Subject: Terrorism Focus - Volume IV, Issue 35

                        
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         October 30, 2007 - Volume 4, Issue 35          
                        
        
IN THIS ISSUE:
*BRIEFS
*Somali Conflict Spreads Across Horn of Africa
*Iraqi Terror Trial Exposes Belgium's Muslim Dilemma
*Tactical and Strategic Problems of a Turkish Winter Campaign in Northern
Iraq
*Bin Laden's Call to Unite Exposes al-Qaeda's Strategic Blunders 

  _____  

BRIEFS

A "MODERATE" TALIBAN EMERGES IN AFGHANISTAN'S HELMAND PROVINCE

Reports are emerging from the Taliban-held Musa Qala District of
Afghanistan's Helmand Province of changes in the style of Taliban rule
there. While the provincial governor continues to refer to Musa Qala as a
"nest of terrorists," Taliban administrators in the area appear to have
adopted a more moderate approach, perhaps in anticipation of being included
in the peace talks with the government of Hamid Kharzai. The Taliban now
inform locals of the "Islamic" prohibitions on music and shaving of beards
but take no action against those who ignore them. A local Taliban FM radio
station called "Shari'a Radio" has begun broadcasting Islamic messages mixed
with Tarana, a classical vocal music. The Taliban are also reported to have
established security in the area. (Pajhwok Afghan News, October 25). The
Taliban occupied Musa Qala in February 2007, after a controversial deal was
reached in October 2006 for an evacuation of the area by British forces in
exchange for a pledge by local elders that they would continue to resist the
Taliban.

JIHADIST PRESENCE RESISTED IN NORTHWEST PAKISTAN

There are signs that Central Asian jihadists of the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU) have worn out their welcome in the North Waziristan
district of Pakistan. The militants have lived in the region since 2001,
when they were forced out of their bases in Afghanistan by a US/Northern
Alliance offensive. A highly effective guerrilla force in the late 1990s,
the typically well-trained and well-armed IMU operated in several Central
Asian republics. Since the loss of their military commander Juma Namangani
in 2001, the IMU has been effectively trapped in Waziristan, where they have
developed close ties to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The large numbers of
Russian speakers in the IMU are often mistakenly identified as "Chechens."
Believing the group responsible for a series of murders in the region, local
tribesmen are calling for the IMU to leave the area; armed action is
threatened if they fail to comply (Daily Times, October 23). In the Mohmand
Agency of Pakistan's North-West Frontier, five militias have united to form
a new organization dedicated to eliminating gangs carrying out criminal
activities in the name of the Taliban. Operations of the Tehrik-i-Islami
will be governed by a 16-member council (Dawn, October 23).


Somali Conflict Spreads Across Horn Of Africa

The conflict in Somalia is spreading, drawing in fighters and displacing
increasing numbers of civilians. Violence has erupted in the previously
calmer north of Somalia, with border clashes between the forces of
semi-autonomous Puntland and the self-declared republic of Somaliland.

Ten people were killed when fighting erupted between Somaliland and
Puntland, with Somaliland forces taking over the border town of Las Anod,
claiming it lies within its colonial-era boundaries (SomaliNet, October 15).
The territory is important to Somaliland, which believes its claim to
independence is threatened by what it interprets as a growing movement of
Somali unity.

Ethiopian troops are backing the feeble and now divided Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) of Somalia against insurgents, among whom the extremist
al-Shabaab militia-the youth wing of the now deposed Islamic Courts-leads
the bloodiest attacks. Ethiopian troops are also caught up in battles on its
own soil, with a long-running low-level insurgency in Ethiopia's eastern
ethnic Somali Ogaden region boiling over into major battles.

Well-equipped rebels from the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)
recently claimed to have killed 250 Ethiopian government troops, although
such high numbers are dismissed by Addis Ababa as "falsehoods" spread by
foreign-based supporters (Reuters, October 23). ONLF fighters have also
threatened to attack Ethiopian ally Somaliland, claiming it has handed over
suspected ONLF supporters to Ethiopian forces (ONLF statement, October 14).

