Islamist Movements and Weapons of Mass Destruction 


Hans Rühle and Michael Rühle | Bio
<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/author.aspx>  30 Oct 2007 
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articlePrint.aspx?ID=1284

Just weeks after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and
Washington, Pakistani authorities arrested two atomic scientists suspected
of having aided the terror network al-Qaida in efforts to acquire weapons of
mass destruction. One year earlier, they had founded a humanitarian aid
agency for Afghanistan: the "Reconstruction of the Muslim Umma." But for the
two Taliban sympathizers, the aim of constructing a new Muslim community was
not only a matter of economic and political solidarity with the faithful
around the world. In their opinion, Pakistan's nuclear weapons, which they
had helped to develop, were also the "property of all Muslims."

A Reevaluation

This episode represents only one of numerous developments in recent years
that make it absolutely urgent for us to undertake an overview and
reevaluation of the issue of Islamist movements and nuclear weapons. When
Pakistan joined the class of nuclear powers in 1998, the commentaries still
moved within the classical categories of regional equilibrium and mutual
nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan. Since the destruction of the
towers of the World Trade Center by suicidal Islamist extremists, however,
the question of the relation between Islamism and weapons of mass
destruction has become one of the key questions of international politics.
The attack did not only demonstrate that al-Qaida was capable of conducting
terrorist operations on a strategic scale in the heart of the Western world;
it also showed that Islamist terror did not shrink from committing mass
murder against non-combatants.

A short time later, it became known that Iran was conducting a secret
nuclear program that threatened to create a nuclear domino effect in the
Middle East. Just shortly after that, yet another reason to fear such an
eventuality emerged, as the full scope in which Pakistan's leading nuclear
scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, had, on his own initiative, furnished nuclear
hardware and software to Libya, Iran and other countries became clear.
Finally, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad provided the macabre
highpoint to this series of developments when he repeatedly called for
Israel to be "wiped from the map": Ahmadinejad, the president of a country
that -- as Pakistani President Musharraf recently put it to a German
journalist -- "was always eager to get an atomic bomb."

In 1983, Iranian-controlled suicide bombers blew up the headquarters of the
American marines in Lebanon: 241 soldiers died -- and the United States
withdrew from Lebanon shortly thereafter. In the years following, suicide
bombing became the preferred form of terrorist violence in the Middle East.
Suicide is clearly prohibited in Islam. But the extremists managed to
resolve this dilemma in an astoundingly simple manner: the suicide bomber
was transformed into a "martyr," who was glorified and who was promised
entry into paradise after death. More prudent Muslim spiritual authorities
tried to prevent this recategorization by pointing to the fact that,
according to the traditional Muslim understanding, a martyr was someone who
was killed by the enemy in a holy war for Islam. Their efforts, however,
were without notable effect.

A Glorification of God

The advocates of "martyrdom operations" -- thus the Islamist terminus
technicus for suicide attacks -- argued that the suicides that occurred in
the context of such martyrdom operations, since they were not the result of
world-weariness or desperation, were therefore not in fact suicides: On the
contrary, they were a form of glorification of God in the holy war against
the unbelievers.

Through most of the second half of the 1990s, the theory and practice of
suicide attacks was almost entirely limited to the context of the
Arab-Israeli conflict. Within a few years, all the restrictions associated
with the laws and customs of war seemed to have given way. Israeli women
could be killed without any limitation, because -- so ran the justification
-- they not only did military service, but they remained available to the
army thereafter as reserves. They were also supposed to be legitimate
targets, moreover, because of their lifestyle -- they generally failed to
observe the Islamic rules on chastity -- and the public display of their
femininity. Israeli farmers and old people were also no longer to be treated
as protected civilians because they occupied Muslim land. It was still not
permissible directly to attack children and civilians regarded as uninvolved
in the conflict; their death, however, was to be accepted as an "undesired
side-effect."

Muslim victims of suicide bombers were treated in a similar fashion. In the
view of the extremists, their deaths were acceptable, since they too thereby
-- even if involuntarily -- became martyrs. In contravention of the
imperative to minimize collateral damage, the suicide attack was directed
less and less against a particular person, but sought, on the contrary, to
achieve the maximum degree of horror in causing the maximum number of
civilian victims. The general principle of proportionality of the means used
toward military aims had gone up in smoke.

Different Themes and Aims

Islamist terrorists also understood their actions as a defensive struggle
against an illegitimate occupation of Arab territory by Israel and the
United States. This argument has remained a part of Islamist rhetoric. But
the nearly ritualistic complaints about the victimhood of Islam are
increasingly accompanied by new accents placing the emphasis rather on the
obligation to bring about a world revolution. Mohammad Atta and his
comrades-in-struggle regarded themselves as the vanguard in a holy war
against the unbelievers, which would some day lead to the worldwide triumph
of Islam. The suicide attack was thus released from the narrow regional
context of the Middle East, and it has in the meantime also arrived in
Europe.

The author Joseph Croitoru has drawn attention to the significance in this
regard of a little known pamphlet that explicitly names the new enemies or
"false idols": The United Nations, The U.N. Charter, the International Court
in the Hague, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Islamic
World Congress. Croitoru comments: "If one considers the rhetoric of
al-Qaida more closely, it becomes clear that the leader of the terrorist
organization and his allies aim to spark an Islamic world revolution, which
would destroy the old world order and the international institutions
associated with it, and replace it with an Islamic Caliphate." The terrorist
movement thereby adopts the political ideas of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood, whose founder Hassan al-Banna called for the universal rule of
Islam in the 1940s. Here the words of al-Banna: "It lies in the nature of
Islam to rule and not to be ruled, to impose its laws on all nations, and to
extend its power to the entire planet."

