restless musings now taking place in the Brazilian
armed forces: "Two-thirds of the air force's planes are grounded due to lack
of replacement parts. The air force does not have any medium-range-to-air
and air-to-ground missiles, attack helicopters or the so-called 'intelligent
bombs' which are part of the equiptment of its Chilean, Peruvian and
Venezuelan counterparts. Furthermore, only half of the navy's combat ships
are fit for their intended purpose. In the army the situation is no
different. There is no money for ammunition, Brazilian tanks are all
secondhand and most over 30 years old." Does this sound like a country that
could spend almost a billion dollars on nuclear submarine project, which
will do nothing to upgrade or modernize the rest of the fleet?

The Brazilian president also is saying that his government will complete the
long-suspended Angra III nuclear plant in Rio de Janeiro state. "We will
complete Angra III, and if necessary, we'll go on to build more (nuclear
plants) because it is clean energy and now proven to be safe," Lula went on
to note that the plant will cost 3.5 billion dollars over five and a half
years. But he did not mention the nuclear waste disposal issue which has
been bedeviling Washington in recent years and still defies easy solution,
as seen in the feral Yucca Mountain dispute.

Going Nuclear All the Way
A June article by Nuclear Engineering International explains that Brazil has
always strived for self-sufficiency in nuclear power, but the ambitious
plans of the 1970s were never fully realized, leaving Brazil with just Angra
I & II and the equipment and technical skills required for a third, all to
be sited at Angra Dos Reis in Rio de Janeiro state. The construction of
Angra III was originally contracted out to the German firm KraftwerkUnion
(KWU), now part of Siemens, which was taken over by Framatome ANP (now
Areva). At the end of 2001, Brazil's National Energy Policy Council (CNPE)
was asked to make recommendations on Angra III and was authorized to take
the preliminary steps to restart the project, with Lula ultimately deciding
to go ahead with it. Brazil's two operating nuclear plants, Angra I and
Angra II, have an installed capacity of about 2,000 megawatts. Angra III
would raise its capacity to 3,300 megawatts, at an estimated cost of about
US$3.6 billion (euro2.6 billion). According to several costing engineers,
they would be surprised if the plant construction didn't come in at least 50
percent higher than the current estimated figure, with the same being true
of the projected costs for the submarine. 

An October 2004 article in Science by Liz Palmer, entitled "Brazil's Nuclear
Puzzle" reported that in 2004 Brazil had plans for a uranium enrichment
plant, which, it if configured to do so, could fuel several nuclear weapons
annually. It went on to explain that "Brazil has pledged to enrich its
uranium to only 3.5% 235U, the concentration required by its two power
reactors. This would be too weak to fuel a bomb, which typically requires a
concentration of 90% or above. If Brazil should, however, change its mind,
its stockpile of uranium already enriched to 3.5 or 5% will have received
more than half the work needed to bring it to weapon grade. This would
confer what is known as "breakout capability" — the power to make nuclear
weapons before the world can react, rendering it a fait accompli. Such a
capacity is what the United States and some European countries fear Iran is
aiming at." 

While it is true that Brazil wants to build a nuclear submarine, not a
nuclear weapon, the feeling remains that Brazil has the potential to become
a global nuclear power incrementally rather than spontaneously, if it chose
to do so at all. It certainly has the resources and the personnel to carry
out nuclear projects, and if you take Lula's words to heart, he also seems
to have the will. But the greatest source of energy currently fueling
Brazil's nuclear dream does not derive from nuclear fission as much as it
comes from Brazil's growing sense of ultimate grandeur—that it is destined
to be a superpower this century, as well as belonge to the nuclear club,
which could help the country's image.

