http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS22768 <http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS22768> -- Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: The Annapolis Conference Carol Migdalovitz Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Summary At the end of November 2007, the Bush Administration convened an international conference in Annapolis, MD to officially revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmud Abbas reached a "Joint Understanding," in which they agreed to launch continuous bilateral negotiations in an effort to conclude a peace treaty by the end of 2008 and to simultaneously implement the moribund 2003 Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Both leaders are operating under significant domestic political constraints and they continue to disagree on many issues. Thus, their negotiations will be challenging. This report will not be updated. For background and future developments, see CRS Report RL33530, Israeli- Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy, by Carol Migdalovitz. Background In early 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was said to have promised moderate Arab regimes that the United States would become more engaged in the Israeli- Arab peace process in exchange for their support for countering increasing Iranian influence in the Middle East.1 The Secretary made eight trips to the region during the year, initially to work with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmud Abbas on developing a "political horizon" that would lead to a resumption of the long-stalled Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, issued by the international Quartet (the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia) on April 30, 2003.2 Each side maintains that the other has not fulfilled its obligations under the three-phase Road Map; independent observers agree that neither has done so. Phase I calls, inter alia, for Israel to freeze all settlement activity (including natural growth of settlements) and for the Palestinians to confront terrorists and dismantle their infrastructures. >From February until June 2007, a Palestinian unity government included Hamas, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), and Hamas's participation impeded Rice's efforts. Olmert refused to negotiate with Abbas as long as Hamas failed to recognize Israel, disavow violence, and accept prior Israeli-Palestinian agreements, i.e., met conditions that the Quartet laid down in January 2006 after Hamas won the Palestinian parliamentary elections. In June 2007, however, Palestinian infighting ended with Hamas in complete control of the Gaza Strip, and Abbas reacted by dissolving the unity government. The Bush Administration and the Israeli government viewed the ouster of Hamas as an opportunity to return to diplomacy. On July 16, President Bush promised to support Abbas in order to lay the foundation for serious negotiations toward the creation of a Palestinian state. The President called for an international meeting "of representatives from nations that support a two-state solution, reject violence, recognize Israel's right to exist, and commit to all previous agreements between the parties." When announced, the meeting was intended mainly to review progress toward building Palestinian institutions and to look for ways to support further reform, although participants also were to provide support for the parties in their bilateral negotiations on a Palestinian state.3 Olmert and Abbas, and later negotiating teams led by Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and former Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Quray (alternate spellings: Qurei, Qureia), met over the next four months to work on a declaration of principles on final status or core issues: Jerusalem, borders, settlements, refugees, security, and water. Olmert sought to keep the declaration vague in order to avoid concessions that would prompt his domestic political opponents to bring down his government, while Abbas wanted it to address core issues substantively in order to show his people that negotiations could lead to an improvement in the quality of their lives, an end to the occupation, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. They failed to produce a document. Conference Attendees The United States invited 49 countries and international organizations to send representatives to a conference at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, MD. Attendees included members of the Arab League Follow-on Committee (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen), the G-8 group of industrialized countries, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, fellow members of the international Quartet, members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and representatives of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The size of the gathering signaled strong international support for a peace process. The size of the Arabs' turnout was attributed to their need for a strategic alliance with the United States against Iran, but also may have indicated support for Abbas over Hamas. 1 Cam Simpson, "Dangerous Territory: With Aid, U.S. Widens Role in Palestinian Crisis; To Undercut Hamas And Iran, Bush Pushes $86 Million Plan" Wall Street Journal, January 12, 2007. 2 For text, see [ http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm> ]. 3 For President's speech, see [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07> /20070716-7.html]. -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? 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