<http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/afghan/articles/20100720.aspx>
http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/afghan/articles/20100720.aspx 


Afghanistan - The Evil Eight Percenters


July 20, 2010: The main problem in Afghanistan is a lack of cooperation. The
various tribes all want to go their own way in terms of laws (especially
about drugs and lifestyle issues, like education of women and use of music
and video) and even foreign policy (cooperation with the Taliban in Pakistan
and terrorists in general). It's not just the tribes, but many of the
foreign NGOs, who control a lot of the aid money, who do not want to
cooperate with the security forces, and prefer to made side deals (pay
bribes)  with drug gangs, bandits and Taliban. 

The NGOs are a particular problem for the Afghan government. First, the NGOs
control most of the aid money, which is a way to prevent the money being
stolen by corrupt officials. The Afghan government wants more control of the
aid money, officially so that it can be spent on things Afghans are more in
need of, but mainly so that greedy officials can steal more of the cash. But
another problem is the desire of NGOs to change the way Afghans live. Many
Afghans resent being told they should stop beating their wives and letting
their daughters  get more than a primary school education. Some Afghans feel
very strongly about banning some aspects of foreign culture (television and
Indian or Pakistani movies). Afghans have handled these disputes in the past
mainly by not trying to impose their customs on others. The Taliban broke
this rule, and are hated by most Afghans as a result. 

India is resuming its medical aid operations in Afghanistan. The five Indian
clinics have treated over 300,000 Afghans, mainly women and children, since
late 2001. This effort was halted earlier this year, after a terror attack
killed nine Indian medical personnel. Pakistanis are very hostile to Indian
aid operations in Afghanistan, because of the decades of Pakistani paranoia
about its larger neighbor to the east. 

Pakistan also believes that Afghanistan is in the Pakistani "sphere of
control" and that other nations should stay out. That has not worked very
well, especially after Afghanistan turned into a terrorist sanctuary in the
1990s. Pakistan also tolerated the rebuilding of the Afghan Taliban in
Pakistan (where the organization was first formed in the early 1990s) 5-8
years ago. This Pakistani connection also reveals the Pushtun aspect of the
unrest in Afghanistan. Pushtun live on both sides of the Pakistani border,
most of them in Pakistan. But in Afghanistan, the Pushtun are the largest
minority (40 percent of the population) dominate the south, and have
traditionally dominated the other minorities. But this came to a halt in
late 2001. Over the next few years, as democracy was introduced, the Pushtun
lost their domination forever. Many Pushtuns resent this, and want to get
their control back. The Afghan majority disagree. The Taliban are seen as
champions of Pushtun domination, and the Afghan majority (Turks, Tajiks and
Hazara) are glad to have foreign troops help them beat down the Pushtun
Taliban. The Afghan security forces have a disproportionate number of
non-Pushtuns, because the war in Afghanistan is mainly everyone against the
Pushtuns, and Pushtuns would prefer not to fight Pushtuns, and non-Pushtuns
would prefer not to have too many Pushtuns in the army and police. 

It's been leaked that most foreign troops are planning to leave in four
years, turning security duties over to the Afghan government. This could
result in another civil war, with the Pushtuns being in a much weaker
position than they were in the 1990s (when the non-Pushtun factions did not
have access to as much foreign aid.) That future civil war might involve
Pakistani intervention, and perhaps even Pakistani annexation of southern
Afghanistan (where Pushtuns dominate.) Much to the distress of the Afghan
government, many foreign governments do not seem to distressed at the
prospect of Afghanistan being dismembered as part of a peace process.

This year, there are more operations planned and carried out by Afghan army
units. Foreign military advisors are still there to help out, and watch out
for drug gang attempts to bribe the Afghan officers to go elsewhere. The
bribes don't always work, as the non-Pushtun commanders realize that it's
more important to kill Pushtuns and destroy the drug trade.

A recent opinion survey in Kandahar and Helmand provinces show the area is
still hostile to foreigners, as it has always been. These two provinces
contain about eight percent of the national population, and have always been
the source of most Taliban support and leadership. This hostile and paranoid
attitude is not shared by most other Afghans, who are particularly hostile
to the Pushtuns from Kandahar and Helmand because of all the pain these
Taliban inflicted in the 1990s. Kandahar and Helmand are also the source of
most of the world's heroin and opium, which is causing a growing number of
Afghan addicts. If the Pushtuns from Kandahar and Helmand hate outsiders,
the outsiders hate them right back, especially fellow Afghans. 

The leaders of the Pushtun tribes in Kandahar and Helmand are aware of their
precarious position and are seeking to work out some kind of deal with the
national government, and the majority tribes (Pushtuns and non-Pushtuns
alike.) But the Kandahar and Helmand Pushtuns have gotten rich from the drug
trade, and are reluctant to give up their wealth. 

Meanwhile, many anti-Taliban Pushtun tribes in the south are demanding help
from the government against Taliban violence. So the government is going to
help equip and organize village defense forces. This is a technique that has
worked elsewhere in similar situations. But in Afghanistan, providing
training, and more guns, to rural clans is likely to backfire later, as
these guns, and the training, are used to settle some local feud. These
little wars are endemic in Afghanistan. 

July 16, 2010:  In Helmand province, NATO and Afghan troops seized an enemy
base containing 1.8 tons of heroin, .8 ton of opium and 90 kg (200 pounds)
of ammonium nitrate (a banned fertilizer used to make roadside bombs). It
takes 3-4 kg of ammonium nitrate for a roadside bomb. These days, the same
smugglers to bring in chemicals needed to refine opium into heroin, also
bring in ammonium nitrate. The drug gangs and Taliban operate so closely
together that they share bases, and often the same personnel. 

 



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