Report: Day after Bhutto assassination, US Predator targeted Islamist ideologue


01/01/2008 @ 11:17 am

Filed by Muriel Kane 



 In the wake of last week's assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the Pakistan 
bureau chief of Asia Times is  
<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JA01Df01.html> laying responsibility 
for the killing on a new and more radical splinter group of al-Qaeda. 

According to journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad, the United States retaliated 
against the head of that faction immediately following the attack on Bhutto:

"This nest of takfiris and their intrigues was on the radar of the US Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the day after Bhutto's killing Sheikh Essa was 
targeted by CIA Predator drones in his home in North Waziristan. According to 
Asia Times Online contacts, he survived, but was seriously wounded. Sheikh Essa 
had only recently recovered from a stroke which had left him bedridden."

There have been no other press reports of such an attack and no US claims of 
responsibility. However, the US never does acknowledge participating in events 
of this sort. For example, in October 2006, a religious school on the 
Afghan-Pakistan border  
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,25689-2429853,00.html> was destroyed 
in an airstrike, killing 80 suspected militants and leading to angry protests. 
Mulitiple reports indicated the school had been hit by a US Predator drone, but 
a Pakistani army spokesman denied any direct US involvement.

Shazad's belief that Bhutto was assassinated as part of an al-Qaeda operation 
to prevent the emergence of a more liberal and secular Pakistan has  
<http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSISL1703420080101> been promoted by 
the Pakistani leadership but does not appear to be widely shared. Most  
<http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/opinion/balance/stories/DN-State.Edition1.0101edi_Viewp.TX1.State.Edition1.4d7cdd3.html>
 current speculation is focused on suspicions of complicity by elements within 
President Musharraf's government.

However, Shazad's discussion of Sheikh Essa, his radical takfiri followers, and 
his growing influence in the Pakistani border region of Waziristan may still 
shed light on the current turmoil in that country.

The Egyptian-born Sheikh Essa -- originally known as Abu Amro Abdul Hakeem --  
<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GK04Ak01.html> teaches that all 
non-practicing Muslims are anti-God, so that jihadis are justified in taking 
arms not merely against foreign troops but also against secular Muslim 
governments. He is particularly influential in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, with 
his claims that the leaders of those two countries, as well as Egypt, Jordan, 
and Yemen, should be targeted for elimination.

According to Shazad, the split between the takfiris and more traditional 
jihadis explains much of what has happened across the Middle East over the last 
several years, as outside radicals come into conflict with local resistance 
movements like the insurgents in Iraq or the Taliban in Afghanistan. 

 <http://mondediplo.com/2007/07/02al-qaida> Shazad writes, "Many of the foreign 
volunteers who have flooded into Pakistan and Iraq since 2003 are Takfirists, 
who regard 'bad Muslims' as the real enemy. Indigenous Islamic resistance 
groups have reacted uncomfortably to the growth of this near-heresy within 
al-Qaida which, by waging war against Muslim governments, has brought chaos to 
the populations it claims to defend."

Sheikh Essa has gained many adherents in North Waziristan, including former 
members of other jihadi outfits. One warlord in South Waziristan, Baitullah 
Mehsud, recently advanced the goal of denying legitimacy to Pakistan's national 
government by declaring "Islamic Emirates" in the region and pressing for a 
boycott of Pakistan's upcoming national elections. The Pakistani Interior 
Ministry  <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1699138,00.html> has 
even claimed that Mehsud was behind the attack on Bhutto, but he has denied it.


  _____  

Al-Qaeda aims at Pakistan's heart
By Syed Saleem Shahzad 

 <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JA01Df01.html> 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JA01Df01.html

KARACHI - As the shockwaves continue to reverberate across Pakistan following 
the assassination of former premier Benazir Bhutto on December 27, and 
political parties declare their intention to contest national elections 
scheduled for January 8, the threat to the country's political system remains 
as dire as ever. 

Following the killing of Bhutto - considered by her al-Qaeda killers to be an 
"American asset" - al-Qaeda can be expected to launch more suicide attackers on 
those considered a part of the United States plan to establish a broad 
coalition government comprising secular and liberal elements that would change 
the political and social dynamics of the country and the region. 

At stake is the very soul of the country and how it should be governed. 

On the one side are US-backed President Pervez Musharraf and political parties 
such as Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (now headed by her 19-year-old son 
Bilawal) and Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League. 

Against them are al-Qaeda ideologues such as Egyptian scholar Sheikh Essa, who 
are determined to stamp their vision on the country and its neighbor, 
Afghanistan. 

Prior to 2003, the entire al-Qaeda camp in the North Waziristan and South 
Waziristan tribal areas of Pakistan was convinced that its battle should be 
fought in Afghanistan against the foreign troops there, and not in Pakistan 
against its Muslim army. 

