Anyone who knows anything about Islam knows that there are no "moderate" and
no "radical" Muslims...
only the followers of Mohammed and Islam: Muslims.
 
B 


Iran's Hamas Strategy


Radical Shiites back radical Sunnis with the aim of destabilizing the Middle
East.


By REUEL
<outbind://13/search/search_center.html?KEYWORDS=REUEL+MARC+GERECHT&ARTICLES
EARCHQUERY_PARSER=bylineAND> MARC GERECHT

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123128812156759281.html#printMode

Anyone who knows anything about the Middle East knows that Sunni and Shiite
radicals don't work together -- er, except when they do. Proof that the
conventional wisdom is badly wrong is on offer in Gaza, where the manifest
destiny of the Islamic Republic of Iran is now unfolding. Tehran has been
aiding Hamas for years with the aim of radicalizing politics across the
entire Arab Middle East. Now Israel's response to thousands of Hamas rocket
provocations appears to be doing just that.

Born in the 1980s from the ruins of the Palestine Liberation Organization's
corrupt and decaying secular nationalism, Hamas is a grass-roots, Sunni
Islamist movement that has made Shiite Iran a front-line player in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Before Hamas, the mullahs had financed the
Palestine Islamic Jihad, whose holy warriors became renowned suicide
bombers. But Islamic Jihad has always been a fringe group within Palestinian
society. As national elections revealed in 2006, Hamas is mainstream.

Although often little appreciated in the West, revolutionary Iran's
ecumenical quest has remained a constant in its approach to Sunni Muslims.
The anti-Shiite rhetoric of many Sunni fundamentalist groups has rarely been
reciprocated by Iran's ruling elite. Since the death in 1989 of Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, the charismatic, quintessentially Shiite leader of the
Islamic revolution, Iran's ruling mullahs have tried assiduously to downplay
the sectarian content in their militant message.

Khomeini's successor, Ali Khamenei, has consistently married his virulent
anti-American rhetoric (Khomeini's "Great Satan" has become Khamenei's
"Satan Incarnate") with a global appeal to faithful Muslims to join the
battle against the U.S. and its allies. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the
most politically adept of the revolution's founding clerics, loved to
sponsor militant Sunni-Shiite gatherings when he was speaker of parliament
and later as president (1989-1997). He and Mr. Khamenei, who have worked
hand-in-hand on national-security issues and have unquestionably authorized
every major terrorist operation since the death of Khomeini in 1989, have
always been the ultimate pragmatists, even reaching out to Arab Sunni
radicals with a strong anti-Shiite bent.

The most radical branch of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad Organization and its
most famous member, Ayman al-Zawahiri, became favored Arab poster boys for
the clerical regime in the 1980s and 1990s even though Islamic Jihad, like
other extremist takfiri Sunni groups, damns Shiites with almost the same
gusto as it damns Western infidels. The laissez-passers that Iran gave
members of al Qaeda before Sept. 11, 2001 (see the 9/11 Commission Report),
the training offered to al Qaeda in the 1990s by the Lebanese Shiite
Hezbollah (again, see the report), and the "detention" of senior members of
al Qaeda fleeing Afghanistan after the American invasion are best seen
against the backdrop of clerical Iran's three-decade long outreach to
radical Sunnis who loathe Americans more than they hate Shiites.

In 2003, Iran launched two Arabic satellite TV channels both under the
guidance of the former Revolutionary Guards commander Ali Larijani, a
well-dressed, well-trimmed puritan with a Ph.D. in philosophy who crushed a
brief period of intellectual openness in Iran's media in the early 1990s. A
favorite of Mr. Khamenei, Mr. Larijani pushed TV content extolling Hamas,
anti-Israeli suicide bombers, anti-Semitism and an all-Muslim insurgency in
Iraq. Iran's remarkably subdued rhetoric against Arabs who gave loud support
to insurgents and holy warriors slaughtering Iraqi Shiites between 2004 and
2007 is inextricably tied to Tehran's determination to keep Muslim eyes
focused on the most important issue -- the battle against America and
Israel. Iran's full-bore backing of Hezbollah in the July 2006 war with the
Jewish State, a conflict that Tehran and its Syrian ally precipitated by
their aggressive military support of Hezbollah, drew Sunni eyes further away
from Iraq's internecine strife.

