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January 8, 2008 - Volume 5, Issue 1
Bin Laden Identifies Saudi Arabia as the Enemy of Mujahideen Unity
By Michael Scheuer
Osama bin Laden's latest message is one of the richest, most comprehensive
and starkly realistic he has issued since the start of the Iraq war. The
following essay is the first of two that will analyze the message and offer
an assessment of its importance. This essay considers al-Qaeda's dour
recognition of its inability to control post-occupation events in Iraq as a
small vanguard organization and a non-Iraqi presence in the country. The
second part of this article will examine bin Laden's confidence that
al-Qaeda has accomplished its main goal in Iraq: establishing a base from
which to project its influence and military power into the Levant and the
Arabian Peninsula.
On December 29, 2007, Osama bin Laden issued a 56-minute statement that
addressed Muslim insurgents in Iraq [1] and built on his earlier message
from October 22 [2]. The new statement was issued via al-Qaeda's media arm,
al-Sahab, and appeared on several internet sites without pre-publication
excerpts on al-Jazeera television. Al-Jazeera's editing of the October 22
audiotape distorted bin Laden's message, incorrectly giving the implication
that he was saying "all is lost" for the mujahideen in Iraq [3]. Al-Jazeera
customarily deletes anything critical of the Saudi regime from bin Laden's
messages. This occurred in the case of the October 22 tape and al-Qaeda
apparently did not want to take a chance on al-Jazeera's penchant for
politically correct editing with its most recent message [4].
Focus on Iraq
The latest bin Laden tape is-like its October 22 predecessor-preeminently a
post-Iraq war tape. In both tapes, bin Laden declares that the United States
recognizes that its Coalition has been militarily defeated in Iraq and
predicts that U.S. and other foreign forces will leave. Bin Laden does not
provide the date U.S.-led forces will withdraw; he focuses his attention on
working with Islamist insurgents in Iraq to ensure the Americans and their
Arab-government allies cannot build a national unity government that is an
"agent to America," dominated by non-Islamists and ready to permit the
United States basing rights and access to Iraqi oil. Because U.S.-led forces
have accepted military defeat, bin Laden argues, Washington and its allies
must look for other means to prevent the consolidation of an Islamic state
in Iraq. "My talk to you," bin Laden explained, "is about the plots that are
being hatched by the Zionist-Crusader alliance, led by America, in
cooperation with its agents in the region, to steal the fruit of the blessed
jihad in the land of the two rivers, and what we should do to foil these
plots."
History's Lesson
As always, bin Laden speaks as a product and close observer of the Afghans'
jihad against the Soviet Union. In appealing for unity among the Iraqi
mujahideen, he makes no demand that they join al-Qaeda and follow its
instructions. He points rather to the failure of the Afghan insurgents to
consolidate victory after the Red Army's 1989 withdrawal: "It would be
useful here to recall an effort in the past to unify the leaders of the
Afghan mujahideen, which includes important lessons that are related to our
topic," bin Laden tells the Iraqi fighters in an almost avuncular tone.
We had made these efforts with Sheikh Abdullah Azzam [bin Laden's late
Palestinian mentor in Afghanistan], may God have mercy on him. After months
of seeking to achieve unity among [the Afghan leaders] and removing the
obstacles that some of them used to claim that they obstruct unity, [but
then] after removing these obstacles ... they [would] claim that there was
another obstacle [preventing unity], and so on and so forth .One of the
mujahideen had a strong opinion about these [obstructing] leaders. He was an
old wise person who had long experience in life with people. At the time we
used to reject his strong-worded statement about them. I will try to convey
to you some of what he said. The conclusion is that those leaders are
tradesmen who care more about their leadership and give priority to their
personal interests over the cause. We used not to believe what he said about
them. This has delayed our realization of the sound conception of persons
and events [presented by this mujahid]. The harmful consequences of this are
no secret . In fact, developments have come to confirm things that we had
never expected due to the fact that we were young and lacked experience at
the time.
