Wahabbis are the enemy.  Saudis are Wahabbis.
 
B

 



A Paladin Gears Up for War


BY NIBRAS KAZIMI
November 1, 2007
URL: http://www.nysun.com/article/65662

The first minute of "The Kingdom," which is currently in cinemas, is great.
The movie tells the story of an FBI team hunting down a terrorist cell that
attacked an American civilian compound in Saudi Arabia, and it begins by
giving American audiences a primer on the last 300 years of Saudi history.
The gist of it is that the Wahhabis are the enemy - a rather accurate
summary.

Here's another thought: My enemy's enemy is my proxy army. The Wahhabis and
the Shiites are sworn opponents, and America has unlocked and released
Shiite power in Iraq. In a decade's time, the Shiites of Iraq may be tasked
with taking out the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia on behalf of the world's
economies, a task the Iraqis will relish.

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, America and its Western allies have
been busily hacking away at the serpents of Al Qaeda but collectively have
been reluctant to go after the head of the Wahhabi Medusa.

Wahhabism is a malicious and malevolent idea that animates the worst of
today's jihadists. It is a xenophobic way of seeing the world that has
radicalized everything it touches, turning the reformist Salafism of the
19th century into a dangerous and hateful ideology, the docile Muslim
Brotherhood into Egyptian and Syrian terrorist offshoots, the Deobandis into
the Taliban, and finally itself into Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda and Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi's nihilism in Iraq.

But the cold stare of petrodollar influence has petrified any efforts to go
after the ideological fountainhead in Saudi Arabia itself, a state founded
and maintained on an all too incestuous embrace between the Royal House of
Saud and Wahhabism. When the gods and kings of Greek mythology wanted an end
to Medusa's reign of terror, they recruited a warrior, Perseus, and
outfitted him with winged sandals, a cap of invisibility, a sword, and a
mirrored shield and sent him off to sever Medusa's head. Perseus got the job
done, and so will the Shiite-led, 200,000-strong Iraqi army.

America is training and equipping a proxy army in Iraq that will fight this
century's most crucial war - the war to keep the oil flowing. There was a
curious sight at the military parade on Monday celebrating the handover of
security in Karbala Province: Iraqi soldiers were marching with M-16 rifles.
This was the manifestation of a recent decision to phase out the
Kalashnikov, a Soviet-era icon, as Iraq's basic infantry weapon.

It is a symbolic break with the past: This is the new Iraqi army for a new
Iraq, schooled in the 21st-century doctrine of counterinsurgency and having
to adapt in all-too-real maneuvers against a postmodern insurgency, the
likes of which the world has never seen before. Zarqawi's insurgency will be
the model for all future jihadist insurgencies, including one that may break
out in the Persian Gulf basin, and that may seriously disrupt the global oil
supply; Iraq is unique in possessing the know-how to snuff it out.

Like Perseus, the Iraqi army should be outfitted with all the trappings that
have proved useful in defeating such insurgencies: armored Strykers and
Humvees, Bradley fighting vehicles, Apache attack helicopters, etc.

The Iraqi army will be the region's paladin, or knight in shining armor, a
far more suitable label than that of regional policeman. This paladin will
raid across the Middle East in the name of the "New Middle East," which
nobly stands for representative government.

A consequence of President Bush's Iraq war is the inheritance by Iraq's
majority Shiites of one of the region's most promising future economies -
one credible estimate puts a quarter of the world's oil in Iraq, most of it
in the Shiite south. They are poised to project their newfound political,
cultural, strategic, and mercantile power beyond their borders.

Iraq's Arab Sunnis, who may number as few as 13% of the population,
according to one analysis of election patterns, are no longer the masters of
Iraq's destiny. The changeover in Iraq is most acutely contrasted with the
old status quo in Syria, where that country's Alawite minority, standing in
at around 12%, still controls all the levers of authority. Likewise, the
Wahhabis form a plurality of the Saudi population but do not constitute a
numerical majority.

