http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/532ftzqs.a
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China's Asymmetrical Strategy 
The battle for access in the Western Pacific. 
by Eric Sayers 
12/27/2007 12:00:00 AM 







THE IMPRESSIVE CONVENTIONAL military strength post-industrial states have
procured in the past half-century has helped to determine the shape and
nature of modern warfare. In a geostrategic environment where conflict
continues to persist between advanced militaries and their substandard
adversaries--either rogue states or terror cells--the latter have been
forced to develop asymmetric ways of challenging the superior with the
inferior. 

The extent of America's sweeping success during the Persian Gulf War had the
unintended consequence of convincing would-be adversaries that they must
reconstitute new strategies in order to compete with and challenge U.S.
power. In essence, American military predominance had become so extensive
that it has altered the face of the battlefield by forcing others to
adapt--to prevent America from playing the game but its rules. 

This is evident in both Iraq and Afghanistan where the U.S. continues its
struggle to contain disconnected networks of al-Qaeda militants and Shia
militias armed with AK-47s and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). As much
as the United States had hoped it could defeat extremist elements using
sophisticated weapons and other advanced technologies, the supposed
superiority of network-centric warfare proved insufficient against Islamist
tactics. Similarly, Venezuela and its despotic leader Hugo Chavez, who
frequently warns of a pending invasion by the United States, has placed
asymmetric warfare at the center of his countries national defense doctrine.
Former Venezuelan General Alberto Mueller has argued in favor of the
doctrine, "because conventional war is ceasing to exist."

Although it is terrorism--and in the case of Venezuela, "guerilla war"--that
is so often discussed in the realm of asymmetric warfare, the Chinese
People's Liberation Army (PLA) has also embraced the precepts of this
strategy to counter American superiority. As Robert Kaplan has explained,
terrorists and their crude tactics fall on the low end of asymmetric
strategy. For America, the even greater challenge will be those states like
China that are able to confront the United States at the high-tech end of
the unconventional sphere. 

While in the coming decades China anticipates that the continued success of
its economic expansion will allow it to take a much more assertive
geopolitical posture--projecting force far beyond its coastal waters--in the
near-term the issue of Taiwan will remain the primary focus for Chinese
policymakers. While ensuring Taiwan does not entertain ambitions of
secession from the mainland, PLA military planners will also be forced to
concern themselves with defeating a U.S. military that remains committed to
the defense of Taiwan.

Just how does the PLA believe it can achieve this? Chinese strategists are
not naive. They recognize that their military is only a decade or two
removed from operational obscurity. And a Chinese conventional force able to
challenge the United States is at least another decade away by the estimates
of the most generous analysts. In summary, Chinese leaders face a strategic
quandary where their interests in Taiwan are at risk, yet for the
foreseeable future they cannot obtain the traditional military capabilities
to secure those interest. 

Should either a political or military event threaten the status quo in the
Taiwan Strait, the U.S. will respond by diverting a Carrier Strike Group to
the region. Chinese analysts understand that if this is allowed to happen,
the United States will almost certainly achieve its objectives, emerging
victorious should hostilities commence.

To deal with this dilemma the PLA has chosen to put its trust in an
asymmetric strategy aimed at battlespace denial, or anti-access as it is
more commonly known. Rather than confront the United States directly, the
PLA believes it can acquire the capabilities to deter an American entrance
into the Taiwan Strait, or, should this fail, delay U.S. forces the freedom
to operate within the theatre. 

Some observers have concluded that China's development of anti-access
capabilities neither undermines U.S. sea control nor contributes to a
war-wining capability. Such assertions may have been accurate as recently as
earlier this decade, but at present, and increasingly in the next several
years, this conclusion will appear to be guided more by an overconfidence in
American capabilities than by pragmatic realism.

Consistent with the teachings of ancient Chinese warfare, anti-access is
comprised of both military and political elements. The Chinese theoretician
Sun Tzu wrote that, "supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's
resistance without fighting." This would appear to be the primary aim of
anti-access: successful diplomatic coercion through expanded asymmetric
capabilities. 

In attempting to defeat a technologically superior adversary such as the
United States, China does not need to control the sea or achieve ultimate
military victory. A truly efficient implementation of anti-access doctrine
would use the weapons systems at China's disposal in a manner that
translates into a bloodless political victory. 

