http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2010/reviewing-jihad041510.htm

 

April 2010 


Reviewing the Jihad 


By John C. Thompson

Introduction

The Western World's scarcely recognized war with the Islamic Jihad stumbles
on; handicapped by the unwillingness of most Muslims to engage in the war
(so far, anyway) and by our own common inability to correctly name or
identify the enemy. As we get lost in the minutia of homegrown Jihadists,
airport security and fighting in Afghanistan, we are losing sight of the
forest on account of the trees.

Periodically, we should sit back and try to remember what the conflict is
about, how it began, and where it is going. Most importantly, we should
examine our own war aims and how to achieve them.

Examining the Jihad movement is not easy. It is a large and complex series
of interrelated activities that join several impulses together. Any
statement in this article will be a generalization -- true enough in the
broad sense and often not in the specifics. Regardless, this is supposed to
be a briefing on a complex subject and not a multivolume analysis.

This paper will review the true "root cause" of the Jihad; its modern
emergence; the ideological fronts that are the other dimension to the
threat; and examine trends among the elements of the Jihad today.


The "Root Cause" of the Jihad


Terrorists need a violent ideology; Islam has been used that way for
centuries.

At heart, terrorism is always an individual choice. Most people who commit
terrorism do so because they want to, often to compensate for their own
personal inadequacies and shortcomings. Others do so to express themselves
or to redefine or protect their self-identity. Some people become terrorists
out of boredom or to vent their own interior violence. These arguments are
as true for the leaders as they are for the spear-carriers who tote guns and
strap on belt bombs for the cause.

The latter elements of a terrorist group can include people who get trapped
in an ideological construct and can be argued into proving their sincerity
or devotion to a cause. Terrorist leaders and their supporters in front
groups are always on the look-out for the impressionable or the coercible.
The Tamil Tigers and the Jihadists of Hamas and Fatah have used many dupes,
the suicidal and even the mentally handicapped to deliver their attacks.
This might make some terrorists deserving of pity too, but should reinforce
our scorn and resolve towards those who directed them.

Terrorism is always shaped by an ideology. Classical Marxist terrorism was
underlain by theories about revolution and 'National Liberation' movements
welded Marxism onto their identity politics. The Jihad, without question, is
defined and shaped by Islam. Its leaders constantly seek guidance and
sanction from Islamic writings and scholars, past and present, for its
current and future actions.

Islam is readily adaptable for use by those who would be terrorists or
insurgents. Its violent messages and history readily give credence to
militant interpretations of Islamic doctrine and the more peaceful
accomplishments of Muslim people have often been achieved by ignoring many
components of their faith (this is a point argued at some length by Ibn
Warriq and a handful of brave -- though very isolated -- reform-minded
Muslims).

Inside Islamic societies, dissent was often legitimized by clinging to
dogmatic Islam whereas governing elites who hoped for a quiet rule usually
ignored the religion's inconveniences. As a result, any ruler --
particularly one who was tolerant of non-Muslims or open to outside
influences -- would almost invariably find himself attacked by his critics
on unassailable religious grounds. This has had two effects. One is to
explain the innate conservatism of the Muslim world. The other explains the
'two-track' policy still practiced by many of today's Middle Eastern
governments: The habit of paying lip service to the Jihad by offering
militants a carrot to go elsewhere while ruthlessly using a stick on them at
home if they threaten existing rulers.

For example, Syria has a long history of providing support to Hezbollah and
has frequently been implicated in the passage of al Qaeda recruits through
its territory into post-Saddam Iraq. However, when Assad senior was
threatened by the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1980s, it is believed that
around a thousand members of the organization were then tortured and killed
in his prisons and an Islamic rising in the city of Hama was brutally
crushed by the Syrian Army with the loss of 10-40,000 lives. Saudi Arabia
must tolerate Wahhabism -- their Royal family has long allied itself with
the sect -- but it pays billions of dollars to encourage preachers and
militants to leave the Kingdom and has frequently destroyed Wahhabi
militants at home.

Another basis for the Jihad movement is a combination of traditional Arab
chauvinism and modern Arab nationalism. Islam was thrust -- often literally
-- on many peoples outside of the Arabian Peninsula but Mohammed's followers
firmly shackled their cultural baggage to the new faith as they went forth
to spread the word at sword point. Now 14 centuries later, the Quran is
supposed to be fully understood only by resorting to 7th Century Arabic.
Non-Arab Muslims still find themselves patronized by Arabs.

As an aside, when today's Muslim activists proclaim tht their religion has a
universal message for all of mankind and yet insist that the quirks and
contrary messages of the Quran can only be properly understood in archaic
Arabic; they are trying to have their cake and eat it too.

When God is revealed in the Bible, it is as men understand his words. Buddha
is a man trying to explain what he has learned to others. Islam maintains
Mohammed was taking dictation from an Archangel. Since God's messenger spoke
in the argot of 7th Century Arabia, the words are holy and thus unchangeable
from the original script. This begs the question that since the Bible and
the Tripitaka of Buddhism have been readily translated into dozens of
languages -- is the Quran truly universal or was it really meant only for
7th Century Arabs?

The Jihad we confront today arose from several sources. At its root is an
admixture of uncompromising Islamic practices and interpretations expounded
in the Saudi Wahhabi cult, itself a militant manifestation of traditional
Arab chauvinism and the desire to reinforce traditional practices imposed on
other Muslims. During the 19th Century, the Wahhabi missionary arm found
fertile ground in the Indian subcontinent where it gave rise to the Deobandi
interpretation of Islam. Shiites, a long suppressed minority outside of
Iran, started to receive their own variation of militant traditionalism in
the 1940s from the Ayatollah Khomeini.

