Why counter insurgency in the Muslim world...just create a 'cordonne
sanitaire' and quarantine them until they mature...and grow out of Islam.
 
B

 
  _____  

 
 
<http://www.defencetalk.com/news/publish/wars/US_Lacks_the_Capability_to_Cou
nter_Insurgency_in_the_Muslim_World130015049.php> US Lacks the Capability to
Counter Insurgency in the Muslim World
 <http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=313281>
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=313281


Recognizing that the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan will not be the last
of their kind, a new RAND Corporation study issued today finds that U.S.
capabilities to meet the threat of Islamist insurgencies are seriously
deficient and out of balance. 

The report finds that large-scale U.S. military intervention and occupation
in the Muslim world is at best inadequate, at worst counter-productive, and,
on the whole, infeasible. The United States should shift its priorities and
funding to improve civil governance, build local security forces, and
exploit information - capabilities that have been lacking in Iraq and
Afghanistan. 

"Violent extremism in the Muslim world is the gravest national security
threat the United States faces," said David C. Gompert, the report's lead
author and a senior fellow at RAND, a nonprofit research organization.
"Because this threat is likely to persist and could grow, it is important to
understand the United States is currently not capable of adequately
addressing the challenge." 

The findings are from a major review of strategies to combat insurgencies
RAND initiated at the request of the Department of Defense. 

The study finds that when infected by religious extremism, local
insurgencies become more violent, resistant to settlement, difficult to
defeat and likely to spread. The jihadist appeal to local insurgents is the
message that their faith and homelands are under attack by the West and they
should join the larger cause of defending Islam. This makes U.S. military
intervention not only costly, but risky. 

While the recent military surge has improved security in much of Iraq, "it
would be a profound mistake to conclude from it that all the United States
needs is more military force to defeat Islamist insurgencies," Gompert said.
"One need only contemplate the precarious condition of Pakistan to realize
the limitations of U.S. military power and the peril of relying upon it." 

The authors cite data from some 90 conflicts since World War II that show
the surest way to defeat insurgencies is to foster local governments that
are seen by their citizens as representative, competent and honest. "Foreign
forces cannot substitute for effective local governments, and they can even
weaken their legitimacy," said co-author John Gordon. 

Historically, large-scale military intervention against insurgencies - e.g.,
France in Indochina and Algeria and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan - more
often fails than succeeds. 

The study finds that because it can take time for a local insurgency to
acquire strength and turn jihadist, the chances of defusing an insurgency
are better than 90 percent when caught early. But those chances drop to less
than 50 percent if the insurgency has the chance to become a full-blown
uprising. Thus, the United States needs the ability to interpret "indicators
and warnings" so it can act in the early stages of the insurgency. 

The United States can be more effective in countering insurgencies in the
Muslim world, the study finds, by strengthening its capabilities: 

- To build effective and legitimate local governments. 
- To organize, train, equip and advise indigenous military and police
forces. 
- To gather, share and exploit information. 

Among the many functions a capable local government must perform, three are
critical to counterinsurgency: job training and placement of ex-combatants;
an efficient and fair justice system, including laws, courts and prisons;
and accessible mass lower education. 

"When it comes to building these and other civil capabilities abroad, the
United States is alarmingly weak," Gompert said. "To fix this problem, the
federal government will need a dramatic increase in civilian capabilities,
new organizational arrangements, and more flexible personnel policies." 

The authors estimate that the United States would need to add thousands of
deployable civilian professionals and billions more in targeted foreign aid
to meet counterinsurgency needs. However, such requirements could be halved
if U.S. allies and international organizations matched U.S. efforts. 

The report also finds that U.S. forces are unable to train enough local
forces of sufficient quality quickly enough to counter fast-moving Islamist
insurgencies. The U.S. Army, Marine Corps and Special Operations Forces must
improve their ability to organize, train, equip and advise local military
forces. Building police forces should be done by professional police
trainers, not military troops. 

As the ability to build local forces is improved, U.S. military capabilities
should concentrate on border and coastal surveillance, technical
intelligence collection, air mobility, large-scale logistics, and special
operations against high-value targets. 

Cyber-savvy Islamist insurgents have broken U.S. domination in exploiting
information. The report proposes ways for the United States to improve
information networking (accessing and sharing information), cognition
(understanding situations and using the information effectively), and
psychology (knowing and influencing the population). 

The report recommends a new information-sharing architecture - Integrated
Counterinsurgency Operating Network (ICON) - that would foster and rely on
universal cell phone use, "wikis" and video monitoring. Such a system would
maintain operational security while allowing for fast-moving information
among U.S. military, intelligence, civilian, allied and local agencies. 

Meanwhile, the United States should discard "pro-America" themes in favor of
strengthening local government, while at the same time highlighting evidence
that jihadists are failing to meet the basic needs of the local population. 

So great are U.S. deficiencies for counterinsurgency in some areas, the
report finds, that multilateral collaboration is not just desirable but
imperative. U.S. allies and international organizations have significant
capacity in areas where the United States is weak, including building
education, health and justice systems, and training police and gendarmerie
forces. While such allied capabilities are not readily deployable at
present, intense planning by NATO, European Union and United Nations
agencies could help meet this goal. 

"It is a matter of strategic importance that the United States and its
European allies end the diplomatic impasse in NATO-EU cooperation," Gompert
said. 

Assuming allied and multilateral participation, the additional annual costs
for acquiring, maintaining and using adequate U.S. counterinsurgency
capabilities is $20 billion to $30 billion. Individual components include
$11million to $17 billion for civilian personnel and foreign assistance, $2
billion to $3 billion for training and equipping local security forces, $4
billion to $6 billion for applying ICON and related information systems, and
$3 billion to $4 billion for military-force enhancements. 

The report, "War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities
for Counterinsurgency," is available at  <http://www.rand.org/>
www.rand.org. The study was funded by the U.S. Department of
Defense................
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