Over the last decade China has committed itself to a deliberate and focused
expansion of the PLA's capabilities, aimed primarily at acquiring the
necessary platforms to serve this area-denial strategy. 

Due to the importance of U.S. Carrier Strike Groups, the PLA has chosen to
focus much of their attention on deterring and, if need be, delaying the
entry of these floating sea bases into the Taiwan theatre. At the center of
this effort is the PLA submarine fleet, which is growing at a rapid rate
and, with the increased sophistication of its submarine classes, could pose
a significant threat to American carriers. In the past decade China has
commissioned 31 submarines. The majority of these are of the Song- and
Yuan-class, which are outfitted with the 'air-independent propulsion" system
that permits them to operate underwater for up to 40 days. In addition to
enabling conventional submarines to avoid the costs of nuclear technology,
the system allows the submarine to remain virtually undetectable to U.S.
anti-submarine surveillance efforts. The sophistication of these new
submarines became evident in October 2006 when a Chinese Song-class
submarine was able to surface within torpedo range of the USS Kitty Hawk off
the coast of Okinawa. 

China also has three new nuclear-powered submarine designs and construction
programs. The Type-093 Shang-class nuclear attack boat and the Type-094
Jin-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine, represent the basis of the
nuclear submarine programs. The Type-095, a larger version of the
Shang/Jin-classes, is also under construction. These numerous programs
represent a submarine development campaign that is unprecedented in
peacetime.

The development of maneuverability reentry vehicle (MaRVs) technology,
capable of allowing ballistic missiles to destroy moving targets, will also
contribute to expanding and overlapping the layers of the PLA anti-access
strategy. These missiles, in coordination with a maritime surveillance and
targeting system, could pose a direct threat to U.S. carriers patrolling in
the Asia-Pacific. According to Pentagon estimates, Chinese missiles armed
with MaRV technology could be deployed as early as 2015. China has also
purchased Russian-built SS-N-22 Sunburn and SS-N-27 Sizzler anti-ship cruise
missiles, designed specifically for targeting U.S. carrier strike groups and
defeating the Aegis anti-missile system.

Chinese strategists, including PLA Major General Dia Qingmin, have written
extensively on battlespace-denial, arguing that the true dominance of the
U.S. military is in fact the result of its impressive integrated network of
command, control, and communications systems. America's C4ISR network
provides everything from target detection and identification to navigational
information. 

But just as this capability is its greatest asset, in the realm of
asymmetry, it is also its greatest vulnerability. For this reason, the PLA
has concluded that attacking information systems could offset U.S.
capabilities much more efficiently than attacking traditional combat
systems. In the event of a pending conflict in the Taiwan Strait, destroying
a series of U.S. satellites--the central node of U.S. networks--could
effectively paralyze U.S. combat capabilities, denying them the initiative
on the battlefield and leveling the operational playing field. China's
January 2007 anti-satellite test, which displayed the ability of the PLA to
target and destroy satellites in orbit, represents a significant achievement
for PLA anti-access capabilities.

The capability to severely disrupt America's C4ISR network, coupled with the
deployment of advanced submarines and anti-ship missiles, presents a new
form of strategic deterrence that is only recently receiving the attention
it deserves. In a scenario where it is suspected China may play a
belligerent role, the United States would be faced with a difficult decision
concerning its commitments to Taiwan's defense. Acting too aggressively
could trigger a Chinese preemptive attack on American satellite and
communication systems, potentially disrupting the U.S. military's war-making
ability in the Taiwan Strait and seriously jeopardizing ongoing operations
around the globe. Alternatively, too weak of a response by the United States
may only invite a more offensively inclined approach by the PLA, further
increasing the potential danger facing the island democracy. The inevitable
hesitation on the part of America may provide Beijing the time and space it
needs to secure its objectives.

Should it come to war, Chinese strategists have determined that they need
only inflict sufficient costs to force the United States to lose its
willingness to continue the conflict. Chinese analysts Peng Guangqian and
Yao Youzhi, among others, have concluded that "smashing the adversary's will
to resist" is now more important then defeating its military forces--a maxim
that resonates across the entire asymmetric sphere. 