That stance was changed by Sheikh Essa, who had taken up residence in the town 
of Mir Ali in North Waziristan, where his sermons raised armies of takfiris 
(those who consider all non-practicing Muslims to be infidels). He was 
convinced that unless Pakistan became the Taliban's (and al-Qaeda's) strategic 
depth, the war in Afghanistan could not be won. 

In a matter of a few years, his ideology has taken hold and all perceived 
American allies in Pakistan have become prime targets. Local adherents of the 
takfiri ideology, like Sadiq Noor and Abdul Khaliq, have grown strong and 
spread the word in North Waziristan. Former members of jihadi outfits such as 
Jaish-i-Mohammed, Laskhar-i-Toiba and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi have gathered in North 
Waziristan and declared Sheikh Essa their ideologue. 

This is the beginning of the new world of takfiriat, reborn in North Waziristan 
many decades after having first emerged in Egypt in the late 1960s. On the 
advice of Sheikh Essa, militants have tried several times to assassinate 
Musharraf, launched attacks on the Pakistani military, and then declared Bhutto 
a target. 

This nest of takfiris and their intrigues was on the radar of the US Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the day after Bhutto's killing Sheikh Essa was 
targeted by CIA Predator drones in his home in North Waziristan. According to 
Asia Times Online contacts, he survived, but was seriously wounded. Sheikh Essa 
had only recently recovered from a stroke which had left him bedridden. 

This somewhat dampened the jubilation in the jihadi camps over Bhutto's death 
and al-Qaeda members had to flee to safe havens. Nevertheless, their intention 
to carry out more attacks is as steadfast as ever. 

Bhutto's assassination was without doubt al-Qaeda's most successful operation 
in the region, even if there is some dispute over exactly how she died. The 
Pakistani government claims she hit her head on a lever of the sun visor of the 
car in which she was travelling in Rawalpindi when she ducked on hearing a 
suicide bomb go off nearby. Her family and party members vigorously dispute 
this claim, saying she was shot twice. 

Al-Qaeda tried to kill Bhutto on October 18 on her return to Pakistan from 
years of exile. Nearly 200 people were killed in that bombing, but she was 
unhurt. In November, a close aide of Musharraf and president of the then-ruling 
Pakistan Muslim League, Amir Muqam, was attacked by a suicide attacker. His 
brother was killed but he survived. 

This month, former interior minister Aftab Shepao was targeted at a prayer 
congregation. His son and nephew were injured but he survived. Shepao was a key 
figure in orchestrating the storming of the radical Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in 
Islamabad in July. The mosque was pro-Taliban and a haven for militants. 
Similarly, on Sunday, former minister of religious affairs Ejaz ul-Haq, another 
central figure in the Lal Masjid operation, was attacked by a suicide bomber, 
but survived. 

Musharraf has always been at the top of al-Qaeda's hit list, but he is a 
difficult target so his close allies are being targeted. 

In this context it is expected that Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the head of a 
faction of the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam and former leader of the opposition in 
the National Assembly, will be a target. Like Bhutto he has been a part of the 
opposition, but he is also considered a part of the bigger US scheme for a 
post-election national coalition government to support Musharraf and provide a 
popular base for the US-led "war on terror" in the region. 

Meanwhile, rioting in the wake of Bhutto's death eased on Sunday after 
destruction that killed at least 44 people and caused tens of millions of 
dollars in damage. Since the angry mobs could not get at the shadowy figures of 
al-Qaeda, they vented their frustration by attacking the offices of the former 
ruling Pakistan Muslim League and its loyalists. 

The Pakistani Taliban, raised under al-Qaeda's ideology, are geared to set up 
an "Islamic Emirates" in defiance of the state of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The 
first shots have already been fired in the restive Waziristans, where emirates 
were recently declared. 

Baitullah Mehsud, a warlord from South Waziristan and the chief of the 
emirates, subsequently declared a boycott of January's elections. Although he 
withdrew the announcement when he was pressed by senior clergy and local 
political leaders, the withdrawal was only superficial as the real ideologues 
of the emirates, like Sheikh Essa, want to discard Pakistan's political system. 

As a result, it now emerges that the Pakistani Taliban have suspended the 
election campaign in Dara Adam Khail in North-West Frontier Province and other 
tribal areas and towns. 

In the coming days, al-Qaeda's takfiri ideologues have a dotted line to follow 
and that dotted line clearly aims to frustrate American designs. 

