Note co-author William Arkin is a radical, leftist wing-nut.  Famous for
anti-US hatchet jobs.

 

B 

 

http://www.examiner.com/examiner/x-2684-Law-Enforcement-Examiner~y2010m7d20-
Washington-Post-slams-US-intelligence-community

 

 

Washington Post slams U.S. intelligence community 

July 20, 6:39 AMhttp://image.examiner.com/img/greydot.gifLaw Enforcement
<http://www.examiner.com/x-2684-Law-Enforcement-Examiner>
Examinerhttp://image.examiner.com/img/greydot.gifJim Kouri

In a controversial article, the Washington Post reported that U.S.
intelligence gathering has become so massive since the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks that agencies are plagued with redundancy and that many
intelligence reports are routinely ignored.

The Washington Post report
<http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/>  cites government
documents, as well as current and former intelligence officials.  As has
become a custom in journalism, many of those officials requested anonymity.

According to the Post, a two-year investigation found that more than 1,270
government organizations and 1,900 private firms involved in
counterterrorism and intelligence do the same work.  The newspaper report
claims that no one knows how much money is being wasted in those efforts.

Closely tied to the question of how best to set intelligence requirements
are the larger questions of how to improve analysis by the intelligence
community and how to increase its impact. 

Many policymakers and lawmakers are critical of the analysis they receive,
and both intelligence consumers and producers often share a frustration over
its perceived lack of utility and hence lack of impact. This includes local
law enforcement commanders who -- more than ever -- depend on solid
information in order to deploy their resources in post-9/11 America.

The best way to ensure high-quality analysis is to bring high quality
analysts into the process. Here it helps to think of the challenge as one of
improving both the stock and the flow of personnel. Certain stock (career
personnel) need to be encouraged to specialize in a geographical area or
function and rewarded for excellence. Not everyone need pursue a career with
a management component. This is not meant to diminish the value of
management skills. To the contrary, the CIA in particular needs to place
much more emphasis on formal management and leadership training as well as
demonstrated competence as a prerequisite for promotion for those headed for
senior levels. 

But better analysis will also require reducing the isolation of the
intelligence community. A greater flow of talented people into the agency
from academia and business is essential. Greater provision ought to be made
for lateral and mid-career entry as well as for short-term entry (measured
in weeks, months, or years) or even for just a single, short-duration
project. In this way the intelligence community could attract and exploit
some of the best minds from academia and other sections of society that
would otherwise not be available. 

Working to improve the quality of analysts, however, is not enough; it is
also necessary to change the relationship between intelligence producers and
consumers. Intelligence professionals must understand the needs of
policymakers and vice versa. One way to do so is through regular rotation of
career intelligence officers into positions in the policymaking departments
(State, Defense, Treasury, etc.) and the NSC. Temporary assignment to the
relevant congressional staffs should also be an option. Sabbaticals as in
academia or business would be similarly useful; indeed, such rotations
should be required for promotion to senior levels. The same logic argues for
assigning careerists normally in the policymaking realm to periodic tours
inside the intelligence community. 

The danger of politicization -- the potential for the intelligence community
to distort information or judgment in order to please political authorities
-- is real. Moreover, the danger can never be eliminated if intelligence
analysts are involved, as they must be, in the policy process. The challenge
is to develop reasonable safeguards while permitting intelligence producers
and policymaking consumers to interact. 

The need to protect intelligence from political pressure and parochialism is
a powerful argument for maintaining a strong, centralized capability and not
leaving decisions affecting important intelligence-related questions solely
to the policymaking departments. (Centralization raises the risk of
politicization stemming from the DCI. Only the president, senior officials
involved in national security, and Congress can help guard against
politicization-though they too can try to politicize intelligence.) 

Unlike business, in the intelligence business, the customer is not always
right. 

The intelligence community can protect itself from political pressure
through competitive analysis of controversial questions. Guarding against
politicization is also a useful function for Congress and the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. (One option to consider in this regard
would be to reconstitute to make it selected by and responsible to Congress
as well as the president, as was the Aspin-Brown Commission.) Perhaps most
important, the leadership of the intelligence community should reinforce the
ethic that speaking the truth to those in power is required-and defend
anyone who comes under criticism for doing so. 

Irrelevance is a related and arguably bigger problem for analysts than
politicization. Intelligence analysis rarely impresses itself upon
policymakers, who are inevitably busy and inundated with more demands on
their time and attention than they can possibly meet. Intelligence officials
must draw attention to their product and market their ideas. This is
especially true in the case of any early warning or intelligence-related
development that has potentially significant consequences for important
interests. A phone call, a personalized memorandum, a meeting-any and all
are required if the situation is sufficiently serious. Involving relevant
policymakers and other consumers in the regular personnel evaluations of the
analysts who serve them would underline the importance of such an effort and
provide an incentive to individual analysts. 

Another serious problem to be avoided is mindset or "groupthink." Any
organization, and the CIA or any intelligence agency is no exception, can
fall into the trap of not questioning basic assumptions that affect much
subsequent analysis. It is essential t hat competitive or redundant analysis
be encouraged. Currently and historically, less than a tenth of what the
United States spends on intelligence is devoted to analysis; it is the least
expensive dimension of intelligence. Not all duplication is wasteful. This
country could surely afford to spend more in those areas of analysis where
being wrong can have major adverse consequences. 

One other aspect of analysis merits mention, namely, the balance between
current intelligence and long-term estimates. For years the culture of the
intelligence community, in particular that of the CIA, has favored the
latter. But it is precisely in long-term analysis of familiar subjects and
broad trends where secret information tends to be less critical and
government analysts are for the most part no better and often not as good as
their counterparts in academia and the private sector. 