The violence, growing in intensity as well as spreading across the wider
Somali region, is being exacerbated by the escalating insurgency in
Mogadishu. The extent of direct links between the varied rebel groups
fighting Ethiopia is not clear in the murky and rapidly shifting conflict.
It is feared, however, that the fighting is boosting the influence of
hard-line powerful militias, which use long-standing local grievances to
strengthen their own radical movements.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer has
said she suspects growing links between more radical fighters: the ONLF and
another Somali rebel group fighting in the Ogaden, the United Western
Somalia Liberation Front (UWSLF). Frazer, speaking to the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs on October 2, claimed that these include suspected links to
the Ogaden faction of the Somali al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) organization
(believed to have ties with al-Qaeda), as well as "terrorists affiliated
with the al-Shabaab militia and remnants of the Somali Council of Islamic
Courts (CIC)." The links identified by Frazer may be overemphasized,
however, especially in terms of their long-term impact on the conflict.

Zakariya Mahamud Abdi, deputy to the chairman of the opposition umbrella
group, the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), has said there
is "solidarity" with Ogaden based rebels, but stressed that his group's
fight to drive Ethiopia out of Mogadishu would stop at Somalia's territorial
borders (September 20, author interview).

At the same time, near-daily attacks continue within central Somalia. A
string of attempts have been made on the lives of the leaders, including a
car-bombing targeting Somali Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi (Garowe Online,
October 11). According to the United Nations, the fighting has had an
increasing impact on civilians, with nearly 85,000 fleeing Mogadishu since
June. The World Health Organization has repeated warnings of a risk of
cholera, which caused over 1,100 deaths last July. Piracy has also
increased, with reported hijackings soaring to 28 this year, compared to
eight in 2006. A French naval vessel is due to protect aid shipments of food
after recent attacks on a World Food Program-chartered ship. (Shabelle,
October 26).

The situation is unlikely to improve soon, with Ethiopian Prime Minister
Meles Zenawi vowing not to withdraw troops from Mogadishu, as it would allow
"already dismantled forces of terror in Somalia to regroup" (Sudan Tribune,
October 24). Growing splits between rival supporters of President Abdullahi
Yusuf and Prime Minister Gedi are threatening the future of the TFG-and
could potentially imperil the Western backing that it now enjoys (Garowe
Online, October 13). With factional infighting diverting the TFG from even
trying to address the deteriorating situation across the region, few can
find much optimism for the immediate future of Somalia.

Sydney Irving is an independent journalist based in East Africa.


Iraqi Terror Trial Exposes Belgium's Muslim Dilemma

The recent start of the Belgian Iraq terror trial of six men accused of
recruiting Europe's first female suicide bomber has once again put the
country's Muslim minority in the spotlight, arousing significant levels of
discomfort, concern and fear among Belgium's Muslims (Le Soir, October 15).
The fact that one of the accused is a converted Muslim accentuated the fear
of growing local Muslim radicalism. Pascal Cruypenninck and four other
Belgians of North African descent have been charged with belonging to a
terrorist group that recruited, among others, Muriel Degauque, a 38-year-old
female convert to Islam who killed herself in a suicide bombing in Baquba,
north of Baghdad (Le VIF/L'Express, December 12, 2005). This case has
convinced many Belgians that the country is quickly emerging as a jihadist
hub for launching terrorist attacks in other countries, as well as their own
(La Libre Belgique, October 15). Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt warned that
the suicide bomber recruitment trial provided proof of "how well-rooted
international terrorism networks are in western Europe," (Belfast Telegraph,
October 16).

