http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/08summer/gates.htm

Reflections on Leadership 

 

ROBERT GATES 

  _____  

>From Parameters,  Summer 2008, pp. 5-13. 

  _____  

Last year I read Partners in Command, a book by Mark Perry. It is an account
of the unique relationship between General Dwight D. Eisenhower and General
George Marshall, and how they played a significant role in the American
victory in World War II and laid the foundations for future success in the
earliest years of the Cold War. Eisenhower and Marshall are, of course,
icons, legends etched in granite. Their portraits hang in my office. 

One of the things I found compelling in Partners in Command is how they were
both influenced by another senior Army officer who is not nearly as
well-known and in fact, as a reader of history, I had never heard of. His
name is General Fox Conner, a tutor and mentor to both Eisenhower and
Marshall. Conner and Marshall first became friends when they served together
on the staff of General “Black Jack” Pershing during World War I. In the
1920s, Eisenhower served as staff assistant under Brigadier General Conner
in the Panama Canal Zone. 

Three Axioms 

>From Conner, Marshall and Eisenhower learned much about leadership and the
conduct of war. Conner had three principles of war for a democracy that he
imparted to Eisenhower and Marshall. They were: 

*         Never fight unless you have to. 

*         Never fight alone. 

*         And never fight for long. 

All things being equal, these principles are pretty straightforward and
strategically sound. We have heard variants of them in the decades since,
captured perhaps most recently in the Powell Doctrine. Of course, all things
are not equal, particularly considering the range and complexity of the
threats facing America today, from the wars we are currently in to the
conflicts we are most 

5/6

likely to fight. So I would like to suggest how we should think about
applying Fox Conner’s three axioms to the security challenges of the
twenty-first century. 

“Never fight unless you have to.” That one should only go to war as a last
resort has long been a principle of civilized people. We know its horrors
and costs. War is, by its nature, unpredictable and uncontrollable. Winston
Churchill wrote in January 1942: “Let us learn our lessons. Never, never
believe that any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on
the strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter .
. . . Once the signal is given, the statesman is no longer the master of
policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events.” 

In a dictatorship, the government can force the population to fall in behind
the war effort, at least for a time. The nature of democracy, however,
limits a country’s ability to wage war, and that is not necessarily a bad
thing. Indeed with perhaps the exception of World War II, every conflict in
America’s history has been divisive and controversial here at home. Contrary
to what General George Patton said in his pep talks, most real Americans do
not like to fight. 

Consider the conflicts today. Afghanistan is widely viewed as a war of
necessity—striking back at the staging ground of the perpetrators of the
September 11th attack. The Iraq campaign, while justified in my view, is
viewed differently by many people. In testimony in front of the Congress on
the Iraq war, I observed that we were attacked at home in 2001 from
Afghanistan. We are at war in Afghanistan today, in no small measure,
because we mistakenly turned our backs on Afghanistan after the Soviet
forces left in the late 1980s. We made a strategic mistake in the end game
of that war. If we get the end game wrong in Iraq, I told the Congress, the
consequences will be far worse. 

Truth to tell, it is a hard sell to say we must sustain the fight in Iraq
right now and continue to absorb the high financial and human cost of the
struggle, in order to avoid an even uglier fight or even greater danger to
our country in the future. We have Afghanistan to remind us that these are
not just hypothetical risks. 

Conner’s axiom—never fight unless you have to—looms over policy discussions
today regarding rogue nations like Iran that support terrorism; that is a
destabilizing force throughout the Middle East and Southwest Asia and, in my
judgment, is hell-bent on acquiring nuclear weapons. Another war 

6/7

in the Middle East is the last thing we need. In fact, I believe it would be
disastrous on a number of levels. The military option must be kept on the
table, given the destabilizing policies of the regime and the risks inherent
in a future Iranian nuclear threat, either directly or through nuclear
proliferation. 