Also, many estimates are likely to be less relevant to busy policymakers,
who must focus on the immediate. All this suggests that the emphasis placed
on such estimates should be reduced. To the extent long-term estimates are
produced, they ought to be concise, written by individuals, and sources
justifying conclusions ought to be shown as they would in any academic work.
If the project is a group effort, differences among participants ought to be
sharpened and prominently acknowledged. While it is valuable to point out
areas of consensus, it is more important that areas of dispute be
highlighted than that all agencies be pressured to reach a conclusion that
represents little more than a lowest common denominator

The most important function of the clandestine services-mostly found in the
CIA Directorate of Operations -- is the collection of human intelligence.
Such intelligence can complement other sources and, in certain instances, be
the principal or sole source of information. 

This tends to be true in closed societies, where decision-making and
information is limited to a few, highly valued efforts are meant to be kept
secret, and the targeted activity is not easily captured by reconnaissance
or eavesdropping. Human intelligence can also help shed light on intentions
as well as capabilities. Such knowledge is likely to prove crucial in
tracking the activities of terrorists and in determining the status of
unconventional weapons programs. Human intelligence is no panacea. Contacts
and networks take years to develop, if they can be developed at all-but it
holds the often unique potential to provide an integrated look at a
subject's thinking and capability. 

A second task for the clandestine services is covert action, that is, the
carrying out of operations to influence events in another country in which
it is deemed important to hide the hand of the US government. Historically,
covert action has included such activities as channeling funds to selected
individuals, movements or political parties, media placements, broadcasting,
and paramilitary support. 

Such operations can be designed to bolster the capabilities of friendly
governments in dealing with challenges to them and their societies. Covert
measures can also have the opposite purpose, to weaken a hostile government.
The capability to undertake these and other tasks-be it to frustrate a
terrorist action, intercept some technology or equipment that would help a
rogue state or group build a nuclear device, or assist some group trying to
overthrow a leadership whose actions threaten US interests-constitutes an
important national security tool, one that can provide policymakers a
valuable alternative or complement to other policies, including diplomacy,
sanctions, and military intervention. 

Clandestine operations, whether for collection of foreign intelligence,
counterintelligence, or covert action, will often require associating with
individuals of unsavory reputations who in some instances may have committed
crimes. This differs little from the tradition in law enforcement of using
criminals to catch criminals and should be acceptable so long as the likely
benefits outweigh the certain moral and potential political costs of the
association-a calculation that should not be made solely by the person in
the field. The only other word of caution (in addition to ensuring legality,
sufficient control, and adequate oversight) is that any covert action must
appear consistent with established US policy so that, if discovered, the
purposes behind the effort would be understood. 

Clandestine operations for whatever purpose currently are circumscribed by a
number of legal and policy constraints. These deserve review to avoid
diminishing the potential contribution of this instrument. At a minimum, the
Task Force recommended that a fresh look be taken at limits on the use of
nonofficial "covers" for hiding and protecting those involved in clandestine
activities. In addition, rules that can prohibit preemptive attacks on
terrorists or support for individuals hoping to bring about a regime change
in a hostile country need to be assessed periodically. 

Maintaining and enhancing clandestine capabilities takes time and resources;
creating and nurturing such capabilities ought to be a high priority of the
intelligence community given the importance of targets that otherwise cannot
be reached. Individuals must not only learn the craft but also develop
language skills, deep knowledge of a society, and covers to shield their
intelligence-related activity. They will also benefit from having available
an adequate official US presence; the closing of US embassies and other
missions abroad reduces the capacity to collect intelligence and undertake
clandestine operations. 

On the other hand, one cannot ignore the Directorate of Operations' record
of operating with questionable legality and judgment. Constant vigilance
inside the CIA is needed to ensure that the DO is doing quality work
consistent with policy priorities, senior officials inside and outside the
CIA are kept fully informed, officer's actions are consistent with existing
regulations and laws, senior DO personnel are treating their employees
responsibly, and analysts outside the directorate have full access to its
product. 

In return, those in the operations directorate should know that risk-taking
will be supported and they will be politically protected so long as what
they do is authorized and legal under US law at the time. Such support is
crucial; contrary to widespread impressions, one problem with the
clandestine services has been a lack of initiative brought about by a fear
of retroactive discipline and a lack of high-level support. This must be
rectified if the intelligence community is to continue to produce the human
intelligence that will surely be needed in the future. 

(The above is an abridged version of a lecture given by the author at a
conference held by the 14,000-member National Association of Chiefs of
Police.) 


Jim Kouri, CPP is currently fifth vice-president of the National Association
of Chiefs of Police and he's a staff writer for the New Media Alliance
(thenma.org). In addition, he's the new editor for the House Conservatives
Fund's weblog. Kouri also serves as political advisor for Emmy and Golden
Globe winning actor Michael Moriarty. 

He's former chief at a New York City housing project in Washington Heights
nicknamed "Crack City" by reporters covering the drug war in the 1980s. In
addition, he served as director of public safety at a New Jersey university
and director of security for several major organizations. He's also served
on the National Drug Task Force and trained police and security officers
throughout the country. Kouri writes for many police and security magazines
including Chief of Police, Police Times, The Narc Officer and others. He's a
news writer for TheConservativeVoice.Com and PHXnews.com. He's also a
columnist for AmericanDaily.Com, MensNewsDaily.Com, MichNews.Com, and he's
syndicated by AXcessNews.Com. He's appeared as on-air commentator for over
100 TV and radio news and talk shows including Oprah, McLaughlin Report, CNN
Headline News, MTV, Fox News, etc. 

 



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