Revealed: Chávez role in cocaine trail to Europe

 

http://observer.guardian.co.uk/world/story/0,,2251440,00.html

 

Sunday February 3, 2008

The Observer 

 

 

Some fighters desert from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
because they feel betrayed by the leadership, demoralised by a sense that
the socialist ideals that first informed the guerrilla group have been
replaced by the savage capitalism of drug trafficking. Others leave to be
with their families. Still others leave because they begin to think that, if
they do not, they will die. Such is the case of Rafael, who deserted last
September after 18 months operating in a FARC base inside Venezuela, with
which Colombia shares a long border.

 

The logic of Rafael's decision seems, at first, perverse. He is back in
Colombia today where, as a guerrilla deserter, he will live for the rest of
his days under permanent threat of assassination by his former comrades.
Venezuela, on the other hand, ought to have been a safe place to be a FARC
guerrilla. President Hugo Chávez has publicly given FARC his political
support and the Colombian army seems unlikely to succumb to the temptation
to cross the border in violation of international law.

 

'All this is true,' says Rafael. 'The Colombian army doesn't cross the
border and the guerrillas have a non-aggression pact with the Venezuelan
military. The Venezuelan government lets FARC operate freely because they
share the same left-wing, Bolivarian ideals, and because FARC bribes their
people.'

 

Then what did he run away from? 'From a greater risk than the one I run now:
from the daily battles with other guerrilla groups to see who controls the
cocaine-trafficking routes. There is a lot of money at stake in control of
the border where the drugs come in from Colombia. The safest route to
transport cocaine to Europe is via Venezuela.'

 

Rafael is one of 2,400 guerrillas who deserted FARC last year. He is one of
four I spoke to, all of whom had grown despondent about a purportedly
left-wing revolutionary movement whose power and influence rests less on its
political legitimacy and more on the benefits of having become the world's
biggest kidnapping organisation and the world's leading traffickers in
cocaine.

 

FARC has come a long way from its leftist revolutionary roots and is now
commonly referred to in Colombia and elsewhere as 'narco-guerrillas'. Pushed
out to the border areas, it has been rendered increasingly irrelevant
politically and militarily due to the combined efforts of Colombia's
centre-right President, Alvaro Uribe, and his principal backers, the United
States, whose Plan Colombia, devised under the presidency of Bill Clinton,
has pumped hundreds of millions of dollars into the Colombian military and
police. A large part of Plan Colombia is designed to eradicate the vast coca
plantations cultivated and maintained by FARC and other Colombian groups.

 

However, the impact on FARC has been ambiguous: its chances of launching a
left-wing insurrection in the manner of Nicaragua's Sandinistas in 1979 are
nil, but then they probably always were; yet it looks capable of surviving
indefinitely as an armed force as a result of the income from its
kidnapping, extortion and cocaine interests.

 

Helping it to survive, and prosper, is its friend and neighbour Hugo Chávez.
The Venezuelan President sought to extract some international credit from
the role he played as mediator in the release last month in Venezuelan
territory of two kidnapped women, friends of Ingrid Betancourt, a French
citizen and former Colombian presidential candidate held by FARC for six
years. But Chávez has not denounced FARC for holding Betancourt and 43 other
'political' hostages.

 

I spoke at length to Rafael (not his real name) and three other FARC
deserters about the links between the guerrilla group and Chávez's
Venezuela, in particular their co-operation in the drug business. All four
have handed themselves in to the Colombian government in recent months under
an official programme to help former guerrillas adapt back to civilian life.

 

I also spoke to high-level security, intelligence and diplomatic sources
from five countries, some of them face to face in Colombia and London, some
of them by phone. All of them insisted on speaking off the record, either
for political or safety reasons, both of which converge in FARC, the oldest
functioning guerrilla organisation in the world and one that is richer, more
numerous and better armed than any other single Colombian drug cartel and is
classified as 'terrorist' by the European Union and the US.

