08/02/2010 11:50 AM
'Capture or Kill'
Germany Gave Names to Secret Taliban Hit List
The Afghanistan war logs obtained by WikiLeaks revealed the existence of
Task Force 373, a secret US unit assigned with eliminating Taliban leaders.
Now SPIEGEL has learned that the German government provided names to the hit
list used by the unit. At least one of the men is now dead. By SPIEGEL
staff.
Omid Nouripour, a member of the German parliament for the Green Party, was
wearing the German national team's jersey in honor of the Germany versus
Serbia match scheduled that afternoon at the World Cup in South Africa. It
was 7:30 a.m. on June 18, and Nouripour and his nine colleagues were
expecting the match to be the most exciting event of the day.
In Room 04/100 at the German Defense Ministry, a windowless, bugproof space
nicknamed the "U-Boot" ("submarine"), representatives of the defense and
foreign affairs committees of the German parliament, the Bundestag, soon
discovered that the day would turn out to be much more eventful than they
had anticipated.
After a brief introduction by Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg,
Volker Wieker, the inspector-general of the German armed forces, stood up to
give his presentation. By the time Wieker had shown his first few slides,
the delegates realized that they were attending a premiere. But this time
they weren't being regaled with accounts of the supposed achievements of
German reconstruction teams. Instead, they were being given a brief glimpse
into the most secret facets of the war in Afghanistan: NATO's ominous list
of enemies and "the operations of US special forces units" within the zone
controlled by the German military, the Bundeswehr.
The sensitive terrain had been a no-go area for members of the German
parliament until then. Until that June morning, the so-called Joint
Prioritized Effects List (JPEL) for Afghanistan was mainly a source of
speculation in Germany, even among elected representatives. But now Wieker
was explaining to them, using simple Bundeswehr diagrams, the procedure in
which the Germans "nominate" candidates for the "Capture or Kill" list. He
also told them how Germany adds names to the JPEL, which ranks targets
according to their relative importance and lists up to 3,000 Taliban,
Al-Qaida fighters and drug dealers targeted to be eliminated, if necessary
by killing them.
K for Kill
JPEL, Capture or Kill, Task Force 373. Since the whistleblower website
WikiLeaks published more
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,708393,00.html> than
75,000 secret US documents (out of a total of almost 92,000 that it has in
its possession), and since SPIEGEL, The Guardian and the New York Times
reviewed and wrote about the material, the world now knows what these
abbreviations and phrases mean. It also has a more detailed understanding of
how the allies in the war in Afghanistan compile hit lists, which are then
handed over to American elite units to process.
Thanks to the WikiLeaks revelations, war-weary Germany now knows that German
officials added names to the JPEL at least 13 times. On this list, 13 names
translate into 13 potential death warrants. The Germans only mark their
candidates with a C for "capture," and not with a K for "kill." But in fact
all International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops are authorized to
shoot and kill candidates on the JPEL list if, for example, they attempt to
avoid capture by fleeing. In other words, although German elite troops do
not use the kill option themselves, Germany does provide its tacit approval
of the killing of candidates in the zone under its control in northern
Afghanistan.
The WikiLeaks story sparked a tremendous public reaction, both around the
world and in Germany. Washington vacillated between studied indifference and
alarmism. National Security Adviser James Jones, for example, said that the
massive data leak doesn't just threaten the lives and security of US
soldiers, but the security of the entire country.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that he wants to conduct an "aggressive"
search for the sources of the leaks. The FBI has been brought in to aid in
the investigation. Washington Post columnist Eugene Robinson wrote that the
documents illustrated how "futile -- and tragically wasteful -- it is to
send more young men and women to fight and die in Afghanistan." The Spanish
newspaper El País summarily declared the war in Afghanistan a "failure."
The WikiLeaks scoop also made waves in Germany. "The documents have the
potential of destroying the last hope of military and political success in
Afghanistan," the Süddeutsche Zeitung wrote, while Die Welt called the leaks
an "exposure of impotence."
'Nothing New'
The initial reaction of the German government and large segments of the
political class was in sharp contrast to reactions in the media. Immediately
following the leaks, a spokesman for the German Defense Ministry
characterized them as "nothing new in terms of news value," as if he and the
rest of the ministry had somehow managed to review the immense body of
material in only a few hours.
Soon afterwards, his boss, Defense Minister Guttenberg, claimed that many
journalists had known all this already, as did a number of members of
parliament -- or at least those parliamentarians on the relevant Bundestag
committees should have known about it, if they had paid any attention at
briefings.
It was a transparent but not unsuccessful tactic. Before long, a competition
of sorts erupted among provoked delegates over who had had access to what
information. "But it isn't any of our business!" said Elke Hoff, a defense
expert with the pro-business Free Democratic Party (FDP), after she was
asked whether the government should give members of parliament details about
the secret assassination teams operated by Germany's allies in Afghanistan.
