The Erosion of Noncombatant Immunity within Al Qaeda 

Carl J. Ciovacco 

http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/67-ciovacco.pdf

Since its inception, al Qaeda’s treatment of noncombatant immunity has
migrated from full observance to complete disregard. In just over a decade,
al Qaeda transitioned from basing entire operations on the inviolable nature
of noncombatant immunity to specifically targeting noncombatants. From 1991
until 2002, al Qaeda evolved through five distinct phases in its observance
of noncombatant immunity. These phases transition from Phase One’s complete
respect for noncombatants to Phase Five’s intentional targeting of millions
of noncombatants with weapons of mass destruction. More recently, however,
al Qaeda appears to be taking stock of the harm that targeting noncombatants
is having on its cause. This paper will provide a phased analysis of how al
Qaeda’s provision of noncombatant immunity disintegrated over time and why
it may be returning today. This progression of thought and action concerning
noncombatants serves as a roadmap by which to understand how and why al
Qaeda made these ideological leaps. 

The Erosion of Noncombatant Immunity within Al Qaeda 

Since its inception, al Qaeda’s treatment of noncombatant immunity has
migrated from full observance to complete disregard. In its evolving mission
from fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, to apostate Muslim
regimes in the 1990s, to its current fight against the West, it has employed
a variety of tactics in its conduct of war. Against the Soviets and Muslim
regimes of Middle East, Northern Africa, and South East Asia, al Qaeda
limited its use of force to combatants and government officials. However, in
its current fight against the West, and more specifically America, it has
shifted its tactics to the targeted killing of noncombatants. What has
caused this great shift and departure from past deference to noncombatant
immunity? 

In just over a decade, al Qaeda transitioned from basing entire operations
on the inviolable nature of noncombatant immunity to specifically targeting
noncombatants. From 1991 until 2002, al Qaeda evolved through five distinct
phases in its observance of noncombatant immunity. These phases transition
from Phase One’s complete respect for noncombatants to Phase Five’s
intentional targeting of millions of noncombatants with weapons of mass
destruction. Fortunately, for the purposes of better understanding this
phenomenon, al Qaeda has published much of its reasoning behind its actions.
Perhaps more than any other warring party in history, al Qaeda has shared
its strategy, tactics, views, and even vulnerabilities for the entire world
to see in the global media.1 It is through these rare glimpses into the
psyche of al Qaeda that we can better understand why this shift happened. By
placing this shift into five finite phases, we can learn more about the
driving factors for the erosion of noncombatant immunity within al Qaeda. 

Background 

Before diving into the analysis of the five-phase transition of al Qaeda
with respect to noncombatant immunity, it would be prudent to briefly
explore two background areas: the leader of al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and
the Islamic Just War ethic. These areas are critical to understanding how
bin Laden sees the world and what constraints he operates under when using
the cover of Islam for his legitimacy. The contextual importance of
understanding the many facets of Islam with respect to war, jihad, and
noncombatants cannot be overstated. 

Osama bin Laden 

Bin Laden, the son of a wealthy Saudi businessman, began his fight against
the enemies of Islam in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation of the
1980s. From its meager beginnings as the Services Office, bin Laden’s al
Qaeda served primarily as the conduit that brought Arabs seeking martyrdom
to Afghanistan.2 The Afghan war was limited to Afghan militias and Arabs,
funded largely by the US and Saudi Arabia via the Pakistani Intelligence
Services, against Soviet soldiers. 

After the Soviets retreated from Afghanistan, bin Laden returned home to
Saudi Arabia. The crystallizing moment for bin Laden’s contemporary view of
the world occurred in the aftermath of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. As
the invasion inherently threatening Saudi Arabia, bin Laden offered his
services, and those of his Afghan veterans, to the Saudi government to repel
Saddam Hussein.3 The House of Saud, however, chose the United States
instead, and thus the fateful rift between bin Laden and the Saudi Royal
Family widened beyond repair. From that point forward, bin Laden saw the
Saudi government and all apostate regimes of the Middle East as the "near
enemy" and the United States as the "far enemy."4 In bin Laden’s view,
without the far enemy’s propping up of the corrupt Muslim regimes in the
Middle East, these regimes would fall under the pressure of Muslims yearning
for Islamic states based on the Sharia. 

After his exile from Saudi Arabia, bin Laden moved to the Islamic-leaning
state of Sudan in 1993, to grow al Qaeda and plot against the far enemy.
Under pressure from Khartoum, bin Laden departed once again for Afghanistan
in 1996, and eventually joined 

1 Jarret Brachman, "Abu Yahya’s Six Easy Steps for Defeating Al Qaeda,"
Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 1, Issue 5, available from
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=articl
e&id=18&Itemid=54, accessed on 17 April 2008. Brachman discusses al Qaeda’s
own discussion of its weaknesses. 

2 Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden,
New York: Touchstone, 2002, p. 54. 

3 Peter Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda’s
Leader. New York: Free Press, 2006, p. 108. 

4 Malise Ruthven, "How to Understand Islam," New York Review of Books,
November 8, 2007, available from http://www.nybooks.com/articles/20800,
accessed 22 February 2008. 

forces with Mullah Omar and the Taliban. It is in this "Golden Age" of al
Qaeda from 1996-2001, that bin Laden planned and executed his American
Embassy bombings in Africa, the USS Cole attack, and 9/11.5 With the US
invasion of Afghanistan following 9/11, bin Laden has been on the run in the
North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan. While most of al Qaeda has been
decimated since 9/11, bin Laden continues to lead al Qaeda and the greater
Islamic jihadist movement through regular media releases that inspire the
next generation of fighters. 

