TUNISIA'S PROTEST WAVE: WHERE IT COMES FROM AND WHAT IT MEANS 

► 
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/02/tunisia_s_protest_wave_where_it_comes_from_and_what_it_means_for_ben_ali
 


► Foreign Policy / by Christopher Alexander [Christopher Alexander is Davidson 
College's McGee director of the 


Dean Rusk International Studies Program, an associate professor of political 
science, and author of Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb.] 


Jan 15 2011 ► Jan 3. January traditionally has been Tunisia's month for 
political drama -- a general strike in January 1978; a Libyan-supported 
insurrection in January 1980; bread riots in January 1984. This year, however, 
January will be hard-pressed to top the previous December. The last two weeks 
of 2010 witnessed the most dramatic wave of social unrest in Tunisia since the 
1980s. What began with one young man's desperate protest against unemployment 
in Sidi Bouzid, in Tunisia's center-west, spread quickly to other regions and 
other issues. Within days of Mohamed Bouazizi's attempted suicide in front of 
the local government office, students, teachers, lawyers, journalists, human 
rights activists, trade unionists, and opposition politicians took to the 
streets in several cities, including Tunis, to condemn the government's 
economic policies, its repression of all critics, and a mafia-style corruption 
that enriches members of the president's family. 


In a country known for authoritarian stability, it is easy to see this unrest 
as a harbinger of dramatic change. In fact, the protests have been building for 
at least two years. The frustration is rooted in a deep history of unbalanced 
economic growth. Several organizations have helped to convert this frustration 
into collective protest. To date, the December protests have produced a cabinet 
reshuffle, a governor's sacking, and a renewed commitment to job creation in 
disadvantaged regions. Whether they lead to more dramatic change remains to be 
seen. If Ben Ali's rule is not in immediate danger, the protests at least 
suggest that his governing strategy is in serious trouble. 


Ben Ali's rule has relied on a skillful combination of co-optation and 
repression. By pledging his fidelity to democracy and human rights early in his 
tenure, he deftly hijacked the core of the liberal opposi-tion's message. At 
the same time, he used electoral manipulation, intimidation, and favors to 
co-opt leaders of ruling-party organs and civil society organizations. Those 
who remained beyond the reach of these tools felt the force of an internal 
security apparatus that grew dramatically in the 1990s. Most Tunisians 
grudgingly accepted Ben Ali's heavy-handedness through the 1990s. Authoritarian 
rule was the price they paid for stability that could attract tourists and 
investors. Ben Ali was an effective, if uncharismatic, technocratic who beat 
back the Islamists, generated growth, and saved the country from the unrest 
that plagued Algeria. 


Over the last five years, however, the fabric of Ben Ali's authoritarianism has 
frayed. Once it became clear that the Islamists no longer posed a serious 
threat, many Tunisians became less willing to accept FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 
10 - no.221 – Jan 16 – 2011 - page 6 


the government's heavy-handedness. The regime also lost some of its earlier 
deftness. Its methods became less creative and more transparently brutal. The 
government seemed less willing to at least play at any dialogue with critics or 
opposition parties. Arbitrary arrests, control of the print media and Internet 
access, and physical attacks on journalists and human rights and 
opposition-party activists became more common. So, too, did stories of 
corruption -- not the usual kickbacks and favoritism that one might expect, but 
truly mafia-grade criminality that lined the pockets of Ben Ali's wife and her 
family. The growth of Facebook, Twitter, and a Tunisian blogosphere -- much of 
it based outside the country -- made it increasingly easy for Tunisians to 
learn about the latest arrest, beating, or illicit business deal involving the 
president's family. 


Shortly before the December protests began, WikiLeaks released internal U.S. 
State Department communications in which the American ambassador described Ben 
Ali as aging, out of touch, and surrounded by corruption. Given Ben Ali's 
reputation as a stalwart U.S. ally, it mattered greatly to many Tunisians -- 
particularly to politically engaged Tunisians who are plugged into social media 
-- that American officials are saying the same things about Ben Ali that they 
themselves say about him. These revelations contributed to an environment that 
was ripe for a wave of protest that gathered broad support. 


Tunisia has built a reputation as the Maghreb's healthiest economy since Ben 
Ali seized power, as market-oriented reforms opened the country to private 
investment and integrated it more deeply into the regional economy. Annual GDP 
growth has averaged 5 percent. But the government's policies have done little 
to address long-standing concerns about the distribution of growth across the 
country. Since the colonial period, Tunisia's economic activity has been 
concentrated in the north and along the eastern coastline. Virtually every 
economic development plan since independence in 1956 has committed the 
government to making investments that would create jobs and enhance living 
standards in the center, south, and west. Eroding regional disparities would 
build national solidarity and slow the pace of urban migration. The latter 
became a particular concern as social protest organized by trade unionists, 
students, and Islamists mounted in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 


Government investment transformed the countryside in terms of access to potable 
water, electrification, transportation infrastructure, health care, and 
education. But the government never succeeded in generating enough jobs in the 
interior for a rapidly growing population. In fact, two aspects of the 
government's development strategy actually made it harder to generate jobs. 
First, Tunisia's development strategy since the early 1970s has relied 
progressively on exports and private investment. For a small country with a 
limited resource base and close ties to Europe, this strategy generated an 
emphasis on tourism and low-skilled manufactured products (primarily clothes 
and agricultural products) for the European market. Scarce natural resources, 
climate constraints, and the need to minimize transport costs make it difficult 
to attract considerable numbers of tourists or export-oriented producers to the 
hinterland. Consequently, 80 percent of current national production remains 
concentrated in coastal areas. Only one-fifth of national production takes 
place in the southwest and center-west regions, home to 40 percent of the 
population. 