Syed Saleem Shahzad is Asia Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief. He can be 
reached at [EMAIL PROTECTED] 

(Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us 
about  
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  _____  

Al-Qaeda goes back to base
By Syed Saleem Shahzad 

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GK04Ak01.html 

Nov 4, 2005 

KARACHI - Al-Qaeda is in the process of a decisive ideological debate that 
could see the highly secretive group restructured within a year, with bases in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, and adopting a more open, centralized, approach. 

Two issues lie at the heart of the matter. The first is whether al-Qaeda 
achieves its aims by "fighting against evil", or whether it "fights against 
evil and its allies", according to contacts familiar with the group who spoke 
to Asia Times Online. 

The second issue involves al-Qaeda's lack of a physical base, a matter of 
concern to Islamic scholars, following its retreat from Afghanistan and 
subsequently being forced out of hideouts along the Afghanistan-Pakistan 
border. 

Regarding the discourse on al-Qaeda's enemy, on one side a major portion of 
al-Qaeda wants to remain true to the original goal of ousting foreign forces 
from the Persian Gulf region and ending the occupation of Muslim territories; 
on the other, a powerful group led by Egyptian Abu Amro Abdul Hakeem, also 
known as Sheikh Essa, who has strongly influenced elements in Pakistan and 
Saudi Arabia, believes that the targets should be extended. 

In al-Qaeda jargon, there are dajal (anti-God) forces, and there are allies of 
dajal. The US and its European allies are dajal forces, and remain the primary 
target of the majority in al-Qaeda. 

Sheikh Essa argues that the Muslim leaderships in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Jordan, 
Egypt and, not least, Pakistan should not be considered pro-God forces, as they 
are now. 

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are central in this debate. Sheikh Essa fervently 
believes that the Pakistani military is as bad as that of the US, and thus 
should be categorized as a dajal force whose leader, President General Pervez 
Musharraf, sides with the US with full conviction. 

The October 8 earthquake in South Asia, which has claimed tens of thousands of 
lives, most of them in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, has added incendiary 
clout to Sheikh Essa, whose followers now claim that the disaster was God's 
revenge against Pakistan, especially as it took place exactly on the fourth 
anniversary of the launch of US air sorties from Pakistani bases to strike 
against Afghanistan, where al-Qaeda had a strong presence. 

The Sheikh Essa faction has other reasons to hate the Pakistani establishment 
as it is seen as having betrayed the al-Qaeda cause by handing over hundreds of 
al-Qaeda members, and even their children and wives, to US authorities; this 
following Pakistan's reversal of its support for the Taliban and the Pakistani 
army being sent into the tribal areas to root out foreign fighters and members 
of the Afghan resistance. 

Osama bin Laden has always resisted taking the fight to Muslim countries. 
According to scholars such as Saad al-Faqih, who is considered very close to 
al-Qaeda, bin Laden understands that a major blow against Saudi Arabia would 
bring down the regime, but the ensuing chaos and mayhem would be reason for the 
US to justify sending its troops into the holy land. 

The senior al-Qaeda leadership believes that only Musharraf is "pro-dajal", and 
not the Pakistani Army; therefore for the time being they want to leave 
Pakistan alone and keep their focus on the US. 

Asia Times Online contacts close to al-Qaeda say that recently the top 
leadership has become alarmed at the widening split within the organization and 
has begun consultations with all major Islamic jihadi groups and scholars. 

Pending the results of these deliberations, expected by the end of this 
northern winter, a definitive and final word on the real course of the struggle 
will be reached, after which major decisions are expected on the shape and 
nature of al-Qaeda. 

Back to base
Many among Islamic groups, scholars and educated masses in the Islamic world 
are sympathetic with al-Qaeda's struggle against US imperialism, but they have 
serious reservations over its shadowy nature and its methods of operation, many 
of which, they believe, go against the tenets of Islam. 

>From the days of the Prophet Mohammed it has been established that neither the 
>message of Islam nor its struggle is a secret. Therefore, Muslim scholars are 
>agreed that an Islamic state is a prerequisite before - and from which - jihad 
>can be waged. 

This places al-Qaeda in something of a spot, as nowadays it has no "home base" 
from which to wage jihad. In discussions in the past several months with 
prominent scholars and a top leader of an Islamic group (followed by Asia Times 
Online contacts), al-Qaeda leaders argued that they were fighting a defensive 
jihad as Afghanistan had been attacked and occupied, followed by Iraq. Since 
they don't have a piece of land in their possession, al-Qaeda has had to 
conduct irregular and guerrilla warfare. 

However, the contacts maintain that the al-Qaeda leadership is optimistic that 
by the start of summer next year they will be in control of significant "space" 
in Iraq and in Afghanistan, which would legitimize their jihad in the eyes of 
scholars. 