And who is the amiable Jingoist stoking the line of Brazil über alles—well,
no other than Lula. Yet there is still another chapter to the Brazilian
story, and that consists of the megalithic corruption that infuses every
cranny of the nation's public life, the inefficiency, the hypocrisy, the
environment chicanery and the unspeakable violence of both the common street
crime and their prosecutors, and the drug-trafficking mafia that renders
Brazil a hellish state in which to reside, if you are not well to do and
strategically positioned. 

Interestingly, on June 8 there was an article in the International Herald
Tribune about the Russian nuclear power company, Atomstroyexport (a former
branch of the Soviet atomic energy ministry) and how Russia is becoming an
important exporter of nuclear energy and engineering skills. The article
explains how the company is currently constructing reactors in countries
like China, India and Bulgaria. The core of the article is based on
declarations by Sergei Shmatko, chief executive of Atomstroyexport. The
business executive speaks of a "nuclear renaissance, with Moscow emerging as
a global exporter of nuclear technology for developing nations. He added
that his company is already producing a new design for emerging markets; it
has a line of mini-reactors more typical of the power plants required for
nuclear submarines or ice breakers, then ostensibly for nuclear power
plants. Moscow already has proven that it has very few qualms about
exporting military technology, as exemplified by the multi-billion dollar
deals with Venezuela over the past couple of years, even though it hasn't
quite overtaken the U.S. as a world leader in the export of weaponry. It is
only logical to assume that the Kremlin would be more than willing to
provide a nuclear reactor to Brazil for its nuclear submarine if Brasilia
has the money for it. And, as Lula boasts, Brazil has the cash, even though
his admirers and generals claim that only penury is to be found in the
Palácio da Alvorada. 

A Nuclear Brazil: Is this Wise?
Lula appears to be resorting to the traditional waving of the "bloody flag
of nationalism" in order to increase his personal popularity and confirm the
support of the nation's powerful military establishment, although all is not
sound here, and his efforts at placating it are probably doomed to not be
enough. This call to arms comes at a time when his administration has been
sent reeling by almost daily corruption scandals in his political party and
administration. In the latest round of nationwide discontent, landless
workers blocked an iron ore railway (with ore being a key ingredient for the
production of steel) owned by Companhia Vale do Rio Doce SA. The company
claims only 300 individuals protested, while the Landless Workers Movement
insists they were as many as 2,600, according to the Associated Press. 

Lula's critics insist that, instead of allocating hundreds of millions of
dollars to a nuclear submarine program, why not address the multiple social
problems pressing Brazil? These include environmental and anti-poverty
initiatives to constructively impact Brazil's current social ills. Instead,
Lula has decided to turn to acquiring a trophy military weapon that couldn't
be less relevant to Brazil's immediate future as a great nation and Latin
America's current concerns. But this could be unwise and will only further
provoke regional tensions. Among others, one must wonder what will be the
reaction in Buenos Aires, with an Argentine military still nursing its
wounds over its defeat in the Falklands. If Brazil's nuclear submarine
actually becomes operational, might this immediately invoke the concerns of
the Argentine navy? One might reply that during that conflict with Britain,
the Argentine cruiser ARA General Belgrano was doomed by the U.K.'s
nuclear-powered submarine, HMS Conqueror. The Belgrano was the second
largest ship in the Argentine navy at the time and was sunk by two Tigerfish
torpedoes from the Conqueror, killing 323 sailors. This was a critical point
in the war as it proved to the Argentine navy that it could not compete
against a modern British fleet, including its nuclear submarine. What will
the Argentine navy have to say about Brazil obtaining a nuclear submarine of
its own? 

