http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704913304575371942413920522.ht
ml

 

*       JULY 29, 2010


How the CIA Got It Wrong on Iran's Nukes 


In 2007, U.S. intelligence said Iran had stopped its nuclear weapons
program. Analyst policy bias and disinformation from Iranian double agents
may explain the mistake.


By
<http://online.wsj.com/search/term.html?KEYWORDS=EDWARD+JAY+EPSTEIN&bylinese
arch=true> EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN 


In a stunning departure from a decade of assessments, the 2007 National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran declared: "We judge with high confidence
that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program," including
"nuclear weapon design and weaponization work" and covert uranium
enrichment. Even more astonishingly, it attributed this change to
"increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of
Iran's previously undeclared nuclear work." In other words, the threat of
sanctions had ended that country's surreptitious effort to obtain nuclear
weapons. 

This assessment suggested that further action against Iran was unnecessary.
Unfortunately, as the Obama administration has now acknowledged, the NIE's
conclusion was dead wrong, costing us precious time in dealing with a
serious threat.

The question remains, what caused such a disastrous mistake? 

In 2007, there was still much the same mountain of evidence that led U.S.
intelligence to conclude in the 2006 NIE with equally "high confidence" that
Iran was secretly engaged in a nuclear weapons program. This evidence
included verified reports that Iran had experimented with Polonium 210, a
key ingredient in the trigger of early-generation nuclear bombs. And
documents recovered from a stolen Iranian laptop described its efforts to
fit a warhead in the nose cone of its Shahab 3 missile that would detonate
at an altitude of 600 meters, which is too high for anything but a nuclear
warhead to be effective. 

The CIA had learned that Iran had most likely acquired a digital copy of a
Chinese nuclear warhead design from the A.Q. Khan network. It also had
monitored Iran's crash program at Natanz to build a nuclear enrichment plant
that could house up to 50,000 centrifuges.

Taken individually, these secret activities might have a nonnuclear
explanation. For example, Iran claimed the purpose of its Polonium 210
experiments was merely to find a power source for an Iranian spacecraft
(though Iran had no known space program at the time). Taken together,
however, these efforts added up an inescapable conclusion: Iran was going
nuclear. 

What helped change this conclusion, in addition to the reorganization of
U.S. intelligence following the report of the 9/11 Commission, was the
receipt of new secret intelligence from Iran. This intelligence included
convincing evidence that the facilities of the weapons-design program (code
named "Project 111") revealed on the stolen laptop had been closed down in
2003. Satellite photographs showed that buildings involved in the program
had been bulldozed, communications intercepts indicated that scientists were
no longer at the location, and a high-level defector from the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard, Ali-Reza Asgari, reported that Project 111 had stopped
functioning. 

Since the Iranians knew that we knew about Project 111 in 2004-the CIA had
released technical drawings from it to the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA)-it was not surprising that the Revolutionary Guard, which runs
Iran's nuclear activities, shut it down. The issue was how to interpret the
closure. Had the weapons-design work been quietly moved to avoid further
scrutiny? Had it been closed because the warhead design had been solved with
the acquisition of the digital blueprints of the Chinese nuclear weapon? Or
had Iran abandoned its quest for a nuclear weapon? 

Deciphering a government's intentions is no easy task. It is especially
difficult in a closed and terrorized society in which the U.S. has no
diplomatic relations and little direct access. So it came down to espionage
to illuminate the intentions behind the shut-down of Project 111. 

Over the years, the CIA had recruited a network of Iranian agents who had,
or claimed to have, access to the thinking of Iran's governing elite. These
agents were in a position to cast light on Iranian nuclear intentions, and
presumably they provided reports that supported the thesis that Tehran
decided to end its nuclear weapons program. In any event, the authors of the
2007 NIE cited secret evidence to support the conclusion in its publicly
released summary document that "Tehran's decision to halt its nuclear
weapons program suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons
than we have been [previously] judging." 

As we now know, the Revolutionary Guard was secretly completing the
construction of new facilities in 2007. For example, at Fordo, 20 miles
north of the holy city of Qom, it was reinforcing tunnels leading inside a
mountain cavern designed to house a new uranium enrichment plant. This
underground facility was only disclosed by Iran to the IAEA in late 2009.
Clearly, Tehran was not abandoning its nuclear-weapons program. 

What may have misled the CIA was a flaw in its espionage system. James
Risen, the New York Times's national security reporter, explains in his book
"State of War" that since the CIA had no embassy base in Iran, it
communicated with its agents through state-of-the-art satellite
transmissions, which it assumed were invisible to the Iranian security
services. 

Then, in 2004, a CIA communications officer accidently included data in a
satellite transmission to an agent that could be used to identify "virtually
every spy the CIA had in Iran." This disastrous error was compounded,
according to Mr. Risen, because the recipient of the transmission turned out
to be a double-agent controlled by the Iranian security service. 

So the Iranians knew the identity of all the agents that the CIA had
arduously maneuvered into positions of access, and the technical methods by
which the CIA communicated with them. The agents (or their replacements) in
Iran would have little choice but to allow the Iranian Security service to
control the information they provided the CIA. If so, the CIA may have been
vulnerable to receiving misleading secret intelligence that Tehran had
abandoned it nuclear ambitions in 2004

One Iranian agent who supplied information to the CIA is Shahram Amiri, who
defected to the U.S. last year and re-defected back to Iran this month. He
reportedly provided details about the termination of Project 111 that
presumably dovetailed with other information we got from the CIA's
compromised network. Iran now claims Mr. Amiri was a double agent all along.


Whether Iran controlled his secret reports to the CIA will be hotly debated
for years to come. But willful blindness on our part should not be ignored.
There were high-level people in the newly reorganized U.S. intelligence
community who wanted to believe Iran was ending its quest for the bomb, and
messages to the CIA from agents inside the country that diplomatic pressure
was accomplishing this task fell on receptive ears. 

Whether the erroneous conclusions in the 2007 NIE proceeded from Iranian
deception or American self-deception, they undercut the case for taking more
drastic action against Tehran. To the degree that other countries believed
Iran had ended its nuclear program, they had little incentive to join us in
imposing further sanctions. 

To be sure, Iran could not conceal forever the evidence of its massive
increase in uranium enrichment capabilities at Natanz, its missile testing,
and its preparation of other underground facilities. In the interim,
however, Iran managed to upgrade a large portion of its centrifuges and
stockpile enough low-enriched uranium gas to manufacture, if it chose to
further process it, the fuel for a nuclear bomb. 

The moral of this sad spy story is that espionage is by its very nature a
two-way game. Spies that are viewed as "assets" in a closed country can turn
out to be very risky liabilities.

 

 



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