5 Marc Sageman, "The Next Generation of Terror," Foreign Affairs. Mar/Apr
2008, p. 38. 

6 Sohail H. Hashmi, "Interpreting the Islamic Ethic of War and Peace," in T.
Nardin, ed., The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular
Perspectives, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996, p. 161. 

7 Ibid. 

8 Ibid., p. 146. 

9 Ibid., p. 155. 

10 Ibid. 

11 Ibid., p. 157. 

12 Ibid. 

Islamic Ethic of War 

The Islamic tradition of jihad (just war) explicitly respects noncombatant
immunity. The foundation for jus in bello (conduct within war) was set by
Muhammad’s successor, the first caliph, Abu Bakr, when he gave the Islamic
"ten commands." He very succinctly said: "do not kill children or old men,
or women."6 Deference for noncombatants in war is also supported by the
Koran which says: "fight in God’s cause against those who wage war against
you, but do not transgress limits, for God loves not the transgressors."
(2:190)7 In the Muslim tradition, there is a doctrine of constraint and
limitations regarding noncombatants in war. 

How then can Islamic jihadists reconcile the killing of noncombatants with
the traditions of Islam? The reasoning lies in the many interpretations of
both the Koran and hadiths (actions and sayings of Muhammad). The "diffuse
nature" of religious authority in Islam allows clerics to offer different
interpretations of the Koran.8 Also, the militaristic lifestyle that
Muhammad led while protecting his nascent religion impacts the Islamic view
of war and noncombatant immunity today. While Muhammad rejected violence
during the Meccan period of his life, during the later Medinan period, he
fought no less than 70 military battles and thus set forth the military
component of jihad. Consequently, the hadiths of Muhammad demonstrate the
vanquishing of the all nonbelievers of the time – the Quraysh, Bedouin
tribes, Jewish tribes of Medina, and the Byzantine Empire.9 Muhammad’s
militant words of, "when you face the enemy, be patient, and remember that
Paradise is under the shade of swords," also adds to the mystique of force
within Islam.10 

The loophole that some Muslims, including al Qaeda, have used to exploit
Islam as a cover to kill noncombatants has been the "sword" verses of the
Koran. The most famous sword verse is: "slay the polytheists wherever you
find them, and take them captive, and besiege them, and lie in wait for them
at every conceivable place."(9:5)11 The "peace" verse which theoretically
would counter the sword verse is: "let there be no compulsion in
religion."(2:256)12 With the dilemma of competing ideas, the principle of
abrogation 

13 Ibid., p. 164. 

14 Ibid., p. 146. 

15 Quinton Wiktorowicz and John Kaltner, "Killing in the Name of Islam: Al
Qaeda’s Justification for September 11" Middle East Policy Council,
available from
http://www.mepc.org/journal_vol10/0306_wiktorowiczkaltner.asp, accessed on
18 April 2008. 

has been used to argue that since the sword verses came second, they
supersede the peace verses. In the cherry-picking nature that al Qaeda has
used in regards to the Koran, the verse, "make ready against them whatever
force and war mounts you are able to muster," has also been used to support
the use of nuclear weapons against noncombatants.13 

The Islamic ethic of war has provided a situation ripe for abuse at the
hands of al Qaeda. In a time of genuine struggle between competing sects of
Islam, and even competing movements within each sect, it is immensely
important to appear more pious than the competition. Sadly, the more
militant, radical, and aggressive the stance of certain Muslim groups, the
more closely they are associated with "true" Islam. As such, the true
standard bearer of Islam has become the observers of the sword verses who
have little regard for the noncombatant immunity of both believers and
nonbelievers. This debate has become so contentious between Muslims that
some groups have named their cause "Islamic jihad" to differentiate between
other Muslim militant groups that they have dubbed "false."14 

In a sense, al Qaeda has hijacked the entire salafi – or proper religious
adherence and moral legitimacy – movement. As a "radical tendency" within
this movement, al Qaeda has exacerbated the struggle over who is truly a
salafi.15 With al Qaeda’s belief in takfir, or the ability to decide who is
a true Muslim and who is not, it has proclaimed itself judge and jury of all
Muslims. It has used takfir to pressure Muslims into supporting an offensive
jihad, often targeting noncombatants, against the West. While defensive
jihad is generally accepted as repelling non-Muslims from attacking Muslim
lands, offensive jihad is the extension of battle to non-Muslim lands. With
the self-proclaimed ability to judge Muslims as nonbelievers if they do not
support offensive actions against the West, al Qaeda has extracted monetary
and physical support under the cover of Muslim piety. Similarly, it has used
the violent salafi interpretation of the Koran’s sword verses to legitimize
its killing of civilians. 

The Wearing Away of Noncombatant Immunity 

We will now look at the specific examples of al Qaeda’s treatment of
noncombatants. Beginning with al Qaeda’s actions in the Afghan war,
noncombatants received the utmost protection and immunity from the
devastation of war. By 2002, however, al Qaeda had declared its intent to
kill noncombatants with weapons of mass destruction. The followed phased
analysis of al Qaeda paints the picture of how its provision of noncombatant
immunity disintegrated over time. This progression of thought and action
concerning noncombatants serves as a roadmap by which to understand how and
why al Qaeda made this ideological leap. 