Khomeini was also reacting to two other trends that helped create the modern
Jihad: These were the growing influences of the West (particularly after the
collapse of the Ottoman Empire as the gun-smoke cleared from the First World
War) and the birth of Arab nationalism -- itself a reaction to the Ottoman
retreat. Arab nationalism at first had room for Christian Arabs, but the
uncompromising work of the Muslim Brotherhood (founded in Egypt in 1928) saw
to it that the Arab identity was first and foremost a Muslim one. Christian
Arab communities that had survived for centuries are in grave danger today.

The 1920s also saw the bloody emergence of the Saudi Kingdom. Since the late
18th Century, the House of Ibn Saud had legitimized their rule through their
partnership with the Wahhabis. In the 1920s, the Saudis embarked on a bloody
war of conquest in the Arabian Peninsula and wrested control of Mecca away
from the Hashemite family who had long been its custodians. Tens of
thousands of Muslims who did not adhere to Wahhabi practices were murdered
and numerous tribal enemies of the Saudis were ruthlessly purged. At the end
of the conflict, emboldened Wahhabis also spilled into Iraq and murdered
more Shiites in the thousands before being curbed by the British.

A generation later the creation of Israel was a further spur to militant
Arab Nationalism, although the Socialist Strongman approach -- so well used
by Nasser in Egypt -- diminished the influence of Islamic ideology until the
utter military failure of the 1973 surprise attack on Israel. The rapid
growth in oil wealth, particularly in Saudi Arabia, resulted in more money
for Wahhabi projects and enhanced the Dawa missionary movement the Wahhabis
started early in the 19th Century. The Dawa's first focus was to encourage
compliance with Arabian cultural practices throughout the Islamic world.
Since then, it has also sought to inhibit the integration of young Muslims
into Western societies and to perform conventional missionary work. It has a
darker function that will be discussed later.


The Emergence of the Modern Jihad


The foundations for today's Jihad were carefully laid for some years.

The critical year for the Jihad was 1979, the year of the Iranian
Revolution. In the 14 Centuries since Mohammed, clerics had never run a
Muslim state, although various rulers adopted the trappings of a Caliph (one
title of the Ottoman Turkish emperor). Historically in Iran whenever the
Mullahs made a bid for political power, they were violently suppressed.
Unfortunately, the Shah was prevented from this traditional remedy by the
appeasement instincts of President Jimmy Carter and the Islamic Revolution
prospered. The Shah fled in January 1979 and the Ayatollah Khomeini returned
from exile in February. Shortly thereafter, the Mullahs purged their
Marxist-oriented allies and created a state run under clerics according to
Shiite interpretations of Sharia law. A revolutionary state, Iran has
exported terrorism ever since, particularly with the creation of Hezbollah
in Lebanon in the early 1980s.

In November 1979, the Saudis were rocked by a Wahhabi takeover of the Grand
Mosque in Mecca in which over a thousand people were killed. This is an
incident that the Saudis would prefer the world to forget, especially as the
last of the gunmen were flushed from underneath the ancient mosque with
lethal chemical weapons and French military help. The new mosque is much
less likely to be so easily secured by hostile insurgents. Since this
episode, the Saudis have increased their funding for the Wahhabi Dawa and
encouraged the more militant among them to seek adventure elsewhere.

Finally, in December of that year, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in
the hopes of defeating the country's rural Islamic insurrection. The
resulting conflict served a number of useful purposes for the Islamic World.

Supported by money from the Dawa, the call went out for volunteers around
the Islamic world to help defend the Afghans. This was a classic Holy War,
the faithful were under direct and very real attack from unbelievers who
hoped to subjugate them to a new faith -- that of Soviet Marxism. Volunteers
and those who sent money were certainly fulfilling the requirements of
Jihad. However, something else transpired among the volunteers who came to
Pakistan's Northwest Frontier to answer the call.

Between the Deobandis in Pakistan's government (and among the local Pashtun)
and the Wahhabi clerics who came with the Saudi funding, many of the
volunteers found themselves doing very little actual fighting in
Afghanistan. Instead, they spent long months in training, networking with
each other, and being conditioned by some of the most radical clerics in
Islam. The Soviets killed hundreds of thousands of Afghans and lost one man
for every 100 Afghans who died between their arrival in 1979 and departure
in early 1989 -- largely due to the unrestrained Soviet use of firepower in
all circumstances. As a result, the Islamic volunteers only made tentative
forays into Afghanistan. They only went over the frontier in numbers when it
was clear that the Soviets were winding down their effort and preparing to
leave.

One might suppose that the aspiring Jihadists were being saved for something
else, something more important. This is a pattern that was repeated in
several other conflicts, notably among the foreign volunteers who arrived to
defend Bosnia's Muslims in the early 1990s. Additionally, from Morocco and
Algeria in the west to Indonesia in the east, when the volunteers returned,
local governments found that these 'Afghansi' had a new agenda. Even Libya's
Qhadaffi found trouble at home. The worst result probably occurred in
Algeria where the military government, prepared to lay down power after 30
years, found the first (and only) national election had ended up as a
victory for Islamic militants. The resulting civil war cost well over
160,000 lives before it ended in 2002, although terrorism has continued.

Moreover, in the Northwest Frontier many of the volunteers and the trainers
never went home. They stayed and continued to indoctrinate all who showed
up. The Northwest Frontier of Pakistan is an unsettled area where the grip
of government has always been tenuous, but it is conveniently close to some
major cities. A traveler can land at Islamabad on an airliner from London or
Frankfurt, and be up in the hills in a couple of hours.