Both the civilian and military leadership in the United States begrudgingly
recognize the opportunity cost phenomenon that affects democratic societies
at war. If the PLA were to preemptively invade Taiwan, while conducting
simultaneous battlespace-denial operations against the United States, how
would American leaders respond after several weeks of costly engagements?
When the United States eventually breaks through, would it then look to
liberate Taiwan, or, more likely, conclude that risking a wider war with
China over the small island democracy falls far outside its calculated
national interest? 

PLA officer Jiang Lei analyzed the opportunity cost scenario further in his
doctoral dissertation: "it is possible for the side with inferior equipment
to strive to gain the initiative on the battlefield [ ] and compel the
superior enemy to pull out of the conflict. Because the superpower must cope
with the influence of its other fundamental strategic interest, the level of
its intervention is limited; moreover, it will seek to win victory in the
war at minimum cost." Successful area-denial operations, therefore, would
enable Beijing to achieve its primary political objectives through a
concerted effort to restrain America's will to fight an escalated war.

Clearly, a competitor armed with the ability to challenge America at the
high-end of asymmetrical warfare poses a substantial dilemma. Is the United
States prepared? Over the past decade anti-access has been accounted for and
increasingly discussed in almost all high-level military documents. The 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review committed the U.S. military to countering
"political anti-access and irregular warfare challenges." Indeed, the Navy's
"Sea Shield" concept--part of its Seapower 21 vision--is solely intended to
ensure continued freedom of access by countering enemy anti-access threats.

In addition to identifying the increased potential of area-denial
strategies, the United States has invested itself in a number of political
and military measures to ensure it remains adequately prepared in the coming
years. 

To help search out and destroy China's growing fleet of submarines, the
United States has turned to the P-8A Poseidon, a modified Boeing 737-800
able to conduct area-wide anti-submarine warfare. The innovative
capabilities of the Poseidon ensure it will be at the center of America's
effort to counter China's area-denial efforts. 

The Pentagon has also announced a $225 million upgrade for its
Raytheon-built MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), a radar
controlled gun designed to defend against low and high flying, maneuvering
anti-ship missile threats. The Phalanx is also being sold to Australia as
part of the deal, extending the anti-missile defensive capabilities of one
of America's most important Pacific allies.

Finally, the U.S. and Australia have agreed to partner in the deployment of
the Wideband Global Satellite Communications system (WGS). The Wideband
satellite constellation, which will include six satellites by 2013, aims to
provide advanced communications capabilities for U.S. and Australian
warfighters. By jointly operating and owning the WGS system, the United
States will not only increase its interoperability with a steadfast ally,
but it will also create a geostrategic dilemma for China by forcing the PLA
to target both U.S. and Australian military satellites in order to
comprehensively paralyze American's command and control network. This
implicit attempt to bind the space-based capabilities of both the United
States and Australia is an example of the shrewd maneuvering the Pentagon
must continue to make to stay ahead of the anti-access curve. 

These measures represent only a variety of the steps being taken to deal
with the anti-access threat. Because of the susceptibility of U.S.
information networks, perhaps the greatest preparations the United States
can make is to conduct military exercises without the use of continuous,
high-bandwidth communications between units. This would enable the various
military components (carriers, battleships, submarines and aircraft) to
experience acting independently, or in a semi-autonomous state, more
adequately preparing them to meet the requirements of a C4ISR-less
environment.

While Washington continues to debate the potentiality of China becoming a
"responsible stakeholder," the ways in which to successfully 'manage" its
rise, and how best to increase PLA transparency, the PLA has remained
committed to modernizing, expanding, and deploying an increasingly
sophisticated military capable of seriously challenging American power. In
the near term, instead of concerning themselves with the strengths of the
U.S. military, PLA planners have diverted their attention to its weaknesses.
In Iraq and Afghanistan, fighting an enemy that has deliberately exploited
America's military and political weaknesses has proven to be an arduous
task. Is America prepared to face the high-end asymmetric strategies being
deployed by a Chinese state readying itself at all levels--political,
military, and economic--to challenge U.S. predominance? The answer to this
question will undoubtedly shape the geostrategic environment of the
Asia-Pacific theater in the coming decades.



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