http://www.geostrategy-direct.com/geostrategy-direct/secure/2010/07_28/ba.as
p?

 

START challenged in secret briefing on 'whether Treaty is verifiable' 

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a top-secret briefing last week
on the U.S. intelligence community's National Intelligence Estimate on the
new START arms treaty and whether it can be verified. 

The central witness in the hearing was Rose Gottemoeller, assistant
secretary of state for verification and compliance. Details of the briefing
and the NIE have not been disclosed, but comments by officials and other
specialists have revealed major problems with the treaty's verification
provisions. 

Russia has been shown to cheat on past arms treaties in a systematic way and
is also involved in strategic deception and disinformation programs designed
to fool outside observers about its strategic arms. 


http://www.geostrategy-direct.com/geostrategy-direct/images/2010/startnegoti
ators2.jpg


New START negotiators Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State for
Verification, Compliance and Implementation and Ambassador Anatoly Antonov
of the Russian Federation at the U.S. embassy in Rome in April 2009.
<http://www.daylife.com/photo/00hQfeGgOfbjF> Reuters 

  _____  

Sen. Jon Kyl, R-Ariz. and one of the treaty's main critics told the Wall
Street Journal July 8 that "it's not clear that the treaty's verification
provisions are adequate." 

Gottemoeller, a key START negotiator, has said that while all on-site
inspections under previous strategic arms treaties ended in December with
the expiration of the 1991 START agreement, she believes the new treaty can
be verified. Gottemoeller said the verification provisions were based on the
idea that "we are no longer in a Cold War relationship." 

Gottemoeller said the verification provisions include notifications, data
exchanges, agreed conversion and elimination procedures, inspections,
demonstrations, and exhibitions. It will also include the use of
"identifiers" for ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, along with warhead on-site
inspections. 

However, critics of the START treaty say that numerous annual State
Department reports on arms control compliance, many of which have not been
released, show Russian noncompliance through the 2000s. 

Former State Department arms control official Robert Joseph testified last
month that he questions whether the new treaty will meet the past standard
introduced during the Reagan administration and known as "trust but verify"
arms agreements with Moscow. 

"Whether the New START Treaty meets this standard is a major issue," Joseph
said, noting that the NIE had not been completed at the time of his
testimony. 

"Experience suggests that there will substantial conditionality in the IC's
judgments. The level of confidence in the assessments will differ depending
on the assumptions. As just one example, if Russia does what the IC expects
in terms of road-mobile ICBM deployments, the confidence level will be
higher than the level if Russia practices denial and deception techniques
that are not prohibited by the Treaty. As with previous assessments from the
IC and State, the devil will be in the details." 

While noting data exchanges and on-site inspections are part of the
verification regime, Joseph said "the treaty leaves potentially significant
gaps in our ability to monitor developments in Russia's strategic posture." 

"For example, the end of the U.S. on-the-ground presence at Votkinsk means
we will have less confidence than under START I in our ability to determine
what is exiting this Russian missile manufacturing facility," he said.
"Moreover, given the telemetry exchange provisions, whereby each side
determines the information to be shared, we may have additional gaps in
understanding ongoing and future Russian strategic force improvements." 

"The Obama Administration argues that this change in monitoring posture will
not affect the ability to verify New START limits because these limits are
different than under START I," he said. "While perhaps technically true, New
START is being advertised as a means of strengthening predictability. Yet,
because of changes in the telemetry regime, we will have less transparency
into Russia's modernization. This is likely to undermine confidence and
predictability." 

Joseph noted that the question senators need to answer before ratifying the
treaty is not whether the country will be better off with the monitoring
provisions of the new treaty than without them. "The question is whether the
Treaty is verifiable. The answer is unclear at this time. Before rendering
judgment on the Treaty, we must await assurances of the ability to verify
its provisions." 

 



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