16 Peter Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, (hereafter OBL I Know), p. 119.


17 Ibid. 

18 Ibid., p. 116. 

19 Ibid., p. 119. 

Phase One 

The first phase of al Qaeda’s treatment of noncombatant immunity begins with
respect for noncombatants in war. When al Qaeda first formed in 1988, it was
fully engaged in a battle between armed combatants. While the Soviet Army
was better trained and equipped, the Afghan militias and Afghan Arabs were
armed nonetheless. Al Qaeda only fought the Soviets with guns and tactics
directed against its soldiers. Suicide bombings against Soviet civilians in
Moscow were scarcely a figment of bin Laden’s imagination. 

The second data point during this phase that illustrates respect for
noncombatant immunity is al Qaeda’s 1991 assassination attempt on the King
of Afghanistan. Zahir Shah, King of Afghanistan, was in exile in Rome
following a 1973 coup. At a time of civil war in Afghanistan in the early
1990s, al Qaeda feared the King’s return would issue in a secular government
incompatible with al Qaeda’s goals of an Islamic state. As such, bin Laden
and the would-be assassin Paulo Jose de Almeida Santos, a Portuguese convert
to Islam, planned to dispose of the King. In a 2002 interview, Santos
recounted how bin Laden was completely averse to killing noncombatants in
the assassination attempt on the Afghan King in 1991. 

In a scene reminiscent of Albert Camus’ 1949 The Just Assassins, bin Laden
planned the King’s assassination. Similar to Camus’ play where Ivan Kaliayev
could not kill the Grand Duke because the carriage in which the Duke was
riding contained his niece and nephew, bin Laden told Santos he could not
kill the King if the King’s grandson would be in danger. Santos recounted
his conversation with bin Laden and, in particular, the question of whether
collateral damage in the form of the grandchild was acceptable in the
assassination attempt. To this question, bin Laden replied: "No, no, in no
way! What are you saying? We are Muslims, we do not eliminate children!"16
Santos said that bin Laden then angrily said that if a child was present,
the King could not be attacked and that bin Laden, "would rather the King
return and have a civil war than to kill a child."17 Thus, al Qaeda’s
respect for noncombatant immunity can be fully established in 1991.
Furthermore, bin Laden respected noncombatant immunity to such a high degree
that he was willing to accept potentially severe losses to al Qaeda from
being forced into a protracted civil war. (Incidentally, the assassination
attempt on the King failed when Santos’ dagger was deflected from the King’s
heart by a tin of Café Crème cigarillos18) 

These events and primary accounts of bin Laden illustrate how disinclined al
Qaeda was to the killing of noncombatants in the beginning. Bin Laden even
went as far as to use Islam as the driving force for why they could not kill
noncombatants. Even more ironic, bin Laden offered an explanation as to why
American civilians were off limits in war. When asked about "eliminating
American civilians," bin Laden replied, "No. The American government is one
thing, the majority of Americans don’t even vote, they are totally
apathetic."19 Santos further outlined the mindset of al Qaeda’s leader when
he 

20 Ibid., p. 120. 

21 Bergen, interview conducted at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, 3
April 2008. 

22 Bergen, OBL I Know., pp. 183-184. 

said that bin Laden, "refused to dirty his hands with the blood of innocent
people. He is a very moral person."20 In Phase Two, the first signs of
departure to this mindset appear. 

Phase Two 

This phase begins in March, 1997, with a CNN interview of bin Laden in
Afghanistan. In a dramatic change to bin Laden’s view of noncombatants, he
hints that civilians may not be as shielded as they were in the past. While
he does not say that al Qaeda will target civilians, he basically intimates
that if noncombatants get in the way, "it is their problem."21 

The CNN interview by Peter Bergen and Peter Arnett was the first time that
bin Laden told Western journalists that he had declared war on the United
States. Departing from his past strategy of targeting apostate Muslim
regimes in the Middle East, bin Laden clearly announced that al Qaeda was
now at war with America. His answer to a question regarding the
classification of the enemy helps to outline his evolving view of
noncombatants. Bin Laden said: 

        As for what you asked, whether jihad is directed against U.S.
soldiers, the [U.S.] civilians in the land of the Two Holy Places [Saudi
Arabia], or against the civilians in America, we have focused our
declaration on striking at the soldiers in the country of the Two Holy
Places…Therefore, even though American civilians are not targeted in our
plan, they must leave. We do not guarantee their safety.22 

Whereas in 1991, bin Laden guaranteed the safety of the Afghan King’s
grandson, in 1997, he was no longer vouching for the safety of
noncombatants. This shift was the beginning of the end for al Qaeda’s
respect for noncombatant immunity. 