Then there is the threat posed by violent jihadist networks. The doctrine of
preemption has been criticized in many quarters, but it is an answer to
legitimate questions. With the possibility of proliferation of nuclear,
biological, and chemical materials, and the willingness of terrorists to use
them without warning, can we wait to respond until after a catastrophic
attack is either imminent or has already occurred? Given the importance of
public opinion and public support, how does one justify military action to
prevent something that might happen tomorrow or several years down the road?
While “never fight unless you have to” does not preclude preemption, after
our experience with flawed information regarding Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction, how high must the threshold of confidence in our intelligence
have to be to justify at home and abroad a preemptive or preventive war? 

Conner’s second axiom was “Never fight alone.” He recognized from the onset
that the way World War I ended—and particularly the terms of the Versailles
Treaty—made another major conflict with Germany almost inevitable. Victory
would require a strong partnership of the Anglo-American democracies, and
the most successful Army officers would have to adapt to working with allies
and partners. Eisenhower and Marshall executed this concept brilliantly in
World War II, despite the fact that, as one historian wrote about Allied
generals, Eisenhower had to deal with “as fractious and dysfunctional a
group of egomaniacs as any war had ever seen.” 

Nonetheless, as Perry writes, “Eisenhower was a commander who believed that
building and maintaining an international coalition of democracies was not a
political nicety . . . but a matter of national survival.” He brought this
concept to the founding of NATO. 

But what do we do when, as is the case today with NATO in Afghanistan, some
of our allies do not want to fight; or they impose caveats on where, when,
and how their forces may be used; or their defense budgets are too small as
a share of national wealth to provide a substantial contribution? Not
counting the United States, NATO has more than two million men and women
under arms, and yet we struggle to sustain a deployment of less than 30,000
non-US forces in Afghanistan, and we are forced to scrounge, hat in hand,
for a handful of helicopters. 

In August 1998, after the terrorist bombings of our embassies in Tanzania
and Kenya, I wrote an op-ed in The New York Times about terrorism and
national priorities, and noted that taking a more aggressive approach to
terrorism would, in virtually all cases, require America “to act violently
and 

7/8

alone.” Even after September 11th and a string of attacks in Europe and
elsewhere, the publics of many of our democratic allies view the terror
threat in a fundamentally different way than we do, and this continues to be
a major obstacle with respect to Afghanistan and other issues. 

As Churchill said, the only thing worse than having allies is not having
them at all. They provide balance, credibility, and legitimacy in the eyes
of much of the world. In the case of Afghanistan, one should never discount
the power of the world’s wealthiest and most powerful democracies coming
together—as they recently did in Bucharest—to reaffirm publicly their
commitment to this mission. Nor, above all, should we forget the superb
performance in combat and the sacrifices of allies like the British,
Canadians, Australians, Danes, Dutch, and others. 

Just about every threat to our security in the years ahead will require
working with or through other nations. Success in the war on terror will
depend less on the fighting we do ourselves and more on how well we support
our allies and partners in the moderate Muslim world and elsewhere. In fact,
from the standpoint of America’s national security, the most important
assignment in an officer’s military career may not necessarily be commanding
US soldiers, but advising or mentoring the troops of other nations as they
battle the forces of terror and instability within their own borders. 

Finally, Fox Conner said, “Never fight for long.” According to Perry,
General Conner believed that “American lives were precious, and no
democracy, no matter how pressed, could afford to try the patience of its
people.” Early on, Conner instilled the idea in both Eisenhower and
Marshall, on finding the enemy, fighting the enemy, and defeating the enemy
all within a short period of time. In World War II, the American people had
already begun to lose patience by the fall of 1944, when the lightning dash
across the plains of France following D-Day gave way to a soggy, bloody
stalemate along Germany’s western border. That was only two-and-a-half years
following Pearl Harbor. 

Eisenhower no doubt had this in mind when he became President during the
third year of the Korean War. He believed that the United States and the
American people could not tolerate being bogged down in a bloody,
interminable stalemate in Northeast Asia while the Soviets menaced
elsewhere, especially in Europe. Eisenhower was even willing to threaten the
nuclear option to bring that conflict to a close. 