Doing the Dirty Work
But all attempts at appeasement do not change the fact that war in
Afghanistan has acquired a new political dimension once again. It also
acquired a new dimension when the German government finally managed to use
the phrase "warlike conditions" in referring to the conflict in Afghanistan
(previously, the German government had refrained from describing the
situation as a war), and when, on Sept. 4, 2009, German Colonel Georg Klein
gave the order to bomb two tanker trucks stuck in a riverbed, causing the
deaths of up to 142 Afghan civilians.
And now it's acquiring yet another new dimension. It has becomes clear that,
even though German elite units such as Task Force 47 were not deployed to
deliberately target people, their counterpart, the American special
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,708407,00.html> forces
unit Task Force 373, which has since been renamed Task Force 3-10, takes on
the dirty work and processes the hit lists -- in the territory controlled by
the Bundeswehr and on the basis of German information, no less. For most
Germans, this is new information, and anyone with any common sense would
argue that it is indeed their business.
The revelations raise important legal and political questions. For instance,
why are elite US soldiers simply flying into the German sector to hunt down
and kill people, acting in a way that contradicts the Germans' self-imposed
policy of restraint? And why were the Germans involved in compiling these
lists?
Putting Names on the List
To add a name to the JPEL list, the Regional Command North, which is led by
a German, must first propose a candidate based on its evidence. The petition
is sent to the German operations command near Potsdam outside Berlin, where
it is reviewed and then sent to the Defense Ministry. If a positive decision
is made, the petition is sent back to Afghanistan, where it also has to be
approved by the supreme commander of the ISAF troops. It is a process that
reflects the precision of German bureaucracy, and one that can have serious
consequences for the people it affects in Afghanistan.
There are now six lists containing the names of targets. The JPEL list, to
which the Germans contribute, is the NATO list. But Task Force 373 isn't
operating on a NATO ticket. It receives its orders directly from the
Pentagon. The German government would neither confirm nor deny whether the
names on the Pentagon list are derived from the NATO list.
There is evidence that the German nomination has already had drastic
consequences for 13 Afghans. According to a briefing given to members of
parliament, this is the number of men the Bundeswehr has placed on the NATO
hit list. Senior German military officials even say that the total number of
names submitted lies in the "two to three-digit range." In 2007, the
Bundeswehr named two Taliban commanders, who were assigned the file numbers
74 and 77, but Mullah Rustam and Qari Jabar were deleted from the list prior
to 2009 due to a lack of evidence. Three others were added a year later, and
two of them are now in custody. Four enemies of the Bundeswehr were captured
in 2009, and another four in 2010.
The Germans have been relatively restrained compared to other NATO allies. A
total of seven Taliban commanders named by the Bundeswehr are still on the
JPEL for northern Afghanistan, including Maulawi Shamsuddin, the insurgents'
notorious chief strategist in Kunduz, and Abdul Rahman, the head of the
Taliban group that abducted the tanker trucks on Sept. 3 that were later
bombed by Colonel Klein.
But the Germans aren't the only ones who nominate candidates for the hit
list for Regional Command North. In June, the JPEL list also included 31
other targets added by other allies.
Distinctions Become Blurred in Combat
Is this even legal? An attorney at the Defense Ministry, Lieutenant Colonel
Hausmann, addressed the issue three years ago. In an eight-page report dated
June 6, 2007, Hausmann writes, in relation to targeting: "When it comes to
targeting, I believe that we lack a clear directive on whether and to what
extent Germany can take part in the targeting process." Hausmann adds that
this is "problematic," because the ensuing process cannot be "easily
reconciled" with "national caveats" -- in other words, the restrictions that
the Germans placed on their mission in Afghanistan, stipulating, for
example, that Bundeswehr soldiers could only shoot in self defense.
A few things have changed since then. The German government now refers to
the campaign as a non-international armed conflict, in other words, a war.
And most international law experts who have commented on the issue in recent
days do not necessarily feel that Germany's participation in the targeting
process is problematic under international law.
And yet it remains a political problem. First of all, no one in the
administration has commented clearly on Germany's role. Second, although a
clean line can be drawn on paper between C for capture and K for kill, these
distinctions quickly become blurred in actual combat.
Uneasy Feeling
A case in point, which still raises many unanswered questions, is that of
Qari Bashir. One thing about the case is clear, however: Even if the Taliban
commander, who was nominated by the Germans and listed as number 2,117 on
the JPEL list since 2009, was only meant to be captured, he has been dead
since Nov. 4, 2009.
How did this come about? It began when a US Special Forces major in
Mazar-e-Sharif presented his plans for a major operation northwest of Kunduz
to German General Jürgen Setzer. While presenting the plans, he showed
Setzer pictures of the targets, including one of Bashir. But the German
officers felt uneasy about the idea and said that German forces would not
take part in the operation, which, to them, was too obviously a plan for the
targeted killing of Taliban leaders. The operation began, and the fighting
and heavy bombing lasted for five days. In addition to Qari Bashir, about
130 people were killed. The US Army claimed that all the victims were
Taliban fighters.
The death of the 35-year-old commander, who had about 50 fighters under his
command east of Kunduz and had ordered several ambushes against the Germans,
proves that anyone who names candidates to the lists is effectively signing
their death warrant.
