schema-root.org/region/europe/central_&_eastern/russia/government/officials/ mikhail_margelov/ "Russia is massively breaching the commitments it undertook to the Council of Europe in 1996 as conditions to Russia's membership Its credibility could now suffer irreparable damage if PACE installs Russia, Europe's prime offender to PACE's values, in thi
THE KREMLIN'S CANDIDATE FOR PACE'S PRESIDENCY by Vladimir Socor 11 October 2007 -- Volume 4, Issue 188 Mikhail Margelov, a politician close to the Kremlin and prominent in the United Russia party of power, seems set to take over the presidency of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly (PACE), the leading democracy and human-rights watchdog in Europe. An inside arrangement shepherded by the outgoing PACE chairman, René van der Linden, has reserved PACE's chair for Margelov for a two-year term starting in January 2008. The arrangement also rests on support from British Tories in the Strasbourg-based PACE, whether ignored or condoned by the Conservative Party leadership in Britain. The opening of PACE's autumn session this month has thrust this arrangement from backstage into the open. The Russian delegation's behavior early in this session reflects confidence that a Margelov presidency is irreversible. By the same token, the numerous opponents of a Margelov presidency at PACE seem scattered and demoralized. Such conclusions on either side are probably premature, however. The arrangement for a Kremlin-connected figure to supervise democracy in Europe is unprecedented in any institution anywhere. At PACE, it has emerged partly from the political designs of some individuals, partly from sheer bureaucratic momentum trumping democracy, and partly from Russian heavy-handed tactics, abetted passively by some West Europeans in the Strasbourg assembly. Although Margelov's party, United Russia, embodies the Kremlin's "managed democracy," Margelov managed to become chairman of PACE's European Democrats' Group (EDG), a conservative caucus built by British Tories at PACE. The EDG's immediate past chairman, David Atkinson, helped arrange for Margelov to take over that post in 2005 on Atkinson's retirement. Moreover, ambitious to increase EDG's numerical weight relative to other caucuses in PACE, the Tories and a few others invited the Russian delegation to join EDG en masse. The well-disciplined United Russia duly allocated 27 members, out of PACE's 36 Russian members, to join EDG, thus becoming overnight the dominant force in this 91-member Conservative group. Tories, of whom there are only 11 in EDG, retain the posts of honorary chair, first-vice-chair, and political officer [whip] thanks to United Russia. Under PACE's rules, the political caucuses rotate in holding PACE's presidency at three-year intervals. Van der Linden held the presidency in 2005-2007 on behalf of the European People's Party (an alliance mainly of Christian-Democrat parties). It is now EDG's turn, and with Margelov in control there, he is next in line for the PACE presidency on procedural grounds. Although Margelov and his United Russia are wide open to challenge on basic democracy criteria, van der Linden provided crucial help to arrange a smooth succession for Margelov as PACE president. Meanwhile, Russia is massively breaching the commitments it undertook to the Council of Europe in 1996 as conditions to Russia's membership. PACE's monitoring mechanism has become chronically complacent on that account, and PACE's credibility eroded as a result. Its credibility could now suffer irreparable damage if PACE installs Russia, Europe's prime offender to PACE's values, in this institution's presidency. The credibility issue would quickly come to the fore if Margelov and Konstantin Kosachev, the head of Russia's delegation to PACE, misuse this institution for propaganda against the Baltic states, Georgia, the United States, and U.S. allies The Russian delegation's conduct seems to reflect this intention since the opening of PACE's autumn session in the first week of October. Thus, Kosachev has called for: a) reintroducing PACE monitoring of Estonia and Latvia over "human rights violations"; b) discussing on PACE's floor "political persecutions" in Georgia, based on former defense minister Irakli Okruashvili's imputations of criminal acts to President Mikheil Saakashvili (which Okruashvili failed to substantiate and then retracted entirely on October 8 -- see Rustavi-2 TV, Civil Georgia, October 8, 9); c) raising at PACE the issue of use of military force by the United States "and its allies"; and d) condemning the planned U.S. anti-missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. Kosachev is also a member of the Conservative EDG at PACE. Margelov and Kosachev are acting in concert in their twin capacities as chairmen of the Russian Duma and Federation Council committees on international affairs. Alone among the Council of Europe's 47 member countries, Russia has not ratified Protocol 14 to the European Human Rights Convention, thereby delaying by years the processing of Russian cases at the European Court on Human Rights (ECHR). Margelov and Kosachev claim that they personally favor Russian ratification, but since the Duma rejects it, they propose modifying the Protocol to facilitate Duma ratification. By this logic, the 46 countries that did ratify the document would have to cancel their ratification and redraft a weaker document in line with Russia's goals at ECHR. Margelov has confirmed matter-of-factly to Russian media that Russia's presidential administration and Ministry of Foreign Affairs have authorized his candidacy to PACE's presidency (Moskovskie novosti, September 14). Margelov's admission reflects the absence of separation of powers in Russia. His full equanimity about this situation should instantly disqualify his candidacy to PACE's presidency. It would unthinkable for a legislator from a democratic country to depend on executive branch approval for seeking election to a parliamentary or inter-parliamentary post. However, Margelov's backers at PACE seem prepared to compromise the organization's standards for the Kremlin-authorized candidate. (Interfax, September 24 - October 9; Itar-Tass, October 1; Parlamentskaya gazeta, October 2) jamestown.org/24A3022E.jpg <http://jamestown.org/images/edm_banner2.jpg> WILL PACE ELEVATE THE MAIN OFFENDER COUNTRY TO PACE'S PRESIDENCY ? Vladimir Socor, 22 October 2007 -- Volume 4, Issue 195 Kremlin-connected