It has been six-and-a-half years since the attacks on September 11th, and we
just marked the fifth anniversary of the start of the Iraq war. For America,
this has been the second-longest war since the Revolution, and the first
since then to be fought throughout with an all-volunteer force. In Iraq and
Afghanistan, initial, quick military success has led to protracted stability
and reconstruction campaigns against a brutal and adaptive insurgency and
terrorists. 

8/9

This has tested the mettle of our military and the patience of our people in
a way we have not seen in a generation. 

At the turn of the twenty-first century, the US armed forces were still
organized, trained, and equipped to fight large-scale conventional wars, not
the long, messy, unconventional operations that proliferated following the
collapse of the Soviet Union. The same traditional orientation was true of
our procurement procedures, military health care, and more. The current
campaign has gone on longer and has been more difficult than anyone expected
or prepared for at the start, and so we have had to scramble to position
ourselves for success over the long haul, which I believe we are doing. 

A drawdown of American forces in Iraq is inevitable over time; the debate in
Washington is largely about pacing. But the kind of enemy we face
today—violent jihadist networks—will not allow us to remain at peace. What
has been called the Long War is likely to be many years of persistent,
engaged combat all around the world in differing degrees of size and
intensity. This generational campaign cannot be wished away or put on a
timetable. There are no exit strategies. To paraphrase the Bolshevik Leon
Trotsky, we may not be interested in the Long War, but the Long War is
interested in us. 

How America’s military and civilian leadership grapples with these
transcendent issues and dilemmas will determine how, where, and when our
forces may be sent into the battle in the years ahead. In discussing Fox
Conner’s three axioms, I hopefully have raised questions and provided few,
if any, answers, and that is precisely the point. It is important that
Americans think about these issues and come to their own conclusions. 

Candor, Credibility, and Dissent 

In order to succeed in the asymmetric battlefields of the twenty-first
century—the dominant combat environment in the decades to come, in my
view—our Army will require leaders of uncommon agility, resourcefulness, and
imagination; leaders willing and able to think and act creatively and
decisively in a different kind of world, in a different kind of conflict
than we have prepared for the last six decades. 

One thing will remain the same. We will still need men and women in uniform
to call things as they see them and tell their subordinates and their
superiors alike what they need to hear, not what they want to hear. 

Here General Marshall in particular is a worthy role model. In late 1917,
during World War I, US military staff in France was conducting a combat
exercise for the American Expeditionary Force. General Pershing was in a
foul mood. He dismissed critiques from one subordinate after another and
stalked off. But then-Captain Marshall took the arm of the four-star
general, turned him around, and told him how the problems they were having
resulted from not 

9/10

receiving a necessary manual from the American headquarters—Pershing’s
headquarters. The commander said, “Well, you know, we have our problems.”
Marshall replied, “Yes, I know you do, General, but ours are immediate and
every day and have to be solved before night.” 

After the meeting, Marshall was approached by other officers offering
condolences for the fact he was sure to be fired and sent off to the front
line. Instead Marshall became a valued adviser to Pershing, and Pershing a
valued mentor to Marshall. 

Twenty years later, then-General Marshall was sitting in the White House
with President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his top advisers and Cabinet
secretaries. War in Europe was looming but still a distant possibility for
an isolated America. In that meeting, President Roosevelt proposed that the
US Army, which at that time was ranked in size somewhere between that of
Switzerland and Portugal, should be the lowest priority for funding. FDR’s
advisers all nodded. Building an army could wait. 

President Roosevelt, looking for the military’s imprimatur to his decision,
said, “Don’t you think so, George?” General Marshall, who hated being called
by his first name, said, “I’m sorry, Mr. President, I don’t agree with that
at all.” The room went silent. The Treasury Secretary told General Marshall
afterwards, “Well, it’s been nice knowing you.” It was not too much later
that General Marshall was named Army Chief of Staff. 