Another element was slowly maturing. Even in the 19th Century, the Deobandis
and Wahhabis had made a practice of offering free schooling -- only to boys,
naturally -- if they came from the poorest families or were orphans.
Naturally, this was classic Islamic education where the highly prized
accomplishment is memorizing the Quran by rote, even if a student doesn't
understand archaic Arabic. These schools turn out Talib, religious scholars.
Among the many refugees and orphans produced out of Afghanistan during the
Soviet occupation, there were plenty of these Taliban available in
Northwestern Pakistan. When the time came to send these scholars back into
Afghanistan in 1996, they seemed competent in weapons handling and small
unit tactics too.

Osama Bin Laden is not the root of the Jihad, although his al Qaeda
organization grew through the 1990s into the central nexus of the Sunni
Jihad movement. The Western World was only barely aware of his group thanks
to a number of near-misses. The 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York
failed to topple one of the towers (and the WTC's subsequent focus on
evacuation procedures saved thousands of lives eight years later). Ramzi
Yousef and Khalid Shaik Mohammed's Bojinka 1995 plot to kill 4,000 airline
passengers in one day was likewise interrupted by police in the Philippines.
Plans to crash aircraft into the CIA Headquarters and the Eiffel Tower were
also aborted. The 1998 US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania did kill
hundreds of people, but Western news consumers -- as usual -- assumed that
since the vast majority of the dead were Africans the implications of the
attack could be safely ignored.

Other preparatory work for the Jihad was largely ignored outside of
intelligence agencies and a handful of academics. The work of Dawa-financed
missionaries inside prisons was barely remarked on and, in many places, they
still continue to recruit and indoctrinate violent criminals without
hindrance. The early recourse to the Internet as a communications tool and
to fundraise and recruit was, again, barely noticed in the 1990s and
implications of this were seldom considered. The benefits from these
activities are still being garnered by the Jihad.

The Jihad movement is not an altogether articulate ideology, but it is a
powerful hate-filled one and that can have attractions of its own. In the
interwar years, much of the animosity between European Communists and
Fascists was that both groups fed on the same discontent and sought the same
recruits (a situation that recurred in Canada in the early 1990s between the
Heritage Front's White Supremacists and the nihilistic anarchists of the
Left). This underscores how an ideology can lure the wrathful, the sullen
and the confused if it encourages them to engage in violence. 

Looking at Europe and North America on a country by country basis, between
10 and 25 percent of those arrested as potential Jihadists have been
converts to Islam; and many of the converts were career criminals. The Jihad
has now positioned itself as the 'power' ideology for those who seek
approval to engage in violence. In the meantime, elements of the old radical
right and left are also being drawn into approving of the Jihad, convinced
that the ideology that will tear down their home societies has finally
arrived.

There is a final point to consider. The highest population growth rates in
the world can be found in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab nations of the
Middle East. Prosperity and education for women had the effect of slowing
down natural increase, but these conditions eluded much of Africa while part
of the explanation for the Middle East's fecundity also involves Arab
Islamic culture's repression of women.

Recent history, such as the Maoist revolts in Sri Lanka in the early 1970s
or the story of the Sendaro Luminoso in Peru, has shown us what happens when
rapid population growth is coupled with a basic education system that gives
youth a sense of expectation until they meet narrowly selected elite that
has no room for them. This may explain the rapid growth of Islamic
Fundamentalism among Egyptian university students in the 1980s or among the
young in Algeria since then.

Westerners, especially in the English-speaking world, tend to forget the
intoxicating effect an ideology can have. We forget how Soviet Marxists
sacrificed themselves during the Stalin Purges, believing that going to
their own unjust deaths would somehow be all right as it would aid the
survival of the Revolution. We forget the fanaticism of Nazi German and
Imperial Japanese troops who would fight on past the point where most
soldiers would pack it in. We also forget that an ideology that believes
itself to be the coming thing among the young can be infectious and
dangerous, convinced as the young are of their own invincibility and
entranced with the notion they will be writing the next chapter in history.

Finally we forget that history has numerous examples of the effects of mass
migration resulting from an expanding population. Mass migration in terms of
Germanic hordes spilling over the Danube and the Rhine has not been a
feature of our more recent times... large scale immigration does not seem
quite so traumatic. However, many immigrants do have a problem integrating
into their new society and this has historically led to higher crime rates
among new arrivals -- to which a wide variety of examples of all religions
and skin hues can attest. However, for societies that have a history of
successfully coping with large scale immigration, Islam presents a new
problem: It contains countervailing influences designed to deliberately
inhibit integration by simultaneously encouraging both a sense of alienation
and of superiority among young Muslims.

The goal of the Jihad movement is to ensure the global domination of Islam.
To achieve this, they believe that Muslims everywhere must live under Sharia
law, which trumps any other legal code. Towards this end, Middle Eastern
states that do not recognize the primacy of Sharia Law must be toppled, and
that Muslim émigrés and minorities elsewhere should work to the same end.
Moreover, the Caliphate (the single community of the believers under one
ruler) should be established while the Western World -- particularly the
United States -- must be weakened and then eclipsed.

The Jihad's ultimate goal does not change, but there is considerable variety
in the means utilized to achieve it.


Watching the Right Hand, Ignoring the Left


Terrorists never operate alone; they always have collaborators present in
parallel political fronts.

While the Animal Liberation Front terrorists -- who usually operate alone or
in very small cells--have caused an enormous amount of destruction since
1975; they have always received moral support, some funding, and 'How-to'
instructions in vandalism from the Animal Rights movement. For over 20
years, the Provisional Wing of the IRA acted in tandem with the Sinn Fein
political party; and senior figures in both occasionally met together to
plot strategy. For every European 'Urban Guerrilla' in the 1970s there may
have been a dozen activists doing reconnaissance, providing safe-houses,
passing money and stashing arms.

