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A Financial Profile of the Terrorism of Al-Qaeda and its Affiliates - Part I


by Juan Miguel del Cid Gómez

 

Abstract
This working document offers an analysis of the sources of financing of the
Al-Qaeda network including some of its affiliated groups.  The development
of Al-Qaeda’s financing has been similar to the evolution of its operational
structure.  The organization is currently under significant financial
pressure.  However, the number and magnitude of terrorist attacks attributed
to Al-Qaeda in a number of countries implies that the network continues to
have access to substantial financial resources to support its activities.
The international community has so far not succeeded in cutting off many of
Al-Qaeda’s sources of financing; the organisation continues to access
funding from wealthy benefactors, legitimate business and criminal
activities.

 

Introduction

Since its foundation in 1988, Al-Qaeda has used various methods to obtain
funding.  Currently, its cells, branches and affiliated groups are obliged
to act autonomously; many of them have, to a great extent, to finance
themselves, including by means of ordinary crime.   These groups have also
had to resort to hawala (a trust-based informal banking system) and cash
couriers to move money or operate on the margins of the formal financial
system.  There are also other methods that are used by terrorist groups to
transfer funds with little risk of  detection.  International trade is
particularly vulnerable, due to its size and the complexity of methods of
payment.  The emergence of new methods of payment through new developments
in information technology present additional risks for the authorities as
these enable terrorists to move money with total anonymity.

The measures established by the United Nations Security Council, based on
asset freezing, have failed to disrupt Al-Qaeda’s activities to a
significant extent.  On the other hand, the enforcement of due diligence
with bank clients has been helpful in detecting some terrorist operations,
although in general reports of suspicious financial transactions made by
financial institutions are currently of limited value in actually seizing
assets of terrorist organisations.

Al-Qaeda’s Operational Costs
According to a CIA report, Al-Qaeda’s financial requirements before the 11
September 2001 attacks amounted to 30 million US dollars annually.[1] This
money was earmarked for carrying out attacks, for the maintenance of its
quasi-military apparatus, for training and indoctrination of its members,
for contributions to the Taliban regime but also for the occasional support
of associated terrorist organisations.  It is currently very difficult to
make a reliable estimate of the operating cost of Al-Qaeda, as it now acts
through a large number of cells and satellite terror groups which are more
or less autonomous.

The means these terrorist groups use to perpetrate attacks (vehicles, maps,
components of explosives, surveillance material, etc.) are of relatively low
cost compared to the damage they can cause.  Certain estimates, whose
accuracy may be open to question,  provide an idea of the ratio of the
approximate direct costs of certain attacks carried out by Al-Qaeda or its
affiliates and the damage caused in terms of economic destruction and loss
of human lives.

Table 1: Cost of Carrying out Various Terrorist Attacks



Attack

Date

Estimated Cost [2]


London Underground/Bus

7 July 2005

8,000 GBP [3]


Madrid Railway Atocha)

11 March 2004

100,000 EURO [4]


Istanbul

15 & 20 November 2003

40,000 US $


Marriot Hotel Jakarta

5 August 2003

30,000 US $


Bali Bombings

12 October 2002

50,000 US $


New York Twin Towers

11 September 2001

400,000-500,000 US $ [5]


USS Cole, Aden

12 October 2000

10,000 US $


US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania

7 August 1998

50,000 US $

 

However, terrorist organisations have to defray both the costs of carrying
out an attack and the more substantial structural costs of maintaining the
organisation and disseminating its ideology.  In addition to purchasing
weapons, vehicles, explosive material and detonators to be used in attacks,
terrorist groups need to anticipate other needs, such as:

1. Subsistence living costs for its members and sometimes also their
families.  These expenses are considerable, despite the terrorists’
generally frugal life styles.  Costs vary according to the proximity of
terrorists to their targets.  The costs of activities in Western Europe will
be considerably higher than those in African or Asian countries.

