http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Analysis/Outside-View/2010/10/13/Outside-View-Wo
rms-of-mass-destruction/UPI-71941286966520/

 

Worms of mass destruction

Published: Oct. 13, 2010 at 6:42 AM
By HARLAN ULLMAN, UPI 

WASHINGTON, Oct. 13 (UPI) -- The alarms are deafening but who is listening?
U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn wrote a remarkable piece in
Foreign Affairs warning of the threats and dangers posed by cyberattacks.
Shortly thereafter, as if on cue, the Stuxtnet worm struck Iran. Its target
was controllers made by Siemens that Iran is using in its nuclear systems
causing them to fail and hence potentially crippling the entire program.

And what is happening in the aftermath? Despite the creation of a U.S.
Department of Defense cyber command and intense rhetoric, the dangers of WMD
-- worms of mass destruction -- haven't led yet to a response remotely
equivalent to the infamous Y2K crisis in which software and computers
unprogrammed to turnover from 1999 to 2000 would crash the system. That
crash never happened. That isn't true for this form of WMD.

YouTube featured a 2 1/2-minute clip showing how Stuxtnet could be used to
create real physical damage by forcing an electronic controller to
overpressure a balloon, exploding it. Clearly, physical, as well as computer
and software, damage can result from a Stuxtnet attack.

In a sense, cyberattacks might be considered the inverse of the neutron
bomb. In the Carter years, the United States had designed a weapon that
would kill humans by extreme radiation while doing minimal damage to
buildings, cities and infrastructure. Critics carped that the neutron bomb
would kill babies but not destroy their cribs. It was assumed that
cyberattacks would cripple infrastructure doing little physical damage. That
is an incorrect proposition.

The consequences of cyberattacks against, say, the electrical grid, Global
Positioning System, banking and credit card systems and most chip-based
electronics are potentially catastrophic. Imagine doing without electricity
or without computers and Internet for an extended period. The actual effects
would be punishing. To get a better sense of what killer worms can do, here
are two real-life examples.

Suppose, simultaneously, millions of savings and checking accounts were
hacked and direct payments and transfers changed or canceled without
anyone's knowledge. Or imagine if credit card billings were stopped or
altered and you received a charge or credit for $1 million. Entire economies
or certainly large sectors could be taken down and ruined possibly
permanently. And fixing the damage to individuals would be expensive, take a
great deal of time and in the interim do much damage.

The possibilities are self-evident. One other critical dilemma regarding
cyberattacks is that we are still in the philosophical and strategic infancy
stages akin to July 1945 after the first nuclear weapons were detonated and
long before a theory and practice of deterrence were developed.

One model or analogy for cyber-thinking is money. Money and cyber are both
ubiquitous and are the basis for conducting virtually all commerce outside
bartering economies. Understanding the use, governance and threats to the
monetary and financial systems applies to cyber and both national and
international systems for its governance, regulation and protection.

Over time, banking, exchange rates, credit and debt mechanisms and rules of
the game evolved. That evolution continues post-meltdown of financial
markets. Indeed the financial meltdown and economic crisis are suggestive of
what WMD could do to our lives. Along with cyber-thugs and states, let alone
hacking for sport, bank robbers, counterfeiters, conmen and even investment
bankers have gone after the money supply and financial systems, some
legally, others not.

Of course, the 10-year-old computer genius who decides to disrupt or hack
into global or national systems is another menace. It would indeed be
interesting if the Stuxtnet inventors turned out to be in their early teens
or even single digits in age.

Creating the equivalent of a nuclear deterrent structure or financial
governance system is sorely needed for cyber. Many of the same challenges
apply. For example, when does a cyberattack constitute an act of war? The
cyber-sortie into Estonia from sources inside Russia wasn't seen as an act
of war. In financial markets, George Soros, famous for shorting the pound,
cost the United Kingdom billions. If a criminal organization had been
responsible for such losses using cyber, let alone al-Qaida, would that
constitute the equivalent of an armed attack?

A serious and ongoing national and international effort to establish an
intellectual framework including rules of the road and conventions for
dealing with cyber is needed now, not later. Hitler's onslaught into Europe
in 1939, the attack on Pearl Harbor and of course September 11th caught the
West off guard and unprepared. The chances of a major cyberattack by thugs,
states or misguided youth are unity. The only question is how much damage
will occur.

Action is needed immediately. But urgency seems AWOL. This new WMD threat is
here. But will anyone act in time?

 



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