http://www.mainstreamweekly.net:80/article392.html
 

Russia Bolsters its Ties with Iran


Wednesday 31 October 2007, by
<file:///C:/Program%20Files/Common%20Files/Microsoft%20Shared/Stationery/aut
eur14.html> M K Bhadrakumar


Relations between Russia and the United States will be put to severe test in
the coming weeks as there are growing signs that the US has decided, or has
almost decided, to launch a military strike against Iran.

Russian observers do not rule out that the Administration of US President
George W Bush is yet to think through its policy on Iran, and the spate of
media "leaks" keeps Tehran and the world community guessing. They analyse
that a US military intervention would become inevitable unless Iran relented
in its regional policy in Iraq. It is inconceivable for the US to leave its
Arab allies in the region to face Iran single-handed.

But then, Russian experts do not visualise that the US has reached anywhere
near the point where it can claim the security situation has been stabilised
and political reconciliation achieved, which would allow a complete
withdrawal of troops. On the contrary, they see the situation in Iraq
continuing to deteriorate.

Moscow would weigh that the real US agenda is aimed at "regime change" in
Iran. Washington has more or less ensured that all military equipment (three
aircraft-carrier battle groups) necessary for an air and sea strike against
Iran are already in position in the Persian Gulf. The Bush Administration
has launched a concerted campaign for mobilising domestic opinion in the US
for an attack on Iran.

Bush has a new cockiness about him, and Moscow wouldn't be the only capital
to notice it. He has certainly lost his fear of the Democrat-dominated
Congress on Capitol Hill. To be sure, he is step-by-step making a case for
war. Commentator Patrick Buchanan wrote recently: "Confident of victory this
fall on the Hill, Bush is now moving into Phase III in his 'war on terror':
first Afghanistan, then Iraq, then Iran."

In Moscow's perception, therefore, the next two- to-three months will be
most critical, even as Iran's cooperation with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) enters a crucial phase.

Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin has decided to go ahead with his
visit to Tehran on October 16, much to the chagrin of Washington. The visit
is in connection with the summit of the Caspian states (Russia, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Iran) that is to take place in Iran, but Putin
is scheduled to hold "bilaterals" as well with the Iranian leadership. This
will be Putin's first visit to Iran.

Russian Stance Unchanged

AT a joint press conference with visiting French Foreign Minister Bernard
Kouchner in Moscow on September 18, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov explained
the Russian position on the Iran nuclear issue. He made it clear at the
outset that Moscow is second to none in insisting on preventing the nuclear
non-proliferation regime from being violated by Iran.

In other words, Russia wouldn't countenance a "nuclear Iran". But having
said that, Lavrov added that the problem has to be solved in accordance with
international law. In other words, Moscow will reject any "unilateralism" on
the part of Washington.

Second, Lavrov argued that the steps taken by the international community so
far-in the direction of the IAEA Board of Governors' decisions and the
United Nations Security Council decisions-have proved "effective". This is
borne out by the fact that last month Iran and the IAEA agreed to address
outstanding issues conclusively; the two sides elaborated their agreement in
an appropriate document. Lavrov said that in Moscow's estimation, the
implementation of this document is proceeding satisfactorily and "we want
this process to conclude unimpeded".

Third, Lavrov spoke in strong support of the IAEA's professional
capabilities and asserted: "We will rely upon the professional assessments
of the experts from the IAEA." He added a punch line: "We remember well what
ignoring the professional opinion of this agency [IAEA] led to in the
situation vis-a-vis Iraq four years ago." He virtually anticipated the US
strategy, which aims at discrediting the IAEA and sidelining it on the Iran
issue, if not elbowing it out of it altogether, so that the UN Security
Council gets into the driving seat.

Fourth, Lavrov spoke emphatically against any military attack on Iran and
instead stressed the "necessity to conduct negotiations in a persistent and
consistent manner".

Fifth, what was most interesting about Lavrov's statement was that he
revisited the big-power discussions last year leading to the creation of the
so-called Five Plus One format. (This comprises the five permanent members
of the Security Council-China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the
US-plus Germany.)

He recalled the understanding given by Washington at that time to Moscow and
Beijing to the effect that the Security Council's involvement on the Iran
issue would be with "a sole objective-to back the IAEA and ensure Iran's
compliance with the IAEA".

Lavrov's message to the Bush Administration was plain: "Do not arbitrarily
shift the goalposts now."