 

All the sources I reached agreed that powerful elements within the
Venezuelan state apparatus have forged a strong working relationship with
FARC. They told me that FARC and Venezuelan state officials operated
actively together on the ground, where military and drug-trafficking
activities coincide. But the relationship becomes more passive, they said,
less actively involved, the higher up the Venezuelan government you go. No
source I spoke to accused Chávez himself of having a direct role in
Colombia's giant drug-trafficking business. Yet the same people I
interviewed struggled to believe that Chávez was not aware of the collusion
between his armed forces and the leadership of FARC, as they also found it
difficult to imagine that he has no knowledge of the degree to which FARC is
involved in the cocaine trade.

 

I made various attempts to extract an official response to these allegations
from the Venezuelan government. In the end Foreign Minister Nicolás Maduro
made a public pronouncement in Uruguay in which he said, without addressing
the substance of the allegations, that they were part of a 'racist' and
'colonialist' campaign against Venezuela by the centre-left Spanish
newspaper El País, where I originally wrote about FARC and the Venezuelan
connection.

 

What no one disputes, however, is that Chávez is a political ally of FARC
(last month he called on the EU and US to stop labelling its members
'terrorists') or that for many years FARC has used Venezuelan territory as a
refuge. A less uncontroversial claim, made by all the sources to whom I
spoke (the four disaffected guerrillas included), is that if it were not for
cocaine, the fuel that feeds the Colombian war, FARC would long ago have
disbanded.

 

The varied testimonies I have heard reveal that the co-operation between
Venezuela and the guerrillas in transporting cocaine by land, air and sea is
both extensive and systematic. Venezuela is also supplying arms to the
guerrillas, offering them the protection of their armed forces in the field,
and providing them with legal immunity de facto as they go about their giant
illegal business.

 

Thirty per cent of the 600 tons of cocaine smuggled from Colombia each year
goes through Venezuela. Most of that 30 per cent ends up in Europe, with
Spain and Portugal being the principal ports of entry. The drug's value on
European streets is some £7.5bn a year.

 

The infrastructure that Venezuela provides for the cocaine business has
expanded dramatically over the past five years of Chávez's presidency,
according to intelligence sources. Chávez's decision to expel the US Drug
Enforcement Administration from his country in 2005 was celebrated both by
FARC and drug lords in the conventional cartels with whom they sometimes
work. According to Luis Hernando Gómez Bustamante, a Colombian kingpin
caught by the police last February, 'Venezuela is the temple of drug
trafficking.'

 

A European diplomat with many years of experience in Latin America echoed
this view. 'The so-called anti-imperialist, socialist and Bolivarian nation
that Chávez says he wants to create is en route to becoming a narco-state in
the same way that FARC members have turned themselves into narco-guerrillas.
Perhaps Chávez does not realise it but, unchecked, this phenomenon will
corrode Venezuela like a cancer.'

 

The deserters I interviewed said that not only did the Venezuelan
authorities provide armed protection to at least four permanent guerrilla
camps inside their country, they turned a blind eye to bomb-making factories
and bomber training programmes going on inside FARC camps. Rafael - tall and
lithe, with the sculptured facial features of the classic Latin American
'guerrillero' - said he was trained in Venezuela to participate in a series
of bomb attacks in Bogotá, Colombia's capital.

 

Co-operation between the Colombian guerrillas and the Venezuelan government
extended, Rafael said, to the sale of arms by Chávez's military to FARC; to
the supply of Venezuelan ID cards to regular guerrilla fighters and of
Venezuelan passports to the guerrilla leaders so they were able to travel to
Cuba and Europe; and also to a reciprocal understanding whereby FARC gave
military training to the Bolivarian Forces of Liberation, a peculiar
paramilitary group created by the Chávez government purportedly for the
purpose of defending the motherland in case of American invasion.