Phase Three 

In this third phase, bin Laden moved from luke warm approval of noncombatant
immunity to overtly declaring that noncombatants were legitimate targets. On
February 22, 1998, bin Laden released a signed statement on behalf of the
World Islamic Front. The World Islamic Front consisted of al Qaeda, the
Jihad Group in Egypt, the Egyptian Islamic Group,
Jamiet-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan, and the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh. In this
statement, bin Laden, and the rest of the alliance, not only sanctioned the
killing of civilians, but also elevated it to level of a holy duty, or
fatwa. The fatwa read: 

        The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and
military – is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any
country in which it is 

23 Ibid., p. 196. 

24 Bergen, OBL I Know, p. 256. 

        25 Both bin Laden and Zawahiri use this term "agent" whenever they
describe anyone who works in collaboration with the US government. This can
describe an individual or another government. 

        possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Asqa Mosque [in
Jerusalem] and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip.23 

The following summer, bin Laden held true to his word and attacked two
American Embassies in Africa. On August 7, 1998, al Qaeda bombed the
American Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya killing 212 civilians, and Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania killing 11 civilians. While no Americans were killed in
Tanzania, eight died in Kenya. Plotters of the attack have said that bin
Laden was so involved with the operation that he actually decided where, in
reconnaissance photos of the targets, to drive the trucks laden with
explosives. 

On October 12, 2000, bin Laden struck again against the US by attacking the
USS Cole. There is little doubt that bin Laden orchestrated this attack
which killed seventeen American sailors and crippled an American Navy
destroyer. The 9/11 Commission Report even categorized the attack as a
full-fledged al Qaeda operation. Bin Laden honored his attack by reciting a
poem about it at his son’s wedding: 

        A destroyer: even the brave fear its might. It inspires horror in
the harbor and in the open sea. She sails into the waves, flanked by
arrogance, haughtiness and false power. To her doom she moves slowly, a
dingy awaits her, riding the waves.24 

The importance of Phase Three is that bin Laden publically sanctioned the
killing of civilians and acted on this threat. Although he killed combatants
in the Cole attack, he also killed non-uniformed American and African
civilians in the embassy bombings. The question that must then be asked is:
were the civilians that were killed true noncombatants or "agents" of the US
government?25 While the definition of combatant is stretched to encompass
government officials, those employees working in the embassies may be
considered combatants. Despite the fact that they are unarmed and are
working in a job that does not explicitly call for the risk to one’s life,
as an employee of the US government, the case can be made that they are more
than mere noncombatants protected under traditional guidelines. This subtle
distinction between civilians working for the US government and those
civilians not titled as an "agent" of the government brings us to Phase
Four. While in Phase Three, bin Laden legitimized attacking all
noncombatants in rhetoric, he only executed attacks against combatants and
American government interests. In Phase Four, however, he took the
degradation of noncombatant immunity to the next level by targeting and
successfully attacking civilians who did not work for the US government in
any capacity. 

Phase Four 

Phase Four is time-stamped by the 9/11 attacks. In these attacks, nearly
3,000 noncombatants were targeted both on the planes and on the ground. The
noncombatants 

26 Osama bin Laden transcript, 1 November 2004, provided to author by the
Combating Terrorism Center, West Point. 

working in the World Trade Towers and those flying on the planes were in no
way associated with the American government. Their intentional murder was
exacted to draw media attention to al Qaeda’s cause and as retribution for
perceived injustices by the American government on the Muslim community.
While uniformed combatants were killed in the Pentagon on 9/11, the thrust
of the operation was directed against noncombatants. 

On April 24, 2002, bin Laden first attempted to explain why he targeted
civilians who were not associated with the US government. In his statement
titled, "A Statement from Qaidat al-Jihad Regarding the Mandates of the
Heroes and the Legality of the Operations in New York and Washington," he
provided religious justification for the attacks by classifying the greater
struggle as a "total war" against the US. By expanding the war against the
US to the total war level, he tried to elevate the unlimited nature of the
war to legitimize targeting civilians. 

In October, 2004, bin Laden again attempted to rationalize his attacks on
9-11 by saying: 

        While I was looking at those destroyed towers in Lebanon [American
bombing in 1982], it occurred to me to punish the unjust one in a similar
manner by destroying towers in the United States so that it would feel some
of what we felt and to be deterred from killing our children and women. And
that day, it was confirmed to me that oppression and the intentional killing
of innocent women and children is a deliberate American policy. Destruction
is freedom and democracy, while resistance is terrorism and intolerance.26 

This justification that bin Laden offers for killing American civilians in
the World Trade Towers is that of retribution for the US and Israel killing
innocent women and children in Lebanon in 1982. This "retaliation-in-kind"
reasoning is of course flawed because US forces did not intentionally target
women and children in 1982, whereas bin Laden did in 2001. It was a commonly
known fact that daycare centers with hundreds of children were housed in the
World Trade Center and still it remained a valid target for bin Laden. This
fact in itself demonstrates how far bin Laden migrated from his willingness
to call off the assassination attempt against the Afghan King based on the
life of one child. While the rhetorical shift from Phase Two to Three was
significant in that the status of civilians moved from protected to
targeted, the largest shift in implementation by al Qaeda occurred from
Phase Three to Four, where true noncombatants were attacked instead of
government employees. 

Phase Five 

After the 9/11 attacks, it appears that al Qaeda’s move to complete
disrespect for noncombatant immunity was complete. This interpretations,
however, does not account for the scale-up potential of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). Accordingly, the fifth phase demonstrates the final and
most disturbing position regarding noncombatants: the use of WMDs to
intentionally kill mass numbers of noncombatants. The fact that al 

27 Bergen, OBL I Know, pp. 346-347. 

28 Ibid., p. 347. 

29 Kelly Uphoff, "Osama bin Laden’s Mandate for Nuclear Terror," The Jewish
Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), available from
http://www.jinsa.org/articles/index.html/function/view/categoryid/1701/docum
entid/2762/history/3,2360,655,1701,2762, accessed on 17 April 2008. 

