Tawhid al-Hakimiyah - A Jihadi Achilles Heel?
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 29
July 22, 2010 04:44 PM
By: Jack Barclay
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Salafism, the Islamic reformist current that first appeared in the Middle
East in the 19th century, is a more diverse movement than many observers
initially assume. Like other Islamic movements, it now encompasses a wide
variety of distinct sub-sets, each with its own scholars and emphasis on the
study and practice of particular concepts.

It will surprise few readers that doctrinal disagreements often occur
between the various schools of Salafism. Of particular interest in
counterterrorism terms, however, are the rifts between followers of the more
apolitical, "establishment" schools and those of a violent offshoot of
Salafism, Salafi-Jihadism. What is perhaps more surprising is that these
disagreements persist over interpretations of some of Islam's most
fundamental concepts, on which, it might be assumed, virtually all Muslims
agree. Such fissures may have wider counterterrorism implications.

One particular area of perpetual disagreement concerns the application of
the concept of Tawhid, or the "oneness" of Allah. As a monotheistic
religion, Tawhid is intrinsically accepted by virtually all Muslims. When a
Muslim makes his or her shahadah, or declaration of faith, they state their
belief in one God, who is without partner, and that there is nothing else
which is to be worshipped, followed, or obeyed besides him. [1]. The
Salafi-Jihadi interpretation of Tawhid's practical obligations remains one
of a number of potential doctrinal vulnerabilities in the ideology of the
global Salafi-Jihadi movement, including its justification for declaring
Muslim governments and individuals apostate (takfir). A deeper understanding
of the intra-Salafi debates on the core issues underpinning the Islamic
legitimacy of groups such as al-Qaeda and their choice of targets offers an
opportunity for the counterterrorism community to increase the effectiveness
of their response to Islamist radicalization.

Tawhid and its Categories

To assist in the clear and comprehensive instruction of Muslims in the
various aspects and obligations of Tawhid and to bolster the religion
against doctrinal innovation, classical Islamic scholars divided the concept
into a number of categories. While there is much diversity of opinion on the
validity of these classifications, three of the most widely-accepted are:

. Tawhid al-Rububiyah: Oneness of Allah's lordship, or the belief that there
is only one God (Allah) and that nothing else is equal to him.
. Tawhid al-Uluhiyah: Allah is the only One God who is worthy of worship,
and that there is nothing to be worshipped, followed, or obeyed except Allah
. Tawhid al-Asma wa'l-Sifaat: Oneness of Allah's many names and attributes,
without deviation, alteration, or similitude.

Salafists stress that these terms will not be found in either the Quran or
Sunnah, but that they are merely tools to aid the most accurate and complete
teaching of Tawhid possible.

Oneness of Legislation and Jihadi Ideology

A controversial issue relating to the study and application of Tawhid has
re-surfaced with the growth of the Salafi-Jihadi movement, which emphasizes
one aspect in particular: Tawhid al-Hakimiyah, or oneness of Allah's
judgement and legislation. The debate over the validity of this concept has
typically taken the form of a fatwa (religious judgement) issued by leading
scholars of the Saudi religious establishment, and opposing fatwas by the
shaykhs of the Salafi-Jihad. More recently, the debate has turned to the
internet.

The term Tawhid al-Hakimiyah is derived from the Arabic word "hukm"
(legislation or law), and in this context refers to the obligation to rule
only by what Allah has revealed, and associating no other forms of
legislation with it. Some Salafi scholars sub-divide Tawhid al-Hakimiyah
into four categories:

. Al-Futiyah - the issuance of Fatwa
. Al-Qa'dthaa' - judicial rulings
. Management of public affairs in accordance with Shari'a
. Adoption of rulings, or the adoption of divine laws as dictated by the
Quran and Sunnah

It should be stressed that the controversy is not over the basic principle
of the oneness of Allah's legislation, but rather its characterization as a
separate category of Tawhid. For many Salafists, it is thought unnecessary
to create a separate category of Tawhid to specifically educate Muslims in
the importance of the oneness of Allah's legislation. Most of the leading
contemporary Salafi scholars of Saudi Arabia have refuted as an innovation
(bida) any attempt to classify Tawhid al-Hakimiyah as a fourth category of
Tawhid, with the largely agreed-upon three categories being judged
sufficient to fully explain Tawhid's many aspects and obligations. [2] Those
scholars willing to acknowledge the classification typically claim that the
concept is a sub-category of Tawhid al-Uluhiyah, though others argue it
falls under Tawhid ar-Rububiyah. Still others believe it falls under both
these definitions as well as under Tawhid al-Asma wa'l-Sifaat. A survey of
fatwa, books, articles, and interviews with shaykhs on this issue suggests
that the consensus is toward oneness of legislation falling under Tawhid
al-Uluhiyah.

