http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/09/osama_bin_ladens_spo.php

 


Osama bin Laden's spokesman freed by Iran




Written by Thomas Joscelyn on September 28, 2010 9:14 PM to The Long War
Journal 


Available online at:
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/09/osama_bin_ladens_spo.php


 


Gaith-bin-Laden-Zawahiri.jpg


Sulaiman Abu Gaith, Osama bin Laden, and Ayman al Zawahiri, from an al Qaeda
propaganda tape. Image from BBC/AP.

Iran has allowed an al Qaeda terrorist who served as Osama bin Laden's
spokesman to return to Afghanistan. Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, a Kuwaiti preacher
who gained worldwide infamy after the September 11 attacks, had lived in
Iran since early 2002, and was reportedly held under a loose form of house
arrest beginning in 2003.

Abu Ghaith's departure from Iran was first reported by the Kuwaiti press,
which has long tracked the influential cleric because of his following
inside Kuwait and beyond. The preacher was stripped of his Kuwaiti
citizenship in late 2001 after promising another al Qaeda strike on America
during an appearance on Al Jazeera.

Al Watan, an online Kuwaiti newspaper, reported earlier this month that
three batches of al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists have been released by Iran
in exchange for the release of Heshmatollah Attarzadeh, an Iranian diplomat
who was kidnapped by the Taliban in northern Pakistan in 2008. Abu Ghaith
was among the terrorists released in the third and final batch.

US intelligence officials contacted by the Long War Journal say the account
is credible. But, these officials say, Ghaith's "house arrest" was really a
form of safe haven.

Post-9/11 threats 

Abu Ghaith garnished widespread media coverage in the weeks following the
September 11 attacks. In a statement released in October 2001, he praised
the 9/11 hijackers and threatened more attacks. "The actions by these young
men who destroyed the United States and launched the storm of planes against
it have done a good deed," the Kuwaiti said, according to a transcript
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1590350.stm>  published by BBC News.

"The Americans should know that the storm of plane attacks will not abate,
with God's permission. There are thousands of the Islamic nation's youths
who are eager to die just as the Americans are eager to live." 

Abu Ghaith's praise for the September 11 attacks is not surprising. The 9/11
Commission found that there was a schism within al Qaeda in the summer of
2001 over the impending attacks on New York and Washington. Several high
ranking al Qaeda members objected to the operation, fearing that it would
compromise al Qaeda's safe haven inside Afghanistan by provoking a
significant American reprisal. Abu Ghaith was not one of the terrorists who
objected, however. The Kuwaiti preacher gave the operation his blessing. 

While living in Iran in 2002, Abu Ghaith posted a screed on the Internet in
which he said al Qaeda has "the right to kill four million Americans,
including one million children, displace double that figure, and injure and
cripple hundreds and thousands."

US intelligence officials took notice. In his book At the Center of the
Storm: My Years at the CIA, former CIA Director George Tenet says that it
"would have been easy to dismiss his ranting as the hyperbole of a deranged
man," but US officials "had to consider the possibility that Abu Ghaith was
attempting to justify the future use of weapons of mass destruction that
might greatly exceed the death toll of 9/11."

Ghaith's threat is one of several made by al Qaeda in this vein. Obviously,
al Qaeda has failed to launch an attack utilizing WMD. But the terrorist
group has long sought such a capability and had active biological and
chemical weapons programs in pre-9/11 Afghanistan.


Gaith.jpg


Sulaiman Abu Gaith, from an al Qaeda propaganda tape. Image from BBC/AP

Faylaka Island attack on Marines

On October 8, 2002, two al Qaeda operatives opened fire on US Marines who
were training on the Faylaka Island in Kuwait. One Marine was killed and
another was wounded. As explained by Stewart Bell in his book, The Martyr's
Oath, the gunmen were recruited and indoctrinated by Abu Ghaith.

One of the gunmen was a Kuwaiti named Anas al Kandari, who was killed in the
firefight. According to declassified documents produced at Guantanamo, a
current detainee named Faiz al Kandari is related to Anas al Kandari. In
addition, the two received training along with Abu Ghaith at one of Osama
bin Laden's training camps in pre-9/11 Afghanistan. 

In a memo
<http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/552-faiz-mohammed-ahmed-al
-kandari/documents/1/pages/1190#4>  prepared for Faiz al Kandari's case, US
military officials explained: 

The detainee is related to one of the al Qaeda members responsible for the
attack on U.S. Marines on [Faylaka] Island, Kuwait on 8 October 2002. This
relative is considered by his peers as among the best al Qaeda cadre.
Additionally, the detainee, Salayman Abu Ghayth, and the detainee's relative
attended an airport training camp near Qandahar.

A DC district judge denied Faiz al Kandari's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus earlier this month. US intelligence officials at Gitmo concluded that
Faiz, who was given the internment serial number 552, was an influential al
Qaeda recruiter and advisor with ties to Osama bin Laden.

