The Russia We Know

Posted By Jacob Laksin On December 3, 2010 

It is fortuitous for Russia that the announcement of its successful bid to
stage the World Cup in 2018 has come on the same week that a diplomatic
document dump from WikiLeaks has painted a grim picture of the powers that
be in the presumptive host nation. With the world's largest sporting event
set to arrive in Russia for the first time, the story of the country's
poisoned political culture is no longer in the headlines.

That story is by no means novel. Yet the WikiLeaks documents, however
illicit their provenance, nevertheless shed a valuable light on the scope of
Russia's political ills. In the considered judgment of America's diplomatic
corps, the Russian leadership is indeed as colossally corrupt, thuggish, and
authoritarian as the evidence of recent years would suggest. In the form and
function of its politics, modern Russia has not managed to sever its Soviet
roots.

It does not take ill-gotten diplomatic correspondence to make all this
clear, of course. That Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is the real powerbroker
in Russia while the acting president, Dmitry Medvedev, is merely the
figurehead, playing the "Robin to Putin's Batman," is hardly news. Nor is it
much of a revelation that Eastern European countries who had long suffered
under the Soviet yolk, such as Poland, remain wary of the regional threat
that Russia poses. And in light of Russia's repeated penchant for shutting
down oil and gas shipments to Ukraine, a major energy pipeline to Europe,
it's not surprising to discover in the WikiLeaks documents that Russia
routinely wields the power of its state-owned energy companies for political
leverage, meting out favors to friends and punishing wayward enemies.

Still, the sheer scale of Russian corruption is staggering. For instance, a
diplomatic U.S. Embassy cable from last February makes a mockery of official
Russian claims that the recent ouster of Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov was a
blow against corruption in city government ranks. The cable points out that
"Luzhkov oversees a system in which it appears that almost everyone at every
level is involved in some form of corruption or criminal behavior."

As other documents make clear, this is no exaggeration. Moscow has become a
gangland city, governed by Mafia rules. The Interior Ministry and the
internal security service, the FSB, are reportedly running extortion rackets
to protect businesses from criminal gangs. Bribery is standard practice.
Tales of cash-laden suitcases being borne into the Kremlin under armed
escort are widespread and plausible. The very distinction between government
agencies and criminal enterprises is increasingly academic. 

Those at the top of this corruption pyramid have prospered. One interesting
piece of speculation from the WikiLeaks cables reveals that Putin, contrary
to his austere public image, may have an illicit fortune stashed away under
the cover of a Swiss-based oil trading firm called Gunvor.

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And yet such is the fundamental lawlessness of the Russian system that it
has made it difficult to control even for even for its putative enforcers.
In this connection, perhaps the most surprising revelation in the WikiLeaks
documents is the report that in 2006, at the height of Putin's power and in
boom economic times, 60 percent of his orders were not being followed. Thus
even the most politically powerful man in Russia must take a backseat to the
country's most powerful force: dysfunction.

In making this reality clear, the WikiLeaks documents indirectly underscore
the conceptual flaw in the Obama administration's policy toward Russia. By
appeasing Russia's more aggressive demands for regional hegemony - for
instance, by scrapping plans for a missile defense shield in Eastern Europe
- and by muting public criticism over the country's backsliding on
democracy, the administration had hoped to achieve a "reset" of the tense
relations that marked the end of President Bush's term in office. Not only
has that indulgent approach not borne diplomatic fruit, but it has allowed
Russia to regress with little international scrutiny. Whatever the merits of
the START nuclear arms treaty currently before Congress, it's folly to think
that its ratification will greatly improve bilateral relations. On far too
much, Russia and the U.S. have divergent interests.

Hopes for a new and more enlightened Russian leadership, meanwhile, are
likely to remain unfulfilled. Despite hopes that Medvedev could be the
reasonable alternative to his predecessor, there is no indication that he
has either the will or the power to introduce political reforms. As deputy
U.S. ambassador Eric Rubin observes in one leaked cable, "A search for
evidence of dissonance between [Medvedev and Putin] is either the forlorn
hope of western-leaning liberals . or a legacy of 'Kremlinology' that
presupposes inter-leadership conflict as the sine qua non of Russian
politics." Even if Putin is officially out of power, the politics that he
represents are here to stay.

All of which argues that suspicion should be the basis of any American
policy toward its old Cold War foe. Upon hearing that Russia had won its
long shot bid to host the World Cup this week, Putin enthused that "this
decision shows that Russia is trusted." That may be so in international
soccer. But as the WikiLeaks documents confirm, it should not be the case in
international politics.

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Article printed from FrontPage Magazine: http://frontpagemag.com

URL to article: http://frontpagemag.com/2010/12/03/the-russia-we-know/

 



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