27 December 2007
''Somalia's New Reality: A Strategic Overview''

Events during the weeks following PINR's December 11 report on Somalia
have confirmed its judgment that the country has settled into a chronic
condition of statelessness characterized by devolution of the political
community to clan-based solidarities, dispersion of power to local
warlords and insurgent groups, and resultant multi-faceted conflicts.
[See: "Somalia Completes its Devolutionary Cycle"
<http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=732> ]

With the collapse of Somalia's internationally-supported Transitional
Federal Government (T.F.G.) after a power struggle between its
president, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, and its then prime minister, Ali
Mohamed Gedi, ended with the latter's resignation on October 29, Somalia
has lacked even the semblance of the possibility of an effectively
functioning government. The new prime minister, Nur "Adde" Hassan
Hussein, has already failed in a first attempt to name a cabinet and is
negotiating on another list. The transitional parliament is
factionalized along clan lines. The transitional high court is
inoperative as a consequence of its chief justice's arrest by Yusuf's
allies during the October power struggle. There is little likelihood
that Somalia's failed transitional institutions can be made to function,
much less mesh with one another, in the foreseeable future.

The T.F.G.'s abject failure has left Somalia without a domestic
political protagonist that would play the role of offering a
programmatic challenge or initiative to stabilize the country, and would
draw on a power base that would make its challenge credible. The
judgment that the T.F.G. has reached a dead end is becoming current
among Somali intellectuals, the political and military opposition to the
T.F.G., and external actors. There is no consensus, however, on how to
pull Somalia out of chronic conflict, with many contending proposals
springing from a common sense that a new chapter of Somalia's political
history has opened.

A strategic overview of the current political situation in Somalia shows
all the domestic and external players acting at cross-purposes, with
none of them willing and/or able to transform the existing power
configuration decisively. Since the defeat of the Islamic Courts Council
(I.C.C.), which controlled most of southern and central Somalia and
sought to set up a state based on Shari'a law, in December 2006 by an
Ethiopian military intervention, the T.F.G. has been propped up
militarily by a partial Ethiopian occupation and financially and
diplomatically by Western donor powers and the United Nations.

Meanwhile, the militant elements of the Courts movement and disaffected
clans have carried on a steady armed insurgency against the occupiers,
and the political wing of the Courts has formed an alliance with other
anti-T.F.G. elements from exile in Eritrea. At present, Addis Ababa --
strained by the insurgency, a separatist movement in its ethnic Somali
Ogaden region and border tensions with Eritrea -- is increasingly
desperate to end its occupation and has begun to criticize the donor
powers for failing to support stabilization in Somalia adequately.

The donor powers continue to back the T.F.G. half-heartedly, unwilling
to commit substantial resources to an unpromising cause. Emboldened by
the T.F.G.'s collapse, Addis Ababa's exhaustion and the donor powers'
tentative stance, the Courts-led opposition remains intransigent in its
demand that the Ethiopian occupation must end before discussions on
power sharing might begin. Pushed and pulled by the other major actors,
the T.F.G. executive appeals for help that does not come.

An Imploded T.F.G.

The implosion of the T.F.G. is a direct result of the power struggle
between Yusuf and Gedi, which was described in PINR's December 11
report. By maneuvering Gedi's resignation, Yusuf had sought to become
Somalia's sole power broker; instead, he fell ill and was shoved aside
by domestic factions and external actors, all of which launched bids for
influence over the new transitional executive. [See: "Somalia Completes
its Devolutionary Cycle"
<http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=732> ]

With clan factions, Addis Ababa and the donor powers presenting
different candidates for the prime minister's post, Yusuf chose Hussein
as a compromise candidate who lacked his own power base and was left
without cover to respond to conflicting demands concerning the
composition of his administration. On one side, factions in the
transitional parliament pressed for a government composed of holdovers
from the preceding administration; on the other side, the donor powers
pushed for an "inclusive government" staffed by intellectuals and
technocrats, moderate figures in the political opposition, and leaders
of dissident clans.

Hussein initially presented a cabinet list drawn preponderantly from
parliament, but it failed to gain approval due to opposition from
clan-based factions that claimed that they were under-represented and
had not been consulted. Addis Ababa, which had been marginalized by
Hussein's appointment, and the donor powers, which had welcomed Hussein
as a politically neutral "technocrat," made clear their "disappointment"
with his list.