Finally, it is still illogical that Brazil's decision-makers even think for
a moment that the nation must have its submarine. The sub-continent, in
spite of the arms race it has experience in recent years, has not had an
major inter-state war since the Peruvian-Ecuadorian border conflict in 1941.
Brazil fought a war against Argentina in the 1820s when Argentina was known
as the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata. The last armed conflict (not
counting its involvement in World War II) in which Brazil fought was the War
of the Triple Alliance when it allied itself with Uruguay and Argentina
against Paraguay from 1864 to 1870. If anything, Brazil's security threats
today come more from drug cartels, the possible infiltration of the
Colombian guerrillas known as the FARC into its territory, and the
widespread occurrence of gang violence, than from Argentina or Paraguay (a
landlocked border country)

Military Politics
By deciding to build a nuclear submarine, Lula is reviving the old dreams of
the Brazilian military. At the same time, he has certainly given reason to
the Argentine navy to push for even a bigger defense budget at a time when
the country is still recuperating from the 2001 economic meltdown. Both the
Brazilian and Argentine security forces have dark pasts that have sullied
their countries' good names. The possession of a nuclear submarine might
provide both militaries with an increased status that would be prejudicial
to the two countries' still not completely stabilized democracies, but might
equip them with a sense of arrogance to question their subordination to
civilian rule.

It is ironic that Lula has declared his intention to build a nuclear
submarine. While he was a union leader before becoming president, Lula had
protested against such nuclear aspirations, but it seems he has now had a
change of heart. Why has this occurred? Can this be explained by the growing
pressure being mounted against Lula from the country's military, which never
has quite regained the self-esteem it had when it ruled the country with an
absolutist style? According to a report by the Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Lula
has emphasized repeatedly that he sees the use of nuclear power as a source
of energy as a bread and butter issue for his administration, and that down
the road such addicting power will be essential to meet the country's energy
requirements; according to estimates, building the nuclear submarine will
cost an annual disbursement of $68 million dollars per year over eight
years, so it will be ready (ideally) not before 2015. But officials close to
the defense establishment claim that any figure less than $1 billion dollars
would be falsely optimistic.

Curiously, the aspiration to acquire a nuclear submarine comes at a time
when the Brazilian military is going through a process of upgrading its
conventional equipment. During a September trip to Spain, in spite of the
obvious disenchantment felt by many of Lula's senior military colleagues
over the poor state of affairs of Brazil's Armed Forces, Lula told the
Spanish daily El País "in the 1970s, we had modern factories that built
tanks […] But they have been dismantled. Brazil must return to what it had.
To rebuild our weaponry factories, we must buy." According to various
reports, Brazil plans to raise military spending by 50 percent next year and
is planning to modernize its conventional submarines, build missiles in
cooperation with South Africa and purchase second-hand aircraft.

The Armed Forces View of the Project
Logically, it would seem that Lula should have the enthusiastic backing of
the Brazilian military establishment for his drive to acquire the submarine.
But this is not necessarily the case. On October 13, an article in the
Brazilian daily Correio Braziliense focused on declarations by General
Barros Moreira, a former commander of the War College (Brazil's military
intelligence service) who currently serves as head of the Political,
Strategic and International Relations Secretariat at the Defense Ministry.
On the question of the nuclear submarine, General Moreira declared: "What is
going to happen to a country where 95 percent of international trade takes
place by sea? And our oil, where is it? If we had a nuclear submarine, we
would be more secure. If the Argentine navy had had a nuclear submarine,
England would not have attacked during the Falklands conflict. A peaceful
country such as ours, that has no intention of attacking anyone, has every
right to defend itself, because it is growing increasingly richer and more
tempting" Of course, it remains somewhat obscure as to which country, if
any, would be inclined to attack Brazil, no matter how tempting its
resources may be.
Opponents of the nuclear submarine and the nuclear plant programs include
Lula's Environment Minister Marina Silva. The minister declared that "in the
last 15 years, no country has built nuclear power plants because of the
problems with the waste […] We have other sources of power: a great
potential in hydroelectric, and clean energies in which we should invest."
In addition, the construction of the Angra 3 power plant is potentially
dangerous because it is located in the state of Rio de Janeiro, near a
natural reserve, where the soil is unstable and has included a history of
landslides. Angra already was a subject of considerable controversy because
of a flawed geological survey which was originally done on the site, which
did not include problems with existing faults that should have been
ventilated in public discussion. Lula has ruled out solar or wind plants,
arguing that they are more expensive than a nuclear plant.

