Defining moment for the Balkans
The year 2008 will be a decisive one for the Balkans, particularly for
Kosovo, Serbia proper, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. And as the
international community dangles carrots and offers up unearned rewards
in an attempt to appease the perceived losers in the Kosovo status game,
regardless of the outcome, bloodshed is likely.

Editor's Note: This is the first in ISN Security Watch's 2008 Prognosis
series. Please find a link to the entire series at the end of this
article.

Prognosis by Anes Alic for ISN Security Watch (21/12/07)

The political and security focus in the Balkans in 2008 will depend on
the outcome of a status resolution for the Serbian province of Kosovo,
whose ethnic Albanian leaders have vowed to declare independence in
February.

The international community will be closely monitoring developments in
other countries in the region, fearing that a unilateral proclamation of
independence in Kosovo and Serbia's reaction could profoundly affect
particularly Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Should Kosovo declare independence, international community officials
involved in the process are preparing for a low-level insurgency.
International forces already have begun boosting their military and
police strength, faced with the possibility that an insurgency could
spill over into Macedonia, southern Serbia and Bosnia.

Whatever decision on Kosovo is made, some form of violence is
inevitable, and the international community is hoping that its forces in
the form of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)
will manage to keep the situation under control. Even though both sides,
the ethnic Albanians and Serbs, have called for a peaceful end to the
status process, they have also made it clear that they will accept
nothing short of a decision in their respective favors. Both sides have
armed paramilitary forces ready to "defend their homeland."
Likely scenarios
Should Kosovo's Albanian leaders fulfill their promise and proclaim
unilateral independence in February - a move that will largely depend on
the level of the support from western powers - several scenarios are
likely, though the order in which they are played out is less
predictable.

First of all, the Serbian majority in northern Kosovo will reject an
independence proclamation and seek form of autonomy for the area in an
attempt to remain tied to Serbia proper. Indeed, Serbian enclaves in
Kosovo are still completely politically and financially integrated with
Serbia, including administratively and with regard to schools, health
care and retirement funds.

On 11 December 2007, Serbia opened a government office in Kosovo's
ethnically divided town of Mitrovica, saying it would "serve to
intensify Belgrade's parallel network of services for Serbs." The move
was criticized by the UN, which called the move a deliberate
provocation.

However, the creation of a Serbian majority entity within the borders of
an independent Kosovo will resound throughout other former Yugoslav
republics - all of which have their own disgruntled minorities whose
political representatives have promised greater autonomy.

For its part, the Albanian minority in southern Serbia has warned that
if Kosovo Serbs create an autonomous entity in the province, the ethnic
Albanians in that region would attempt to create a similar autonomous
entity there.

Next in line would be Macedonia, whose 25 percent ethnic Albanian
minority and their radical leaders have pledged an armed rebellion and
secession from the country, with the aim of integrating with Kosovo.
However, such a move lacks support from ethnic Albanian political
leaders in the Macedonian government.

Since November 2007, Macedonian paramilitary groups, led by the Albanian
National Army (ANA) - a group operating in Kosovo and Macedonia and
listed as a terrorist organization by the US and the EU - threatened to
renew the 2001 rebellion and already has clashed several times with
Macedonian forces, which have very limited authority in the areas of the
country bordering Kosovo.

Macedonian secessionists are closely monitoring the Kosovo status
solution, and regardless of the outcome, Macedonia will face political
and security instability.

Finally, the final Kosovo solution will have a serious ripple effect in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and pose grave consequences for the country's
territorial integrity.

Bosnia's Serb-dominated entity of Republika Srpska was created during
the war on the territory the Bosnian Serb military conquered between
1992 and 1995. By the end of the war, Republika Srpska was a largely
ethnically cleansed territory, legalized by the Dayton Peace Agreement.

Since 1996, most international community efforts have been focused on
stripping powers (both economic and military) from the country's
separate entities and, for all intents and purposes, doing away with
these separate governments and working toward a unified country.

However, Republika Srpska's existence as a separate entity created
through the results of a military conflict and based on a simple ethnic
majority has in some respects legitimized the calls of other separatists
in the region.

Politicians in Republika Srpska, which comprises 49 percent of Bosnian
territory, have warned that should Kosovo declare or be granted
independence by the international community, they will hold a referendum
among Bosnian Serbs to vote on secession from Bosnia and annexation to
Serbia. According to a November 2007 public opinion poll held in
Republika Srpska, 77 percent of Bosnian Serbs believed Serbs should
break away from Bosnia if Kosovo Albanians seceded from Serbia.
Waiting on Belgrade
It is still not clear how Serbia will react should Kosovo gain
independence, though Belgrade has said that a military response is not
an option.It has threatened to impose an economic and travel blockade on
Kosovo in the event that the province declared independence. Such a move
would include cutting telephone and electricity services, which could
paralyze the province for some time.