In Iraq, Riyadh is the main enemy
Bin Laden urges the Iraqi fighters to heed the lesson of the Afghans'
historic post-Soviet debacle because "the same thing applies to Iraq today";
leaders are more interested in their own power and status than in making
Islam and the ummah (Islamic community) victorious. And while bin Laden
warns that Washington is using promises of money, military training and arms
to entice the "Islamic Party and some fighting groups [to] support America
against Muslims," he leaves no doubt that the Islamists' main enemy in Iraq
is now Saudi Arabia, not the supposedly militarily defeated United States.
After the Soviets' withdrawal from Afghanistan, bin Laden reminded the Iraqi
fighters that "America exerted great efforts . to convince the Afghan
leaders through the governments of Riyadh and Islamabad to join a national
unity government with communists and secularists from the West." Bin Laden
explained that the Saudi regime was then-and is again today in Iraq-the main
enemy of the mujahideen:
[In post-Soviet Afghanistan] the government of Riyadh sought the help of its
unofficial scholars to infiltrate the ranks of the mujahideen. These were
influential speakers who incited the people to perform jihad and collect
huge funds for the leaders of the mujahideen. At the set time, [the Saudi
regime] asked the Afghan leaders to unite with the communists and
secularists under the so-called national unity state. [The Saudis]
obstructed the plan to achieve unity among the leaders of the mujahideen
when they tempted one of them with a big amount of money and promised him to
be the president of Afghanistan . We do not have much time here for more
details. So the current situation [in Iraq] is similar to the past one [in
Afghanistan]. The government of Riyadh continues to this day to carry out
the same malicious roles with many Islamic action leaders and commanders of
the mujahideen in our nation [5].
Bin Laden goes on to claim that the Saudis are trying to co-opt some of the
Sunni mujahideen in Iraq by allowing "some groups to confidently move in the
Gulf to receive [financial] support." Riyadh is careful to avoid officially
funding its Iraqi insurgent favorites, so its support "is channeled under
the banner of raising donations by some unofficial scholars and preachers."
Bin Laden warns that "many of them . are loyal to the state and seek to
implement [Riyadh's] policy by pulling the rug from under the honest
mujahideen's feet" and forcing them to support a national-unity government
that is designed to be the agent of the United States and Saudi Arabia. He
asks the Iraqi mujahideen how they can trust Saudi King Abdullah, who is the
"malignant foe" of Islam, the "main U.S. agent in the region" and a man who
took it upon himself "to tempt and tame every free, virtuous, and honest
person with the aim of dragging him to the path of temptation and
misguidance . [and] the path of betraying the religion and nation and
submitting to the will of the Crusader-Zionist alliance." The Americans are
defeated, bin Laden concludes, but to assure God's victory the Iraqi
mujahideen must reject Saudi overtures and direction if they are "not to
waste the fruit of this chaste and pure blood that was shed for the sake of
consolidating religion and entrenching the state of Muslims."
A way out?
Bin Laden and his senior lieutenants are reliving what for them is a
familiar nightmare. In one of the greatest ironies of the post-1945 era,
Islamist fighters have proven that with great, prolonged and bloody effort
they can claim the military defeat of superpowers-the USSR and the United
States-but cannot consolidate victory when confronted by the wiles, funds
and religious establishment of the Saudi leadership. While it is clear in
the December 29 tape that bin Laden rates the Saudis as the main obstacle to
God's victory in Iraq, there is little indication of what he intends to do
to destroy Riyadh's ability to stymie the mujahideen there as it did in
Afghanistan.
One possibility-though bin Laden did not allude to this-would require a
rethinking of al-Qaeda's grand strategy. Although bin Laden and al-Qaeda
have been consistent in their three-fold grand strategy-to drive the United
States from the Muslim world, destroy Israel and incumbent Muslim regimes
and settle scores with the Shiites-they now face a situation where the Saudi
regime has not only so far prevented the unification of Islamist leaders,
but is allegedly preparing the Sunni Iraqi insurgents it supports for a
civil war with Iraq's Iranian-backed Shiites. Bin Laden, of course, is
correct in arguing that Riyadh wants no genuine national-unity government;
the Saudis may be intending to fund and equip a Sunni insurgent force that
could join forces with the U.S.-armed and trained Sunni Awakening Councils
to battle for control of post-U.S. Iraq against the Shiites and seek the
establishment of a Saudi-like Sunni theocracy in Baghdad. If this occurs,
the third step of bin Laden's grand strategy-settling scores with the
Shiites-will immediately become the top priority of the Islamic world, as
both Sunnis and Shiites focus on assisting their brethren in the Iraqi civil
war. This scenario would severely erode bin Laden's ability to keep Sunni
militants focused on the "far" U.S. enemy.
