<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/03/weekinreview/03markoff.html?_r=1>
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/03/weekinreview/03markoff.html?_r=1

 

October 2, 2010


A Code for Chaos


By
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/john_markoff/i
ndex.html?inline=nyt-per> JOHN MARKOFF


IN June, a Belarus-based computer security firm identified a new computer
malware program,
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/computer_mal
ware/stuxnet/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier> Stuxnet, which was repeatedly
crashing the computers of one of its clients. Then, last month,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/world/middleeast/30worm.html?scp=2&sq=stu
xnet&st=cse> a German security researcher suggested that the program's real
target might be the Iranian nuclear program - and that clues in the coding
suggested that Israel was the creator. Since then, there has been growing
alarm about the worm, as its target and sophistication have become more
apparent. The code has appeared in many countries, notably China, India,
Indonesia and Iran. It appears designed to attack a certain type of Siemens
industrial control computer, used widely to manage oil pipelines, electrical
power grids and many kinds of nuclear plants. The question is: Just how
dangerous has this worm and cyberwarfare become? 

How widespread is cyberwarfare? 

A 2007
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/f/federal
_bureau_of_investigation/index.html?inline=nyt-org> F.B.I. report asserted
that 108 countries had at least some offensive cyberwarfare capabilities.
And there has been widespread speculation that a secret cyberwar "arms race"
is under way as a number of countries build sophisticated software and
hardware attack capabilities. Most recent wars and military engagements,
like
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/technology/29estonia.html?scp=1&sq=Russia
%20Estonia%202007&st=cse> Russia's quarrel with Estonia in 2007 or
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html?scp=1&sq=Russia%2
0Georgia%202008&st=Search> with Georgia in 2008, have been accompanied by a
"cyberwar" engagement, in which government and financial Web sites have been
targeted. 

What was the earliest case of cyberwarfare? 

In his book "At the Abyss," Thomas C. Reed, a former secretary of the
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/a/us_air_
force/index.html?inline=nyt-org> Air Force, described a software program
known as a Trojan horse, in which industrial control software was covertly
added by the United States to equipment being shipped to the Soviet Union
from Canada. When the equipment was installed in a trans-Siberian gas
pipeline in June 1982, it suddenly went haywire, touching off a huge
explosion and fire, according to Mr. Reed. 

Another episode in January 1990, the collapse of
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/at_and_t/index.html?i
nline=nyt-org> AT&T's long-distance network, also raised suspicions of
sabotage. 

But security experts have been concerned about potential cyberattacks since
the 1970s, during the early days of the Arpanet, an experimental,
military-financed research network that was the predecessor to the Internet.
There was great concern about a network connection - a now old-fashioned
9600 baud modem - that had been installed by scientific researchers linking
Moscow and the United States, via a mathematics research center in Vienna.
When national security officials discovered the link, financing to the
center was canceled. 

How is Stuxnet different? 

Stuxnet is the first widely analyzed malware program that is intended to
jump from Windows-based computers to a specialized system used for
controlling industrial equipment, like electric power grids, manufacturing
plants, gas pipelines, dams and power plants. Previously, most high-profile
cyberattacks have focused on Web sites and corporate or military networks. 

At least, that's true when it comes to proven cyberattacks. But there has
also been speculation about episodes that could have been caused by
sabotage. For example, The Los Angeles Times reported in 2001 that
intrusions into the network that controlled the electrical grid were traced
to someone in Guangdong Province, China. Later reports of other electric
grid attacks have often included allegations that the break-ins were
orchestrated by the Chinese, although no proof has been produced. 

In the case of Stuxnet, what are arguments for and against Israel's
involvement? 

Ralph Langner, a German security researcher, was the first to point out that
it appeared that the Stuxnet program had been tailored to attack a nuclear
facility or a uranium enrichment plant. And several hints in the code
suggest Israeli authorship, including a possible allusion to the Book of
Esther, which describes Jewish retaliation against a Persian threat, and a
number - 19790509 - that appears to refer to the date of the execution of an
Iranian Jew by a firing squad in Tehran. 

But many military and intelligence analysts, including several with direct
knowledge of Israeli intelligence operations, have said it is unlikely that
either an Israeli or United States operation would leave such blatant clues.
That leaves the possibility that someone wanted to plant evidence pointing
incorrectly to Israeli involvement. Most computer security specialists say
the authorship of the program may never be discovered. 

What kind of attack do computer security experts fear most? 

There has been widespread fear about attacks that jam or damage large
financial networks, the electric power grid, power plants, transportation
systems or any of the modern infrastructure underlying industrial economies.


In many cases, the first step in securing these systems has been to insure
that they are entirely separated from the Internet. However, even if they
are separated from the Internet, in many cases they use internal networks
based on the Internet protocol, as well as common computing equipment, like
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/microsoft_corporation
/index.html?inline=nyt-org> Microsoft and
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/intel_corporation/ind
ex.html?inline=nyt-org> Intel-based computers. That means they remain
potentially vulnerable to a "sneakernet" attack, in which a malicious
program is physically carried into an isolated network either accidentally
or by an intruder. 

Can this kind of attack be done by a lone hacker? 

In the case of Stuxnet, computer security specialists generally agree that
it was not the work of one person but rather a team of sophisticated
programmers. Many who have examined the malicious code have stated that it
would have required an organization with substantial financial resources to
develop, test and then release such a program. Certainly nations with
cyberwar capabilities are potential suspects, but they are not the only
possible creators. China, Israel and the
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/p/palestinians
/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier> Palestinians are all known to have
irregular cyberarmies of motivated hackers with significant skills. 

 



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