AMIRI DEFECTION WAS AN IRANIAN PLAN 

► 
http://original.antiwar.com/porter/2010/07/15/clues-suggest-amiri-defection-was-an-iranian-plant/
 

► AntiWar / by Gareth Porter 

► Inter Press Service 

► Stringer: Kees Kalkman / VDAmok / Utrecht NL / [email protected] 

Jul 16 2010 ► Jul 16. U.S. officials are explaining Iranian scientist Shahram 
Amiri‘s return to Iran as the result of a defector having a change of heart 
because of his concern about Iranian government threats to his family. Iran and 
Amiri himself have insisted that it is a simple case of a victim of ab-duction 
escaping his captors. 

But several features of the story of Amiri‘s defection suggest that Amiri may 
have been acting on Iranian government orders to defect temporarily in order to 
embarrass the U.S. government. 

Amiri resurfaced only last month after having disappeared from Saudi Arabia 
during a pilgrimage in June 2009. He made two seemingly contradictory videos 
which appeared within hours of one another, the first charging that the United 
States had kidnapped him and brought him to the U.S. against his will, the 
second saying he was living in the U.S. freely to continue his education. 

That mystery remained unresolved when Amiri turned up at the Pakistani Embassy 
Monday evening and said he wanted to return to Iran. 

One indication that intelligence officials are now considering the real 
possibility that Amiri‘s defection was not really genuine is that questions are 
being raised about how the contact was made with Amiri in the first place. 

ABC news had reported Mar. 31 that the CIA had approached Amiri through an 
intermediary and offered resettlement to the United States. But the Washington 
Post‗s David Ignatius, who is extra-ordinarily well connected with CIA 
officials, suggested in a column Wednesday that Amiri had con-tacted the agency 
first and "may have been a virtual walk-in." 

That means Amiri contacted the agency through the Internet – normally a danger 
signal for a "defector" who is still a government agent. 

Ignatius also notes another "mystery" about the Iranian scientist now 
apparently now being discussed in intelligence circles: "why he decided to 
defect without his young wife and child, leaving them – and himself – 
vulnerable to Iranian pressure." 

The normal practice would be for the agency to arrange for the entire family of 
a defector to accompany the asset. But Ignatius notes that Amiri chose to leave 
the family in Tehran, which should have been another danger sign for the CIA. 
FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.210 – Aug 1 – 2010 - page 73 

Yet another indicator that U.S. intelligence officials suspected that Amiri‘s 
defection was a deception is how far they have gone to portray him as a 
longtime U.S. intelligence agent. 

The Washington Post reported Thursday that a U.S. official had claimed Amiri 
was paid five million dollars for valuable intelligence on Iran‘s nuclear 
program. 

A Jun. 28 ABC news story went much further, quoting U.S. intelligence officials 
as claiming that Amiri had been a spy for the CIA on the Iranian nuclear 
program for several years. The sources claimed the CIA had urged him to flee 
Iran last year "out of fear that his disclosures might expose him to Tehran as 
a spy." 

ABC news repeated that same assertion in its Jul. 13 story on Amiri returning 
to Iran. 

In the arcane world of spying, those claims wouldn‘t have been leaked to the 
media unless the CIA believed Amiri was working for the other side, according 
to a former intelligence official. 

"This is the pattern of a double agent," said the former official. "Nothing 
else makes any sense." 

Other information that has now emerged about Amiri suggests that the story that 
he was a long-term CIA asset was a falsehood aimed at sowing distrust of Amiri 
in Tehran. 

At age 32, Amiri is a very junior scientist who could not have had information 
about such issues as plans for Qom, even if he were working for the nuclear 
program 

The Post story acknowledges that the scientist "is not believed to have had 
direct access to Iran‘s most sensitive nuclear sites or leaders involved in 
decisions on whether to pursue a bomb." 

Both the Iranian Foreign Ministry and Amiri‘s wife have said he was a 
specialist on radioisotopes for medical purposes, which would mean that he 
probably had no knowledge of the nuclear program of any value to U.S. 
intelligence. 

Amiri‘s behavior this spring appears to reflect an interest in demonstrating to 
the world that the U.S. government was intent on disseminating falsehoods about 
an alleged Iranian push for nuclear weapons. 

In early April, Amiri recorded a video in which claimed to have been kidnapped 
and held against his will, which was sent to Iran for broadcast. A central 
point of the video, however, was his claim that the real objective of the 
United States was to get him to say in a televised interview that he was an 
important figure in the nuclear program and had brought "very important 
documents on a laptop with classified information on Iran‘s military nuclear 
program." 

When that video was broadcast on Iranian state television Jun. 8, it was 
followed within hours by the posting of another video of Amiri seeming to deny 
his previous statements. The second video had obviously been produced by the 
CIA well in advance. 

That sequence of events indicates that Amiri‘s CIA handlers had learned weeks 
before that he was already intending to return to Iran, and insisted that he do 
a video in which he would admit that he was in the United States of his own 
volition. 

Amiri agreed to make such a statement on camera, knowing that the CIA would 
post it on YouTube if and when a video claiming he was abducted was posted. But 
he also insisted on including a statement implying that leaks to the press 
indicating that he had given valuable intelligence to the CIA on Iran‘s nuclear 
program were false. 

In the CIA-sponsored video, Amiri says, "I am free here and assure everyone 
that I am safe." But he also calls for an end to "information that distorts the 
reality about me," and says, "I am not involved in weapons research and have no 
experience and knowledge in this field." 

He may been referring to a Washington Post report Apr. 25 that he had provided 
"details about sensitive programs, including a long-hidden enrichment plant 
near the city of Qom…" and an ABC report Mar. 31 that he had "helped confirm 
U.S. intelligence assessments about the Iranian nuclear program." 

Even before Amiri posted yet another video portraying himself as a kidnap 
victim Jun. 30, U.S. intelligence officials apparently suspected they had been 
duped by him and retaliated by leaking the story that Amiri had been a 
long-term CIA intelligence asset in Iran. 

The CIA‘s eagerness to claim an intelligence coup on Iran‘s nuclear program 
appears to have set the agency up for the Amiri defection scheme. They viewed 
his affiliation with Malek-e-Ashtar Industrial University, which has 
connections to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, as evidence that he must 
be linked to the assumed Iranian plans for a "nuclear weapons capability."



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