2. A terrorist cell also needs for its members reliable channels of
communication, including highly secret channels to its leadership, from
which it receives its instructions.  Although communications costs have been
reduced considerably through the use of mobile telephones, pre-paid cards
and e-mail (often sent from Internet cafés), the procurement and use of
communication tools can entail significant expenses. 

3. Training new recruits constitutes a large investment for terrorist
groups, both in terms of ideological indoctrination as well as the
procurement of practical items to prepare for attacks.  Although part of the
general preparation can be carried out in terrorist training camps, some
specific operations may require specialist skills (such as piloting
planes)which can only be achieved with expensive training.

4.Travel costs for group members in preparation of an attack and acquiring
false documentation papers, which may also involve travel.  Further travel
is required to meet other members of the network, to meet senior members of
the hierarchy or to meet individuals able to provide material or financial
support.

5. Propaganda for the cause via various channels of communications.
Al-Qaeda’s capability of using camrecorders to broadcast its video footage
is well-known. This terrorist organisation also makes extensive use of the
Internet for recruitment, to spread its jihadi message and to raise funds.
Al-Qaeda has managed to develop powerful propaganda materials that advocates
violence, suicide attacks and the murder of infidels – which includes many
Muslims deviating from Salafist ideals as understood by the group and its
affliliates.

6. Charitable activities as a means of social legitimisation in order to win
and maintain a
constituency are another significant cost for some organisations that pursue
their goals by means of terrorism (however, this does not apply to Al-Qaeda
as much as to some other terrorist groups).

The points listed above lead us to conclude that although individual
terrorist attacks can be performed at relatively low costs, organizations
that are responsible for them need to be able to finance a considerable
infrastructure to sustain themselves and to promote their objectives.

Sources of Al-Qaeda’s  Financing

In the past eighteen months, groups associated with Al-Qaeda have made many
appeals for funds.  A leader of Al-Qaeda, Mustafa Abu al Yazid, also known
as Jeque Saeed,  complained in a declaration published in extremist forums
on 10 June 2009 that “many of the mujahidin have been inactive and failing
to participate in jihad through lack of money”.[6]

Various extremist Internet sites have discussed the risks militants face
while fundraising and laundering the money obtained by various  methods.  A
report published in April 2009 warned members of Al-Qaeda’s network that
intelligence services could identify jihadists through banks, money transfer
services, credit cards and online websites.[7]

Such statements indicate that Al-Qaeda is under significant pressure
resulting from international measures aimed at freezing its assets and
cutting off its traditional sources of income.  According to the US Treasury
Department, Al-Qaeda is in its worst financial position for many years.[8]
In addition, the organisation cannot transfer money with the same ease as in
the past.  Parts of the purportedly charitable organisations that formed the
backbone of its financing have been liquidated by national authorities and
added to the UN list of organisations that support terrorism.  However, the
number and magnitude of terrorist attacks attributed to Al-Qaeda throughout
the world indicate that the network continues to have access to considerable
funding to support its activities.

In order to understand how the organisation currently finances itself, it is
necessary to study the development of its operational structure.  Since the
11 September 2001 attacks, Al-Qaeda has morphed into a decentralised
organisation.  Currently, three distinct but interlinked entities co-exist
within Al-Qaeda.  The first and original entity, established by its previous
leaders and led by Osama Bin Laden, retains its importance and influence. It
is most likely located in the rugged area on the border between Afghanistan
and Pakistan.

The second group, consisting of veteran combatants who had received training
in Afghanistan, extends to dozens of countries. It serves as an example and
provides training and instructions to new recruits wish to become part of
the jihadist enterprise.