The 2006 Lebanon war, which lasted 34 days and saw Hezbollah's
Iranian-trained forces embarrass the Israeli army, made Tehran's favorite
Arab son, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, one of the most admired men in
the Sunni Arab world. This was a remarkable achievement given that Hezbollah
had helped Iran train some of the Iraqi Shiite militants who were wreaking a
horrific vengeance against Baghdad's Sunni Arabs in 2006 -- a bloodbath that
was constantly on Arab satellite television.

Prominent Sunni rulers -- Egypt's Hosni Mubarak and Jordan's King Abdullah
-- have railed against a "Shiite arc" of power forming in the Near East,
only to see few echoes develop outside of the region's officially controlled
media. Although the Sunni Arab rulers have sometimes shown considerable
anxiety about the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon, Sunni
fundamentalist organizations affiliated with Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, the
mother ship for Sunni Islamists, have been much more restrained in
expressing their trepidation.

With strong ties to its fundamentalist brethren along the Nile, Hamas has
given Iran (really for the first time, and so far at little cost) an
important ally within the fundamentalist circles of the Muslim Brotherhood.
One of the Islamic revolution's great disappointments was that it failed to
produce more allies within the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its many
offshoots.

The revolution certainly inspired many within the movement in Egypt and in
Syria. But Iran's ties to the ruling Syrian Allawite elite -- a heretical
Shiite sect that Sunni fundamentalists detest -- complicated its outreach to
Sunni militants. When Syria's dictator Hafez Assad slaughtered thousands of
Sunni fundamentalists in the town of Hama in 1982, and revolutionary Iran
remained largely silent, Tehran's standing within the Muslim Brotherhood
collapsed.

With Hamas, Iran has the opportunity to make amends. The mullahs have a
chance of supplanting Saudi Arabia, the font of the most vicious anti-Shiite
Sunni creed, as the most reliable backer of Palestinian fundamentalists.
Even more than the Lebanese Hezbollah, which remains tied to and constrained
by the complex matrix of Lebanese politics, Hamas seems willing to absorb
enormous losses to continue its jihad against Israel. Where Saudi Arabia has
been uneasy about the internecine strife among Palestinians -- it has
bankrolled both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority of Mahmoud Abbas -- Iran
has put its money on the former.

Although Fatah, the ruling party within the Palestinian Authority, may get a
second wind thanks to the excesses of Hamas and the Israelis' killing much
of Hamas's brain power and muscle, it is difficult to envision Fatah
reviving itself into an appealing political alternative for faithful
Palestinians. Fatah is hopelessly corrupt, often brutal, and without an
inspiring raison d'ĂȘtre: a Palestine of the West Bank and Gaza is, as Hamas
correctly points out, boring, historically unappealing, and a noncontiguous
geographic mess. Fatah only sounds impassioned when it gives vent to its
anti-Israeli, anti-Semitic, profoundly Muslim roots. It's no accident that
the religious allusions and suicide bombers of Fatah and Hamas after 2000
were hard to tell apart. If Hamas can withstand the current Israeli attack
on its leadership and infrastructure, then the movement's aura will likely
be impossible to match. Iran's influence among religious Palestinians could
skyrocket.

Through Hamas, Tehran can possibly reach the ultimate prize, the Egyptian
faithful. For reasons both ancient and modern, Egypt has perhaps the most
Shiite-sympathetic religious identity in the Sunni Arab world. As long as
Hamas remains the center of the Palestinian imagination -- and unless Hamas
loses its military grip on Gaza, it will continue to command the attention
of both the Arab and Western media -- Egypt's politics remain fluid and
potentially volatile. Tehran is certainly under no illusions about the
strength of Egypt's military dictatorship, but the uncertainties in Egypt
are greater now than they have been since the assassination of Anwar Sadat
in 1981.