politician Mikhail Margelov's bid for the presidency of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) is beginning to run into trouble. It is not yet the done deal that Margelov's supporters at and near the top of PACE's leadership had hoped - and others feared - would go through unstoppably (see EDM, October 11). Three factors account for the slowdown in the momentum behind Margelov's candidacy. One is the hesitation and scruples felt by a growing number of PACE members about electing a representative of the Kremlin's "managed democracy" to the presidency of Europe's leading democracy-promoting institution. The doubters realize that such an election would accelerate the ongoing erosion of PACE's credibility. Another factor is information about outgoing PACE president René van der Linden's involvement in business in Russia in 2006-2007. A dossier of Russian media reports - that were available all along - on that topic has now been compiled in Estonia and is circulating among members of the Strasbourg-based PACE. Van der Linden had previously disclaimed repeatedly any business activity in Russia. Faced with the Russian media reports, he no longer denies involvement but disclaims having earned profits from it. Van der Linden played a key role in the deal to put Margelov in PACE's presidential chair for the next three-year term. Thus, van der Linden's overall political judgment comes into sharp question at the end of his presidential term. Baltic parliamentarians in the three capitals and in Strasbourg were taken aback when van der Linden suddenly began replaying Russia's propaganda themes against their countries in August and September. The Estonian parliament's European Affairs Commission chairman, Marko Mihkelson - until recently the head of Estonia's delegation to PACE - made public the Russian media compilation, commenting that it is up to van der Linden himself to judge whether he finds himself in a conflict-of-interest situation (Baltic Times, October 17). Yet another factor in the debate is Russia's failure to fulfill a host of commitments it had made to the Council of Europe in 1996 as a pre-condition to Russian membership. Quite apart from the overall assault on democracy in Russia in recent years, the non-fulfillment of Russia's commitments to PACE involves specific, clearly worded, incontrovertible obligations. PACE's itemized list of those issues when Russia was admitted as a member (Opinion No. 193, January 1996), now circulating among members, helps flag Russia's unfulfilled membership conditions and commitments. Regarding Chechnya, Article 3 stipulates that Russia could be admitted to PACE membership "on the grounds that Russia [is] henceforth committed to finding a political solution and that alleged and documented human rights violations [are] being investigated." Article 6 records "Assurances of continued progress were given to the Council of Europe by the President of the [Russian] Federation, the Prime Minister, the Duma's President, and the Federation Council's President" on those Chechen issues. And Article 7 concludes, "on the basis of these assurances, the [PACE] Assembly believes that Russia is clearly willing and will be able in the near future to fulfill the provisions for membership of the Council of Europe." However, Moscow proceeded almost immediately to breach its top-level assurances and commitments and remains in breach to date at both the executive and the parliamentary level, while its top representatives at PACE - Margelov and Konstantin Kosachev - are helping to cover up the situation. Article 7 further requires, "Those found responsible for human rights violations will be brought to justice," and "inhuman conditions in many pre-trial centers will be ameliorated without delay." Furthermore, Russia shall institute "compensation programs which must be worked out'," including for "persons formerly deported from the occupied Baltic states or the descendants of deportees." These commitments also remain unfulfilled. According to article 9 of PACE's conditions, Russia shall work with the Council of Europe and the European Union for "strengthening [Russia's] federal structure" as well as for "strengthening non-governmental organizations in the field of human rights and the establishment of a civil society." Instead, the Kremlin has liquidated the prerequisites to a federal structure and began eviscerating civil society before authorizing Margelov to run for the PACE presidency. Under Article 10, Russia is required "to settle international as well as internal disputes by peaceful means -- an obligation incumbent on all member states of the Council of Europe -- rejecting resolutely any forms of threats of force against its neighbors." And, further, "to settle outstanding international border disputes according to the principles of international law." However, various forms of intimidation and pressure against the Baltic states, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia have multiplied during the intervening years and are not abating. According to the same article Russia was to ratify, within six months of the time of accession, the Russia-Moldova agreement of 1994 regarding the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova within three years. Nevertheless, Russia "keeps its troops in Moldova to the present day" and denies any obligation to remove them. Further under this article, Russia was "to reduce, if not eliminate, incidents of ill-treatment and deaths in the armed forces outside military conflicts" -- a flexible requirement, also not met. As PACE's members revisit this set of criteria and conditions for Russia's membership, many must reflect that PACE's mission in Europe would lose credibility if the Assembly were to elevate the main violator country to the institution's presidency. (Baltic Times, October 17; PACE, "Opinion No. 193 on Russia's Request for Membership of the Council of Europe"; see EDM, August 3, October 11) [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? Head on over to our discussion list, [EMAIL PROTECTED] -------------------------- Brooks Isoldi, editor [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.intellnet.org Post message: [email protected] Subscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Unsubscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED] *** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. 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