The third group consists of newly radicalised militants who form local
cells. They neither depend on a centralised authority, nor are they directly
linked to it.  Although these cells share fundamental objectives with
Al-Qaeda’s leadership, they are quite independent of it.   They are
anonymous and to a great extent invisible until they decide to carry out an
attack.  These cells exist in various parts of the world and include
individuals from widely different social status, education, age and racial
background.[9]

Among the sources of Al-Qaeda’s income we find since its inception funds
diverted from charitable organisations, profits gained from businesses run
by its members and sympathisers and money collected by fundraisers seeking
donations.  It is currently highly unlikely that the local groups receive
significant financial support from the core leadership.  Although they may
receive funding from other traditional sources, the Al-Qaeda cells, branches
and affiliates are currently obliged to act independently, and to a great
extent finance themselves to varying degrees also from criminal activities
such as kidnappings, and, in some cases maybe also drugs trafficking.

Fundraisers

Since its inception, Al-Qaeda has used a core of fundraisers tasked to
solicit money from a range of donors.[10]  The main group of donors is based
in the Gulf area, principally Saudi Arabia, but donors also exist in other
parts of the world.  Some of these donors have been fully aware of the final
destination of their money; others were not.  Many donors make their
contributions to money collectors. Other funds come from corrupt employees
of charitable organisations, in particular during the holy month of Ramadan.
Fundraisers often have also access to imams in the Mosques and obtain part
of zakat (obligatory almsgiving)donations to support the cause of radical
Islam.   Fundraisers have sometimes used legitimate charitable
organisations; in other cases they have used front organisations and
legitimate businesses to provide cover for their activities.  This mix of
fund raising methods has enabled Al-Qaeda to construct a considerable
financial network throughout the Muslim world and in foreign diasporas
allowing it to obtain the money needed to operate.

Many of the original fundraisers, such as Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, a senior
leader of Al-Qaeda, have been arrested. New fundraisers have been added to
the UN Security Council’s Sanctions Committee list.[11]  Although the names
of some of these fundraisers are known, and the funds and the businesses
they use are subject to assets freezing orders in many countries, a good
number of them have been able to continue their activities without major
problems.  In some cases, Al-Qaeda has been able to replace known
fundraisers with as yet unknown individuals and organisations.

Charitable Organisations

Charities have certain characteristics that make some of them particularly
vulnerable to exploitation for the financing of terrorism.  They generally
enjoy the confidence of the public and have access to significant resources,
in many cases in the form of cash.  In addition, many of these organisations
have a transnational presence which provides them with the necessary
infrastructure to enable national and international transactions.  In
certain countries they are subject to only limited or no regulation at all
(in terms of registration, accountability, transparency and audits of their
accounts). They are also often easy to establish where there is no need for
initial capital and where no background checks on employees are made).[12]

Since its inception, Al-Qaeda has made attempts to use charitable
organisations to finance some of its activities.  Charities enable a number
of terrorist organizations to collect, transfer and distribute the necessary
funds for the purposes of indoctrination, recruitment and training.  They
also enabled them often to meet logistical and operational requirements.

Charity is one of the fundamental principles of the Islamic religion, and
all those who have a certain amount of money are obliged to pay zakat (2.5%
annually of savings and assets).  Apart from the obligatory zakat, the Koran
and Islamic tradition also advocate sadaqah (voluntary contributions) to the
most needy.  Most Muslims pay these contributions to Islamic charities and
to their mosque, which use them to finance a great variety of religious,
humanitarian and social activities.

Al-Qaeda’s strategy has been to infiltrate employees in charities to divert
money from the charities’ legitimate humanitarian or social programmes
towards its own illicit activities.  In some cases, Al-Qaeda has created its
own networks of charitable institutions as a cover to obtain funds directly.
Some of these networks originated during the jihad against the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980’s. Al-Qaeda has also used charitable
organizations to disseminate and teach the most radical forms of Islamic
fundamentalism.  In a number of countries, these organisations function
outside the scrutiny and supervision of state authorities.  It has proven
difficult to shut them down completely, even in cases where they have been
investigated and accused of financing terrorism.