The current trial is not the first of its type in Belgium. In February 2006,
three leaders of a Belgian cell of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group were
found guilty for their role in the March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings.
Another case involved the conviction of 18 militants in September 2003,
including a former professional soccer player from Tunisia, Nizar Trabelsi.
The latter was found guilty for trying to execute orders from Osama Bin
Laden's network to bomb the U.S. air base at Kleine Brogel, housing U.S.
military personnel and nuclear missiles (Expatica, November 2005). Another
culprit, Tarek Maaroufi, was sentenced to six years in prison for his role
in providing fake Belgian passports to the militants who killed anti-Taliban
Afghan military commander Ahmed Shah Massoud on September 9, 2001 (PBS,
January 25, 2005).

These trials and other arrests bring to light how Belgium has become a
support base for terrorist organizations. One report by the Belgian
parliament's intelligence committee warned as early as 2002 that Islamic
extremists were turning Belgium into a "launch pad for terrorists," thanks
in part to the country's "open-door immigration policy" and "hands-off"
approach to Belgium's mosques. Perhaps the most controversial and
unsubstantiated finding of the committee's report concerned the claim that
Belgium not only harbors many Islamic clerics linked to bin Laden, but also
a fifth column that threatens to destabilize the country (The Daily
Telegraph, June 3, 2002). These inflammatory statements unfortunately serve
to fuel the conspiracy theories about Belgium's half million Muslims,
including 10,000 to 15,000 converts (Qantara.de, October 10). The European
Commission against Racism and Intolerance has already warned of the
increasing demonization of Islam and the dangers of populist political
rhetoric becoming the defining condition of the new Belgium. The
increasingly popular Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest) party is notorious for
its Islamophobia. The party was called Vlaams Blok ("Flemish Bloc") before
it was found guilty in court for violating anti-racist laws. On the sixth
anniversary of the September 11 attacks on the United States, police
arrested two leaders of this extreme right party for staging an illegal
march against the threat they claim Islam poses to the civilized world. The
mayor of Brussels, Freddy Thielemans, had refused to grant permission for
the protest "Stop Islamisation of Europe," calling the organizers an
inflammatory group. Terry Davis, Secretary General of the Council of Europe,
called the protestors bigots: "It is very important to remember that the
freedom of assembly and expression can be restricted to protect the rights
and freedoms of others, including the freedom of thought, conscience and
religion" (AFP, September 12).

Today, the only thing that seems to unite a divided Belgium-a country on the
verge of breaking up into Dutch-speaking Flanders and French-speaking
Wallonia-is a fear of immigration and Islam, not just as a radical fringe,
but also as a religion (International Herald Tribune, October 9). There is a
growing consensus that the country's culture has suffered tremendously in
the promotion of a failed multicultural policy that celebrated cultural
distinctions and special treatments for a faith community that refuses to
embrace the country's values of tolerance, equality and freedom. As a
result, the public discourse has become more culturalist and policy
responses are increasingly colored more by ideology than by much needed
pragmatism. To be sure, Belgians are understandably concerned about the
threat that radical Muslims pose to the country. The Iraq terror trial is a
clear example of the danger posed by terrorist groups using the country as a
platform to launch terror attacks on other countries. It is not, however,
Belgium's multiculturalism that is to blame for the rise of home-grown
Islamist terrorism and the current crisis of citizenship and unity, but
rather the unsuccessful implementation of the multiculturalist model.

Anouar Boukhars is a specialist on politics of the Muslim world. Dr.
Boukhars is an assistant professor and director of the Center for Defense
and Security Policy at Wilberforce University in Ohio. He is also editor of
Wilberforce Quarterly Journal.


Tactical and Strategic Problems of a Turkish Winter Campaign in Northern
Iraq

As Turkish troops mass along the border with Kurdish northern Iraq, chief of
the Turkish General Staff General Yasar Buyukanit has promised to make the
rebels of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) "grieve with an intensity they
cannot imagine" (AP, October 27). While an attack on northern Iraq seems
imminent, important questions are being raised in Ankara about the
effectiveness of a cross-border operation. What meaningful objectives are
obtainable? Can the PKK be crushed through unilateral military action?
Should the campaign wait until spring? There is political pressure on the
Turkish government to do something now, a sentiment reflected in the urgency
of Turkish demands for Iraq and the United States to take action against the
PKK.