Political Agendas

Such introspective debates over classification are driven by a more serious
fissure, however. Of greater concern to many Salafi scholars is that the
prominence given by Salafi-Jihadists to Tawhid al-Hakimiyah belies political
motives, not a commitment to the most complete practice of Tawhid possible.
They argue that categorizing the oneness of Allah's legislation is an
attempt by Salafi-Jihadists to provide clearer theological justification for
their belief that modern Muslim governments, such as that in Saudi Arabia,
are un-Islamic. This provides the driver with a doctrinal narrative which
de-facto ends in the declaration of these governments as apostate and their
legitimization as targets in a violent Jihad. According to Shaykh Muhammad
Salih al-Uthaimeen, one of the 20th century's leading Saudi religious
ideologues:

"Whoever claims that there is a fourth category of tawhid under the title
'Tawhid al-Hakimiyah' is to be counted as an innovator [mubtadi]. So this is
an innovated categorization which emanates from an ignorant person who does
not understand anything of the affairs of aqidah [creed] and the din
[religion]." [3]

Another leading Saudi Salafi shaykh, Abdullah ibn Ghudayyan, warned of the
true designs of those seeking to elevate the status of Tawhid al-Hakimiyah
when he remarked:

"The follower of truth will reflect and see the harm caused by those who
raised the banner of al-Hakimiyah, intending by it purely political agendas
and what is attached to it of violent and bloody revolutions and a
destructive jihad against the Muslims themselves, let alone the
non-Muslims." [4]

The doctrinal narrative used by Salafi-Jihadists to underpin `Jihad against
the rulers' essentially runs as follows:

. Tawhid mandates that there is nothing that should be worshipped, followed,
or obeyed other than Allah
. Tawhid al-Hakimiyah clarifies that legislation is only for Allah and that
establishing a system of governance or legislation other than what Allah has
revealed is a sin
. Establishing such systems is in effect an attempt to associate partners
with Allah. This is an act of shirk akhbar (major polytheism) which takes a
Muslim outside the fold of Islam
. The Quran and Sunnah mandate a Muslim to excommunicate such apostates and
to fight them until Tawhid is established. Many of the rulers of Muslim
countries and the governments they have established are based on man-made
legislation and not Shari'a, which they refuse to fully implement. Their
disobedience of Shari'a makes these governments apostate and it is
obligatory (fard) for Muslims to overthrow them.

Jihadist Scholars Respond

The refutations of establishment scholars have been dismissed by
Salafi-Jihadists, who typically argue that pro-state clerics have labelled
them innovators as part of an agreement with their apostate paymasters to
mask the full extent of a Muslim's obligations to fully implement Shari'a.
They list scores of verses from the Quran as proof of the prominence given
by Allah to Muslims striving to implement his rule on earth. They also cite
a range of classical and contemporary scholars who have stressed the
importance of Tawhid al-Hakimiyah in making Muslims aware of the need to
eliminate all forms of legislation in favor of Shari'a. [5] Even those who
concede that it cannot officially be classified as a fourth pillar of Tawhid
are suspicious of scholars who relegate it to a sub-category. This, they
believe, is often an attempt by pro-establishment "palace scholars" to
conceal Tawhid al-Hakimiyah's importance from Muslims.

Abu Qatada al-Filistini, the Salafi-Jihadi ideologue once described as
"al-Qaeda's spiritual ambassador in Europe," has written and spoken at
length on the Salafi-Jihadi interpretation of Tawhid al-Hakimiyah. [6] Abu
Qatada has argued that Tawhid al-Hakimiyah is a valid classification of
Tawhid and rejected the claim that it is an innovation; all classifications
of Tawhid, he argues, are matters of ijtihad (interpretation) and are not
categorizations based on solid proof from the Quran and Sunnah. Therefore,
he says, they cannot be innovations. Abu Qatada claims that, as with other
classifications of Tawhid, Tawhid al-Hakimiyah is used in order to educate
Muslims on the various aspects and obligations of Tawhid, and nothing more.
However, he adds, given the current state of governance across the Muslim
world, Tawhid al-Hakimiyah is a valuable and important tool to counter those
Muslims who argue against full implementation of Allah's laws.

