Extremism's little helpers

Home-grown Islamists need look no further than our universities for
ideological inspiration, write David Martin Jones and Carl Ungerer |
December 15, 2007 

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 The global jihadism that confronts Western liberal democracies in the shape
of al-Qa'ida and its affiliates is above all a war of perception and
propaganda.

That our universities may be sustaining the ideology that supports global
jihadism, this Islamist revolt against the West, should therefore be a
concern. 

Not only does the prevailing academic anti-Western thought form the
background to jihadism's thinking about the international order, it also
undermines our political democratic self-understanding. Yet the argument and
style that characterise the more sophisticated jihadist texts reflect
supposedly cutting-edge thinking in new, academically fashionable fields
such as critical terror studies: critical of the West, that is. 

By a curious and little explored irony, the thinking that supports jihadism
has been dreamed up in university departments funded by Western governments
and finds its way into the reports of the jihadist equivalent of think
tanks. 

Clearly, home-grown Islamist radicalisation is a threat to the way of life
of open, liberal Western societies such as ours. This has been recognised
since the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2003 and London in 2005, and the
discovery of similar alleged plots in Toronto, New York, Sydney, Melbourne,
Copenhagen and Frankfurt. 

We face a form of Islamist ideology that deliberately exploits the anxieties
of second-generation Muslims of immigrant parents. These younger Muslims are
confronted by the conflicting demands of a modern lifestyle and a
traditional family structure, and this tension is crucial to the recruitment
and radicalisation process. 

Although the ideology is nominally related to Islam, it assumes a
particularly Western style of thought and practice in order to resolve a
specifically modern dilemma: the discomfort of Muslims who are, or whose
families are, relatively recent arrivals in Western countries. 

Central to the articulation and promotion of this ideology is the
London-based Party of Liberation, Hizb ut-Tahrir. Although the movement
derived its inspiration from the thinking of the 20th century anti-colonial
and anti-Israel theologian and judge Taqiuddin al-Nabhani and the Islamic
liberation struggle in Jordan and Palestine in the 1950s, it was the radical
cleric Omar Bakri Mohammed who effectively reorganised the party in London
in the '90s to promote the Islamist international. 

Recruiting high-quality graduates from London universities, Hizb ut-Tahrir
quickly established itself as a new and excitingly alternative, cool
Britannic, radical voice. As former member Ed Hussein explains in The
Islamist, Hizb ut-Tahrir exploited any issue that might demonstrate the
decadence of the non-believing West and the moral superiority of the
alternative presented by what Hizb ut-Tahrir terms the Islamic system. 

In the course of the '90s and especially after 2001, British Islamists
exploited issues ranging from the tolerance of homosexuality and drugs to
Western foreign policy in order to reinforce the perception of irresoluble
differences between Islamic and liberal democratic values. 

Ironically, it was the multicultural policies promoted by successive British
governments, together with the politically correct nature of British
university politics, that enabled the party to evolve its ideology and
elaborate its Manichean distinction between Islamism and secularism in a
persuasive manner that recruited educated middle-class British Muslims to
its cause. 

This essentially post-Cold War creation, which for the best part of two
decades produced a cohort of tertiary-educated British Islamists, also
actively exported its ideology. Hizb ut-Tahrir now has more than 40
branches, including one in Sydney, and produces high-quality Islamist
material in various languages for global consumption. 

Officially non-violent, as a number of former adherents such as Hussein and
Hassan Butt have shown, it is nonetheless the ideological motor driving what
Butt terms the British "jihadi network". 

Hizb ut-Tahrir's ambition is to build a postmodern caliphate that transcends
the decadent secular state, whether in Britain, Indonesia (where it was
responsible for organising a recent conference on rebuilding the caliphate)
or Australia. This anti-liberal vision is promoted through a global network
of websites, chat rooms and videos. 

At the core of the system is the promotion of the caliphate, a
seventh-century Muslim ideal that it is claimed would, if adapted to
contemporary life, restore the moral and political authority of Islam. As a
recent Hizb ut-Tahrir publication, Iraq: The Way Forward, shows, the
caliphate, unlike a liberal democracy, constitutes the regime most
appropriate for an integrated Islamic life and the solution to political and
economic uncertainty in the Middle East and South Asia. 

The caliphate represents a political system derived from the ideology of
Islam that transcends ethnic and religious differences. It would "usher in a
new era of stability for the Muslim world". 

Evidently influenced by Western models, the Islamist ideal promotes "the
rule of law and accountability by the people through an independent
judiciary". The law, however, is Koranic law and the teachings of the
prophet Mohammed, while religious scholars preside over the Islamic system's
judiciary. 

Thus, despite superficial similarities, the Islamic system vigorously
opposes the promotion of secular liberal democracy. Its thinking and
practice, however, also draws selectively on non-liberal tendencies in the
Western ideological canon. In particular, Hizb ut-Tahrir derives its
ideological momentum from understandings of a radical Marxist provenance
along with a deeply illiberal and relativist strain in contemporary Western
thought. It followed and developed the strategies pioneered by groups such
as the Socialist Workers Party in Britain. As Hussein points out: "We
borrowed, as we did much else, from radical socialists." 

Likewise, its hostile understanding of the liberal democratic state's
conduct of foreign policy derives its inspiration from the international
idealism that prevails in British and, more recently, Australian schools of
political science and international studies. This dominant scholarly
orthodoxy of constructivism (the belief that knowledge is socially
determined and subjective) and pacifism views the international order as a
self-serving construct of the US and its allies. It seeks an ethical
transformation and has, by an interesting process, come to permeate Hizb
ut-Tahrir's analysis of world politics and pervade its rhetoric. 