An example of this lack of control can be found in one of the largest
co-ordinating institutions of Islamic charities, the International Islamic
Relief Organisation (IIRO), based in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia).  Although most
of its activities are dedicated to religious, educational, social and
humanitarian programmes, IIRO and some of its subsidiary organisations have
reportedly been used, knowingly or otherwise, to finance Al-Qaeda. The
International Islamic Relief Organisation has subsidiaries throughout the
world, although most of its financial contributions come in the form of
private donations from Saudi Arabia.  It has established an Endowment Fund
(Sanabil al Khair) to generate a stable flow of revenues to finance its
activities.  It also works in close co-operation with the Global Islamic
League.  Many prominent individuals and financiers from the Middle East are
associated with this Islamic charity.  Various reports have linked it also
to the financing of terrorist operations.[13]

Another case that has raised suspicion is the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation
headquartered in Saudi Arabia. It presented itself as a private
non-governmental organisation with charitable and educational objectives.
Considered a single entity, Al Haramain was one of the principal NGO’s
operating worldwide and allegedly supporting Al-Qaeda.  The financing
generally came from individual donors but special campaigns were also
directed at certain commercial enterprises throughout the world.

The founder and former head of the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Aqeel
Abdul Aziz Al Aqeel, and Al Haramain’s subsidiaries in other countries, were
accused of providing financial and material support to Al-Qaeda and other
terrorist organisations such as Jemaah Islamiya, Al Itihaad al Islamia, the
Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Lashkar e Tayyiba.  These terrorist organisations
had received funding from Al Haramain; they also used it as a cover for
collecting funds.[14] In 2008, the US Treasury accused the entire Al
Haramain organisation, including its Saudi Arabian headquarters, of
financing the Al-Qaeda network.  Between 2002-2004, three of its
subsidiaries in various countries were designated financers of terrorism.
However, its leaders succeeded in re-establishing part of the organisation
and continue to operate under another name.[15]  According to a 2009 report
from the Pakistani police, Al Haramain had contributed approximately 15
million dollars to jihadist groups in Pakistan.  Most of the funding went to
the Tehrik e Taliban (TTP), which was responsible for several suicide
attacks and also accused of the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.[16]

Although the Saudi Arabian government took some counter-terrorism measures
immediately after 9/11, only Al-Qaeda attacks against Saudi Arabia in 2003
and 2004 marked a clear change of mind for Saudi authorities. They began to
combat terrorist financing and considered Al-Qaeda as a threat to the regime
itself.  Despite these developments, the United States has recently
demonstrated its concern about the ability of certain charities to support
terrorism outside Saudi Arabia and about their use of money transfers to
move funds to various remote locations.[17]

Another charitable organisation, based in Kuwait, called the Revival of
Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS) has also been accused of providing material
and financial support to Al-Qaeda and its affiliates.  For their support of
Al-Qaeda, RIHS delegations in Afghanistan and Pakistan were in 2002
designated as terrorists by the US government and the Sanctions Committee of
the UN Security Council.  Yet there was at first no evidence indicating that
RIHS’s headquarter itself was aware that subsidiaries were financing
Al-Qaeda.  Since then, however, the authorities have established proof of
the express consent of its leaders to the illegitimate use of the
organisation’s funds. RHIS subsidiaries in Albania, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh,
Bosnia, Cambodia and Russia have been closed down by their respective
governments on suspicion of supporting the financing. of terrorism.  In
countries where RIHS activities were banned or placed under State
supervision, the central organisation developed various ways of continuing
its activities.  Among these was the channelling of funds through another
organisation or changing the name of the subsidiary to avoid control by the
authorities.  Amongst other charges, the RIHS headquarter has been accused
of lending financial and logistical support to Lashkar e Tayyiba (LeT), a
Pakistani terrorist organisation linked to the Al-Qaeda network and involved
in the 2006 train attacks in Mumbai and the attacks on the Indian parliament
in 2001.  It was a key source of financing that enabled the Bangladesh
terrorist organisation known as Jamaat Mujahidin Bangladesh (JMB) to carry
out a series of co-ordinated attacks in 2005 that left 2 people dead and 64
injured.  Followers of Al-Qaeda in Somalia said that they had received
significant amounts of money from RIHS.[18]

The current situation of many of these charities is opaque.  Despite the
freezing of  assets, in many cases financial activities have continued in
the same locations, using bank accounts and resources in the name of third
parties.