The ideology of the current Jihad was formed in part by the Wahhabis and
Deobandis many decades ago. Khomeini started writing his more toxic
pamphlets in the 1940s, and the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in
the 1920s. Wahhabis and Deobandis still practice, the Muslim Brotherhood
still exists and has a large international network, and Khomeini has many
spiritual heirs.

The Islamic Fronts are not easily detailed. They consist of a bewildering
array of organizations, most of which operate quite legally. Historically,
in most front structures, only a few people deliberately or knowingly
supported the active terrorists. Most of the rest, although broadly
sympathetic to the aims of terrorists in the same movement, at least had a
measure of plausible deniability for any active involvement. This is true
for the Islamic front organizations.

What makes things worse for charting the activities of the Islamic Fronts is
the tradition of Taqqiyah -- religious permission to 'dissemble' to
non-believers for the good of Islam. To supporters of the Jihad, misleading
statements and even bald lies to non-Muslims are actually a religious duty,
and one that seems exercised quite often. Westerners, largely conditioned to
think that any statement is broadly true, have a hard time coping with this
tactic.

Front organizations have a number of roles that they perform in concert with
a terrorist movement. First, there are disarming messages to deliver. In the
early 1960s, the Soviets began to realize that many of their KGB agents
abroad were confirming Western stereotypes about thickly accented, badly
dressed thugs. Ten years later, KGB agents tended to be well dressed, urbane
and articulate. Soviet diplomacy took off when people could no longer
associate the USSR of labor camps and tank armies (which still existed and
did right till the end) with their charming and -- almost literally --
disarming representatives.

The Islamic world has plenty of screaming fanatics but is doing its very
best to keep them out of view of westerners. Bearded Imams screaming 'Death
to the Jews' are eased out of the picture wherever possible by polite quiet
men in neat suits with a different message. "Of course, I don't approve of
terrorism either, but you have to understand..." The subtext is "See how
reasonable I am? Now let me communicate the terrorists' ideological message,
but in a more polished way." It is appalling how many journalists and
politicians fall for this.

The second duty of a front organization is to communicate with the
supporters of the movement. Sometimes the exact same message can be
delivered so it resonates with different audiences in different ways. For
instance, when a front organization talks about 'disenfranchised alienated
Muslim youth', Westerners are encouraged to assume that whatever violence
the youth accomplished is our fault , and that we must be more trusting and
accommodating. Muslim youths hear that what they did is excusable, with a
subtext that since they will never fit it in, they might as well continue to
get violent.

The third function of a front organization is to provide logistical support.
This is the hidden function and will not be widely discussed within the
organization -- plausible deniability is such a useful protection. Money has
to be raised and diverted, recruits have to be talent spotted and
conditioned. At times, some members of a front organization might play a
part in the planning process for a terrorist attack -- such as providing
safe houses, airline tickets, or undertaking reconnaissance activities. This
latter role has been far more common with other terrorists than those of the
Jihad, but it now seems that al Qaeda prefers to remain self-sufficient in
order to preserve operational security.

Sometimes, as is the case with Hezbollah, the Front organization is the
terrorist group. Attempts to see Hezbollah or Hamas as a political party
with hospitals and schools as being somehow separate from the terrorist
cells are delusional as they are one in the same. Hezbollah also expects all
members to develop intelligence on an on-going basis.

The main active political front for the Wahhabis is their Dawa Missionary
arm. It is funded (and comprises) several Saudi based organizations such as
the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), the International Islamic Relief
Organization (IIRO) and the Muslim World League (MWL). These are funded by a
variety of mostly Saudi sources -- the Government, members of the royal
family, and some of the country's wealthier citizens. The Dawa has built a
massive infrastructure for Islam across much of the world, and particularly
has funded the construction of new mosques and Islamic centres in countries
that receive Islamic immigrants. It has also funded Imams for those mosques,
with the net effect that the disparate Muslim immigrants in such countries
are being exposed to radicalism as never before.

The Deobandis have an organization similar to the Dawa but without the lush
oil funding available to it. Nevertheless, Tablighi Jamaat has a presence in
dozens of nations and is no longer only found in communities of South Asian
Muslim migrants. Tablighi Jamaat has been directly traced to Islamic
terrorism by authorities in Germany and other European nations, and seems to
be more willing to be overtly radical than the Dawa. 

While trying to identify the structure of the Dawa and Tablighi Jamaat
through a web-work of mosques, cultural centres, and madrassas and spin-off
charities is difficult, the Muslim Brotherhood does have a more conventional
structure of cells and satellite groups of its own. However, it tends to be
more secretive and sometimes has been entirely clandestine. Strongly
influenced by the Egyptian radical Sayyid Qutb (who toured the US in the
1940s and was appalled by the effects of individual freedom) and founded by
Hassan al-Banna, the Brotherhood was the first organization to articulate
the political objectives of the modern Jihad movement.

These goals include the restoration of the Caliphate, a single
political-religious entity for the entire community of the faithful;
particularly as Western-influenced Arab governments are hopelessly corrupt
and also need to be toppled. The Western world must be rendered supine, and
this might be achieved by using its liberal institutions and traditions
against it from within. The Brotherhood works to create a mass movement and
will create institutions such as schools and hospitals in Islamic countries
to enhance its credibility and draw more support. It has a very long
tradition of subversion, especially of other Muslim groups, through the old
tactic of what British Trotskyites used to call "entryism" -- joining an
organization to transform it from the inside.