30 Uphoff. 

31 Bergen, OBL I Know, p. 348. 

Qaeda released a public statement informing the world of this intent, and
received religious backing from a prominent Muslim cleric, makes this phase
all the more dangerous. This is the current phase that we find al Qaeda;
however, as far as we know, it is only at the rhetorical and preparation
stage. 

In June, 2002, Suleiman Abu Ghaith, al Qaeda’s official spokesman, published
an essay on al Qaeda’s web site al Neda (The Call) titled, "In the Shadow of
the Lances."27 In this announcement, Ghaith explained al Qaeda’s right to
kill Americans using weapons of mass destruction. He stated: 

        Due to the American bombings and siege of Iraq, more than 1,200,000
Muslims were killed in the past decade…The Americans have still not tasted
from our hands what we have tasted from theirs. The [number of] killed in
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon are but a tiny part of the exchange
for those killed in Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, the Philippines, Bosnia,
Kashmir, Chechnya, and Afghanistan. We have not reached parity with them. We
have the right to kill four million Americans – two million of them children
– and to exile twice as many and wound and cripple hundreds of thousands.
Furthermore, it is our right to fight them with chemical and biological
weapons, so as to afflict them with the fatal maladies that have afflicted
the Muslims because of [Americans’] chemical and biological weapons. America
knows only the language of force. America is kept at bay by blood alone.28 

This assertion by al Qaeda’s spokesman was afforded religious backing in the
form of a fatwa by Sheik Nasir bin Hamid al Fahd. This fatwa allowed al
Qaeda to use WMDs against the United States.29 Al Fahd, a prominent Saudi
cleric, issued this fatwa on May 21, 2003. In his fatwa titled, "A Treatise
on the Legal Status of Using Weapons of Mass Destruction against Infidels,"
he addressed moral dilemmas and allowed for, "the permissibility of
attacking the polytheists by night, even if their children are injured," and
accepted the problems "that these weapons will kill some Muslims."30 

After receiving a religious mandate to use WMDs against noncombatants, the
next question is how close is bin Laden to having this capability? While
many experts believe that al Qaeda is still several years away from
acquiring or building their own WMDs, both bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al
Zawahiri have publically noted otherwise. On November 8, 2001, bin Laden
told his official biographer Hamid Mir, "we have nuclear deterrence and this
is for our defense."31 In addition, when Mir asked Zawahiri how al Qaeda
obtained nuclear weapons, Zawahiri responded, "if you have thirty million
dollars, you can have these kinds of [nuclear] suitcase bombs from the black
market in central 

32 Ibid., p. 348. 

33 Michael Walzer, Arguing About War, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2004, p. 132. 

Asia. It is not difficult."32 While these statements could only be a ruse to
keep America guessing, the proximity of al Qaeda’s implementation of Phase
Five is a worrisome question. 

Phase Five is also marked by al Qaeda’s heightened tactical need to target
noncombatants with the intent of consummate devastation. In order to achieve
this goal and in turn harm the enemy, al Qaeda targeted not only Western
noncombatants but also Muslim civilians in countries deemed by al Qaeda to
have apostate governments. While al Qaeda has targeted Muslim leaders in the
likes of the Afghan King, Ahmad Shah Massoud (head of the Northern Alliance
in Afghanistan), and Pervez Musharraf in the 1990s and early 2000s, it only
started attacking Muslim civilians in 2003. In addition to its suicide
bombings campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, it also deliberately
targeted Muslim civilians in large-scale bombings in Riyadh and Casablanca
in 2003. While the targeting of Muslims in countries with apostate regimes
was new, al Qaeda reinforced its already established policy of killing of
Western noncombatants with its attacks on Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005.
Yet, the effect of these massive attacks on civilians was for the most part
counterproductive as al Qaeda has begun to experience blowback and decreased
support from formerly supportive demographics. 

Gateways for Change 

In just over a decade, al Qaeda transitioned from extreme respect, as
dictated by religion, for noncombatant immunity, to a religious duty for all
Muslims to kill American noncombatants. This shift was not overnight and it
had to pass through several gateways in order to arrive at the position that
killing noncombatants was not only acceptable but desirable. The three most
important philosophical gateways that al Qaeda passed through in order to
kill noncombatants with a clear conscious were: the creation of an Enemy, an
excuse for killing, and a last resort scenario. It is most likely the
confluence of all three steps that has allowed al Qaeda to justify targeting
noncombatants. 

Creation of an Enemy 

Michael Walzer explains that for terrorists to gain the ability to kill
noncombatants, they must create an Enemy where a whole people are
"ideologically or theologically degraded so that they are available for
murder."33 He provides examples of the creation of Enemies by the IRA to the
Irish Protestants, the PLO to the Israeli Jews, and FLN to the French
Algerians. He further explains that once the Enemy is created, any of them
(men, women, or children) can be killed. 