Lavrov continued: "We remain committed to this original agreement on the
understanding that the Security Council will not be forced to go beyond
support of the IAEA." And, "The IAEA is now satisfied with the way Iran is
implementing the accords on closing the outstanding issues on its nuclear
file."

Lavrov in effect said nyet to Washington's latest move for tightening up the
sanctions against Iran via yet another Security Council resolution. This
echoed the statement attributed to an unnamed "senior Kremlin official in
Moscow" a week earlier, who told The Financial Times of London: "As far as
Iran's nuclear programme is concerned, we have passed resolutions in the UN.
So far, it's enough."

Finally, Lavrov criticised the move by the US and the European Union to
impose unilateral sanctions against Iran. He reminded the Western capitals
that the original understanding while forming the Five Plus One was to
develop a comprehensive dialogue with Iran "not only resolving all aspects
of Iran's nuclear programme, but also on economic and commercial affairs and
on regional security".

Lavrov added: "It was this kind of comprehen-sive approach that helped to
unlock the situation surrounding the Korean nuclear programme." (Under the
February agreement, in exchange for North Korea's denuclearisation and
information on all its nuclear programmes, the reclusive state will receive
950,000 tonnes of fuel oil for its thermal power-generating plants in
addition to the 50,000 tonnes already delivered by South Korea for the
closure of its only operational nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.)

If Kouchner's visit to Moscow was to persuade Russia to fall in line with
the US move to introduce a new Security Council resolution, things didn't
quite work that way. (Kouchner is scheduled to arrive in Washington on
October 12; French President Nicolas Sarkozy is due to visit Moscow on
October 10-11.)

Russia couldn't be unaware that France is playing a double game. On the one
hand, Sarkozy is closing ranks with the Bush Administration's policies
toward Iran. On the other hand, France is using the US-French rapprochement
to share the spoils of Iraq's oil wealth with US oil interests. France's
Total and the United States' Chevron have agreed to collaborate on the
Majnoon oilfields in Iraq.

The San Francisco Chronicle recently wrote: The building of a US-French
consensus on Iraq is largely the result of the willingness of US oil
interests to share the spoils with their European counterparts in exchange
for their military and military backing of Washington's foreign policy in
the Middle East.

In the coming period, Moscow will have to factor the "trans-Atlantic
partnership" in dealing with the Iran nuclear issue.

Moscow Backs ElBaradei

MOSCOW is determined not to be party to Washington's attempt to discredit
the IAEA's credentials in handling the Iran problem. Washington launched a
similar offensive against the IAEA in the run-up to the Iraq war. Lavrov
made it clear that Russia's sympathy lies with the IAEA Director General,
Mohammed ElBaradei.

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said on September 18: "The IAEA is
not in the business of diplomacy. The IAEA is a technical agency . It is not
up to anybody to diminish or to begin to cutback on the obligations that the
Iranians have been ordered to take" by the Security Council. In effect, she
meant that ElBaradei was freelancing where he didn't belong.

Russia doesn't want to see ElBaradei being bullied. Russia would like the
Agency's inspectors to report back without fear at the end of the year on
the Iran file. Russia finds itself in complete agreement with ElBaradei's
approach, which is to encourage Tehran to move forward in terms of the
roadmap with the IAEA so that by November or December, a definitive
assessment becomes possible as to whether the Iranians would keep their
promises, and a peaceful solution emerges. Moscow goes along agreeing with
ElBaradei's view that there are hopeful and positive signs.

Moscow would have no quarrels either with ElBaradei's conclusion that We
[IAEA] consistently searched for evidence that Iran intends to build nuclear
weapons. We found suspicious signs, but no smoking guns. We could now make
some progress in setting aside these suspicions . It's important to exert
pressure. But in addition to sanctions, we must also have incentives to
encourage Iran to take a new direction . If we turn up the heat too high,
the pot could explode around our ears.

Bushehr Controversy

LAVROV'S statement of the Russian position on Iran comes at a most awkward
time for Washington. It knocks the bottom out of the US move to get a tough
sanctions resolution passed by the Security Council. But the unkindest cut
will be Moscow's confirmation that Putin is going ahead with his scheduled
visit to Iran.

The Kremlin's decision runs counter to Washington's campaign to isolate Iran
in the world community. Some US analysts fancied that Putin would ultimately
settle for a tradeoff with Washington over Iran. US think-tank Stratfor,
which has links with the security establishment, drew up a smart "checklist"
of all that could be traded-Georgia, Baltic republics, missile-defence
system, Ukraine, Kosovo and so on.