"House arrest" as a form of safe haven

According to Al Watan, Saad bin Laden, Osama's son, and Saif al Adel, one of
al Qaeda's most senior military planners, were also part of the deal for
Heshmatollah Attarzadeh. Both reportedly left Iran after receiving refuge
there since late 2001.

Saad left Iran in 2008 and was reportedly killed in a US airstrike in
northern Pakistan in 2009. But in conversations with the Long War Journal,
US intelligence officials cautioned that Saad's death has yet to be
confirmed. 

Al Qaeda typically releases martyrdom tapes when senior terrorists are
killed. No such tape has been released for Saad, the officials pointed out.

Although Abu Ghaith, Saad bin Laden, Saif al Adel and other senior al Qaeda
terrorists were reportedly under "house arrest," it was a loose form of
detention. "House arrest is a convenient cover for high-level meetings," one
US intelligence official explained. 

Iran also continues to allow the al Qaeda network to operate on the mullahs'
soil. 

Saad bin Laden and Saif al Adel were implicated in terrorist attacks in 2002
and 2003. Saad was implicated in the April 11, 2002 bombing a Tunisian
synagogue, as well as the May 12, 2003 attacks on three separate apartment
complexes in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Saif al Adel, who received training from
Hezbollah and Iran in the early 1990s, was also implicated in the Riyadh
attack. The pair was in contact with the al Qaeda cells that pulled off the
operations.

After the Riyadh bombings, American and Saudi officials complained about the
al Qaeda network operating on Iranian soil. It was after these complaints
that Iran placed a cadre of al Qaeda leaders under "house arrest." But the
al Qaeda leaders continued to meet and plan on Iranian soil, while being
careful not to raise international scrutiny once again. There is evidence
that al Qaeda operatives continue to receive training inside Iran, along
with Taliban fighters, as well. 

The Iranians have been coy when pressed about their al Qaeda guests. The
State Department has repeatedly noted in its Country Reports on Terrorism
that Iran remains "unwilling to bring to justice senior al Qaeda members it
has detained, and has refused to publicly identify those senior members in
its custody." 

In addition, "Iran has repeatedly resisted numerous calls to transfer
custody of its al Qaeda detainees to their countries of origin or third
countries for trial" and "fail[s] to control the activities of some al Qaeda
members who fled to Iran following the fall of the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan."

In March of 2010, General Petraeus discussed al Qaeda's presence in Iran in
written testimony delivered to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Al Qaeda
"continues to use Iran as a key facilitation hub, where facilitators connect
al Qaeda's senior leadership to regional affiliates," Petraeus explained.
"And although Iranian authorities do periodically disrupt this network by
detaining select al Qaeda facilitators and operational planners, Tehran's
policy in this regard is often unpredictable."

Iran's behavior can be explained by way of analogy. Like a corrupt cop in
league with the mob, the Iranians have been willing to clamp down and turn
over small-time operatives, while allowing bigger players to operate with
impunity. 

And some senior al Qaeda terrorists, like Abu Ghaith, have now gone free.
The terms of the supposed quid pro quo for the kidnapped Iranian diplomat
remain murky. And the timing is suspicious. According to the US Treasury
Department, which designated several members of al Qaeda's network in Iran,
Saad bin Laden may have left Iranian custody as early as September 2008. But
Heshmatollah Attarzadeh was reportedly kidnapped two months later, in
November 2008. 

So, it seems unlikely this was really an exchange of hostages. It is
possible that there is more to the deal than meets the eye, just like the
Iranians' concept of house arrest.

In any event, Abu Ghaith has now left Iran for Afghanistan. "He won't stay
there for long," one US intelligence official surmised, "because he knows he
will be hunted."

 



[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



------------------------------------

--------------------------
Want to discuss this topic?  Head on over to our discussion list, 
[email protected].
--------------------------
Brooks Isoldi, editor
[email protected]

http://www.intellnet.org

  Post message: [email protected]
  Subscribe:    [email protected]
  Unsubscribe:  [email protected]


*** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has 
not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. OSINT, as a part of 
The Intelligence Network, is making it available without profit to OSINT 
YahooGroups members who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the 
included information in their efforts to advance the understanding of 
intelligence and law enforcement organizations, their activities, methods, 
techniques, human rights, civil liberties, social justice and other 
intelligence related issues, for non-profit research and educational purposes 
only. We believe that this constitutes a 'fair use' of the copyrighted material 
as provided for in section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Law. If you wish to use 
this copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use,' 
you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.
For more information go to:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtmlYahoo! Groups Links

<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/

<*> Your email settings:
    Individual Email | Traditional

<*> To change settings online go to:
    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/join
    (Yahoo! ID required)

<*> To change settings via email:
    [email protected] 
    [email protected]

<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
    [email protected]

<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
    http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/

Reply via email to