Iraq is trending toward stability through representative government, whereas
Saudi Arabia is trending toward instability due to a lack of it. Even after
it came to light that most of the September 11 bombers were Saudis - a stark
wakeup call to the ruling family there and to the world at large - Saudi
Arabia remains the Islamic world's leading factory for suicide bombers. One
needs to ask the question: Why is a young Saudi male so culturally suited to
blow himself up? Why is this young Saudi so utterly devoid of empathy as to
be willing to take the lives of women and children along with his own?

The House of Saud has yet to answer such questions, even though it was
compelled by international pressure to enact some limited reforms. But
instead of curbing the flow of bombers, the conveyer belt seems to have been
ratcheted up. What is going on? The answer, quite simply, is that Wahhabism
still holds sway, as the royals have staked their legitimacy on keeping
things that way, and while the all powerful Wahhabi clerical establishment
has relented on some reforms, one area remains a no-go for change: their
cherished anti-Shiite sectarianism.

If anything, the House of Saud has upped its anti-Shiite rhetoric in order
to placate the Wahhabis, consequently encouraging more young men to kill
Shiite women and children in Iraq. This issue becomes more problematic when
one considers that Shiites of various denominations constitute 20% of the
Saudi population.

How will the House of Saud react as Wahhabi-inspired vigilantes begin
massacring their country's 2 million Shiites, who are clustered around the
eastern oil wells? Will they beat them back and risk the ire of being seen
as Shiite friendly? And as the margins of sectarian chaos widen, and the
jihadists move in to burn those oil wells - as they have so clearly
indicated their wish to do so - thus bringing the world's economies to a
sputtering halt, who is going to leap in to re-establish order?

No force in the Middle East in as clearly suited to the task as the Shiite
Iraqis: They have plenty of scores to settle with the Wahhabis - going back
to 200 years ago, when the Wahhabis laid waste to Karbala, the holiest of
holies for the Shiites, right up to our time - and they are coming to the
aid of their Shiite co-religionists in the Eastern Province, an area that
was managed by the Ottomans from Basra in southern Iraq during the 19th
century.

The Marines certainly can't land on the shores of Dammam without inflaming
the sensibilities of the wider Islamic world; the Arabian Peninsula is seen
as a holy land on which no "infidel" should tread. The Egyptians and Turks
cannot be counted on, as their populations turn more hostile toward the West
and more enamored of those who fight it, and other supposed allies of
America, such as Jordan or Qatar, are too inconsequential for such a huge
civilizational task. Nobody trusts the Iranians. That only leaves the
Iraqis.

I am quite aware that this column will be dismissed as yet another round of
Saudi-bashing, alarmism, Shiite triumphalism, or neoconservative
warmongering. The detractors may ridicule the solution, but they cannot
discount the problem: what to do about the Wahhabi Medusa? "Washington is
not structured to look that far ahead in the Middle East," one Persian Gulf
expert told me. "Deep thinking about the problem before it blows up in our
face is not our style. This is not as easy as downing a frappuccino and
reading through a Tom Friedman article."

There is still a slim possibility that the House of Saud will redeem itself
by accepting, nay accommodating, a Shiite-led Iraq and a representative
government, thus averting internal chaos and a future war. The royal
family's ancestors were a pragmatic lot that came back from political death
- twice. But maybe those good genes have gone to seed, and what little we
see of Saudi nimbleness is the frenetic schmoozing of Washington-based
public relations and lobbying firms making the rounds on their tab.

The top echelon of Ibn Saud's progeny seems too stodgy and lethargic under
its layers of gray, caviar-fed flesh; they are not agile enough to survive a
jihadist storm.

The new Iraq means that the House of Saud is no longer indispensable: If it
can't keep things under wraps, then the Iraqi paladin is in line to right
the wrongs. A Shiite-led Iraq is an invaluable asset for investment bankers
as well as military planners "gaming" how the military and economic wars of
the 21st century are going to be fought, and where. The new Iraq should be
seen as a potential "savior" and its new army should be prepared and
equipped as such.

Mr. Kazimi, a contributing editor to The New York Sun, can be reached at
[EMAIL PROTECTED] <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]> com.

.
 
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