There are other, more recent examples of senior officers speaking frankly to
their superiors. Just before the ground war started against Iraq, in
February 1991, General Colin Powell, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, met
with the first President Bush. I was there in the Oval Office. General
Powell looked the President in the eye and said words to the effect: “We are
about to go to war. We may suffer thousands of casualties. If we do, are you
prepared to drive on to victory? Will you stay the course?” He wanted the
President to face reality. The President gave the right answer. 

I should note at this point that in my time as Secretary of Defense, I have
changed several important decisions because of general officers disagreeing
with me and persuading me of a better course of action. For example, at one
point I had decided to shake up a particular command by appointing a
commander from a different service than had ever held the post. A senior
service chief persuaded me to change my mind. 

On trips to the front, I have also made it a priority to meet and hear from
small groups of soldiers ranging from junior enlisted to field-grade
officers, and their input has been invaluable and has shaped my thinking and
decisions. All in senior positions would be well-advised to listen to
enlisted soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and company- and field-grade
officers. They are the ones on the front line, and they know the real story.


10/11

More broadly, if as an officer one does not tell blunt truths or create an
environment where candor is encouraged, then they have done themselves and
the institution a disservice. This admonition goes back beyond the roots of
our own republic. Sir Francis Bacon was a seventeenth-century jurist and
philosopher as well as a confidante of the senior minister of England’s King
James. He gave this advice to a protégé looking to follow in his steps at
court: “Remember well the great trust you have undertaken; you are as a
continual sentinel, always to stand upon your watch to give [the king] true
intelligence. If you flatter him, you betray him.” 

In General Marshall’s case, he was able to forge a bond of trust with
President Roosevelt not only because his civilian boss could count on his
candor, but also because once a decision was made, FDR could count on
Marshall to do his utmost to carry out a policy—even if he disagreed with
it—and make it work. This is important because the two men clashed time and
again in the years that followed, ranging from yet more matters of war
production to whether the Allies should defer an invasion on the mainland of
Europe. 

Consider the situation in mid-1940. The Germans had just overrun France, and
the Battle of Britain was about to begin. FDR believed that rushing arms and
equipment to Britain, including half of America’s bomber production, should
be the top priority in order to save our ally. General Marshall believed
that rearming America should come first. President Roosevelt overruled him
and others, and made what most historians believe was the correct
decision—to do what was necessary to keep England alive. 

The significant thing is what did not happen next. There was a powerful
domestic constituency for General Marshall’s position among a whole host of
newspapers and congressmen and lobbies, and yet General Marshall did not
exploit and use them. There were no overtures to friendly congressional
committee chairmen, no leaks to sympathetic reporters, no ghostwritten
editorials in newspapers, and no coalition-building with advocacy groups.
General Marshall and his colleagues made the policy work and kept England
alive. 

11/12

In the ensuing decades, a large permanent military establishment emerged as
a result of the Cold War, an establishment that forged deep ties to the
Congress and to industry. Over the years, senior officers have from time to
time been tempted to use these ties to do end-runs around the civilian
leadership, particularly during disputes over the purchase of major weapon
systems. This temptation should and must be resisted. 

General Marshall has been recognized as a textbook model for the way
military officers should handle disagreements with superiors and in
particular with the civilians vested with control of the armed forces under
our Constitution. In these situations, an officer’s duties are: 

*         To provide blunt and candid advice always. 

*         To keep disagreements private. 

*         And to implement faithfully decisions that go against you. 

As with Fox Conner’s lessons of war, these principles are a solid starting
point for dealing with issues of candor, dissent, and duty. Like Conner’s
axioms, applying these principles to the situations military leaders face
today and in the future is a good deal more complicated. 