Having failed to satisfy parliament and having alienated the major
external actors, Hussein dissolved his proposed cabinet on December 16
and jumped to the side of the donor powers, promising to reduce the
cabinet to 18 ministers from the previous 31, and to choose nine from
outside parliament. The donor powers had pressed for a reduction in
cabinet posts in order to streamline the T.F.G. executive and make it
more efficient, and had demanded ministers be named from outside
parliament in order to make the T.F.G. more representative of previously
excluded political forces and to infuse it with expertise.

Hussein's problems in forming a cabinet spring from the weakness of his
position. Lacking his own power base, Hussein is subjected to
contradictory demands for clan-based domestic factions for
representation in his government and from the donor powers for an
effective administration and broader power sharing. It is highly
unlikely that he can satisfy both demands or even either one alone. As
Hussein attempts to please the donors, he will rouse the opposition of
the factions, which have on their side the fact that the T.F.G. is based
on a system of clan representation. Just because the factions failed to
unite on Hussein's original list does not mean that they will be ready
to acquiesce in a reduced list that will diminish their power
substantially.

It is also unlikely that even if a list satisfying the donor powers
carries parliament, they will provide the financial and technical aid
necessary for the T.F.G. actually to govern, deliver services and
initiate reconstruction. Hussein appears to be in an untenable position
and the T.F.G. appears to be destined to continued failure.

A Resurgent Opposition

The failure of the T.F.G. has been underscored by statements from some
of its own officials that the security situation in Somalia has gone out
of control. On December 13, Sheikh Qasim Ibrahim Nur, director of
security at the National Security Ministry, announced that 80 percent of
the country was outside the control of the T.F.G., and that the Courts'
forces had regrouped and were "everywhere." Presidential spokesman
Mohamed Mahmoud Nur followed, saying that the Courts' fighters had been
reinforced by up to 4,500 foreign jihadists. Both officials appealed to
external actors for immediate help.

On December 20, the T.F.G.'s temporary interior minister, Mohammed
Mahmoud Guled, appealed specifically to the Arab League for aid in
hunting down al-Qaeda cells in Somalia that he said are working with an
alliance of the radical Islamist Youth Mujahideen Movement (Y.M.M.),
which had split from the I.C.C. after the Ethiopian intervention, and
"old leaders from the Courts" to intensify the insurgency against the
Ethiopian occupation.

Although the grim assessments of T.F.G. officials are possibly
exaggerated in order to get the attention of external actors, PINR's
monitoring of daily reports of violent events confirms that despite
continued Ethiopian attempts to crush it, the insurgency continues
unabated and has spread to most of the regions of Somalia south of the
sub-state of Puntland.

More significant than the mere continuation of the insurgency are signs
that the opposition has begun to coalesce around a more militant line
emphasizing armed resistance. Warnings from T.F.G. officials that the
Y.M.M. and the Courts' leadership had healed their rift were confirmed
through December. On December 10, Yusuf Indha'ade, defense minister of
the Courts-dominated Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (A.R.S.),
who had been reported to have joined with the Y.M.M., declared that the
T.F.G. was a "colonial government" and that Hussein was a "yes-man" for
Yusuf.

On December 16, Mukhtar Ali Robow, former deputy defense minister of the
I.C.C. and then commander of the Y.M.M., announced from the Bay region
-- where the T.F.G.'s transitional capital Baidoa is located -- that his
forces were planning to launch "the most enormous attacks," and repeated
that the Y.M.M. was committed to establishing a Somali state based on
Shari'a law. (Robow was reported to have been replaced in late December
by Sheikh Mukhtar Abdirahman Abu-Zubeyr, who had trained in Afghanistan
under the Taliban, and is likely to continue the hard line.)

On December 18, A.R.S. spokesman Sheikh Abdirahim Mudey said that Courts
officials and fighters were "everywhere" in Somalia. He denied that the
insurgents were preparing to invade the key southern port city of
Kismayo, adding "we are there right now." On December 16, a Y.M.M.
commander in Kismayo had told the Associated Press that he was sending
fighters to Somalia's official capital Mogadishu "every day" to engage
the Ethiopians.

Although both the speaker of the transitional parliament, Adan Madobe
Mohamed, and the U.N. special envoy to Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah,
reported discussions between the T.F.G. and some A.R.S. leaders, those
reports were not confirmed by the A.R.S. and, according to Madobe, met
with mixed results. On balance, it appears that the opposition senses
Hussein's weakness, allowing the hawks to gain preponderant influence.
Whether or not the military option is timely for the Courts, the fact
that it is being taken makes it nearly impossible for Hussein to woo the
opposition into his government and thereby satisfy the donor powers,
which want to isolate the militants by co-opting the moderate
opposition.