Al Qaeda has undergone this process with the United States. Bin Laden and
Zawahiri have attempted to reinforce this enemy characterization of the US
by running a comprehensive media campaign targeted at both fellow jihadists
and mainstream Muslims. Analysis of their video releases over the past seven
years has shown them to reinforce several platform themes in order to vilify
the US. These themes have been: 

34 Walzer, Arguing About War, p. 141. 

35 Wiktorowicz. 

36 Clifford Geertz, "Which Way to Mecca?" New York Review of Books, June 12,
2003, available from http://www.nybooks.com.ezp1.harvard.edu/articles/16380,
accessed on 20 April 2008. 

1) there is a strong US-Israeli alliance, 2) the US is stealing Muslim oil,
3) a clash of civilizations exists between the West and Islam, and 4) the US
is propping up apostate regimes in the Middle East. With these themes, al
Qaeda has forged an Enemy in the US by using ideas that resonate incredibly
well among Muslims. 

Excuse for Killing 

Another gateway that al Qaeda must pass through in order to kill
noncombatants is the formulation of an excuse in which to base the murder of
women and children. This excuse for killing noncombatants provides the
necessary rationale for jihadists to perform an act that human nature would
inform otherwise. The "excuses for terror" are manifold for al Qaeda;
however, they primarily rest on the norm of reciprocity.34 

Jihadists characterize the US and Israel as "people of war" where the
Israelis oppress the Muslims of Palestine and the US attacks the Muslims of
Afghanistan and Iraq.35 Accordingly, as a people of war, the US can only be
fought using similar tactics. Al Qaeda reasons that since American actions
have resulted in the deaths of Muslim noncombatants around the world, it has
charged itself with the mission of exacting like retribution. Consequently,
al Qaeda’s excuse for killing civilians is that it is merely following the
"eye for an eye" doctrine of justice. This form of justice carries immense
weight not only among jihadists, but also within the greater Muslim
community. 

Last Resort Argument 

Al Qaeda has fashioned a last resort argument within its fight against the
US in order to justify the killing of noncombatants. Bin Laden premises his
argument in the historical justification of the demise of Muslims over the
last four centuries. In business terminology, bin Laden has cleverly painted
the picture that Muslims around the world are on a "burning platform" that
without drastic measures will sink into oblivion. 

For historical reasons, bin Laden argues that Muslims must immediately unite
and take emergency measures to defeat the West or risk remaining in
servitude. As Bernard Lewis has explained, Muslims are "morning over the
loss of a cultural primacy that was theirs" for almost a thousand years from
Muhammad’s death in 632 A.D. to the failed Muslim siege of Vienna in 1683.36
Bin Laden echoes this idea that Muslims have been humiliated for the last
hundred years and that the US will continue to suppress Muslims well into
the future. In a January, 2004, taped message, bin Laden shows the last
resort nature of al Qaeda’s cause against the US. 

        O Muslims: The situation is serious, and the misfortune is
momentous. By God, I am keen on safeguarding your religion and your worldly
life. So, lend me your ears and open up your hearts to me so that we may
examine these pitch-black 

37 Osama bin Laden, tape from 4 January 2004, provided to author by the
Combating Terrorism Center, West Point. 

        38 Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want, New York: Random House,
2006, p. 4. 

        misfortunes, and so that we may consider how we can find a way out
of these adversities and calamities. The West's occupation of our countries
is old, yet new. The struggle between us and them, the confrontation, and
clashing began centuries ago, and will continue because the ground rules
regarding the fight between right and falsehood will remain valid until
Judgment Day.37 

As bin Laden seeks to reestablish the Islamic Caliphate, his means for
carrying out his goal against an economically and militarily superior enemy
have turned increasing desperate. This last resort desperation seems to
legitimize the attacking of noncombatants as it is the only tool that al
Qaeda has left in its toolbox. Since the members of al Qaeda truly believe
the without such tactics the war against the US will be lost, they have
accepted the killing of civilians as a just means to achieve their ends. In
al Qaeda’s eyes, this tactic of targeting noncombatants has had the desired
effect of halting American supremacy and restoring power to Muslims. An al
Qaeda spokesman confirmed this belief when he said after 9/11 that the
attacks "rang the bells of restoring Arab and Islamic glory."38 

Where Does al Qaeda Go From Here? 

As one looks to the future of al Qaeda and its view of noncombatant
immunity, it is hard to foresee an immediate shift back to complete respect
for noncombatants. With limited resources, terror attacks against civilians
yield the most publicity for al Qaeda’s cause. 

But after 9/11 with the world now aware of al Qaeda and its goals, is the
targeting of noncombatants the most beneficial use of its labor and funding?
Similar to how the terrorist attacks on Israeli athletes at the Munich
Olympics in 1972 brought the Palestinian cause to the forefront of the
global media, 9/11 has shed light on Muslim jihad against the West. Now that
al Qaeda’s platform issues have been publicized, however, their terror
attacks against noncombatants appear to be undermining their cause. 

For two reasons, it would appear that al Qaeda may revert back to a
semblance of respect for noncombatant immunity in the near future. The first
reason is that the US is proving to be thicker skinned than bin Laden had
thought. The second is that Muslim opinion is waning regarding al Qaeda’s
tactic of killing civilians. As a disproportionately high number of Muslim
civilians are being killed in al Qaeda’s attacks, Muslims around the world
are beginning to question al Qaeda. 