Offshore Entities and Companies

Al-Qaeda has used commercial companies to finance itself as well as to
transfer funds.  One example is Barakaat, a network of companies which, in
2001, had a foothold in 40 countries operating its telecommunications,
construction, money remittance and cash exchange services from the United
States and Somalia.

For Bin Laden, Barakaat was a suitable instrument for making cash transfers;
he had invested in its telecommunications network.  Barakaat acted as a
source of financing and arranged cash transfers for him. Its owners
channelled millions of dollars every year from the USA to Al-Qaeda or its
associates.  Barakaat also managed, invested and distributed funds for
Al-Qaeda.  Most of Bin Laden’s transactions were carried out between
Mogadishu and Dubai, Mombassa (Kenya) and Nairobi.  In general, these funds
were interlinked with transfers made in the name of non-governmental
organisations such as Al Haramain and the International Islamic Relief
Organisation.[19]

Another case is the one of the Somalian group Al Itihaad Al Islamiya which,
according to UN officials, led terrorist training centres and collected
money from followers in Europe and the Middle East.  Al Itihaad Al Islamiya
financed its activities with distinct commercial operations.  Among these
activities was the export of coal to the Middle East, the provision of
transport, security and protection services, telecommunications, commercial
centres, running hawalas andother financial services, agricultural and hotel
companies and was even involved in the distribution of fishing rights.
Some of these services held genuine monopolies in certain areas; they were
also employed by international relief organisations.[20]

The use of fictitious companies and offshore fiduciary companies to shield
the identity of  individuals or entities taking part in terrorist financing
poses difficult problem for those trying to regulate business transactions.
These are companies, funds, entities or businesses that are registered in an
extra-territorial financial centre.  One example are International Business
Corporations (IBC) which are used to create complex financial structures.
They can be established using bearer shares and do not have to publish
accounts. Residents of  financial centre can act as fictitious directors or
shareholders in order to disguise the genuine directors or owners.  These
entities are attractive to investors who seek anonymity or wish to carry out
their activities beyond the official scrutiny of their national government.

In Spain, according to investigations made by the Fiscalía of the High Court
(Audiencia Nacional), the former Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
(GSPC), -now integrated into Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) -
obtained funds that its front men and couriers transported to Algeria and
Syria.  In order to do this, they used inactive companies or companies in
the process of liquidation in tax havens such as the Bahamas and Delaware.
The Audiencia Nacional followed the trail of an Algerian citizen in Spain
with bank accounts in Palma de Mallorca in the name of an American company
formed in Delaware. He transmitted funds totalling US $ 200,000 with the
supposed purpose of paying invoices for the services of an IT company with
bases in the Netherlands and Germany.  The company concerned denied having
issued these invoices these turned out to be false. This led investigators
to believe that this money had left Spain for other purposes.[21]

Drugs Trafficking and other Common Crime

The Afghan Taliban is an insurgent-cum-terrorist organization that makes
extensive use of taxing proceeds from drugs to finance itself.  In
Afghanistan, the links between both pro- and anti-government elements and
drugs trafficking is well-established.[22]  Unlike the Al-Qaeda network, the
Afghan Taliban is an insurgent group whose activities and range is (so far)
limited to Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Although the Taliban receives (or
received) support from Al-Qaeda and private donors from the Gulf States, a
large part of its revenue in Afghanistan and Pakistan is derived from
collections in Mosques, contributions from sympathisers and taxes on opium.

The Taliban practises extortion at several points in the heroin business in
Afghanistan: taxing poppy farmers, laboratories where the drugs are
processed and traffickers who transport precursors into the country and
heroin out of it.  Currently, many of those involved in the destabilisation
of Afghanistan are directly or indirectly involved in illicit drug
production, processing or procurement.  In addition, the Taliban also raises
“taxes” on legitimate business seeking to operate in Afghanistan.[23]  It is
more than likely that part of the money that these activities generate
leaves the country and enters the international financial system.