It is a central position of the Jihad movement that all Muslims -- indeed
all of the World's people -- must eventually be governed by Sharia law, and
that Sharia law must trump all other legal systems. Accordingly, every
opportunity to gain a foothold for Sharia law inside the Western World is
pursued nonstop. A good starting position for opposing the Jihad movement is
a zero-tolerance approach to Sharia law in any guise anywhere.
Interestingly, banks are starting to offer Sharia-law compliant services to
Muslim customers... never mind that many of the financial backers for the
Dawa and Tablighi Jamaat don't feel obliged to let their own finances be
constrained this way.

At the Holy Land Foundation trial in the US, many connections were drawn to
the Brotherhood by prosecutors who were after the US-based charity for
helping to fund Hamas. Connections were drawn to the US branch of the
Brotherhood and such groups as the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA),
the Muslim Students Association, the American Muslim Council, and the
Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). CAIR was named as an
unindicted co-conspirator by the US prosecutors.

The Brotherhood was also instrumental in the formation of Hamas and its
network of fronts and organizations such as the al-Aqsa Foundation.

Hizb ut-Tahrir: A more conventional fundamentalist Islamic group that has
been in existence since the 1950s, it currently has over a million members
mostly in the UK and Central Asia. While the Muslim Brotherhood seeks to
simultaneously rot out the west and undercut existing Arab governments, this
group is more eager to create the Caliphate of the Ummah first and then go
after the rest of the world. The movement has inspired some terrorism, but
does not seem to have directly incited any specific terrorist groups.

The Leaderless Front of the Internet: Between dozens upon dozens of sites
maintained by Islamic charities, mosques, the Dawa, key organizations and
terrorist groups themselves, there are hundreds more generated autonomously
by individual Muslims.

Propaganda depends upon repetition, the totality of the message, and
simplicity. Despite an early prediction that the Internet would prevent
propaganda from being possible, modern news consumers are so overwhelmed
with information choices that most of them self-select what media they will
choose to watch. The internet and the great mass of material on it allow
people to voluntarily propagandize themselves.

The growing number of "Home-Grown" Jihadists in the Western World clearly
illustrates the potential of the internet to attract recruits who
indoctrinate and mentally condition themselves. With the ample provision of
'Do-it-yourself' videos and self-instruction manuals by al Qaeda and its
trainers, it is even possible for aspiring terrorists to train themselves,
even in techniques of mass destruction.

There are many other front organizations, and it is commonly forgotten that
the front can wage a political struggle to achieve the same ends that a
terrorist group commits violence for. This does not mean that the fronts are
inherently peaceful. Rather, in conventional Marxist revolutionary theory
fronts ideally create the conditions in which the insurgent can win while
fear of terrorism can let the fronts happily politick away towards a shared
goal. One might as well ask a boxer which arm is more important than the
other in winning his matches.


The State of the Jihad Today


As Sun Tzu observed, tactics should appear to be as water, without form or
shape, but infinitely adaptable to circumstances.

In the thirty years since the Jihad movement coalesced and began to prepare
for terrorism, it has ceaselessly changed shape and orientation. These
include:

Proxy agencies for nation states: Hezbollah (at first) was an extension of
Iran in the first decade of its existence and sometimes still operates that
way.

"National Liberation" movements: Groups seeking independence for their own
ethnic group, examples include Uighurs and their Eastern Turkestan Islamic
Movement or -- initially -- Lashkar e-Taiba in the Kashmir.

Conventional Terrorist Groups: Regional or limited in original scope,
limited in size of membership (usually because they also recruit from an
ethnic base). Examples include Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines or Palestinian
Islamic Jihad.

Nexus groups that tied together or controlled several smaller groups. Though
not strictly a Jihadist group, Yasser Arafat's Fatah tried to achieve
political credibility by behaving diplomatically while Force 17 (his
oversized corps of bodyguards) and the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades acted as his
cut-outs. Al Qaeda was the main nexus group in the 1990s, as it slowly tied
in almost all Sunni Jihadist groups into a shared operational and logistical
structure.

Loose independent cells: Groups that form around one or two key characters,
share an ideology with a larger movement but are still largely
self-dependent for money, arms and equipment and technical expertise. Most
of the "Home Grown" Jihadists arising out of Islamic communities within the
Western world constitute such, but are now increasingly likely to be linked
with more conventional terrorist groups. 

Autonomous individuals: Lone Jihadists acting out with a gun, a knife or a
car having been staging a growing number of attacks; one of the most
notorious was the November 2009 attack by Major Nidal Malik Hasan on US
soldiers at Fort Hood. Perhaps because of political correctness and fear of
the implications of lone attackers, authorities and the press have tended to
gloss over the enabling role Islam can play in facilitating an attack by a
disturbed individual in addition to the Jihad's ability to allow individuals
to recruit, condition and train themselves. Many episodes have gone entirely
unrecognized as terrorism -- but the swelling numbers of these incidents
will soon change this perception.

At various times in the past twenty years, the Jihad movement has utilized
all of the above models, usually simultaneously. This argues to several
points.

The Jihad movement has an interoperable ideology that easily allows
partisans and supporters of the movement to slide from one organization to
another and for cooperation between its different components. Even the
divide between Shiite and Sunni Islam can be bridged. Americans in Fallujah
in 2004 were startled to find some Hezbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guard
Corps support for abu Musab al-Zarqawi's al- Qaeda franchise even though the
latter was already notorious for his outrageous attacks on Iraqi Shiites.
Al-Zarqawi was also reported to have slipped into Iran for medical treatment
in 2005, apparently with the support of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
Corps.