Education issues complicate matters further. The Tunisian government has long 
received praise for its commitment to broad education. The prevailing culture 
holds up university education as the key to security and social advancement. 
However, universities do not produce young people with training that meets the 
needs of an economy that depends on low-skilled jobs in tourism and clothing 
manufacturing. This mismatch between education and expectations on the one 
hand, and the realities of the marketplace on the other, generates serious 
frustrations for young people who invested in university educations but cannot 
find commensurate work. The challenge is particularly dire for young people in 
the interior. While estimates of national unemployment range from 13 to 16 
percent, unemployment among university graduates in Sidi Bouzid ranges between 
25 and 30 percent. 


The trade unions' role is one of the most striking aspects of the December 
protests. The government worked very hard, and with great success, to 
domesticate the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), Tunisia's sole trade 
union confederation, in the 1990s. More recently, however, activists in some 
unions have succeeded in taking a more independent and confrontational stance. 
In 2008 and again in early 2010, union activists organized prolonged protests 
in the southern Gafsa mining basin. The players and the grievances in those 
cases resemble what we saw in late December. Education unions, some of the most 
independent and aggressive within the UGTT, played a critical role in 
organizing unemployed workers, many with university degrees, who protested the 
government's failure to provide jobs, its corruption, and its refusal to engage 
in meaningful dialogue. Human rights organizations, journalists, lawyers, and 
opposition parties then joined in to criticize the government's restrictions on 
media coverage of the protests and the arrests and torture of demonstrators. In 
this way, a broad coalition of civil society organizations has connected 
bread-and-butter employment grievances with fundamental human rights and 
rule-of-law concerns. They also pull together constituencies that FRINGE 
INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.221 – Jan 16 – 2011 - page 7 


transcend class and regional distinctions -- unemployed young people in Sidi 
Bouzid, Menzel Bouzaiene, and Regueb, and lawyers and journalists in Monastir, 
Sfax, and Tunis. 


It is too early to know if these protests signal the beginning of the end for 
Ben Ali. However, Tunisia's current political scene looks a bit like it did in 
1975 and 1976, the beginning of the long slide for Ben Ali's predecessor, Habib 
Bourguiba. Again, we see an aging president who seems increasingly out of touch 
and whose ability to co-opt and repress has deteriorated. We still see a 
political system that lacks strong possible successors and a clear mechanism 
for selecting one. We have a set of economic and political grievances that 
enjoys the support of a range of civil society organizations, including some 
with the ability to mobilize considerable numbers of protesters. Over the 
medium and long terms, this is the most significant aspect of the December 
protests. The fact that unemployed young people took to the streets is much 
less important than the fact that their cause has been taken up -- and 
supplemented -- by civil society organizations that spent most of Ben Ali's 
rule under his thumb or too cowed to act. 


Despite all this, it is important to recall that Bourguiba did not fall 
suddenly to a mass movement that rallied broad popular support. His government 
rotted steadily for more than a decade. Additionally, Ben Ali's bloodless coup 
and his subsequent rule took great advantage of the disorganization in 
Tunisia's political class. Tunisia's civil society, including the opposition 
parties, is notoriously easy to divide and conquer. If Ben Ali's ability to 
repress and co-opt has deteriorated, it has not disappeared. With the December 
protests, Tunisia might have turned an important corner. However, nothing in 
the country's history or its current state of affairs makes it easy to believe 
that the protests will lead quickly to a coherent, unified opposition movement 
with a clear message, a charismatic leader, and a national support base. 
Additionally, another long, slow slide toward chaos could simply set the stage 
for another Ben Ali -- another unelected president who seizes power at the top 
and changes little below it.



[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



------------------------------------

--------------------------
Want to discuss this topic?  Head on over to our discussion list, 
[email protected].
--------------------------
Brooks Isoldi, editor
[email protected]

http://www.intellnet.org

  Post message: [email protected]
  Subscribe:    [email protected]
  Unsubscribe:  [email protected]


*** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has 
not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. OSINT, as a part of 
The Intelligence Network, is making it available without profit to OSINT 
YahooGroups members who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the 
included information in their efforts to advance the understanding of 
intelligence and law enforcement organizations, their activities, methods, 
techniques, human rights, civil liberties, social justice and other 
intelligence related issues, for non-profit research and educational purposes 
only. We believe that this constitutes a 'fair use' of the copyrighted material 
as provided for in section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Law. If you wish to use 
this copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use,' 
you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.
For more information go to:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtmlYahoo! Groups Links

<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/

<*> Your email settings:
    Individual Email | Traditional

<*> To change settings online go to:
    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/join
    (Yahoo! ID required)

<*> To change settings via email:
    [email protected] 
    [email protected]

<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
    [email protected]

<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
    http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/

Reply via email to