Next Page: Osama Bin Laden issues a 'License to Kill'. . .


In a statement published in 1998, for which he has received the explicit
support of several Muslim notables, Osama Bin Laden said: "To kill Americans
and their allies, both civil and military, is an individual duty of every
Muslim who is able, in any country where this is possible." Bernard Lewis,
the British dean of Islam scholarship, has labeled this fatwa the "License
to Kill." On Sept. 11, 2001, 19 al-Qaida terrorists made use of it. In
committing a mass murder of non-combatants, Islamic extremist terror had
become entirely unbound from all traditional constraints. The Qaida
justification for the indiscriminate killing of Americans -- i.e. that in
the democratic United States the whole people elects its criminal and
aggressive government and is thus entirely responsible for its actions --
merely provides the ultimate macabre proof for this fact.

Hardly Any Limits

In this connection, the question of how Islamic terrorism would deal with
weapons of mass destruction has to be posed. This is not merely a
theoretical question and it has not been for a long time already. Osama Bin
Laden demonstrated this in 1998, when he declared it to be the religious
duty of every Muslim to make nuclear and chemical weapons available for the
higher aims of Islam. In 2003, a Saudi Islamist provided the religious
justification for their use. In a comprehensive opinion, he declared that
Muslims are authorized to kill 10 million Americans -- if necessary, by
using weapons of mass destruction. There is no detailed explanation given
for the number 10 million. But it is likely no coincidence that it
corresponds to the size of the population of New York City: the supposed
citadel of the Western civilization that the Islamists so much despise.

It would be irresponsible to rule out the use of weapons of mass destruction
by Islamists. It would be all the more irresponsible inasmuch as al-Qaida
and other terrorist organizations have been attempting to acquire nuclear
material since 1990: above all, in the successor states of the former Soviet
Union. The Clinton Administration's "Project Sapphire" makes this clear.
When the Kazakh government was seeking to dispose of some 600 kilograms of
"unclaimed" highly enriched uranium in 1993, al-Qaida was reportedly present
in the area. By gently applying pressure on the Kazakh government, the
United States was able finally to purchase the nuclear material -- enough
for 20 atom bombs as powerful as that dropped on Hiroshima -- and remove it
by plane. In this case, al-Qaida came up empty-handed. It is unlikely,
however, that all its other -- in part documented -- attempts to obtain
weapons of mass destruction or their preliminary components have likewise
failed.

One need not have in mind here the immediate use by al-Qaida of a nuclear
weapon. There are other, less demanding, possibilities that already fall
within the scope of its capacities: the use of chemical agents, the release
of nuclear radiation through the depositing of radioactive material in
highly populated urban areas, or the detonation of a "dirty bomb," whereby
radioactive material is disbursed over a wide area by a conventional
explosive. According to the findings of a scientific study from 1992, the
detonation of a high-caliber bomb of this sort in Manhattan would require
the evacuation of the entire island and (per the guidelines of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency) render an area of several hundred square
kilometers uninhabitable. 

Why Has It Not Happened Up Till Now?

If, however, as is probable, al-Qaida has both the know-how and the
materials required to build at least a relatively simple explosive device
like a "dirty bomb," why has no such attack occurred up till now? There are
several possible explanations. Al-Qaida could be having a go at producing a
technically demanding weapon, whose construction and use presents challenges
that are for the moment beyond its capacities or require a considerable
amount of time to resolve. It is also possible that the anti-terror measures
of the United States and its allies have damaged al-Qaida to such an extent
that undertaking major projects like the use of weapons of mass destruction
is presently impossible for it.

Political considerations could also play a role. Al-Qaida could fear that by
using weapons of mass destruction, it would lose the large acceptance it
enjoys in the Arab world, which could have as consequence in turn the loss
of financial and material resources as well as personnel. Finally, it can
also be presumed that deterrence has had some effect -- even if it has
always been maintained up to now that there can by definition be no
deterrence vis-à-vis terrorists who love death more than life. This may well
be correct as far as the individual suicide bombers are concerned. But for
an organization like al-Qaida, which has larger, indeed global, plans for
conquest, the survival of its leadership and large parts of its
infrastructure is indispensable.

Such an organization does not need its own territory, like the territory of
state. It depends, however, on having at least a host country: a "safe
harbor" where it can train its cadres and to which it can fall back in order
to regroup. Osama Bin Laden might believe that at the moment he cannot
afford to provoke retaliatory strikes -- possibly themselves employing
weapons of mass destruction -- against, say, a country like Pakistan.

In short: By virtue of the globalization of the suicide attack and its
justification on the part of radical Islamic spiritual authorities, Islamism
has torn down the traditional limitations placed on the use of violence in
war. For the moment, we can only begin to imagine the consequences this
uncompromising attitude toward the use of violence -- including the use of
weapons of mass destruction against innocents -- will have for the stability
of the multinuclear world of the 21st century.

Hans Rühle is the former chief of the planning section in the German
Ministry of Defense. Michael Rühle is the head of the speechwriting section
in the Political Affairs Division of NATO. The above article represents only
their personal views. It first appeared in German in the Swiss daily the
Neue Zürcher Zeitung <http://www.nzz.ch/>  <http://www.nzz.ch/>  on Oct. 11.
The English translation is by John Rosenthal.

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