This interoperability also cuts across other lines. For the February 1993
World Trade Center bombing Khalid Sheik Mohammed (the planner behind several
of al Qaeda's most brilliant attacks) may have been responsible for the plan
to topple one tower into the other. The identity of the person who did the
reconnaissance for the attack is not known to the public. Khalid's nephew
Ramzi Yousef, a trained al Qaeda terrorist, travelled to New York as the
bomb expert and the explosive package he assembled was much more
sophisticated than its fertilizer base would lead one to believe. In New
York, Yousef was able to recruit two Palestinians, two Egyptians and an
Iraqi through Omar Abdel-Rahman's circle. After the attack, his escape route
lay through Canada where he was able to pick up a new identity and flee to
Pakistan.

The perpetrators of this one attack cut across family and national lines,
and displayed a widely mixed standard of competence. The initial plan was
well conceived, the bomb design used widely available improvised materials,
and the logistics worked. However, the incompetent behaviour of Yousef's
locally recruited assistants helped prevent the bomb from being properly
placed (sparing the World Trade Centre for another eight years) and gave the
FBI some easy successes at the start of their investigation.

Years later, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab tried to ignite a new kind of bomb on
Flight 253 on Christmas Day 2009 as it approached Detroit. A well educated
Nigerian youth with a wealthy father, he adhered to a more radical
interpretation of Islam than his father, and this was reinforced during his
schooling in the UK and the Middle East. Abdulmutallab particularly appears
to have felt alone and isolated during these years but for his activities
with hard-line Mosques and student groups. In short, he was talent spotted
and conditioned. In the summer of 2009, he went to Yemen to study Arabic at
the behest of a radical cleric, dropped out of school and apparently went
off to a new al Qaeda sanctuary in the interior of the country.

Elements of the Dawa complex kept track of him in four countries and saw to
it he was drawn off for training at an appropriate moment. He was also
disposable, hence his role as a suicide attacker. The technique involved in
his bomb was also highly innovative and well conceived -- a good design to
defeat standard aviation security measures. The technique of injecting a
powerful acid into liquid explosives worked under lab conditions, but for
now appears to be too awkward for suicide attackers to successfully use
operationally. Once again, a well conceived attack failed during the
delivery.

The amorphous support network provided by the maze of political fronts and
charities is rarely subjected to any disruption. Trials like that of
Texas-based members of the Holy Land Foundation take years to conclude,
during which time the funding and political support they provided for Hamas
is replicated a dozen times over through new networks. Knocking out the
logistic arrangements behind a terrorist movement is never easy; under
current conditions it is next to impossible when it involves the Jihad
movement.

The interoperability of the Jihad movement can also be seen in, for example,
Afghanistan where the supposedly local Taliban has contained numbers of
volunteers from such diverse places as Algeria, Chechnya, Indonesia and
Yemen. The Taliban/al Qaeda bases in Northwestern Pakistan encompass an even
greater variety of Muslims, including converts gained in European and North
American schools and prisons.

Ever since the 1980s, the Jihad movement has looked for territory it can
control as it never really did possess Pakistan's turbulent northwest
Frontier provinces. Regional conflicts such as that in Chechnya, Bosnia,
those waged by the Albanians in Macedonia and Kosovo were all investigated,
but a new base area was never satisfactorily established. Only after the
1996 Taliban invasion of Afghanistan (and Osama bin Laden's expulsion from
the Sudan) were Sunni Jihadists able to set up a base area for training and
sheltering key leaders. This state of affairs vanished after 9/11 but the
yearning for a territorial base has never vanished.

By contrast, Hezbollah's hammerlock on South Lebanon has provided another
example of territorial control, but Hezbollah's business acumen is necessary
to subsidize the social infrastructure that helps validate their dominating
presence and the group has long had access to a better arms locker than al
Qaeda has ever enjoyed. Hezbollah's proximity to Israel also meant that the
group has literally entrenched itself in southern Lebanon and houses their
families atop their bunkers and tunnels.

So, what is new with the Jihad?

Hezbollah has been expanding rapidly in the last two years, particularly in
South and Central America where -- thanks to Hugo Chavez's cozy cooperation
with Iran -- the group has become increasingly involved in cocaine
trafficking. Hezbollah's ability to smuggle to Africa, Europe and the Middle
East is netting them vast new sums and gaining them access to various
parties in Latin America's underworld. They also tax almost every
transaction in southern Lebanon and among the dispersed Lebanese Shiite
Diaspora. Thanks to this influx of money, they are buying more arms than
ever and may have over 50,000 artillery rockets stashed in southern Lebanon
-- some with the range to hit central Israel. They have facilitated a Shiite
insurrection in rural Yemen. They are emerging as a partner, rather than a
subordinate, to Iran and are gearing up for a second encounter with Israel.
Hezbollah's growing saliency is also attracting recruits from beyond Shiite
circles -- and hundreds of Fatah gunmen recently defected to the group.

Al Qaeda has spent two years funneling arms, money and expertise into two
countries -- Yemen and Somalia. Harakat al Shabaab, their Somali franchise,
has recovered much of the territory their predecessor group (the Islamic
Courts Union) lost and is striving to keep Somalia ungovernable. It has also
been able to recruit heavily among the youth in Somali Diaspora communities
in North American and Australia.

