<http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/TerrorFinanceBlog/~3/235256781/blowing-mough
ni.html> Blowing Moughniyeh away still leaves a lot of work

Today, February 14, 2008, 5 hours ago | David Nordell
<http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/TerrorFinanceBlog/~3/235256781/blowing-mough
ni.html> Go to full article
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The assassination of Hizbollah's terror mastermind, Imad Moughniyeh, in
Damascus on Tuesday night is certainly a very welcome blow against Islamist
terrorism, and a salutory reminder to terrorist organisations everywhere
that even their most valued leaders can and will be hunted down, no matter
how well they disguise and protect themselves. 

Killing Moughniyeh -- at least assuming that the operation was carried out
by the Mossad or CIA and not, as some analysts have already mooted, the
Syrians themselves in order to curry favour with Washington -- will
certainly hurt the morale of Hizbollah and some of its allies, and will
force them to divert attention and resources to investigating the failure of
their internal security, at least initially at the expense of carrying out
attacks on Western interests. 

However, anyone expecting that this killing will make a significant
difference to the level of terrorist activity will be disappointed. In the
greater scheme of things, Moughniyeh was basically a long-time terrorism
celebrity who won his infamy by planning many of the more prominent attacks
of the past against US, Israeli and Jewish targets: the US embassy and
Marine Corps HQ in Beirut during the 1980s, the Israeli embassy and Jewish
community centre in Buenos Aires during the 1990s, and so on. He has
certainly played a major role recently in motivating and training Iranian
terrorists and their mainly Shiite allies in Iraq and Lebanon. However, the
Middle East itself is no longer the central front of Islamic terror, and
Moughniyeh's influence on terrorist activity, both during his life and in
the manner of his sudden and well-deserved death, is significantly less in
today's main operational fronts: the USA, Britain, France, Sudan, Somalia,
Australia and the Philippines. In all these places, Islamic terror is
basically a local phenomenon, based on locally born or educated but
radicalised Muslims who form terror cells more or less spontaneously: for
them, Moughniyeh is now just another shahid, but his death certainly won't
deter them from their goals. 

This change of organisational culture in the terrorist world, from the
organisations with clearly identifiable leaders (Arafat, Habash, Hawatmeh et
al) that dominated Palestinian terrorism to the newer phenomenon of loosely
allied groups formed around the brand name of Al Qa'eda, is of huge
importance in understanding correctly how to fight them. Moughniyeh's demise
will certainly cause Hizbollah a lot of dislocation, fear and possibly
scapegoating too, and will probably lead to revenge attacks against US and
Israeli targets worldwide; but in the longer term, his disappearance will
weaken the Iran-Lebanon axis of Shite terrorism, because Moughniyeh was a
key figure in coordinating, planning and executing terror operations. The
small indigenous cells of American, British or German Muslims -- or even the
larger and better organised group that carried out the 9/11 attacks -- that
have contemplated, planned and sometimes succeeded in carrying out terror
outrages do not depend to anything like the same extent on brilliant or
charismatic leaders of Moughniyeh's kind. Even if Usama bin Laden is
captured or killed in action, the Al Qa'eda phenomenon is not at all likely
to disappear with him, because the cells that form Al Qa'eda today are more
or less autonomous, except in their ideological orientation. And few of
these cells have identifiable leaders who can even be arrested, let alone
assassinated pour encourager les autres, even if the Western governments
could contemplate such action. 

This distinction is especially important in the context of counter-terrorism
financing. Moughniyeh's operational leadership of Hizbollah was supported
not only by Iranian money but also by a large and well-oiled financial
machine within Lebanon that included not only profits from narcotics
smuggling from Lebanon but also the many legitimate businesses owned by
Hizbollah and its sympathisers, from building contractors to a part of
Middle East Airlines. On the one hand, much of this was visible, but on the
other, Hizbollah's other identity (in the Jekyll-and-Hyde sense) as a
legitimate political party made it almost impossible to ban or interdict its
financing. This means that Hizbollah is relatively immune to
counter-terrorism financing. 

By contrast, the indigenous cells of aspiring terrorists that make up most
of Al Qa'eda's operational strength in target countries depend for their
financing, at least for operations and much of their training, on local
financial resources: these may come from fund-raising within the local
Muslim communities (usually camouflaged under the pretext of raising money
for charities in Pakistan, Palestine and so on), or from financial fraud and
other crime (credit card and mortgage fraud are especially popular). All of
these activities are prone to effective counter-terrorism financing
measures, especially front-line intelligence gathering by alert financial
institutions coupled with police and intelligence services that know how to
piece the jigsaw puzzles together. I am aware that I may appear to be
contradicting what I wrote in another piece here less than two weeks ago,
<http://www.terrorfinance.org/the_terror_finance_blog/2008/02/sometimes-look
i.html> 'Sometimes, looking for the money trail is missing the point,' in
which I commented that very often, the amounts of money involved in carrying
out a terror outrage are too small to be detected by the normal requirements
for banks to file Suspicious Activity Reports. But in fact the bulk of the
money raised by these local cells goes for recruitment, training and support
activities before any operation is actually carried out, so there is usually
enough suspicious financial activity to be detected by the financial
institutions and then investigated. And, as I hope to explain very soon in
another article here, it turns out that, with all its severe limitations,
the compliance regime for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism
financing does actually produce some real successes. 

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