The Hizb ut-Tahrir propagandists who wrote Iraq: The Way Forward and
Radicalisation, Extremism and Islamism: Realities and Myths in the War on
Terror imbibed their ideas, in part, from the state-transcending ethicism of
the English school of international relations. This ethical approach to
international relations seeks what two of its leading proponents, Andrew
Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, term a solidarist world informed by global
ethics. Thus, a Hizb ut-Tahrir report such as Radicalisation, Extremism and
Islamism reads like a masters thesis in international relations in the style
of the English school, complete with methodological framework and footnotes.
In fact, one would not be entirely surprised if it began life as an honours
thesis at a British university. 

Thus, in keeping with this prevailing critical scholarship, Hizb ut-Tahrir
considers the war on terror just a narrative told by Western governments.
Islamist terrorism is, therefore, simply a distorted Western construct.
Ultimately, for this group, the West's "orientalist discourse" regarding
Islam and the caliphate compounded Muslim alienation. Therefore, orientalism
(the Western scholarly study of eastern societies) and its ideological
cousin colonialism constitute the root causes of Muslim oppression and the
subsequent Islamist response that has dialectically evolved since the late
19th century. 

According to this perspective, "the West's foreign policy has illustrated
not just the unacceptable face of Western imperialism but the true face of
Western states with the indomitable pursuit of profits, raw materials and
cheap labour". 

Not only does Hizb ut-Tahrir's methodology reflect contemporary critical
social-science theory, the policy solutions to counter US imperialism are
remarkably similar. As Iraq: The Way Forward argues, stability in the Middle
East requires the immediate withdrawal of all US and allied forces from the
Gulf region. 

This would facilitate the rebuilding of the caliphate and enable the Muslim
world, funded by the Gulf and Iraq's oil resources, to determine its own
destiny. 

This destiny would, of course, reject the false Western ideal of liberal
democratic universalism and the destabilising economics of the free market.
It would also see an Islamist solution to the Palestine question that would
necessarily involve the dissolution of the "illegal" Zionist state of Israel
and its incorporation into the caliphate. Under the caliph, Jews, Sunnis and
Shias, Kurds, Lebanese, Persians and Arabs would all transcend their false
consciousness and unite through Islam's undoubtedly global ethic. 

Such a radical solution to the Middle East is, of course, contemplated with
equanimity by critical international relations theorists and the exciting
new discipline of critical terror studies. 

Thus, Cambridge University lecturer Tarak Barkawi requires us to empathise
with radical Islamist thought and practice while Manchester University's
Richard Jackson tells us in the Chatham House journal International Affairs
that jihadist texts reveal a "nuanced political analysis" and a "clear set
of political goals". Indeed, Jackson maintains, Islamist parties, when
afforded "mainstream political influence", have often followed "moderate and
pragmatic directions". Presumably, he has in mind groups such as Hamas and
Hezbollah. 

Critical international relations courses taught at leading British and
Australian universities advocate a similarly nuanced approach to jihadism at
home and abroad. 

Immediate withdrawal from Iraq and a greater awareness of the Muslim other,
it is alleged, will dilute Islamist rage, whether home-grown or externally
generated. 

So, for senior academics such as one at the University of NSW, the violence
in Palestine cannot be resolved without "the call to ethics and the love of
the other". 

For this academic, the solution to the West's "perverse perseverance of
sovereignty" is "deconstructive and reproductive". 

British and Australian global ethicists should reflect, however, on former
Hizb ut-Tahrir activist Butt's observation in the wake of the London and
Glasgow bombings in June this year: "I remember how we used to laugh in
celebration whenever people on TV proclaimed that the sole cause for Islamic
acts of terror like 9/11, the Madrid bombings and 7/7 was Western foreign
policy. By blaming the government for our actions, those who pushed the
'Blair's bombs' line did our propaganda work for us. More important, they
also helped to draw away any critical examination from the real engine of
our violence: Islamic theology." 

In the face of such evidence, you would expect that Western governments
would be more acutely attuned to the inherent dangers of fuelling Islamist
propaganda. But rather than funding projects that examine all phases of
counter-terrorism, successive Australian education ministers have allowed
the critical terror studies agenda to obtain research funding through the
Australian Research Council. 

Critical theorists regularly receive significant doles of public money to
discourse on "the politics and ethics of force" or "ethical and conceptual
approaches to counter-terrorism". We're not sure what value this adds to our
understanding of failed and failing states. But the conclusion is already
known. It's all our fault. As Ruth Blakeley of the University of Kent tells
it, "the northern democracies have been responsible for widespread
terrorism". 

In this curious world of international ethicist thinking, the present system
of states is the problem and demands "an imperative to change the world" as
we know it. Therefore, it is not surprising to learn that the policy
solution is to "resist and transform", an idea endorsed not only by Hizb
ut-Tahrir but international terror groups of all stripes. 

As US political philosopher Leo Strauss observed presciently in a different
ideological context, "the crisis of the West consists in the West having
become uncertain of its purpose. The West was once certain of its purpose,
of a purpose in which all men could be united and hence it had a clear
vision of its future... 

"We no longer have that certainty and that clarity. Some among us even
despair of the future, and this despair explains many forms of Western
degradation." 

A society accustomed to understanding itself in terms of a universal and
progressive purpose cannot lose faith in that purpose without becoming
utterly bewildered. 

The relativist and critical approaches that have come to dominate the
academic social sciences since the '90s are a reflection of that
bewilderment, give comfort and coherence to our enemies, reinforce our
bewildering loss of purpose and receive state-funded research grants to
promote it. 

David Martin Jones and Carl Ungerer teach political science at the
University of Queensland. Ungerer has edited the book Australian Foreign
Policy in the Age of Terror (UNSW Press, $49.95), to which he and Martin
Jones have contributed some chapters.

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