AQAP (al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) is an amalgam of existing groups in
Saudi Arabia and Yemen; it is also noteworthy that supporting it is a
priority for what remains of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda. The group seeks to
establish a sanctuary area in rural Yemen (where the terrain is formidable
and tribalism is as entrenched as it is on the Pakistani-Afghan frontier) to
work towards control of Yemen and to undermine the Saudi Royal Family.
Judging from the reach and pronouncements of the Dawa cleric Anwar
al-Awlaki, they have ambitions beyond the Arabian Peninsula. It must be
remembered that there are many ancient ties between Yemen and Somalia and
that control of both can threaten all shipping through the Red Sea. Somali
pirates are bankrolled and armed by Yemenis, and the lucrative Somali Khat
trade depends on Yemeni cultivators to supply the narcotic plant.

The Taliban/al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Northwestern Pakistan are waging a
two-front war, but seem to be putting more resources into Afghanistan. Their
logistics improved in 2009 and Taliban fighters were often accoutered as
light infantrymen (wearing boots and webbing, as opposed to flip-flop
sandals and clothing alone); and were more likely to have had some training
in infantry tactics than was the case earlier. In 2009, some 9,000 IEDs were
planted in Afghanistan which suggests something much more than a rudimentary
logistics structure. They have gravitated beyond hosting irregulars and are
now fielding platoon and company-sized units; but US missile strikes and
Pakistani Army incursions into their base areas are wearing their overall
strength down. This suggests that 'Taliqeda' forces in the region may have
overreached themselves last year when they directly threatened the survival
of the Pakistani government.

The al Qaeda franchise in North Africa (al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or
AQIM) is still growing since its formal establishment in 2005. It has a wide
footprint across the Sahara but seems to have real strength only in Algeria
for now although it is rapidly recruiting and training inside other North
African nations (and in Europe). In early 2009, news reports suggested that
they had a mishap with an unknown chemical or biological agent they were
preparing in Algeria, killing a number of members of the group.

Notwithstanding an admission of defeat by al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the group
rebounded in 2009 with the end of the American surge and the start of the US
drawdown. It has staged very deadly destabilization attacks on the Iraqi
government and has continued to pursue the instigation of a wider sectarian
conflict by attacking Shiites. At the same time, Iran is also funneling arms
and supplies to the Sadrist Shiite militias to attack Iraqi Sunnis while
continuing to support AQI.

Lashkar-e-Taiba is one of the Kashmiri Jihadist groups, and scored a
spectacular success with its assault on two hotels in Mumbai in November
2008. Closely linked to the Taliban and al Qaeda, the group has an
international support structure of its own but it has been quiet through
most of 2009 without launching any major attacks. Despite -- or perhaps
because of -- its close ties to the Pakistan ISI, Indian outrage over the
Mumbai attacks has probably resulted in this low profile for the moment. The
group is too large and well organized to remain quiet for long.

Among the Palestinians Fatah and Hamas have both been relatively quiet for
most of 2009, the latter largely because of the Israeli assault on the Gaza
sanctuaries in December 2008 and January 2009. Fatah, and to some extent,
opinion on the Palestinian street is favoring more of a restrained mode for
the moment. One influence for this is a concern over the growing Iranian
nuclear threat to Israel; many Palestinians are quite sure where the fallout
would go. A second influence is the political uncertainty in both Jerusalem
and Washington... there is a sense that the cards are being reshuffled and
the next deal might be more favorable to their interests.

Attacks by "Homegrown" Jihadists inside the Western World are few and far
between -- normally because they get detected at some point before an attack
is actually delivered. While constant failure might be expected to have a
deterring influence, the Jihadists don't count their losses and are still
coming on in greater numbers than ever before. Worse still, as the Jihadists
have delivered very few effective attacks, police resources are being drawn
off for other functions which means attacks are being detected later and
later in the planning cycle. Opportunistic attacks by lone Jihadists are
increasing in number too. This is a rapidly growing threat and will present
us with enormous challenges soon.


Punching Fog: What Next?


For societies that have groomed themselves to be tolerant and open, survival
will have its costs.

Terrorism always presents a society with a number of challenges, and good
choices might be illusions. When confronted by a series of hard choices,
pick the ones that let you survive because defeat by an ideology is always
far costlier than any victory, no matter how bloody.

The Post-WW2 values of tolerance and the older Western values of individual
freedom and individual conscience, political pluralism and the rule of law
are integral to the prosperity of the Western World and everything that has
flowed from it. These values have almost erased many internal differences
within Western Societies and allowed many nations to peacefully absorb many
newcomers. The Jihad movement sees these strengths as weaknesses to exploit;
making the most use of them they can although they would have no intention
of keeping these values once in the driver's seat themselves.

If the 20th Century has any lessons to teach, it is about how horrific
violent ideologues can be when they achieve power. The Jihad movement would
be no less harmful than Stalin's Russia, Hitler's Germany, Mao's China, or
Pol Pot's Cambodia -- so why give them the chance? No matter how odious
resistance to them may be, the consequences of not resisting them would be
far worse. 

There is an old military axiom that the best practice is to never prop-up
failure and only reinforce success. A recipe for defeat is to do the
opposite. Deferring counter-terrorism efforts to police and the legalism of
courts and lawyers is in accord with the best practices that the Western
world has developed over centuries. However, they are often inadequate in
dealing with terrorism in a timely manner and -- worse still -- the front
organizations are doing their level best to insert supporters into the
police and legal community. 

Between the actions of 'progressive' lawyers, crusading journalists, social
campaigners, and the agents of the Front organizations in the legal system,
it is getting harder and harder for police and intelligence agencies to
operate effectively. This is compounded by the need to protect human rights,
requirements to preserve secrecy for ongoing activities by police and
security agencies, and the difficulty of turning intelligence grade material
into legal standard of proof. What makes things even worse in dealing with
the Jihad is the concept of Taqqiyah. Jihadists and their supporters lie and
misdirect, without shame or hesitation, in dealing with Western courts, news
media, and other audiences. 