Whether Kosovo's ethnic Albanian leaders will choose to unilaterally
declare independence depends largely on the amount of perceived support
for such a move from western power houses. It is expected that the US
and a handful of EU countries will be the first in the line to
officially recognize an independent Kosovo.

Serbia has not of yet announced a course of action against those
countries that choose to officially recognize an independent Kosovo. But
Belgrade could decide to sever diplomatic ties with and recall its
ambassadors from those countries. Initiating trade embargoes with the
latter, however, would have a negative impact on the Serbian economy.

Belgrade's most probable course of action will be through "legalese" in
the form of declaring the ethnic Albanian parts of Kosovo in violation
of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 by seceding from the sovereign
territory of Serbia.

Serbia could use this resolution to keep the northern part of Kosovo and
its Serbian majority under Belgrade's authority.

The Kosovo issue will be the focus of the upcoming Serbian presidential
elections set for 20 January, even though more or less all candidates
hold the same stance concerning Kosovo - that it is an integral part of
Serbia.
Outside forces and appeasement rewards
The success of eventual international recognition of an independent
Kosovo will also depend on Russia's reaction. So far, the traditional
Serbian ally has managed to block all western efforts to grant Kosovo
independence, but has stopped short of suggesting an alternative
solution other than to opine that no decision can be made on Kosovo
without Belgrade's approval.

Presumably, Russia will continue to insist on further negotiations
between Belgrade and Pristina, though the US, Britain and France
rejected such a call on 12 December, after another round of talks failed
and it became clear that finding a solution to satisfy all parties would
be impossible.

Regarding the unstable political and security situation in Serbia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina, in 2008 the EU will step up efforts to bring those
two countries closer to integration.

In November and December 2007, the EU initialed the Stabilization and
Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
first step toward membership, even though the two countries showed no
visible progress. The signings were widely seen as an attempt to appease
local leaders and prevent radicalization.

On 17 November, the EU initialed the SAA with Serbia, despite the fact
that the main obstacle to the agreement, Serbia's failure to arrest and
hand over Bosnian Serb wartime general Ratko Mladic, has not been
cleared. Then on 4 December, the EU initialed the same agreement with
Bosnia, even though just weeks before, the country was facing the worst
political crisis in its post-war history.

One of the main pre-negotiation conditions between Bosnia and the EU is
police and constitution reform, both intended to strengthen state-level
institutions. Since 2005, local leaders have failed to make any progress
on these reforms due the Bosnian Serb fears that the suspension of the
separate Republika Srpska police and further stripping of its power
through constitutional changes would ultimately mean the entity's
demise. Now that the international community has postponed the police
reform requirement, some progress can be expected in 2008, as long it
does not interfere with ethnic interests.

The initialing of the SAA with Bosnia-Herzegovina was made possible
after local leaders pledged to solve the problem of police reform or
face international community sanctions. Nonetheless, progress on these
reforms in 2008 is unlikely, as the country's ethnic leaders have not
changed their stances and show no signs of budging to reach consensus.

For its part, Serbia can expect quicker EU integration as it holds the
key to stability in its hands, with EU country leaders describing Serbia
"as the region's lynchpin," which must not be allowed to "destabilize."

Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Jansa, who will take over the EU's
rotating presidency in January, said in a recent statement that Serbia
could win EU membership candidate status in mid-2008.

A similar message was sent following a 14 December meeting of EU leaders
in Brussels, where they stressed that independence for Kosovo from
Serbia was inevitable but that Serbia could earn itself expedited EU
accession on two conditions: that it fully cooperate with the war crimes
tribunal in The Hague, with or without arrest of Ratko Mladic, and that
is recognize an independent Kosovo. At the same meeting, EU leaders also
agreed in principle to send a 1,800-strong security force to Kosovo.

But even if Serbia were to accept these two conditions, which Belgrade
initially rejected, it would spark heated discussion within the EU,
where some members fear that granting Kosovo independence without
Serbia's explicit approval could undermine their own territorial
integrity. Russia, opposing Kosovo's independence, continues to argue
that half a dozen ethnic enclaves around the Black Sea would be inspired
to declare independence following the Kosovo example.





Anes Alic, based in Sarajevo, is ISN Security Watch's senior
correspondent in Southeastern Europe and the Executive Director of ISA
Consulting <http://www.isaintel.com/> .

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=18493
<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=18493>





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