Taking the Arms Race to the Next Level
Brazil's renewed coveting of a nuclear submarine comes at a time when the
sub-region is already moving towards an arms race. Among other regional
countries, Venezuela and Chile are engaged in major military purchases. Most
recently, Venezuela has ordered the purchase of five Kilo-636 submarines
from Russia. Peru has contracted a number of naval purchases a couple of
years ago during the Alejandro Toledo administration, including the purchase
of four Lupo-class frigates from Italy. Last year, Bolivian president Evo
Morales declared his plans to build a number of military outposts, with
Venezuela's help to parallel Bolivia's borders, including installations
facing its border with Brazil. It is unlikely that other countries,
including Argentina, will not feel compelled to follow suit at some point in
the near future, as a result of pressure coming from its own armed forces

With Brazil's neighbors now interested in increasing their own military
capability, Brasilia arms specialists claim that the country has adopted a
specific posture on its prospective acquisition of a nuclear submarine that,
from a strategic point of view, would give it a definite advantage over
potential attackers when it comes to naval warfare, even though the strategy
could be seen as being somewhat provocative. 

An additional issue regarding Brazil's nuclear submarine has to do with the
de facto violation of the spirit, or even the letter of the Treaty of
Tlatelolco. Signed in 1967 and entered into force in 1969, the Treaty was
drafted in Mexico City to make Latin America and the Caribbean into a
nuclear-free zone. Brazil is also a signatory of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty. It seems clear that obligations to these treaty
regimes would seem to present some problems for Lula's ambitious plans to
have his submarine fleet go nuclear.

And Washington's Reaction is….
At a time when the drums of war are beating regarding Washington's tough
stand against Iran's nuclear ambitions, and while negotiations continue with
North Korea on comparable subjects, how will Washington policy makers react
to Brazil possessing a nuclear-powered submarine? 

In 1991, Presidents Fernando Collor of Brazil and Carlos Menem of Argentina
signed an accord with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in
Vienna that provided for IAEA inspection of their respective nuclear
programs. At the time, the U.S. State Department praised the decision by
both leaders, by issuing a statement issued on December 13, 1991 saying
that: "The two South American Presidents have demonstrated exceptional
statesmanship in moving to free their continent from the risk of nuclear
weapons proliferation." What will the State Department say now?

Other institutions that have yet to declare themselves about Brazil's plans
include the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the
Caribbean (OPANAL), based in Mexico City. Also of note, the other members of
the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), who have or have had
nuclear ambitions of their own in the past and present, might come to
Brazil's defense in terms of justifying its acquisition, even though as one
of the newest cross-continental alliances, it has yet to play a large role
in the process or come out conclusively for or against Brazil's nuclear
plans.

The Nuclear Nightmare
It could be persuasively argued that Brazil's proposed nuclear submarine is
an imprudent foreign policy move for Brazil to take. Conventional weaponry,
in addition to the country's geography, which features broad land buffers,
should serve, as they have in the past, as a sufficient deterrent to
dissuade other countries from attacking Brazil under any conceivable
scenario. Some unkind soul might even accuse Lula of engaging in a good deal
of hypocrisy for considering to carry out the plans that basically echo the
aspirations of the military junta which was responsible for numerous human
rights abuses when it held power and which Lula himself once fiercely
opposed. Brazil is regionally and globally respected and would be the
natural Latin America representative in the UN Security Council should it
ever be reformed and expanded. In addition the country is presently besieged
by a host of domestic problems, including widespread criminal violence and
drug trafficking, aside from increasing gang warfare. With all of this on
its plate, does it really need a submarine?

This analysis was prepared by COHA Research Fellow Alex Sánchez 
October 26th, 2007 
Word Count: 4300

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