 

Chávez's contacts with FARC are conducted via one of the members of the
organisation's leadership, Iván Márquez, who also has a farm in Venezuela
and who communicates with the President via senior officials of the
Venezuelan intelligence service. As a FARC deserter who had filled a senior
position in the propaganda department said: 'FARC shares three basic
Bolivarian principles with Chávez: Latin American unity; the
anti-imperialist struggle; and national sovereignty. These ideological
positions lead them to converge on the tactical terrain.'

 

The tactical benefits of this Bolivarian (after the 19th-century Latin
American liberator, Simón Bolívar) solidarity reach their maximum expression
in the multinational cocaine industry. Different methods exist to transport
the drug from Colombia to Europe, but what they all have in common is the
participation, by omission or commission, of the Venezuelan authorities.

 

The most direct route is the aerial one. Small planes take off from remote
jungle strips in Colombia and land in Venezuelan airfields. Then there are
two options, according to intelligence sources. Either the same light planes
continue on to Haiti or the Dominican Republic (the US government says that
since 2006 its radar network has detected an increase from three to 15 in
the number of 'suspicious flights' a week out of Venezuela); or the cocaine
is loaded on to large planes that fly directly to countries in West Africa
such as Guinea-Bissau or Ghana, from where it continues by sea to Portugal
or the north-western Spanish province of Galicia, the entry points to the EU
Schengen zone.

 

A less cumbersome traditional method for getting the drugs to Europe in
small quantities is via passengers on international commercial flights -
'mules', as they call them in Colombia. One of the guerrilla deserters I
spoke to, Marcelo, said he had taken part in 'eight or nine' missions of
this type over 12 months. 'Operating inside Venezuela is the easiest thing
in the world,' he said. 'FARC guerrillas are in there completely and the
National Guard, the army and other Venezuelans in official positions offer
them their services, in exchange for money. There are never shoot-outs
between Farc and the guardia or army.'

 

Rafael said he took part in operations on a bigger scale, their final
objective being to transport the cocaine by sea from Venezuelan ports on the
Caribbean Sea. His rank in FARC was higher than Marcelo's and he had access
to more confidential information. 'You receive the merchandise on the
border, brought in by lorry,' he said. 'When the vehicle arrives the
National Guard is waiting, already alerted to the fact that it was on its
way. They have already been paid a bribe up front, so that the lorry can
cross into Venezuela without problems.

 

'Sometimes they provide us with an escort for the next phase, which involves
me and other comrades getting on to the lorry, or into a car that will drive
along with it. We then make the 16-hour trip to Puerto Cabello, which is on
the coast, west of Caracas. There the lorry is driven into a big warehouse
controlled jointly by Venezuelan locals and by Farc, which is in charge of
security. Members of the Venezuelan navy take care of customs matters and
the safe departure of the vessels. They are alive to all that is going on
and they facilitate everything Farc does.'

 

Rafael described a similar routine with drug operations involving the port
of Maracaibo which, according to police sources, is 'a kind of paradise' for
drug traffickers. Among whom - until last week when he was gunned down by a
rival cartel in a Venezuelan town near the Colombian border - was one of the
'capos' most wanted internationally, a Colombian called Wilber Varela, but
better known as 'Jabón', which means 'soap'. 'Varela and others like him set
themselves up in stunning homes and buy bankrupt businesses and large tracts
of land, converting themselves almost overnight into personages of great
value to the local economy,' a police source said. 'Venezuela offers a
perfect life insurance scheme for these criminals.'

 

This 'tactical' convergence between the Venezuelan armed forces and FARC
extends to the military terrain. To the point that, according to one
especially high-placed intelligence source I spoke to, the National Guard
has control posts placed around the guerrilla camps. What for? 'To give them
protection, which tells us that knowledge of the tight links between the
soldiers on the ground and Farc reaches up to the highest decision-making
levels of the Venezuelan military.'