Al-Qaeda and its associated groups have greatly diversified their methods of
raising money to finance jihad. They finance themselves to varying extents
through common crime, according to the conditions and opportunities in the
locations in which they operate.  It is therefore often difficult to
distinguish between terrorist groups, insurgents and organised crime groups
since these categories often overlap. Their methods and sources of financing
are often similar if not the same.

Amongst other sources of income, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),
which is active in the desert region between Mauritania, Mali and Algeria,
obtains money from kidnapping ransoms, contraband and apparently also from
drugs trafficking.  The discovery of the remains of a Boeing 727 in the Mali
desert raised serious suspicions amongst intelligence services in Europe and
the United States that Latin American drugs traffickers have been using some
areas partly controlled by AQIM to transport drugs from Colombia’s FARC to
European markets.  From West African coastal countries such as
Guinea-Bissau, the illicit drugs are reportedly taken across Mauritania,
Mali and Niger to Egypt and Libya, from where they are transported further
in containers.[24]

According to Spanish police informants, drugs trafficking groups operating
in the North African enclaves Ceuta and Melilla send a portion of the
profits from hashish trafficking to finance Islamic terrorist groups, with
whose cause they sympathise.  A report from the National Intelligence Centre
(NIC) dated 27 October 2003 concluded that members of Al-Qaeda sleeper cells
are financed by drugs trafficking and credit card theft.[25]

The 11 March 2004 bombings in Madrid represent an example of how attacks
were funded by drug money and crime.  Various members of the unit that
carried out these bombings were involved in drugs trafficking, falsification
of documents and other crimes by which they managed to raise substantial
amounts of revenue.  This criminal structure was used to acquire explosives
for those who commit terrorist acts, with the ultimate aim is to establish a
Sharia-based Islamic State.[26]

Some radical groups which have financed themselves in Spain for years
through hashish trafficking have taken a step further in their strategy to
seek new resources.  According to Spanish counter-terrorist sources, AQIM
uses revenue from trafficking cocaine and synthetic drugs between Spain and
Algeria to finance a campaign of terror in northern Africa.  Having obtained
cocaine from Latin America and synthetic drugs pills manufactured in the
Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe, they resell these in Algeria, where the
price is reportedly substantially higher than in the EU.

Such drugs trafficking activities form another link in a large chain of
criminal activities to raise financing across borders.   Joint
investigations by the Spanish, Italian, Swiss and French police have
revealed how robberies and drugs trafficking in Spain, robberies in
Switzerland and tax fraud in Italy generate a significant amount of money
which is then used to finance armed attacks and terrorist training. In
addition to hashish trafficking, Moroccan radicals have specialised in
robbery and the resale of all kinds of modern information technology such as
GPS, new generation mobile telephones and electronic diaries.  In many cases
such items are later resold in Morocco or Spain.[27] According to another
official Spanish investigation, the sale of designer watches, gold bracelets
and emerald necklaces stolen from around 20 villas on the Costa del Sol by a
Salafist group that goes by the name ”Group of the Truth” was used to
finance several murders in Algeria and Mauritania. [28]

There is also an emerging relationship between Islamic terrorist groups and
the commission of cyber crimes.  According to investigations led by the UK
police, three members of a terrorist cell that planned to carry out attacks
in the US, Europe and the Middle East used several stolen credit cards to
buy items such as GPS systems, night vision goggles, sleeping bags,
telephones, knives and tents from hundreds of websites. These were meant to
be sent to jihadists in Iraq.  Among their purchases were hundreds of
pre-paid mobile telephones and more than 250 airline tickets. These were
bought with 110 different credit cards from 46 different airline companies
and travel agencies.  The three men involved also laundered  money plundered
from bank accounts with the help of on-line gambling sites. Numerous stolen
credit cards and hacked bank accounts were also used to buy web-based
services in the United States and Europe with the apparent aim of creating
an online network to be used by jihadist cells throughout the world to
exchange information, recruit members and plan attacks. The three cell
members involved spent 3.5 million dollars from credit cards stolen by
phishing on hundreds of websites. They also distributed spyware contained in
emails or websites which enabled them to gain control of infected
computers.[29]