Large-scale PKK attacks, such as the October 21 ambush in Hakkari province
(about four kilometers from the border) that killed 12 Turkish soldiers and
involved over 200 Kurdish fighters, clearly seem designed to provoke a
Turkish border crossing. The aim may be to cause a rift between Turkey and
its allies while involving the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) in a difficult and
dangerous winter campaign in Iraq's northern mountains. The PKK has also
threatened to cut the oil pipeline to the Turkish port of Ceyhan and even
strike oil tankers heading for Turkey (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 21).
Following the deadly attack on the 21st, 11 Turkish battalions were moved up
to the border to prevent the movement of PKK fighters across it (Today's
Zaman, October 26).

The electoral success last summer of Turkey's ruling Justice and Development
Party (AKP) in former PKK strongholds in southeast Turkey has put pressure
on the PKK to try and draw Turkey into a major struggle in northern Iraq
with international implications for Ankara. Iraq's Kurdish Foreign Minister,
Hoshyar Zebari, claims that the PKK has been infiltrated by Turkish
intelligence, and suggests that Ankara is seeking a provocation that will
allow it to intervene in northern Iraq to "disrupt the Kurdish regional
administration, (and) to cripple the infrastructure" (Newsweek, October 23).

Public demands for immediate military action against the PKK have dominated
raucous protests in several Turkish cities. Many of the demonstrations now
condemn the United States as well as the PKK. Senior Turkish politicians
have also been abused at massive public funerals for "martyred" troops. In
response to the attacks, TSK troops and Cobra helicopter gunships have
already begun making "hot pursuits" of PKK fighters across the border.
Turkish tanks and artillery shell targets in northern Iraq almost daily.

The difficulty for Ankara is that a quick raid on PKK installations in Iraq
is likely to have little long-term effect. Turkey has already launched
dozens of major raids on northern Iraq without doing anything to end the PKK
presence along the border. PKK guerrillas possess little more than what they
can carry on their back, and are thus ready to pull out to safer,
pre-planned positions at a moment's notice. Only an extended occupation
stands any chance of success, and this will be difficult, if not impossible,
without cooperation from Baghdad, Washington and northern Iraq's Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG).

Ankara is receiving mixed messages from the United States. Last week the
U.S. military commander in northern Iraq, General Benjamin Mixon, declared
that U.S. forces were not involved in tracking PKK movements and intended to
do "absolutely nothing" to end Kurdish cross-border attacks on Turkey (AP,
October 27). On the same day, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
stated that the United States "will do what is necessary" against the PKK
while warning Ankara to abandon plans for a major cross-border incursion
(Hurriyet, October 27). There are also signals from the Pentagon that the
U.S. military may be ready to use Predator reconnaissance aircraft to supply
the TSK with the intelligence necessary to make pinpoint special forces
strikes against PKK targets while avoiding a larger invasion (CBS, October
26).

Turkish air capability is limited. There are few attack helicopters
available, and Turkish F-4 and F-16 jet-fighters flying from the Diyarbakir
air base are largely ineffective against PKK mountain positions without the
specialized munitions used by the United States or the fuel-air explosives
Russia used against Chechen hideouts in the Caucasus Mountains. For now
though, the Turkish warplanes continue to mount strikes on Kurdish villages
and PKK positions inside Iraq while providing air support for
search-and-destroy missions within southeast Turkey.

Turkey's nine U.S.-built Cobra attack helicopters have undergone extensive
refits to enable them to carry out night missions against the PKK. In
September Turkey signed a deal with an Italian aerospace firm to provide 51
new attack helicopters to add to Turkey's force of 90 U.S.-made Sikorsky
Black Hawk assault helicopters (Today's Zaman, October 22).

