"Along comes the NIE to instantly undo four years of diplomacy, using a
semantic sleight-of-hand to suggest some kind of distinction can be drawn
between Iran's bid to master the nuclear fuel cycle and its efforts to build
nuclear weapons. 


http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/bstephens/?id=110010974
The NIE Fantasy
BY BRET STEPHENS, 11 December 2007

The intelligence community failed to anticipate the Cuban Missile Crisis.




"The USSR could derive considerable military advantage from the
establishment of Soviet medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in
Cuba, or from the establishment of a submarine base there. . . . Either
development, however, would be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and
with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it."
- Special National Intelligence Estimate 85-3-62, Sept. 19, 1962


Twenty-five days  after this NIE was published, a U-2 spy plane photographed
a Soviet ballistic missile site in Cuba,  and the Cuban Missile Crisis
began. It's possible the latest NIE on Iran's nuclear weapons program  will
not prove as misjudged or as damaging as the 1962 estimate.  But don't bet
on it.

At the heart of last week's NIE is the "high confidence" judgment that
Tehran "halted its nuclear weapons program" in the fall of 2003,


"primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure
resulting from exposure of Iran's previously undeclared nuclear work."


Prior to that, however, the NIE states, also with "high confidence," that
"Iranian military entities were working under government direction to
develop nuclear weapons." Left to a footnote is the explanation that


"by 'nuclear weapons program' we mean Iran's nuclear weapon design and
weaponization work. . . . we do not mean Iran's declared civil work related
to uranium conversion and enrichment."


Let's unpack this.

In August 2002,  an Iranian opposition group revealed  that Iran had an
undeclared uranium enrichment facility at Natanz  and an undeclared heavy
water facility at Arak - both previously unknown to the pros of the U.S.
intelligence community. Since then, the administration has labored to
persuade the international community that all these facilities have no
conceivable purpose other than a military one. Those efforts paid off in
three successive U.N. Security Council resolutions demanding Iran suspend
enrichment because it was "concerned by the proliferation risks" it posed.

Along comes the NIE  to instantly undo four years of diplomacy,  using a
semantic sleight-of-hand  to suggest some kind of distinction can be drawn
between Iran's bid to master the nuclear fuel cycle and its efforts to build
nuclear weapons. How credible is this distinction?

In "Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy" (1996), MIT's Owen Cote notes that


"The recipe [for designing a weapon] is very simple. . . . Nor are the
ingredients, other than plutonium or HEU [highly enriched uranium],  hard to
obtain. For a gun weapon,  the gun barrel could be ordered from any machine
shop,  as could a tungsten tamper machined to any specifications the
customer desired. The high-explosive charge for firing the bullet  could
also be fashioned by anyone with access to and some experience handling TNT,
or other conventional, chemical explosives"

(my emphasis).


In other words,  Iran didn't abandon its nuclear weapons program. On the
contrary, it went public with it.  It's certainly plausible Tehran may have
suspended one aspect of the program  - the aspect that is the least
technically challenging and that, if exposed, would offer smoking-gun proof
of ill intent.
Then again, why does the NIE have next to nothing to say about Iran's
efforts to produce plutonium at the Arak facility,  which is of the same
weapons-producing type as Israel's Dimona and North Korea's Yongbyon
reactors?  And why the silence on Iran's ongoing and acknowledged  testing
of ballistic missiles  of ever-longer range, the development of which only
makes sense  as a vehicle to deliver a weapon of mass destruction?

Equally disingenuous is the NIE's assessment that Iran's purported decision
to halt its weapons program is an indication that "Tehran's decisions are
guided by a cost-benefit approach" - an interesting statement, given that
Iran's quest for "peaceful" nuclear energy makes no economic sense. But the
NIE's real purpose becomes clear in the next sentence, when it states that
Iran's behavior


"suggests that some combination of threats  of intensified international
scrutiny  and pressure with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security,
prestige and goals for regional influence in other ways, might - if
perceived by Iran's leaders as credible - prompt Tehran to extend the
current halt to its nuclear weapons program."


This is a policy prescription,  not an intelligence assessment.
Nonetheless,  it is worth recalling  that if Iran did have an active
weaponization program prior to 2003,  as the NIE claims,  it means that
former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami was lying  when he said that
"weapons of mass destruction have never been our objective."  Mr. Khatami is
just the kind of "moderate" that advocates of engagement with Iran see as a
credible negotiating partner.  If he's not to be trusted , is Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad?

Then again,  when it comes to the issue of trust,  it isn't just Mr.
Ahmadinejad we need to worry about. It has been widely pointed out that the
conclusions of this NIE flatly contradict those of a 2005 NIE on the same
subject, calling the entire process into question. 
Less discussed is why the administration chose to release  a shoddy document
that does maximum political damage to it  and to key U.S. allies,
particularly France, the U.K. and Israel.

The likely answer is that the administration calculated that any effort by
them to suppress or tweak the NIE would surely leak,  leading to accusations
of "politicizing intelligence." But that only means  that we now have an
"intelligence community" that acts as an authority unto itself, and cannot
be trusted to obey its political masters, much less keep a secret.  The
administration's tacit acquiescence in this state of affairs  may prove even
more damaging  than its wishful thinking on Iran.

For years  it has been a staple of fever swamp politics  to believe the U.S.
government is in the grip of shadowy powers  using "intelligence" as a tool
of control. With the publication of this NIE,  that is no longer a fantasy.




Mr. Stephens is a member of The Wall Street Journal's editorial board. His
column appears in the Journal Tuesdays.



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