Pakistani extremists based in Spain developed operating methods of their
own.  These groups have close relations with radical cells in the UK that
specialize in stealing credit cards.  Such cards are cloned and sent to
Spain, where hundreds to thousands of euros in charges are made by a certain
business owner who then transfers the money to radical organisation, asking
a commission of 10% for himself.  Radical Pakistani groups also obtain funds
by collecting a ‘revolutionary tax’ from fellow countrymen based in Spain.
On occasions they even engage in so-called express kidnappings which end
once family members pays a ransom in Pakistan.[30]

According to Interpol, there are also important links between intellectual
property crimes and the financing of Islamic terrorist networks.  Some
terrorist groups participate directly in the production and sale of fake
items and divert part of the profits to finance attacks.  Also, part of the
profits from the sale of non-genuine items (such as illegally copied CDs)
apparently go to fundamentalist networks and such monies are eventually sent
to terrorist groups via informal money transfers.[31]

The Movement of Terrorist Funds

In the more than twenty years of its existence, Al-Qaeda and later  its
affiliates have used various methods to transfer funds with the aim of
avoiding detection by the authorities.  Among them are informal systems of
money transfers such as hawala, cash transfers and the use of official
financial systems.  However, other mechanisms such as external trade and new
methods of payment allowing anonymity have emerged in recent years.

Hawala

Alternative money transfer systems are a cheap and rapid way of sending
funds and making transactions. Originally they mainly served those who did
not have a bank account, particularly in remote areas without a functioning
normal financial system.  One of the most frequently used informal
mechanisms is hawala (“transfer” in Arabic), a form of transporting
financial obligations from one place to another without the physical
movement of money and often also without a paper trail. What distinguises
hawala from other informal systems are trust and a strong sense of honour as
these often exist in extensive family networks based on regional and tribal
connections of those who use it.  The security, anonymity and the
versatility of hawala is also attractive for criminals and terrorists who
wish to move legally obtained funds or launder money raised by illegal
activities.

These informal systems constitute a risk factor for the authorities since
operators usually do not need to reveal the true identity of their client or
apply  official due diligence procedures.  Hawala is widely used in the
Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, in South East Asia and parts of
Africa, particularly in rural areas where people have no access to the
formal financial system.  It is also prevalent in countries populated by
émigrés and refugees, who use this system to send money to families in their
countries of origin in order to avoid paying excessive bank charges.

Before 9/11, Al-Qaeda moved a large part of its funds through hawala
networks.  After the organisation’s leadership moved to Afghanistan in 1996,
there was no practical alternative as the Afghan national banking system was
antiquated and insecure.  Later, hawala became again Al-Qaeda’s system of
choice when the government-regulated official financial systems stepped up
controls on bank-based money transfers across national borders.

Many hawala transactions originate in, or are destined for, Dubai or Yemen,
or pass through these places.  Some countries such as the UAE have tried to
regulate hawala operations and require users to register and provide
information about the identity of remitters and beneficiaries on special
forms which must be submitted periodically to the Central Bank.  There are
also requirements to report suspicious transactions.  Currently in
Afghanistan, all businesses that offer hawala services must obtain a
licence, and report transactions to a financial intelligence agency of the
Central Bank.[32]

However, other countries have paid no attention to informal money transfer
systems, or simply attempted to prohibit them.  Although the vast majority
of these unregulated services transmit legitimately obtained funds,
terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda and the Taliban use them to hide or
manage many of their legal and illegal financial transactions.  They are
often used to transfer funds obtained from charities, common crime, drugs
trafficking or wealthy donors.