Another leading Salafi-Jihadi ideologue, Shaykh Abu Basir al-Tartusi,
describes Tawhid al-Hakimiyah as a sub-division of Tawhid al-Uluhiyah, but
argues that it is an important and necessary classification. [7]

Significance and Implications

>From a counterterrorism perspective, it may initially be difficult to
appreciate how seemingly esoteric theological debates, refutations, and
counter-refutations such as those discussed above could have even an
indirect bearing on national security. However, the outcome of such debates
between Salafi-Jihadists and their opponents within the Salafi community may
have a longer-term strategic affect on the mobilizing potential of the
jihadi message, and in turn the survival and growth of the movement as a
whole. To be characterized by leading clerics as religious deviants in their
interpretation of the most fundamental cornerstone of Islam challenges the
Jihadists' perceived legitimacy, which rests in large part on their claims
to be the only contemporary sect practicing Islam in full accordance with
the example of the Prophet Muhammad and the Companions. One of the harshest
criticisms meted out by Salafi-Jihadists against adherents of other Islamic
sects is that their belief and practice has become polluted by innovation
and polytheism - to be accused of the same sin by rival Salafists (including
many of Salafism's most respected ideologues), therefore has the potential
to severely damage the appeal of Salafi-Jihadism.

Such debates are firstly a reminder for counterterrorism analysts and
policy-makers of the potential fragility of this movement's ideological
undercarriage. A recent brief survey of postings on Salafi-Jihadi internet
forums suggests the movement is painfully conscious of such vulnerabilities,
and is hence eager to refute its detractors whenever it is the target of
doctrinal criticism. For example, many members of the more committed
Salafi-Jihadi forums have cautioned forum participants to identify and shun
anyone posting suspected "bait comments" designed to draw them into a
potentially damaging doctrinal spat. Nevertheless, these same participants
in many cases find it almost impossible not to refute at length those who
start discussions on contentious issues such Tawhid al-Hakimiyah, not to
mention other perceived doctrinal weaknesses. As academics such as Dr.
Jarret Brachman have noted, the jihadists' own discourse is often the
counterterrorism community's best guide on the areas of Salafi-Jihadi
doctrine most open to attack. [8]

Remote observation of this important discourse, though its relevance in
counterterrorism terms may at times appear tenuous, firstly equips analysts
and strategic communications practitioners with deeper insight into their
adversaries' ideology and worldview. It may also help them identify
contentious aspects of that ideology that might be vulnerable to targeted
communications designed to expose weaknesses in the Salafi-Jihadi message.

Notes
1. A useful English-language reference work on Tawhid is the Dr. Salih al
Fawzan's Concise Collection Creed and Tawhid, Al Maiman Publishing House
(2009). The Collection includes an abridged version of the classic Salafi
study of Tawhid, Kitab al-Tawhid, by Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.
2. Examples of such refutations include that of Saleh al-Fawzan, a leading
Saudi Salafi Shaykh. See: www.salafipublications.com/sps/sp.cfm . Similar
refutations were issued by Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani, a hugely
influential Salafi ideologue from Albania who died in 1999. See:
www.salafipublications.com/sps/sp.cfm . A further refutation of Tawhid
al-Hakimiyah as a fourth category of Tawhid was written by Shaykh Muhammad
Ibn Saleh al-Uthaimeen, one of the most prominent Salafi scholars of the
last century (d. 2001). See: www.salafipublications.com/sps/sp.cfm
3. "Shaykh Muhammad bin Saalih al-Uthaymeen: Tawhid al-Haakimiyyah As a
Fourth Category Comes from an Ignorant Mubtadi,"
www.themadkhalis.com/md/articles/prtli-shaykh-muhammad-bin-saalih-al-uthayme
en-on-tawhid-al-haakimiyyah-as-a-fourth-category.cfm
4. "Shaikh Salih al-Fawzaan on Tawheed ul-Haakimiyyah,"
abdurrahman.org/tawheed/haakimiyyahFawzaan.html
5. Classical scholars often cited by jihadists who have written at length on
this issue include Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Qayyim, and Muhammad Ibn Abd
al-Wahhab, the ideological founder of the Wahhabi movement. Contemporary
Salafist ideologues that have written and spoken on this subject include Abu
Qatada al-Filistini, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Abu Basir al-Tartusi, and
Abdul Qadir Ibn Abdul-Aziz.
6. Abu Qatada al-Filistini (real name: Omar Mahmud Othman) is one of the
most influential and widely respected living Salafi-Jihadi ideologues. He is
currently in detention in the UK, where he is fighting extradition to his
native Jordan on terrorism charges. For a summary of Abu Qatada's position
on Tawhid al-Hakimiyah, see the following interview at: salafiyyah
jadeedah.tripod.com/Hakimiyah/Divisions_of_Tawheed.htm
7. Shaykh Abu Basir al-Tartusi (real name: Abd-al Mun'em Mustafa Halima) is
a Syrian Salafi-Jihadi ideologue residing in London. He is considered by
many of his supporters to be one of the pre-eminent contemporary
thought-leaders of the global Salafi-Jihad. A summary of Abu Basir
al-Tartusi's position on this issue can be found on the English language
version of his web site: www.en.altartosi.com/haakimiyyah.htm 
8. See Jarret Brachman, Global Jihadism; Theory 



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