This would include appointing an ameer (commander) whose name would be 
announced, and al-Qaeda's irregular fighting would be organized under one 
command. The existing setup of small, virtually independent cells would be 
subsumed under the single command, and no one would operate on their own, as 
has been the trend since al-Qaeda lost their base in Afghanistan following the 
ouster of the Taliban in late 2001, and the intense pressure of the US-led "war 
on terror", which saw many communication and financial links severed. 

The cells would fall under single commands in Iraq and Afghanistan, from where 
they would be directed for external operations, such as launching attacks on 
the US. 

If al-Qaeda prevails over its internal conflicts and adopts the strategy as 
outlined above, it would be a major turning point not only for the 
organization, but for the whole of the Muslim world and beyond. 

Dawa (Islamic message), hijra (evolution from an enemy state into an Islamic 
state) and jihad are the three stages based on the life of the Prophet Mohammed 
to bring about revolution in society. 

In essence, al-Qaeda, which means means "the base" in Arabic, is in search of a 
physical base, like the mujahideen had during the Soviet resistance period in 
Afghanistan in the 1980s, when they grabbed all rural Afghanistan, or like the 
one al-Qaeda had two years ago when it moved into the Shawal and Shakai areas 
near South and North Waziristan on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, before 
being driven out by combined US and Pakistan efforts. 

Once new bases are found - al-Qaeda confidently believes this will be done in 
Iraq and Afghanistan - the process of dawa, hijra and jihad will begin, and 
many presently peripheral Islamic groups across the world will pour into these 
two countries for a reinvigorated campaign against US forces. 

Syed Saleem Shahzad, Bureau Chief, Pakistan Asia Times Online. He can be 
reached at [EMAIL PROTECTED] 

(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us 
for information on  
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  _____  

Global jihad splits into wars between Muslims
Al-Qaida: the unwanted guests 

July 2007 <http://mondediplo.com/2007/07/> 

http://mondediplo.com/2007/07/02al-qaida

As the arc of chaos grows from Afghanistan to Somalia by way of the Middle 
East, the region’s states are growing weaker and their armed groups gaining in 
power. But in this battle for competing visions between the US and al-Qaida, 
the Sunni resistance is now opposing al-Qaida in Iraq, as are the Taliban in 
Afghanistan.
By Syed Saleem Shahzad 

There is a widening split between armed Islamists, as two recent incidents 
show. In March the local Taliban in the Pakistani tribal zone of South 
Waziristan killed foreign fighters from the al-Qaida-affiliated Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan. Almost simultaneously, infighting broke out between the 
Islamic Army in Iraq and the local branch of al-Qaida. The confrontation 
between the two strategies – and two different ideologies – of the Islamist 
struggle is getting more violent.

Many of the foreign volunteers who have flooded into Pakistan and Iraq since 
2003 are Takfirists, who regard “bad Muslims” as the real enemy (see 
‘Takfirism: a  <http://mondediplo.com/2007/07/03takfirism> messianic 
ideology’). Indigenous Islamic resistance groups have reacted uncomfortably to 
the growth of this near-heresy within al-Qaida which, by waging war against 
Muslim governments, has brought chaos to the populations it claims to defend.

Between 2003 and 2006, across the war zone that is the two Waziristans, 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the complexity of the situation reinforced al-Qaida’s 
doctrinaire thinking and reduced indigenous groups to silence. The consequence 
of Takfirist influence was the emergence in the two Waziristans of a 
self-styled Islamic state that challenged the writ of the Pakistan government 
within its own boundaries and fuelled the spread of armed conflict to major 
cities. The aim was to provoke armed insurrection against the pro-western 
military regime.

The fierce response of the Pakistani army led to the deaths of hundreds of 
non-combatants, including women and children, and fuelled the anger of 
Takfirist ideologues. But many Taliban leaders privately felt that the 
Takfirists had lost touch with reality and were distorting the sharply focused 
anti-western strategy developed during the 1990s by Osama bin Laden. The war of 
national resistance against foreign occupying forces had been transformed into 
one aimed at Pakistan’s military establishment.

On the eve of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a leading 
Takfirist, arrived from Waziristan to emerge as the frontline resistance 
leader. He publicly pledged allegiance to bin Laden and became the rallying 
point for the foreign militants who coalesced into the Iraqi branch of 
al-Qaida. The situation in Iraq soon came to resemble that in the two 
Waziristans and Afghanistan.


Resistance was slow


Resistance in post-Saddam Iraq was slow to mobilise. The realignment of the 
tribes, fragmented religious groups, former Ba’athist party elements and 
officers from the defunct republican guard into combat units took several 
months. Meanwhile, foreign fighters who had streamed into Iraq from the Muslim 
world to gather beneath the black banners of al-Qaida formed a coordinating 
majlis al-shura (council). They proved more effective than the leadership of 
the internal Iraqi resistance, who were left with little scope to express their 
reservations about the arrivals’ Takfirist ideology. It was left to individual 
elements within the indigenous groups to deplore the excesses of al-Qaida, 
which had begun to concentrate on diverting the struggle against occupying 
forces towards attacks on Shia religious centres.