Hussein has also had little success with the dissident clans linked in
the Hawiye Tradition and Unity Council, which have resisted the
Ethiopian occupation in Mogadishu, have suffered most from Ethiopian
crackdowns and population displacements, and whose leaders have been
arrested or gone into hiding. Speaking from a safe haven, Tradition and
Unity leader Mohamed Hassan Haad told ISN Security Watch that Hussein
does not represent the Hawiye clan family and "does not have the
blessing of the elders."

An Impatient Ethiopia

The consensus of all domestic and external actors, as well as analysts
and journalists, affirms that the T.F.G. could not currently survive the
withdrawal of Ethiopian military support. After a year of occupying
Somalia, however, Addis Ababa -- faced with the T.F.G.'s implosion and
the persistence of the insurgency -- is losing patience with the donor
powers over their failure to give sufficient support for the expansion
of a small and ineffective African Union peacekeeping mission (AMISOM)
in Mogadishu, and appears to be considering a policy shift that would
distance it from the T.F.G., over which it no longer has preponderant
influence.

Addis   Ababa wants a robust international or regional peacekeeping
mission to be implemented that would replace its forces in Somalia, but
sees little promise that its interest will be satisfied. At present,
there are 1,600 Ugandan troops in Mogadishu out of a projected force of
8,000, with an advance party of Burundian peacekeepers on the ground to
prepare for a deployment of 1,700.

The rift between the donor powers, which favor an Ethiopian withdrawal,
but only on the condition that there is an effective replacement for the
occupation, and Addis Ababa surfaced on December 20, when Ethiopia's
prime minister, Meles Zenawi, told the BBC that even increasing the
present AMISOM deployment to half its projected number would "go a long
way to making the appropriate environment for us to withdraw." He joined
his remarks to a condemnation of U.N. humanitarian agencies for their
charges that the occupation had been committing serious human rights
abuses in its crackdown on the insurgency, saying that the situation in
Somalia -- as "bad as it is -- could do with less hype and
exaggeration."

On December 10, an Ethiopian government statement had attacked the donor
powers and regional states for not delivering on their pledges to
recruit and supply a peacekeeping force: "Ethiopia has single-handedly
been playing its role by bearing the large responsibility that the
international community and countries failed to accomplish in
collaboration or individually."

Signs that Addis Ababa was reconsidering its strategy toward Somalia
appeared in an interview with Ethiopia's foreign minister, Seyoum
Mesfin, published in the newspaper Nouvelles d'Addis and posted on
December 12 on the Nazret website. Mesfin remarked that "Somalia cannot
be reconstituted in the old way," noting that the country's regions were
"insisting on decentralized state structures." He concluded that the
"new reality" needed to be "addressed by peaceful means."

Both Zenawi's public expression of displeasure with the donor powers and
Mesfin's acknowledgment of a "new reality" in Somalia indicate Addis
Ababa's slackening resolve to continue the occupation. Ethiopia would be
satisfied with a "decentralized" Somalia, which would eliminate the
latter as a potential security threat and would allow Addis Ababa to
gain influence through its traditional divide-and-rule strategy.

Addis   Ababa has made it clear that it is not a reluctant ally of the
donor powers, to which it is tied by a marriage of convenience that is
under severe strain. Although Addis Ababa, which is itself financially
dependent on donor powers, is unlikely to make any precipitous policy
shift, it is preparing an exit strategy. Ethiopia's faltering commitment
does not bode well for Hussein's prospects of staying afloat.

An Irresolute "International Community"

If Ethiopia is the T.F.G.'s military support, the donor powers -- the
United States, the European Union and the U.N. -- are its economic
lifeline; without them, not only would there be no aid to alleviate
Somalia's devastating humanitarian crisis, but there also would be no
funds to sustain the T.F.G.'s existence.

Having, for the moment, taken center stage by pressing Hussein into
their corner, the donor powers are confronted with Somalia's "new
reality" -- an imploded T.F.G. on which they have staked themselves, a
defiant and militant Courts-led opposition alliance, and a flagging
Addis Ababa. Reluctant to take up the challenge to be a protagonist,
they have stood pat in their diplomatic support of the T.F.G. and their
unwillingness to make that support materially effective, dealing Hussein
his final blow.