On October 21, the chairman of Turkey's Grand Unity Party, Muhsin
Yaziciolgu, called on the TSK to develop new strategies, such as the
formation of "mobile units composed of high-level officers having
extraordinary powers and responsible in taking initiatives" (Today's Zaman,
October 22). A brigade of professional commandos is undergoing training at
the Isparta commando school in Egirdir, but these are not expected to take
the field until 2009. Six existing commando brigades are replacing
conscripts with volunteer professionals in a process that is expected to be
completed by next spring.

Last week, 3,000 members of the police special forces joined Turkish
regulars, mountain commandos, Gendarmerie forces and village guards in the
fighting against PKK guerrillas (Hurriyet, October 25). Thousands of imams
trained in "national unity issues" are also on their way to southeast Turkey
to explain the unacceptability of terrorism in Islam.

Snow is already falling in the higher mountain passes. There is a danger
that a Turkish winter offensive could get bogged down in difficult and
roadless country without the benefit of the Iraqi Kurdish guides that used
to accompany Turkish missions against the PKK. As the earth turns to mud
under heavy rains and snow, the TSK's armor will find the going difficult.
Winter storms could also mean troops on the ground might lose the benefit of
air cover and medical-evacuation services.

There are several options available. The TSK could cooperate with Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps forces in a strike against the PKK and Party for a
Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK) strongholds in the Qandil Mountain region 100
kilometers south of the border, probably the most effective option
militarily, but the most dangerous politically, and potentially the most
embarrassing for the United States. Such a strike would have substantial
risks for the TSK, which has never penetrated so far into Iraq. The onset of
winter usually marks the end of the PKK's campaigning season until spring,
as the fighters retire to bases well inside the border while only a small
number remains behind in southeast Turkey. The TSK will have to penetrate 20
to 30 kilometers deep into Iraq to get to PKK's winter camps. The
alternative would be to create a buffer zone on the Iraqi side of the border
and wait until spring for a major offensive (barring the success of
diplomatic efforts in the meantime).

Even if Turkey could obtain Baghdad's cooperation against the PKK, there is
little chance the beleaguered Iraqi national army could carry out a
successful campaign in the Kurdish mountains. The Kurdish President of Iraq,
Jalal al-Talabani, claims that even the Kurdish peshmerga militias could not
expel the PKK (Kurdish Aspect, October 21). The effect of a military
offensive on the future status of the disputed oil-centre of Kirkuk must
also play into the calculations of Turkish planners.

Economic sanctions and border closures present an alternative to military
action until spring. Sanctions could include closing the Habur border gate
through which $3 billion in trade now passes annually. A large quantity of
American military supplies also pass through the Habur gate, but Ankara is
now exploring the possibility of diverting Turkish trade with Iraq through a
number of Syrian border crossings, avoiding Kurdish Iraq all together. Other
options include a halt in vital Turkish investment, cutting supplies of
electricity to northern Iraq, and the evacuation of Turkish contractors
responsible for most of the rebuilding and infrastructure creation in
northern Iraq. Over 600 Turkish construction firms are currently at work in
northern Iraq (Today's Zaman, October 26). In the presently charged
atmosphere, the Turkish business community has expressed wide support for
economic measures if necessary. In the event of economic sanctions by
Turkey, Iraq's government may save the PKK the trouble of cutting the
pipelines to Ceyhan. Iraqi Speaker of Parliament Mahmud al-Mashhadani warned
on October 25 that the Iraqi government would cut the flow of oil to Ceyhan
should Ankara apply sanctions.

There is little chance of a large cross-border military operation starting
before Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visits Washington on
November 5. As the TSK awaits orders, every day that passes increases the
difficulty of mounting a successful operation in northern Iraq.

Dr. Andrew McGregor is the Director of Toronto-based Aberfoyle International
Security.