When, in 2006, al-Qaida announced the formation of an ideologically pure 
Islamic emirate, the strategy of the indigenous resistance groups became 
subservient to al-Qaida’s Takfirist ideology and divisive global agenda. A war 
against foreign occupation had turned into a nightmare of sectarian strife. The 
seeds had been sown for an eventual break between the international combatants 
and the indigenous resistance.

Understanding this split requires an examination of the specific circumstances 
that led to the ideological transformation of al-Qaida during and after the 
jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s.

The Arabs who poured in to join the Afghan resistance fell into two camps, 
Yemeni and Egyptian. The zealots who went to Afghanistan, inspired by their 
local clerics, were mostly in the Yemeni camp. In breaks from fighting they 
spent their days drilling and cooking their food, before going straight to 
sleep after the isha (last prayer of the day). As the Afghan jihad tailed off, 
they went home or melted into the population in Afghanistan or Pakistan, where 
many married. In al-Qaida circles, they were called dravesh, easy-going.

In the Egyptian camp were the politically minded and ideologically motivated. 
Though most belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood (1 
<http://mondediplo.com/2007/07/02al-qaida#nb1> ), they opposed its commitment 
to elections and the democratic process. The Afghan jihad cohered these 
like-minded, often educated, individuals, many of them doctors and engineers or 
former soldiers associated with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad under Ayman 
al-Zawahiri, now Bin Laden’s deputy. This group had been responsible for the 
assassination of president Anwar Sadat in 1981 after he signed a peace deal 
with Israel at Camp David. All agreed that the US and its puppet governments in 
the Middle East were responsible for the decline of the Arab world.


Cultivate the best brains


After the isha the Egyptian camp would discuss contemporary issues. Their 
leaders reiterated the message that members should invest their resources in 
the armies of their countries, and cultivate the best brains.

Al-Qaida emerged from another organisation, Maktab al-Khidamat, the services 
bureau that Abdallah Azzam set up in the early 1980s to support Afghan 
resistance. Azzam was assassinated in 1989 (2 
<http://mondediplo.com/2007/07/02al-qaida#nb2> ); he was succeeded by Bin 
Laden, one of his leading disciples, who transformed the organisation into 
al-Qaida.

During a recent interview in Amman, Azzam’s son Hudayfa, who has spent almost 
20 years among Arab militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan, told me: “Most 
Yemeni fighters, simple minded warriors whose only ambition was martyrdom, left 
Afghanistan after the fall of the Communist government. The Egyptians stayed 
because they had other ambitions as yet unfulfilled. When Osama bin Laden 
joined them, after he left Sudan in 1996, they focused on shifting his basic 
thinking from opposition to American hegemony in the Middle East towards a 
Takfirist perspective.

“When I met Osama bin Laden in 1997 in Islamabad, he was flanked by three 
members of the Egyptian camp: the Somali Abu Obaida, and the Egyptians Abu Haf 
and Saiful Adil. I realised how successfully they had instilled their extremist 
ideas into him. When my father asked him to go to Afghanistan in 1985, he had 
replied that he would only do so if King Fahd personally granted permission. At 
that time Osama still referred to Fahd as wali al-amr (supreme authority). 
After 9/11, when he denounced the rulers of Saudi Arabia, I could see how much 
the Egyptian camp had influenced him.”


A hurried departure


By the beginning of 2006 more than 40,000 trained fighters of Arab, Chechen and 
Uzbek origin joined Waziristanis and other militants from Pakistan’s cities 
congregating in North and South Waziristan. This created a dilemma for the 
Taliban leadership in Afghanistan, because the Takfirists persuaded most of the 
militants to fight Pakistani armed forces in the tribal belt rather than Nato 
coalition troops in Afghanistan.

Tahir Yuldash, a prominent Uzbek militant and Takfirist ideologue based in 
South Waziristan, issued a fatwa supporting this strategic priority. Two 
Taliban leaders in North Waziristan, Maulanas Abdul Khaliq and Sadiq Noor, 
issued similar statements. The declaration of Islamic states in North and South 
Waziristan exacerbated the conflict between the Pakistani military 
establishment and the Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaida.