 

Rafael told how he had travelled once by car with Captain Pedro Mendoza of
the National Guard to a military base outside Caracas called Fuerte Tiuna.
He entered with the captain, who handed him eight rifles. They then returned
to the border with the rifles in the boot of the car.

 

Rafael said that members of the National Guard also supplied FARC with hand
grenades, grenade-launchers and explosive material for bombs made out of a
petrol-based substance called C-4.

 

An intelligence source confirmed that these small movements of arms occurred
on a large scale. 'What we see is the drugs going from Colombia to Venezuela
and the arms from Venezuela to Colombia. The arms move in a small but
constant flow: 5,000 bullets, six rifles. It's very hard to detect because
there are lots of small networks, very well co-ordinated, all of them by
specialists in FARC.'

 

Rafael worked directly with these specialists, both in the arms and the
drugs business, until he decided the time had come to change his life. 'In
June and July I had received courses in making bombs alongside elements of
Chávez's militias, the FBL. We learnt, there in a camp in Venezuela, how to
put together different types of landmines and how to make bombs. They also
taught us how to detonate bombs in a controlled fashion using mobile
phones.'

 

They were training him, he said, for a mission in Bogotá. 'They gave us
photos of our targets. We were going to work alongside two FARC groups based
in the capital. The plan was to set off bombs, but as the date dawned I
began to reflect that I could not continue this way. First, because of the
danger from the military engagements we had with the ELN [another formerly
left-wing guerrilla group] on the border over control of the drug routes
and, second, because it now seemed to me there was a very real risk of
getting caught and I believed I had already spent enough years in jail for
the FARC cause. It was also highly possible that the security forces in
Bogotá would kill me. That was why at the end of August I ran away and in
September I handed myself in.'

 

A European diplomat who is well informed on the drug-trafficking business
generally, and who is familiar with Rafael's allegations, made a comparison
between the activities of FARC in Venezuela and hypothetically similar
activities involving ETA in Spain.

 

 

'Imagine if ETA had a bomb-making school in Portugal inside camps protected
by the Portuguese police, and that they planned to set off these bombs in
Madrid; imagine that the Portuguese authorities furnished ETA with weapons
in exchange for money obtained from the sales of drugs, in which the
Portuguese authorities were also involved up to their necks: it would be a
scandal of enormous proportions. Well, that, on a very big scale, is what
the Venezuelan government is allowing to happen right now.'

 

'The truth,' one senior police source said, 'is that if Venezuela were to
make a minimal effort to collaborate with the international community the
difference it would make would be huge. We could easily capture two tons of
cocaine a month more if they were just to turn up their police work one
notch. They don't do it because the place is so corrupt but also, and this
is the core reason, because of this "anti-imperialist" stand they take. "If
this screws the imperialists," they think, "then how can we possibly help
them?" The key to it all is a question of political will. And they don't
have any.'

 

A similar logic applies, according to the highest-placed intelligence source
I interviewed, regarding FARC's other speciality, kidnappings. 'If Hugo
Chávez wanted it, he could force FARC to free Ingrid Betancourt tomorrow
morning. He tells FARC: "You hand her over or it's game over in Venezuela
for you." The dependence of FARCc on the Venezuelans is so enormous that
they could not afford to say no.'

 

A nation at war

 

· Colombia, the centre of the world's cocaine trade, has endured civil war
for decades between left-wing rebels with roots in the peasant majority and
right-wing paramilitaries with links to Spanish colonial landowners.

 

· Manuel 'Sureshot' Marulanda named his guerrilla band the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia in 1966.

 

· FARC is thought to have about 800 hostages. The most high-profile is
Ingrid Betancourt, 45, held since 2002.

 

· Every FARC member takes a vow to fight for 'social justice' in Colombia.

 

· About a third of FARC guerrillas are thought to be women.

 

· Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez is pushing for 'Bolivarian socialism',
while Colombian President Alvaro Uribe is a free-market conservative.

 

 

 

 

 



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