President Hosni Mubarak, Sadat's successor, is old and in questionable
health. His jet-setting son or a general may succeed him. Neither choice
will resuscitate the regime's legitimacy, which has plummeted even among the
highly Westernized elite. The popularity and mosque-power of the Muslim
Brotherhood, which would likely win a free election, continues to rise. A
turbulent Gaza where devout Muslims are in a protracted, televised fight
with the cursed Jews could add sufficient heat to make Egyptian politics
really interesting. The odds of Egypt cracking could be very small -- the
police powers of the Egyptian state are, when provoked, ferocious -- but
they are now certainly enough to keep the Iranians playing.

Where once Ayatollah Khomeini believed in the revolutionary potential of
soft power (Iran's example was supposed to topple the pro-American autocrats
throughout the Middle East), Khomeini's children are firm believers in hard
power, covert action, duplicity and persistence. With Gaza and Egypt
conceivably within Tehran's grasp, the clerical regime will be patient and
try to keep Gaza boiling.

It is entirely possible that Tehran could overplay its hand among the
Palestinians as it overplayed its hand among Iraqi Shiites, turning
sympathetic Muslims into deeply suspicious, nationalistic patriots. The
Israeli army could deconstruct Hamas's leadership sufficiently that Gaza
will remain a fundamentalist mess that inspires more pity than the white-hot
heat that comes when jihadists beat infidels in battle. But with a
nuclear-armed Iran just around the corner, the mullahs will do their best to
inspire.

Ultimately, it's doubtful that Tehran will find President-elect Barack
Obama's offer of more diplomacy, or the threat of more European sanctions,
to be compelling. The price of oil may be low, but the mullahs have seen
worse economic times. In 30 years, they have not seen a better constellation
of forces. And as the Shiite prayer goes, perhaps this time round the
Sunnis, too, inshallah(God willing), will see the light.

Mr. Gerecht, a former Central Intelligence Agency officer, is a senior
fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

 
(F)AIR USE NOTICE: All original content and/or articles and graphics in this
message are copyrighted, unless specifically noted otherwise. All rights to
these copyrighted items are reserved. Articles and graphics have been placed
within for educational and discussion purposes only, in compliance with
"Fair Use" criteria established in Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976.
The principle of "Fair Use" was established as law by Section 107 of The
Copyright Act of 1976. "Fair Use" legally eliminates the need to obtain
permission or pay royalties for the use of previously copyrighted materials
if the purposes of display include "criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, scholarship, and research." Section 107 establishes four criteria
for determining whether the use of a work in any particular case qualifies
as a "fair use". A work used does not necessarily have to satisfy all four
criteria to qualify as an instance of "fair use". Rather, "fair use" is
determined by the overall extent to which the cited work does or does not
substantially satisfy the criteria in their totality. If you wish to use
copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use,' you
must obtain permission from the copyright owner. For more information go to:
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml>
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml 

THIS DOCUMENT MAY CONTAIN COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL. COPYING AND DISSEMINATION IS
PROHIBITED WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE COPYRIGHT OWNERS.

 
 


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]


------------------------------------

--------------------------
Want to discuss this topic?  Head on over to our discussion list, 
[email protected].
--------------------------
Brooks Isoldi, editor
[email protected]

http://www.intellnet.org

  Post message: [email protected]
  Subscribe:    [email protected]
  Unsubscribe:  [email protected]


*** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has 
not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. OSINT, as a part of 
The Intelligence Network, is making it available without profit to OSINT 
YahooGroups members who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the 
included information in their efforts to advance the understanding of 
intelligence and law enforcement organizations, their activities, methods, 
techniques, human rights, civil liberties, social justice and other 
intelligence related issues, for non-profit research and educational purposes 
only. We believe that this constitutes a 'fair use' of the copyrighted material 
as provided for in section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Law. If you wish to use 
this copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use,' 
you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.
For more information go to:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtmlYahoo! Groups Links

<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/

<*> Your email settings:
    Individual Email | Traditional

<*> To change settings online go to:
    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/join
    (Yahoo! ID required)

<*> To change settings via email:
    mailto:[email protected] 
    mailto:[email protected]

<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
    [email protected]

<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
    http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/

Reply via email to