New hostilities seemed inevitable. The Taliban leadership in Afghanistan 
realised that such a conflict would delay the major offensive against Nato 
troops that it had been preparing for the spring of 2006 (3 
<http://mondediplo.com/2007/07/02al-qaida#nb3> ). Mullah Omar, the Taliban’s 
supreme guide in hiding, sent Mullah Dadullah (an astute commander in southwest 
Afghanistan, killed this May) to persuade the Pakistani Taliban and the 
al-Qaida factions to focus on the offensive rather than dissipate their 
energies. This led to the September 2006 peace accord between the Taliban in 
the tribal zones and the Pakistani security forces. This called for the 
expulsion of foreign fighters and allowed the Pakistani establishment to make 
inroads into the Taliban command structure in the Waziristans. The Pakistani 
Taliban leadership received significant quantities of weapons and money, and 
were invited to Islamabad to win hearts and minds.

The peace accord was the result of the Taliban leadership’s realisation that, 
after five years working with al-Qaida, resistance in Afghanistan, although 
stronger, had reached an impasse. The 2006 offensive was a classic example of 
guerrilla warfare with the help of indigenous support, using improvised 
explosive devices and urban warfare learned in Iraq. But despite major 
casualties among coalition troops (150 killed in 2006), the Taliban were unable 
to achieve important strategic objectives, such as the capture of Kandahar or 
the encirclement of Kabul.

Taliban commanders acknowledged that they could not fight a sustained battle 
against state resources. They believed they could mobilise the masses, but this 
would likely bring bombing and missile strikes killing Taliban sympathisers. 
Their answer was to find their own state resources, and they looked toward 
their former patron, Pakistan; hence the September 2006 accord.

Taliban commanders in Waziristan and Afghanistan were comfortable with the new 
peace deal. They played down the expulsion of foreign fighters, believing these 
would flock to join the resistance in Afghanistan. They were not unhappy to be 
free of al-Qaida and elements developing a global strategy that diverted 
energies from the struggle against Nato forces.


Shattered dreams


But the accord was unacceptable to the global warriors of al-Qaida, who had 
dreamed of the emergence of a regional conflict waged on several fronts from 
their newly won bases in Waziristan. The prospect of small, sporadic battles in 
Afghanistan was no consolation for the shattered dreams of a victory against 
the non-practising Muslim establishment of the Pakistani state. And al-Qaida 
hoped to benefit from new developments.

Already groups of foreign fighters had joined forces under the banner of Ayman 
al-Zawahiri. These included two Libyan groups, Jamaa al-Muqatila led by Sheikh 
Abu Lais al-Libbi, and Ibn al-Malik’s Jabha al-Birra; the Jeish al-Mahdi, 
founded by the Egyptian leader Abdul Rahman Canady and now led by Abu Eza; an 
Egyptian splinter group from the Egyptian Islamic Jihad; Takfirists led by 
Sheikh Essa; and Tahir Yuldash’s Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. According to 
Pakistan intelligence, al-Qaida managed to reactivate some sources of funding, 
particularly from the United Arab Emirates, interrupted after 9/11.

The al-Qaida leadership were threatened by the peace deal between Pakistan and 
the Taliban and feared that the latter would soon fall prey to the machinations 
of the Pakistani intelligence agencies. Al-Qaida sought to sabotage the peace 
accord by exploiting differences between the signatories.

An opportunity came this January, when Pakistani planes bombed an active 
training camp in South Waziristan, killing several foreign fighters. Baitullah 
Mehsud, one of the few Taliban leaders in South Waziristan, renounced the peace 
deal on the grounds that Pakistan had violated it. Tahir Yuldash lent his 
support by dispatching more than a dozen squads of suicide bombers to terrorise 
cities, causing heavy civilian casualties. The Pakistani establishment had 
other concerns: a serious internal crisis after President Musharraf’s decision 
to fire the president of the supreme court, Iftikhar Muhammad Choudhry; and an 
escalating conflict with the Lal Masjid seminaries in Islamabad, which had 
announced Taliban style Islamisation in the capital (4 
<http://mondediplo.com/2007/07/02al-qaida#nb4> ).

The accord survived because it suited both parties. It allowed the Pakistani 
establishment a breathing-space to construct a strategy to counter al-Qaida’s 
grip on the tribal belt. And the Taliban were weary of al-Qaida’s one-sided 
global strategy, which only weakened Afghan resistance.

One episode demonstrated the tensions. Haji Nazir, a little-known Taliban 
commander, supplied with money and weapons by the Pakistani security agencies, 
had established himself as the strong man of South Waziristan. He offered the 
foreigners a simple choice: agree to disarm, or go to reinforce the current 
offensive against Nato troops in Afghanistan.

The foreigners’ predictable refusal escalated into a serious conflict which 
left 141 dead, mostly from Central Asia. There were similar incidents in North 
Waziristan. The legendary commander of anti-Soviet Afghan resistance during the 
1980s, Jalaluddin Haqqani, sent his son Sirajuddin to bring in Mullah Dadullah 
and Noor Muhammad 
Saqib (chief justice under the Taliban regime) to mediate.