The U.N.'s envoy to Somalia, Ould-Abdallah, understood the gravity of
the situation, the slim opportunity presented by the donor powers'
momentary position of influence, and the new reality. In advance of a
Security Council meeting on Somalia on December 19, he told the
Financial Times that international efforts in Somalia had been
"half-hearted" and were dissipating, even as the insurgency had
"escalated." He warned that a robust peacekeeping presence would be
essential to "political progress" in Somalia, and concluded: "The
credibility of the U.N. is at stake."

Ould-Abdallah expanded upon his comments when he addressed the Security
Council and bluntly stated that its "wait-and-see attitude" was a
prescription for failure in Somalia, and that it was "time to decide
whether to give up and withdraw aid" or to "find a new strategy." He
suggested trying to convince Saudi Arabia to coordinate a mission to
expand AMISOM that would be recruited from Muslim countries and would
receive logistical support from "one or two NATO states."

On December 19, the Security Council took up Somalia and issued a
non-binding presidential statement disregarding Ould-Abdallah's warning
and plea, and reaffirming its previous policies, including support for
AMISOM and calls for contributions to it, calls for "full and
all-inclusive national reconciliation," and calls to strengthen efforts
to provide humanitarian relief. The Council said that Hussein's
appointment offered "a renewed opportunity to make further progress,"
and called for the T.F.G. to provide a "roadmap" for the transitional
period that is supposed to end in 2009 with national elections held
under a permanent constitution that has not yet begun to be drafted.

As a Somali proverb would have it, the T.F.G. has become "sand in the
hands" of the donor powers. They fail to acknowledge the new reality in
Somalia because any other alternative seems to be too costly to them.
They realize that in Somalia's current security environment, a broadened
peacekeeping mission would be a high stakes gamble, would be difficult
to recruit for, and would be expensive to fund were it to be effective.
They are ambivalent about dealing with the Courts. They fear the
destabilizing effects of "decentralization," yet are unwilling to expend
the resources for nation-building. That is why they clutch the sands of
the T.F.G. and watch statelessness settle in.

On December 21, the African Union Peace and Security Council (P.S.C.)
issued its own statement, scoring the international community for
failing to "seize the window of opportunity" opened up by the Ethiopian
intervention. The P.S.C. concluded that the international community and
Somalia's domestic political actors needed "to explore new avenues in
order to effectively address the current situation and to muster the
required political will and resources."

Conclusion

With general acknowledgment among the major actors in Somalia's
conflicts -- except for the donor powers -- that the country has
returned to its former condition of statelessness -- the meaning of
Mesfin's "new reality" -- what "new avenues" might there be that would
lead to stabilization?

One possibility is the revival of the Islamic state that had begun to
develop when the Courts movement controlled much of southern and central
Somalia in 2006. That alternative, which seemed to have been eliminated
by the Ethiopian intervention, has again become actionable, although its
probability of realization remains low, given resistance from the other
major players and much of Somali society. Nonetheless, at the moment,
the opposition is the only actor evincing momentum.

The other alternatives for Somalia's political future, which are
increasingly proposed and debated on Somali websites, break with the
T.F.G.'s hybrid structure of a central government grafted on a system of
clan representation, taking one of its elements for a new political
formula. Centralists recommend a unified and streamlined government
transcending clan representation, where as decentralists urge a
"bottom-up" approach in which regional conferences would pave the way
for local conflict resolution and the establishment of legitimate
regional administrations.

The roadblock to progress up either "new avenue" is the lack of
mobilized popular impetus, which, in consequence, means that the impulse
to move would have to be provided by external actors with the will to
commit the required resources. In practical terms, the centralist
approach finds its correlate in the attempts of the donor powers to
impose an efficient central government on the clan-based T.F.G., and the
decentralist approach translates into the proposal circulating in the
U.S. military and reportedly in Addis Ababa to cantonize Somalia in
order to contain the insurgency.

Neither of the practical alternatives would draw Somalia out of
statelessness, the first because the T.F.G. executive is too weak to
bear its burden, and the second -- especially if it would involve
recognizing the independence of the self-declared republic of Somaliland
-- because it would void the possibility of an integrated political
community in Somalia.

The "required political will and resources" that would lift Somalia out
of its "new reality" are nowhere to be found.

Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein



http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=734&language_id=\
1
<http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=734&language_id\
=1>



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