If bin Laden's assertions are true, and Saudi Arabia's Afghanistan-like
intervention in Iraq continues to prevent the mujahideen unity bin Laden
advocates, the al-Qaeda chief and his Shura (consultative) council may soon
confront the very unpalatable necessity of having to break with their
traditional grand strategy and move to try to destroy the Saudi regime. In
such a scenario, al-Qaeda would abandon the pinprick
insurgency-and-terrorism campaign it has conducted in the kingdom since
9/11, and employ all the force it commands and can incite there-and bring in
from Iraq-to take on the well-infiltrated Saudi military and security
services. Such a campaign probably would combine attempts to assassinate the
king, the interior minister and senior intelligence and military officials
with attacks to disrupt Saudi oil production. The latter operations would be
staged in the hope of forcing Washington to a Hobson's choice between
standing back and allowing havoc to reign in the world's oil market-with the
immense damage it would entail for the U.S. economy-and ordering U.S.
military forces into action against Muslims in order to restore oil
production on the sacred soil of the Prophet Muhammad's birthplace and what
bin Laden refers to as "the land of the two holy mosques."
The foregoing clearly is not an option that al-Qaeda is eager to undertake;
it is an option that amounts to an almost desperate gamble. But that said,
if such a campaign successfully triggered a U.S. military response in the
kingdom, the focus and militancy of the entire Muslim world-both Sunni and
Shiite-would be switched from Iraq to Saudi Arabia, and the enmity and
weapons of all Muslims would, at least temporarily, be refocused on the "far
enemy" in North America.
Michael Scheuer served in the CIA for 22 years before resigning in 2004. He
served as the Chief of the bin Laden Unit at the Counterterrorist Center
from 1996 to 1999. He is the once anonymous author of Imperial Hubris: Why
the West is Losing the War on Terror and Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama
bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America. Dr. Scheuer is a Senior
Fellow with The Jamestown Foundation.
Notes
1. Osama bin Laden, "The Way to Foil Plots," al-Sahab Media Production
Organization, December 29, 2007. All quotes from bin Laden in the text are
from this statement unless otherwise noted.
2. Osama bin Laden, "A Message to Our People in Iraq," Threat and Claim
Monitor, IntelCenter.com, October 22, 2007.
3. Al-Jazeera, October 23, 2007. By censoring bin Laden's statement,
al-Jazeera unwittingly seems to have done al-Qaeda a great service. The
"all-is-lost" message yielded by al-Jazeera's editors has become the common
wisdom among Western media and governments, thereby obscuring for those
entities the fact that bin Laden was discussing how all Iraqi insurgents
should proceed to consolidate Islam's victory over the United States and its
allies in Iraq.
4. Al-Jazeera's editing earned it some outrage and condemnation from
Islamists. See, for example, Bilal al-Khaldi, "And thus Usama's message has
gone to waste. An invitation to a proactive response." Islamic al-Fallujah
Forums (internet), November 16, 2007.
5. Bin Laden says that the Saudi effort to prevent post-Soviet Afghan unity
was led and managed by "the Riyadh intelligence chief," who was at the time
Prince Turki al-Faisal. This is the same Prince Turki who-while serving as
the Saudi ambassador to the United States-unexpectedly and hurriedly
departed Washington in early 2007 when a Sunni-Shiite civil war seemed
imminent in Iraq. Not much has been heard from Prince Turki since his
departure, but if bin Laden's claims about the current Saudi campaign to
co-opt Iraq's Sunni mujahideen are true, it is hard to imagine anyone more
qualified by past experience to lead the effort than Prince Turki.
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