This sort of information is giving shape to the war for the first time. In
the past, there was a great deal of silence and a cloud of assumptions.
There was also a sort of information cascade among informed individuals in
the government, a few informed members of parliament and significantly fewer
informed members of the relevant parliamentary committees, while the
remainder of the Bundestag members was generally uninformed. In fact, even
the defense minister was kept in the dark at key moments. The most glaring
case unfolded last August, when Task Force 373 was discussed for the first
time.
Withholding Information
On the sidelines of a cabinet meeting shortly before last September's
parliamentary election, Chancellor Angela Merkel asked then Defense Minister
Franz Josef Jung to tell her about Task Force 373. But Jung could only shrug
his shoulders. In fact, until that point he had never heard of Task Force
373.
The chancellor was irritated. Several weeks earlier, the US military had
sent a request to Wolfgang Schneiderhan, the then inspector-general of the
Bundeswehr, asking for permission to station 300 special forces troops at
the German base in Mazar-e-Sharif. Schneiderhan's response was to say that
the US request would require "an extensive review." Schneiderhan apparently
felt that simply approving the request was too risky during an election
campaign. The targeted killing of Taliban in the German zone could have
raised many unpleasant questions.
Keeping the chancellor and her defense minister in the dark was a blatant
case of suppressing information. Nevertheless, failing to provide the
political class, all the way down to ordinary delegates, with important
information was apparently deliberate.
Members of the Bundestag can address questions regarding Afghanistan to the
federal government, which is something that the veteran Green Party
politician Hans-Christian Ströbele does again and again, although he finds
that the answers he gets show that his efforts are only moderately
successful. FDP delegate Elke Hoff sounds almost resigned when she says:
"They don't allow themselves to be monitored by someone like me. It isn't
our job to keep tabs on the special forces of other nations."
'Unrewarding and Counterproductive'
Not all parliamentarians have remained as acquiescent as Hoff following the
WikiLeaks revelations. Rainer Arnold, the defense policy spokesman of the
center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), believes that all this secrecy
surrounding special forces is "exaggerated," and that it "tends to
contribute to the development of conspiracy theories." Fellow SPD member
Hans-Peter Bartels even goes a step further when he says: "It isn't enough
to merely inform the representatives of the defense committee, if they are
then subject to restrictions on passing on the secret information," he says.
"Instead, the entire parliament should be briefed after operations are
completed."
Bartels believes that "Capture or Kill" operations are "fundamentally
problematic, unrewarding and counterproductive." The people being labeled as
Taliban "commanders" are often leaders with the rank of a sergeant, in
command of perhaps 10 to 15 men, he says: "These are not major commanders
who are being captured or killed here." In fact, says Bartels, the
operations have "led to greater animosity among Afghans, because some people
were killed who shouldn't have been killed."
Bartels' intuition has been borne out in the field. In the region they
supposedly control, the German officers are expected to put up with being
humiliated and deprived of their authority by the Americans -- and they have
to live with the consequences. "Now they're heading out on missions that
aren't supposed to exist here," a German officer said with a groan on a
spring evening in April at Camp Marmal near Mazar-e-Sharif. The drone of the
engines of Blackhawk transport helicopters could be heard on the runway at
the other end of the camp. "I've been working here day and night for the
past four months. I've never seen Task Force 373; I've only heard them."
Friction between German and US Forces
The group of at least 40 elite soldiers has barricaded itself behind tall
concrete walls and massive metal doors at the northeast end of the camp.
Their meals were delivered to them, and they only move around in the camp,
to and from the airfield, under cover of darkness. There has already been
friction between Berlin and Washington because the Germans were upset over
the fact that they were not even told when the Americans would be arriving
in their sector. Instead, they came and went as they pleased, and whenever
they did arrive at the camp, they expected the Germans to have their
helicopters re-tanked by the time they were ready to leave again. Then they
would simply disappear into the night. Now that Berlin has intervened, the
German soldiers in northern Afghanistan are at least told when to be ready
with their pump nozzles.
The Germans have no influence on the operations of Task Force 373, and yet
they are the ones who are exposed to the Taliban's acts of retaliation.
Besides, the lists are not reliable. Sometimes the Americans encounter real
surprises with their "high-value targets," as they did last December.
According to a report among the secret documents, a man suddenly turned up
at Forward Operating Base Shank, a small American base in Logar province. He
said he was Mullah Matin, that his name was on the JPEL and that he was
there to clear up a misunderstanding. He swore to the soldiers that he was
not some dangerous Taliban fighter, and told them he had been deliberately
wrongly accused and informed on, and that he even knew who the accuser was.
The reason for the accusation, he explained to the baffled soldiers, was
that he was embroiled in a bitter dispute with the man over a piece of land.
ULRIKE DEMMER, MATTHIAS GEBAUER, CHRISTOPH HICKMANN, MARCEL ROSENBACH,
CHRISTOPH SCHWENNICKE
Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan
URL:
* http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,709625,00.html
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
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