A characteristic of Islam is that an individual alone must decide for
himself about his obligations to the faith and the Ummah (community of all
the believers). He can get guidance and instruction, but must still decide
for himself where his duty and loyalty lies. Unfortunately, this implies --
as the families of 13 dead soldiers at Fort Hood have learned -- that it
might be unsafe to trust any Muslim. Yet, at the same time, not trusting any
Muslim might well drive more of them into the arena of the Jihadists. We are
on the horns of a dilemma and both points are going to gore us.

There is no perfect solution, but there are some good principles to
remember.

First, when fighting violent people, be violent. Don't wear kid gloves when
in a boxing ring.

Second, when fighting an ideology -- fight the ideology.

Jihadist guerillas and insurgents prosper where they are unopposed, and
become shy when faced with action. Hamas has been quiet since the Israelis
went into the Gaza strip. Al Qaeda in Iraq re-emerged as the American
presence retreated from the streets. India's rage and the threat of military
action after Mumbai inhibited the LeT. What other possible conclusions can
be drawn from this?

Terrorism depends upon our restraint, and usually it is a good idea to be
restrained -- to be careful about inflicting casualties on non-combatants
and be particular about our treatment of prisoners and the wounded. Hiding
in schools and mosques, or behind their own families, might appear to
provide Jihadists with temporary tactical advantages; but against
well-trained Western troops, these ploys really offer little protection. But
there will be occasions where rounds miss and restraint is momentarily
abandoned in the heat of combat... these things happen and we should all do
well to remember that. Insisting on high standards is good, demanding
impossible ones is not.

The conduct of the Israeli Defence Forces during Operation Cast Lead during
2008/2009 -- notwithstanding the bleating from the usual suspects -- was
both exemplary and an example to emulate under similar circumstances.
American roving Predator Drones with Hellfire Missiles must be allowed to
roam over areas where Jihadist leaders feel safe... after all, if countries
want their sovereignty to be respected, than it is incumbent on them to
ensure their territory is not used as a sanctuary for terrorists. Otherwise,
get used to the occasional explosion in your hinterland.

However, the struggle against the Jihad depends upon much more than this.
Both arms of the Jihad are trying to work us over with feints, jabs, hooks
and parries. In the interests of toleration and inclusion, we cannot even
openly identify the enemy. We must accept his arguments at face value and
are told it is 'hurtful' to debate him. We are attacked, and then must hear
the supporters of the attacker tell us how defending ourselves is
provocative.

The legendary boxer Mohammed Ali would herd his opponent into a corner of
the ring -- playing 'rope a dope' so that the rival boxer would get hemmed
in and be unable to move, fall, or do anything but accept the barrage of
blows until he was too disoriented to fight any further. Then the knockout
blow would finish the match. This is the same tactic that the Islamic Front
groups are pursuing... which means that it is time for some fancy footwork.

The fundamentalist ideology does not like freedom of religion. For us, there
is no sensible reason to permit the Dawa and Tablighi Jamaat to function
openly in our societies.

If we accept religious pluralism here then we should insist on it elsewhere.
Why should Saudi-funded Mosques be built in our cities, when Asian, African
and Western workers inside Saudi Arabia are not allowed to openly practice
their religions there? Freedom of religion also means the freedom to
criticize any particular faith and the freedom of all people to change their
faith. If Khomeinists and Wahhabis want to convert our violent criminals and
addle-pates, fine... but it would be interesting to see how Islam really
fares in an atmosphere of religious tolerance, because it has never fairly
competed with other religions in such circumstances.

It will not be easy to practice selective discrimination against the
followers of one religion, but until its supporters are themselves prepared
to tolerate others as equals -- not second class dhimmi at best -- then it
may be a necessary response. Ergo, no obvious religious trappings should be
tolerated. The recent bans in Europe on Burkas and Minarets and a blanket
ban on Sharia Law in any guise should be emulated, until such time as
restrictions on other religions are lifted in Islamic countries. 

The popular symbol for Justice is of a blindfolded woman holding a scale.
Bearing in mind that the practice of Islamic Law is inimical to Western
legal traditions, it might be time to loosen the blindfold. Islamic
'lawfare' has been practiced enough against many Western commentators and
writers to recognize it for what it is. Between Taqqiyah and Dawa funding
for court challenges (and an irritating habit of abandoning suits when the
discovery stage of a trial comes up), it is time that judges ceased
humouring vexatious suits and understood that warfare by litigation is a
substitute for terrorism. There is an urgent need for legislation that
retroactively compensates the targets of lawfare -- from the pockets of the
plaintiffs. Moreover, legislators must understand who they are really
dealing with when receiving submissions from members of the Front
organizations.

Societies built upon immigration have been exceptionally tolerant by the
standards of most societies in human history; but there still must be a
necessary degree of assimilation for the larger society to survive. It must
be completely understood that no aspect of Sharia Law can ever trump our
existing legal codes and that tolerance must also be practiced by those who
would claim its protections. Those are the rules, live by them here or live
elsewhere.

The fight against the Jihad will take decades, cost tens of billions of
dollars and ultimately claim millions of lives (so far, the death toll has
been much less than this and most of the dead have been Muslims slain by
other Muslims... particularly in Algeria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan).
But a successful Jihad movement that takes control of Middle Eastern
governments and becomes dominant elsewhere will result in the murder of
people in the tens or hundreds of millions. Firmness and resolution will
save those lives let us act accordingly.

John Thompson is President of the Mackenzie Institute which studies
political instability and terrorism. He can be reached at:
[email protected]

 



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