But as things stand-and from what Lavrov said-Putin is in no mood for
bargaining. Moscow in fact bolstered its contacts with Tehran by addressing
a sticking point in the bilateral relations-construction of the Bushehr
nuclear power plant. This became further evident during the visit by the
Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki to Moscow recently and in the
decision to schedule a meeting of the Iran-Russia Joint Economic Commission
in Moscow.

Moscow signalled that it was sprucing up the bilateral cooperation with Iran
so as to build momentum and concrete content into Putin's forthcoming visit
to Tehran. Mottaki held discussions with Russian atomic-energy chief Sergei
Kiriyenko regarding Bushehr. It was decided that Kiriyenko would accompany
Putin to Tehran. It is a moot point whether or not, as Iranians subsequently
claimed, a timetable has been worked out for providing fuel for Bushehr and
for inaugurating the plant.

Kiriyenko met with Iranian Vice-President Gholam Reza Aghazadeh on the
sidelines of the IAEA meeting in Vienna on September 18. Kiriyenko later
told the media:

I have discussed the construction of the Bushehr plant with Aghazadeh.
Taking into account the fact that Russia and Iran have signed an agreement
according to which all the fuel for the plant will be produced in Russia,
while spent nuclear fuel will be returned to Russia, Bushehr will pose no
threat to the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

There are no, and there should be no, political impediments to completing
the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

He said he also discussed with Aghazadeh the measures to ensure an early
completion of the construction. "I am satisfied with the outcome of the
meeting," Kiriyenko said.

Moscow Energises Iran Ties

THUS Moscow and Tehran have underscored that as much as differences remain
over the Bushehr plant, neither side regards that the issue is the sum total
of their bilateral cooperation. Equally, what is important is that the
Kremlin, in different ways, is making the point that Russia's coopera-tion
with Iran remains substantial, and that Moscow is willing to conduct it in
public view without coming under any compulsion to be sensitive as to what
Washington might make of it.

Looking back, the four-nation tour of the Central Asian capitals last month
by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and his meetings with the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) leaders-with Putin, in particular, in
Bishkek, Kyrghyzstan-appear to have been crowned with success. Ahmadinejad
succeeded in thwarting the US stratagem of containing Iran and to encircle
it in Central Asia. It was no doubt a difficult and impressive diplomatic
feat for Ahmadinejad that he got the leaders of Russia, Kazakhstan,
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to agree to participate in the Caspian summit.

Certainly, Putin's attendance by far elevates the Caspian summit's
importance. The fact is, among all the Caspian littoral states, it is Iran
that has taken a stance closest to Russia's on the issues affecting the
status of the Caspian Sea. Again, Russian and Iranian interests overlap in
Central Asia and Afghanistan.

Russia remains Iran's main arms supplier. Russian oil companies have been
marginalised in Iraq. Russia would be loath to see the Bush Administration
steamrolling yet another "regime change" in Iran-under whatever pretext-and
thereby proceed to appropriate the oil and gas resources of the Middle East.
Besides, an unfriendly, pro-US regime in Tehran (like the one engineered by
the US in Georgia) would have catastrophic consequences for Russian
interests in a wide arc of regions in its "soft underbelly" in the Caucasus
and Central Asia.

During Putin's visit, there is bound to be renewed focus on cooperation
between Iran and Russia in the field of energy. Russia would always seek a
broad understanding with Iran so that they didn't end up competing with each
other in gaining market access. Iran is a keen enthusiast of the idea of a
gas cartel modelled on the lines of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting
Countries that was first mooted by Moscow. Russia is hosting the next
meeting of gas-producing countries in early 2008. On its part, Russia has
been advocating an "SCO energy club", which would gain traction if Iran
becomes an active participant.

Of course, Russia and Iran have a shared interest in calibrating the "great
game" over Turkmenistan. British Energy Minister Malcolm Wicks, who arrived
in Ashgabat on September 18, was the first British Minister to visit
Turkmenistan in nine years. He promptly told the Turkmen leadership that
Europe would pay market price for Turkmen gas, hinting that it was time
Ashgabat looked beyond Russia and Iran in its energy-export policy.

If Ahmadinejad succeeds in nudging his Turkmen counterpart Kurbanguly
Berdymukhamedov to join the SCO, that would no doubt please Moscow (and
Beijing). The East and West are vigorously courting the Turkmen leader.
Berdymukhamedov is due to visit the US soon at Bush's invitation-just ahead
of the Caspian summit in Tehran. Amid the cacophony over the Iraq crisis,
Bush has understood the meaning of Putin's forthcoming visit to Iran.

 



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