World War II was America’s last straightforward conventional conflict that
ended in the unconditional surrender of the other side. The military
campaigns since—from Korea to Vietnam, Somalia, and Iraq today—have been
frustrating, controversial efforts for the American public and for American
armed forces. Each conflict has prompted debate over whether senior military
officers were being too deferential or not deferential enough to civilian
leaders, and whether civilians, in turn, were too receptive or not receptive
enough to military advice. 

In the absence of clear lines of advance or retreat on the battlefield, each
conflict has prompted our nation’s senior civilian and military leadership
to seek the support of an increasingly skeptical American public, using a
variety of criteria and metrics—from enemy body counts to voter turnout.
Then as now, the American people especially relied on the candor and the
credibility of military officers in order to judge how well a campaign is
going and whether the effort should continue. 

Candor and credibility remain indispensable, because we will see yet more
irregular and difficult conflicts, of varying types, in the years ahead;
conflicts where the traditional duties of an officer are accompanied by real
dilemmas—dilemmas posed by a nonlinear environment made up of civilians,
detainees, contractors, embedded media, and an adversary that does not wear
uniforms or obey the laws of war; an adversary that could be an enemy on one
day or, as we have seen in Iraq’s Anbar province, a partner the next. 

Many young officers and cadets examine these scenarios in ethics classes or
hear the accounts from returning veterans; take for example a situa-

12/13

tion where a beloved platoon sergeant is killed by a sniper shot believed
fired from a house by the side of a road. When the combat forces arrive, the
sniper is gone. But the elderly woman, who lives in the house, is still
there. The battalion and brigade commanders pass down orders to demolish the
house, to teach the enemy’s sympathizers a lesson and take away a possible
sniper position. The young platoon leader conducts an investigation and
concludes this course of action is counterproductive. So the lieutenant
makes the call not to destroy the house, and his commanding officer stands
by him. This is a true story from Iraq, a campaign that has been dubbed the
“Captain’s War” because, as in any counterinsurgency, so much of the
decisive edge is provided by the initiative and the judgment of junior
officers. 

Speaking of lessons learned, I should note that during my time as Secretary,
I have been impressed by the way the Army’s professional journals allow some
of our brightest and most innovative officers to critique—sometimes
bluntly—the way the service does business; to include judgments about senior
leadership, both military and civilian. I believe this is a sign of
institutional vitality and health and strength. I encourage every member of
the military to take on the mantle of fearless, thoughtful, but loyal
dissent when the situation calls for it. Agree with the articles or not,
senior officers should embrace such dissent as healthy dialogue and protect
and advance those considerably more junior who are taking on that mantle. 

I wrote my first and far from last critique of the Central Intelligence
Agency in a professional journal in 1970, four years into my career. Without
the support of several senior agency officers, my career would have quickly
been over. 

In the military, as at every university or company in America, there is a
focus on teamwork, consensus-building, and collaboration. Yet make no
mistake, the time will come when a leader in today’s military must stand
alone and make a difficult, unpopular decision, or challenge the opinion of
superiors and tell them that they cannot get the job done with the time and
the resources available—a difficult charge in an organization built on a
“can-do” ethos like America’s Army; or a time when a member of the military
will know that what superiors are telling the press or the Congress or the
American people is inaccurate. These are the moments when an officer’s
entire career may be at risk. What will they do? These are difficult
questions that require serious thought over the course of any officer’s
career. There are no easy answers. 

If they will follow the dictates of their conscience and maintain the
courage of their convictions while being respectfully candid with superiors
and encouraging candor in others, they will be in good stead to meet the
challenges facing them as officers and leaders in the years ahead. 

  _____  

Dr. Robert M. Gates was sworn in on 18 December 2006, as the 22d Secretary
of Defense. This article is based on remarks delivered 21 April 2008 at the
US Military Academy. 

  _____  

Go to  <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/08summer/contents.htm>
Summer issue Table of Contents. 

Go to  <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/a-index.htm>
Cumulative Article Index. 

Go to  <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/parahome.htm>
Parameters home page. 

Reviewed 14 July 2008. Please send comments or corrections to
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