Bin Laden's Call to Unite Exposes al-Qaeda's Strategic Blunders

Last week, several jihadi forums released an audio message from Osama bin
Laden chastising the Iraqi mujahideen for their failure to unite to defeat
their common adversary. Bin Laden's message elicited mixed reactions from
the splintered factions of the Iraqi insurgency, with some echoing bin
Laden's advice and others criticizing the distributors of the message,
including Arab satellite stations like al-Jazeera, for airing their dirty
laundry (al Quds al Arabi, October 26).

Bin Laden lectures, "My brothers, the Mujahideen in Iraq, just as you are
deserving of praise and commendation, your open hearts and good humbleness
makes you deserving of admonition and advice. You have done well by carrying
out one of the greatest duties, which few carry out: repelling the attacking
enemy. But some of you have been tardy in performing another duty, which
also among the greatest of duties: combining your ranks to make them one
rank, as loved by Allah..."

Bin Laden also warns the Iraqi mujahideen that disunity is a source of
ammunition for their enemies. "As for those in whose hearts there is a
disease, they look for the faults and lapses of the mujahideen and
exaggerate them, and perhaps allege that they are a consequence of the
devotion of Jihad, which they label as violence and terror."

Some groups, like the Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI), immediately heeded bin
Laden's message. IAI issued a statement after the missive, stating that they
will join the Islamic State of Iraq, claiming that the only reason they had
not done so previously was because of a leadership dispute that has now been
resolved (al Farj Media Center, October 25).

Other groups like the Association of Muslim Scholars welcomed bin Laden's
statement, but interpreted the message differently. They were grateful that
bin Laden came out strongly against the Islamic State of Iraq,
characterizing his statement as a "precise diagnosis" (al Jazeera, October
22). However, bin Laden never explicitly condemned the formation of the
Islamic State of Iraq. Instead he criticized Iraqi Sunni groups for
participating in elections and joining the police forces, and generally
warned Iraqi insurgents' groups to cease their infighting. It seems rather
than urging for unity among the Iraqi factions, the various players are
manipulating the message to suit their political goals.

Although bin Laden's message was an attempt to shore up unity amongst the
disordered mujahideen, his explicit chastising of jihadist groups also
highlights al-Qaeda's biggest strategic blunder in Iraq-the formation of the
Islamic State of Iraq and its fumbling effort to compel other Iraqi groups
to come under its banner. This move, rather than bolstering the Iraqi
insurgency, fueled resentment towards al-Qaeda by indigenous Iraqi insurgent
groups and accelerated anti-al-Qaeda sentiment. The tribes who formerly
supported al-Qaeda formed the Anbar Awakening and expelled al-Qaeda from its
former stronghold in al-Anbar province.

Bin Laden's message may in fact bolster the spirit to unite temporarily, but
will not likely translate into a serious transformation of the Iraqi
insurgency. As the various responses to bin Laden's message suggest, the
insurgency's factionalism is rooted in deep divides over tactics and end
goals. Unfortunately for al-Qaeda, the mistakes bin Laden alludes to in his
statement cannot be solved by a directive from the man himself. The
establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq will reverberate against al-Qaeda
as long as the insurgency is active. In fact, many Iraqi insurgent groups
are heeding the opposite advice of bin Laden and joining the political
process.

The Iraqi insurgency is now faced with a significant trend towards political
participation. A move that was spearheaded by the Awakening Councils has now
expanded into the formation of the Political Council of the Iraqi
Resistance. Though much less inclined towards cooperating with Coalition
forces than the Awakening Councils, and not renouncing violence outright,
the formation of this group by important factions within the Iraqi
insurgency represents a clear break from al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of
Iraq by key elements in the insurgency (al Jazeera, October 13). Bin Laden's
admonishing has done little to affect this trend of political participation.
Neither has it forged true unification among the insurgents.

Lydia Khalil recently returned from Iraq where she worked as governance
policy advisor for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad.
 
  _____  


 
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