The assumption that the US has a soft underbelly in regards to sustaining
casualties is weakening every month that the US continues to stay in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Bin Laden and his associates believed that after the US
suffered the civilian casualties from 9/11, it would begin to pull out of
the Middle East. Unfortunately for bin Laden, this has not happened.
Following the 9/11 attacks, just the opposite occurred with Americans’
resolve against al Qaeda and radical Islamists becoming stronger. In fact,
there was an increase in military service applications and a surge of
patriotism, as shown by the unfurling of American flags on homes, cars, and
office buildings everywhere. 

39 J.C. Ford, "The Morality of Obliteration Bombing," Theological Studies 5
(1994), p. 301. 

40 Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, "The Beginning of the End for Al
Qaeda?" p. 3. Forthcoming. 

41 "Poll: Bin Laden’s Popularity fading in Pakistan," MSNBC.com, available
from http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23094334/, accessed on 19 April 2008. 

42 "Poll: Dramatic Change in Public Opinion in the Muslim World," Terror
Free Tomorrow: The Center for Public Opinion, available from
http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/articlenav.php?id=71, accessed on 17 April
2008. 

43 Michael Moss and Souad Mekhennet, "Rising Leader for the Next Phase of al
Qaeda’s War," New York Times, available from
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/04/world/asia/04qaeda.html?_r=2&ei=5088&en=ad
e199d53d7ab70a&ex=1364961600&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&pagewanted=all&oref=slog
in&oref=slogin#, accessed on 17 April 2008. 

44 Peter Bergen, interview conducted on 29 April 2008. Noman Benotman, the
former leader of the militant Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, is the
ex-jihadist that is quoted. 

The counterproductive nature of al Qaeda’s targeting of civilians is not a
historical anomaly. During WWII, the German air war over London that
targeted civilians actually hardened British resolve to fight Germany
instead of forcing its surrender. Perhaps bin Laden should have heeded the
words of the famous French military commander Marshal Foch when he said:
"You cannot scare a great nation into submission by destroying her
cities."39 Thus, with the stiffening of national resistance to al Qaeda
precisely because of its targeting of noncombatants, bin Laden may be
rethinking his faulty tactic of attacking civilians. 

Secondly, there is considerable evidence that al Qaeda’s attacks on
noncombatants are having a deleterious effect on al Qaeda’s support base
both within the organization and the mainstream Muslim community. The number
of ex-jihadists and formerly supportive Muslim clerics speaking out against
al Qaeda has increased in the last several years precisely because of its
targeting of civilians.40 After al Qaeda’s former chief in Iraq, Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, began targeting noncombatant Shia, support for al Qaeda within
the greater Muslim community dropped precipitously. Al Qaeda’s increased
suicide attacks on civilians within Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have also
caused its supporters to leave in droves. In fact, a recent Terror Free
Tomorrow poll in Pakistan shows that support for bin Laden has plummeted
from 46% to 24% and backing for al Qaeda has dropped from 33% to 18% in the
past six months.41 In another survey from 2005, when suicide bombings
against noncombatants first peaked, the number of Pakistanis believing that
suicide bombing was justified dropped from 73% to 46%.42 Thus, if al Qaeda
wants to stem its dwindling support, it will seek to reduce its targeting of
noncombatants. 

Just as al Qaeda’s targeting of noncombatants progressed in phases, perhaps
it is moving into a Phase Six where a limited respect for noncombatant
immunity once again exists. In 2005, Zawahiri directed al Qaeda in Iraq to
stop killing Shia noncombatants because it was hurting al Qaeda’s greater
cause. Furthermore, a top al Qaeda strategist, Abu Yahya al-Libi, has
written to al Qaeda in Iraq telling them that its killing of "too many
civilians" was undermining al Qaeda’s global strategy.43 Indeed, one
influential ex-jihadist has correctly identified the flawed nature of
targeting noncombatants by saying that, "the tactics have taken over the
strategy."44 While a full prohibition against the targeting of all
noncombatants may be years ahead, this development is promising. Although
the path to disregard for noncombatant immunity took over a decade to
mature, signs are pointing to a reversal as its legitimacy is crumbing under
its own weight. 

45 Osama bin Laden, "The Way to Foil Conspiracies" video released on 29
December 2007, available from
http://www.lauramansfield.com/subscribers/20071229_binladen.asp, accessed on
20 April 2008. 

46 Ayman al Zawahiri, "The Open Meeting with Shaykh Ayman al Zawahiri,"
As-Sahab, text released 15 March 2008, available from
http://www.lauramansfield.com/OpenMeetingZawahiri_Part%201.pdf, accessed 28
April 2008. 

47 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical
Illustrations, N.Y.: Basic Books, Inc., 1977, p. 3. 

48 Ibid. 

Further evidence that al Qaeda is rethinking its targeting of noncombatants
is a recent bin Laden video from December 29, 2007, that said al Qaeda is
not intentionally targeting civilians. Bin Laden’s video entitled, "The Way
to Foil Conspiracies," explains how he is saddened when civilians are
killed. He says: 

        and him [sic] who falls dead from the Muslims in any of the
operations against the crusader infidels or their agents, he is not meant by
killing and Allah only knows how it hurts and grieves us when some Muslims
die in any operation and we are responsible for it, and we seek Allah's
forgiveness due to it, and we ask Allah to grant their souls mercy, grant
them paradise and help their families.45 