Taliban commanders in Pakistan were persuaded to allow foreign militants a safe 
exit to wherever they chose to go. Many decided that Iraq, rather than 
Afghanistan where the Taliban seemed reluctant to welcome them, was the new 
promised land. There they met up with leading al-Qaida personalities such as 
Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi, who had left Waziristan a few months earlier and who is 
now under arrest in Guantánamo Bay.


The promised land


Al-Qaida’s migration from the two Waziristans to Iraq began after the US 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 and was accelerated by its increasing ideological and 
strategic differences with the Taliban.

Dr Muhammad Bashar al-Faithi, a leading member of the Muslim Scholars’ 
Association, a component of Iraqi resistance to the US, told me: “After US 
forces installed Paul Bremer as administrator, he disbanded Iraq’s security 
forces. We formed a delegation and cautioned him as to the wisdom of Iraq’s 
borders being left open on all sides. At the least a border security force 
should have been retained. Bremer disagreed and dismissed all Iraqi security 
forces as Saddamists. The Iraqis were left standing by as all sorts of 
unscrupulous elements and terrorists, from Iran and al-Qaida, gathered in Iraq 
in pursuit of their agendas. Today I believe it was Bremer’s deliberate policy 
to draw al-Qaida militants into Iraq, where it is far more easy to kill or 
capture them than in Waziristan or Afghanistan” (5 
<http://mondediplo.com/2007/07/02al-qaida#nb5> ).

Al-Qaida has increased efforts to assume the leadership of the Iraqi resistance 
and persuade it to adhere to its own global vision. But the indigenous leaders 
of the resistance, following their own nationalist agenda, are worried and keen 
to be rid of foreign fighters. Recently fresh evidence of disunity has appeared 
in the Arab media. Al-Jazeera reported in April that Ibrahim al-Shammari, a 
spokesman for the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI), announced that his group had 
decided to part ways with al-Qaida. Their goals were so dissimilar that in some 
circumstances the IAI might be more willing to deal with the US.

At a news conference in Washington in April, General David Petraeus, the US 
commander in Iraq, discussed the Sunni backlash against al-Qaida: “Sunni 
insurgents and the so-called Sunni resistance are still forces that must be 
reckoned with, as well. However we are seeing some others joining Sunni Arab 
tribes in turning against al-Qaida Iraq and helping transform Anbar province 
and other areas from being assessed as lost as little as six months ago to 
being relatively heartening. We will continue to engage with Sunni tribal 
sheikhs and former insurgent leaders to [ensure] that their fighters join 
legitimate Iraqi security force elements to become part of the fight against 
extremists” (6 <http://mondediplo.com/2007/07/02al-qaida#nb6> ).

Dr al-Faithi said: “All foreign elements that became part of irregular militias 
are a curse for the Iraqi resistance. They desperately want to control Iraq for 
the advancement of their specific agendas. Al-Qaida has been infiltrated by 
many intelligence outfits, besides being subject to religious deviations like 
Takfirism. In the end it is the Iraqis who are being made to pay the price. The 
same is true of the Iranian intelligence-backed Shiite militias: they too want 
to dominate southern Iraq and have so far killed as many as 30 tribal Shiite 
sheikhs from the southern marshlands. These sheikhs want to support the 
resistance against foreign occupation forces, but the activities of the 
Iranian-backed militias prevent them from doing this.”

Al-Faithi believes that indigenous resistance groups carry out most major 
operations in Iraq; but since they are slow to claim responsibility, the world 
media often attribute these operations to al-Qaida. “Even James Baker (7 
<http://mondediplo.com/2007/07/02al-qaida#nb7> ) admits that al-Qaida is only a 
small component of the Iraqi resistance. After the invasion, we were desperate 
to prompt the people to resist the US occupation. We welcomed the first wave of 
al-Qaida fighters, but now we are paying the price; everything they are doing 
now has badly damaged the resistance movement.”

The Iraqi resistance, the Taliban and any other group that initially accepted 
al-Qaida within its ranks, have suffered. But parting ways with al-Qaida may 
prove profitable: the US has almost agreed to strike separate deals with Iraqi 
resistance groups, which may be rewarded with power-sharing deals with the 
Iraqi government. On the eastern front, the death of Mullah Dadullah, who had 
almost managed to secure the backing of the Pakistani establishment, has 
created uncertainty. The government wants to negotiate a power-sharing deal 
with Taliban moderates. But for this to work, Arab militants must continue to 
leave. Takfirism must advance into other Muslim states that will turn it out 
one day.