Cash Transactions

The physical movement of money across borders is predominant in countries
where bank transfers are rarely used by common people. Couriers carrying
money are also used where financial institutions have increased the
efficiency of due diligence practices with clients.  It is also one of the
methods used by terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda to move funds
whilst avoiding anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing
measures implemented by national and international  financial institutions.
The investigation into the 9/11 attacks provided a good example of how
Al-Qaeda used human couriers to move money.  One of the financial backers of
the attack, Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, passed a large amount of money (possibly
as much as US $ 200,000) to Abdul Aziz Ali in Dubai, who subsequently
transferred it to the hijackers in the US.[33]

Various counter-terrorism operations have demonstrated that money couriers
moved funds between Middle Eastern and South Asian countries. They often did
so by using indirect flights between origin and destination, with large
numbers of couriers and frequent exchanges of money.  Moving money by using
couriers can be more expensive than a simple transaction, but it leaves no
trace even if the courier is detained, since the origin and final
destination of the money might be unknown to him or her.  Some terrorist
groups have converted the money into high-value goods where the source is
difficult to trace, such as gold and precious stones, moving smuggling
activities away from  formal financial systems.

Algerian and Moroccan cells based in Europe use human couriers, as the
Italian police discovered when a bus company connecting France and Italy
with Algeria was transporting three individuals at least twice a week, each
of whom carrying an average of 1,500 euros.  Pakistani radicals also sent
money to the United Kingdom with the help of couriers who fly to the UK
carrying the equivalent of thousands of euros.[34]

The Formal Financial System

Government-regulated financial institutions and other regulated financial
service providers constitute the formal financial system It is the world’s
principal gateway for financial transactions across borders.  Al-Qaeda has
in the past used the formal financial system as a means of moving money to
support its own cells and affiliated terrorist groups, financing their
actions.  The speed and ease with which money can be moved via the
international financial system enables terrorists to move funds efficiently,
unfortunately often still  with relatively small risk of detection.

The 9/11 terrorists used official financial institutions both within and
outside the US to deposit, transfer and withdraw money.  The money was
deposited in US banks, generally via transactions, cash deposits and
travellers cheques bought overseas.  Some of them kept funds in overseas
bank accounts to which they had access through cash-point machines (ATM) and
credit cards.  Of the overall cost of the 9/11 operation (between US $
400,000-500,000), at least US $ 300,000 came from bank accounts in the
United States.  None of the terrorists or their backers were experts in
using the international financial system.  The money laundering controls at
the time were primarily designed to detect drugs trafficking and large-scale
financial fraud. Therefore bank employees at that time were not suspicious
of apparently routine transactions as those carried out by the 19
hijackers.[35]  One of those involved in the 7 July 2005 bombings in London
financed the operation with his own funds, which were deposited in various
accounts These movements did not attract the attention of bank employees.
[36]

Combined with other mechanisms such as offshore companies, the formal
financial system can still provide terrorists with sufficient cover to carry
out operations and launder crime money. The sheer volume and speed with
which sums of money rush through the computer-linked international financial
system make watertight CFT measures impossible.

Money remittance companies are particularly attractive to terrorist groups
such as Al-Qaeda, which has used branches of such companies, which often
operate globally, to send and receive money.  These companies are in
principle obliged to register identification details of the individual who
has sent the money from one country and of the person who is meant to
received it in another.  This should enable the authorities to track
individual transactions by means of the logged details of every transaction.
However, the lack of a consistent and worldwide application of due diligence
procedures (involving identification, record keeping and report of
suspicious transactions) are an obstacle for investigators when trying to
track specific financial transactions.

For a <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/articles/issues/PTv4i4.pdf>
printable pdf version of issue, click here.

  _____  

Note: Perspectives on Terrorism invites a diversity of opinions to be
presented in articles. The views expressed in this article are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Perspectives on Terrorism
or the Terrorism Research Initiative.


 
<http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=artic
le&id=126&Itemid=54> 




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