Zawahiri then followed suit several months ago when he held an unprecedented
online Question and Answer session in March, 2008. Zawahiri accepted
hundreds of questions in an online submission process and answered with 46
pages of text. The first and most important questions, he said, regarded al
Qaeda’s stance on noncombatant immunity. Zawahiri went as far as to say that
only by mistake does al Qaeda kill civilians. Zawahiri replied when asked by
Mudarris Jughrafiya, a geography teacher, "Do you consider the killing of
women and children to be jihad?": 

        we don’t kill innocents: in fact, we fight those who kill innocents.
Those who kill innocents are the Americans, the Jews, the Russians and the
French and their agents. Were we insane killers of innocents as the
questioner claims, it would be possible for us to kill thousands of them in
the crowded markets, but we are confronting the enemies of the Muslim Ummah
and targeting them, and it may be the case that during this, an innocent
might fall unintentionally or unavoidably, and the Mujahideen have warned
repeatedly the Muslims in general that they are in a war with the senior
criminals – the Americans and Jews and their allies and agents– and that
they must keep away from the places where these enemies gather.46 

Final Thoughts 

The killing of noncombatants is often justified by the idea of inter arma
silent leges: in time of war the law is silent.47 This is expanded to impart
that in war, "self-interest and necessity prevail" and "morality and law
have no place."48 This is a bleak, but realist view of war and the treatment
of noncombatants. Al Qaeda has embraced this position over the last decade,
although using religious cover to kill noncombatants. Ironically, this
"self-interest and necessity" that drove al Qaeda to target civilians may be
driving it back into the fold of respecting noncombatant immunity. When the
US did not leave the Middle East following the murder of thousands of
civilians after 9/11, it sent a message 

to al Qaeda that the targeting of civilians would not achieve its goals.
Also, with Muslims around the world retracting support from al Qaeda
precisely because of its targeting of civilians, the ummah (Muslim
community) is sending its own message that al Qaeda must respect
noncombatant immunity. At this point, bin Laden’s best bet for winning the
war would be to begin respecting noncombatants’ right to life. If the
observation of noncombatant immunity, spanning from respect to disregard, is
plotted on a line, it appears that the pendulum depicting al Qaeda’s current
position has reached its apex of disregard and is beginning to swing back
towards a greater level of respect. If this holds true, it can only serve as
a positive force in the future of warfare. 

Carl J. Ciovacco graduated from West Point and Harvard’s Kennedy School of
Government with a Masters in Public Policy. His thesis focused on Al Qaeda’s
media strategy and his policy area of concentration was International
Security and Political Economy. He has served as a military officer in Iraq
and Saudi Arabia. 

 SWJ Magazine and Small Wars Journal are published by Small Wars Journal
LLC. COPYRIGHT © 2008 by Small Wars Journal LLC. Permission is granted to
print single copies for personal, non-commercial use. This work is licensed
under a Creative Commons Attribution – Non-Commercial –Share Alike 3.0
License per our Terms of Use. We are in this together. No FACTUAL STATEMENT
should be relied upon without further investigation on your part sufficient
to satisfy you in your independent judgment that it is true. Contact:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] Visit www.smallwarsjournal.com Cover Price:
Your call. Support SWJ here.   

 
(F)AIR USE NOTICE: All original content and/or articles and graphics in this
message are copyrighted, unless specifically noted otherwise. All rights to
these copyrighted items are reserved. Articles and graphics have been placed
within for educational and discussion purposes only, in compliance with
"Fair Use" criteria established in Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976.
The principle of "Fair Use" was established as law by Section 107 of The
Copyright Act of 1976. "Fair Use" legally eliminates the need to obtain
permission or pay royalties for the use of previously copyrighted materials
if the purposes of display include "criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, scholarship, and research." Section 107 establishes four criteria
for determining whether the use of a work in any particular case qualifies
as a "fair use". A work used does not necessarily have to satisfy all four
criteria to qualify as an instance of "fair use". Rather, "fair use" is
determined by the overall extent to which the cited work does or does not
substantially satisfy the criteria in their totality. If you wish to use
copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use,' you
must obtain permission from the copyright owner. For more information go to:
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml>
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml 

THIS DOCUMENT MAY CONTAIN COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL. COPYING AND DISSEMINATION IS
PROHIBITED WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE COPYRIGHT OWNERS.

 
 


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]


------------------------------------

--------------------------
Want to discuss this topic?  Head on over to our discussion list, [EMAIL 
PROTECTED]
--------------------------
Brooks Isoldi, editor
[EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.intellnet.org

  Post message: [email protected]
  Subscribe:    [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Unsubscribe:  [EMAIL PROTECTED]


*** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has 
not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. OSINT, as a part of 
The Intelligence Network, is making it available without profit to OSINT 
YahooGroups members who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the 
included information in their efforts to advance the understanding of 
intelligence and law enforcement organizations, their activities, methods, 
techniques, human rights, civil liberties, social justice and other 
intelligence related issues, for non-profit research and educational purposes 
only. We believe that this constitutes a 'fair use' of the copyrighted material 
as provided for in section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Law. If you wish to use 
this copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use,' 
you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.
For more information go to:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtmlYahoo! Groups Links

<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/

<*> Your email settings:
    Individual Email | Traditional

<*> To change settings online go to:
    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/join
    (Yahoo! ID required)

<*> To change settings via email:
    mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
    mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]

<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
    [EMAIL PROTECTED]

<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
    http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/

Reply via email to