(1 <http://mondediplo.com/2007/07/02al-qaida#nh1> ) The Muslim Brotherhood was 
founded in Egypt in 1928 and spread throughout the Arab world. See Wendy 
Kristianasen, “Islam on message for  <http://mondediplo.com/2000/04/02brothers> 
modernity”, Le Monde diplomatique, English edition, April 2000.

(2 <http://mondediplo.com/2007/07/02al-qaida#nh2> ) His death remains a 
mystery. Some claim that Bin Laden ordered it following disagreements between 
the two.

(3 <http://mondediplo.com/2007/07/02al-qaida#nh3> ) See Syed Saleem Shahzad, 
“Taliban resurgence in  <http://mondediplo.com/2006/09/06afghanistan> 
Afghanistan”, Le Monde diplomatique, English edition, September 2006.

(4 <http://mondediplo.com/2007/07/02al-qaida#nh4> ) See Françoise Chipaux, “La 
Mosquée rouge, sanctuaire taliban de la capitale pakistanaise”, Le Monde, 22 
May 2007.

(5 <http://mondediplo.com/2007/07/02al-qaida#nh5> ) See also George Bush’s 
remarks regarding the situation in Iraq at a press conference on 2 July 2003: 
“There are some who feel like that, you know, the conditions are such that they 
can attack us there. My answer is bring them on. We got the force necessary to 
deal with the security situation.”

(6 <http://mondediplo.com/2007/07/02al-qaida#nh6> ) 
www.defenselink.mil/transcript  
<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3951> 
s/tra...

(7 <http://mondediplo.com/2007/07/02al-qaida#nh7> ) See James Baker and Lee 
Hamilton, The  
<http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/index.html> Iraq 
Study Group Report, 2006, which made a series of recommendations for US policy 
in Iraq. Although both Democratic and Republican representatives contributed to 
the report, President Bush rejected its main conclusions.


  _____  

Global jihad splits into wars between Muslims
Takfirism: a messianic ideology 

By Syed Saleem Shahzad 

http://mondediplo.com/2007/07/03takfirism

Takfirism is a centuries-old belief that suddenly revived among Islamic 
militants in Egypt after the Israeli victory in 1967. It claims that the Muslim 
ummah (the community of believers) has been weakened by deviation in the 
practice of Islam. Takfirism classifies all non-practising Muslims as kafirs 
(infidels) and calls upon its adherents to abandon existing Muslim societies, 
settle in isolated communities and fight all Muslim infidels.

Small isolated groups of Takfirist militants survived throughout the Arab world 
in the 1970s. They regrouped alongside the mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 
1980s, during the war of resistance against Soviet forces. The Egyptian Ayman 
al-Zawahiri, the Uzbek leader Tahir Yuldash and Sheikh Essa, who were later the 
top leadership of al-Qaida, were among the fiercest proponents of Takfirism in 
these years. After the US invasion it flourished in Iraq, where the al-Qaida 
leader Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, killed in June 2006, was a leading exponent.

After 2003 Takfirism gained support among al-Qaida’s middle leadership and the 
rank and file. These ideologues were no longer defined by their hatred of the 
US military machine. Takfirism encompassed the belief that infidels within 
Muslim societies gave strength to the enemy and were a danger to be eliminated. 
Leaders of infidel Muslim societies were prime candidates for elimination 
before those who had been led astray from Islam could be brought back into the 
fold. The Takfirists were enemies of all non-practising Muslims. The difficult, 
isolated terrain of North and South Waziristan was their new sanctuary.

They were different from the ideologues of al-Qaida in the 1990s, who had 
concentrated upon driving out western occupying forces from Muslim territories. 
The Takfirists focused on the enemy within. The lesson they learned after 9/11 
was simple: they had been ransomed for US dollars and bombed by both western 
and Pakistani infidels. Henceforth, they would make no distinction between 
Muslims and Christians or between presidents Musharraf and Bush. The 
elimination of the enemy within was a necessary preliminary to any showdown 
with outsiders. Repeated assassination attempts against Musharraf during the 
past four years must be viewed within this context.

This dual sensibility afflicts all Takfirist militants, whether in al-Qaida or 
its allied groups. They must continue their war against western armies, but 
meanwhile will lay down the basis for a conformist Islamic state to keep 
dissenting brethren in line. As well as raising the standard of rebellion 
against Muslim states, they have attacked moderate pro-Islamic reformists 
inside resistance groups based in the Waziristans. Takfirists abhor Shiism, 
which they regard as an unacceptable deviation from Islam. Sectarian warfare 
has assumed a partnership with jihad, over which it often takes precedence. 
Takfirism is messianic – the sole leadership of Muslims against apostates and 
the infidel West.

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