THE DUBAI JOB 

► 
www.gq.com/news-politics/big-issues/201101/the-dubai-job-mossad-assassination-hamas?printable=true
 


► GQ Magazine / by Ronen Bergman [Senior political and military analyst for the 
Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth 


and the author of several books, including By Any Means Necessary and The 
Secret War with Iran. He is currently writing a book about the history of the 
Mossad's targeted killings.] 


► Stringer: Kees Kalkman / VDAmok / Utrecht NL / [email protected] 


Jan 6 2011 ► Jan. One year ago, an elite Mossad hit squad traveled to Dubai to 
kill a high-ranking member of Hamas. They completed the mission, but their 
covers were blown, and Israel was humi-liated by the twenty-seven-minute video 
of their movements that was posted online for all the world to see. Ronen 
Bergman reveals the intricate, chilling details of the mission and investigates 
how Israel's vaunted spy agency did things so spectacularly wrong 


Monday, January 18, 2010. Morning 


At 6:45 a.m., the first members of an Israeli hit squad land at Dubai 
International Airport and fan out through the city to await further 
instructions. Over the next nineteen hours, the rest of the team—at least 
twenty-seven members—will arrive on flights from Zurich, Rome, Paris, and 
Frankfurt. They have FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.221 – Jan 16 – 2011 - 
page 31 


come to kill a man named Mahmoud Al-Mabhouh, a Hamas leader whose code name 
within the Mossad—the Israeli intelligence agency—is Plasma Screen. 


Most of the operatives here are members of a secretive unit within the Mossad 
known as Caesarea, a self-contained organization that is responsible for the 
agency's most dangerous and critical missions: assassinations, sabotage, 
penetration of high-security installations. Caesarea's "fighters," as they are 
known, are the elite of the Mossad. They rarely interact with other operatives 
and stay away from Mossad headquarters north of Tel Aviv, instead undergoing 
intensive training at a separate facility to which no one else in the agency 
has access. They are forbidden from ever using their real names, even in 
private conversation, and—with the exception of their spouses—their families 
and closest friends are unaware of what they do. As one longtime Caesarea 
fighter recently told me, "If the Mossad is the temple of Israel's intelligence 
community, then Caesarea is its holy of holies." 


In the course of reporting this story, GQ has learned that this is Caesarea's 
second attempt to kill Al-Mabhouh. On a previous trip to Dubai two months 
earlier, in November 2009, the same team tried to poison him. It is not known 
precisely how the team administered the toxin in their first attempt, though 
the suspicion is that they either slipped it into a drink or smeared it on one 
of the fixtures in his hotel room. Al-Mabhouh fell mysteriously ill but 
eventually recovered, and was never aware he'd been poisoned by Israeli 
operatives. This time, nothing will be left to chance; it has been determined 
in advance that the team will leave Dubai only after they have confirmed with 
their own eyes that Plasma Screen is dead.* 


Al-Mabhouh has been on the Mossad's list of assassination targets (see box on 
page 40) since 1989, after he and an accomplice named Muhammad Nasser abducted 
and murdered two Israeli soldiers near the Negev Desert in southern Israel. In 
an interview he gave to the Al Jazeera network, Al-Mabhouh recalled one of 
those killings in detail. "We disguised ourselves as religious Jews with 
skullcaps on our heads like rabbis," he said. He went on to describe picking up 
the soldier, Avi Sasportas, at a place called Hodayah Junction and offering him 
a ride. "I was driving, and the door behind me was neutralized. We took care of 
that beforehand. I told him in Hebrew, 'Get in on the other side, the door's 
broken.' He walked around and sat in the back seat. I and Abu Sahib [Nasser] 
had a predetermined signal. We had fixed that at the right moment I would make 
a sign with my hand, because I could see what was happening on the road in 
front and behind. And indeed, about three kilometers after the crossroads I 
signaled to Abu Sahib. Abu Sahib shot him with his Beretta pistol. I heard him 
breathe heavily and die. He took two bullets in the face and one in the chest 
and died from the first shot. Breathed out and that's it, finished." The only 
thing he regretted, Al- Mabhouh said, was that he was driving the car at the 
time, and so it was Nasser who got to shoot the soldier in the face. 


In both killings, the two men desecrated the soldiers' bodies and photographed 
each other stomping triumphantly on them before burying them in a ditch by the 
roadside. (The body of the second soldier wasn't discovered until seven years 
later, with the aid of a hand-drawn map that Al-Mabhouh and Nasser had sketched 
from memory after the killing. In a deal mediated by the Palestinian Authority, 
Nasser eventually handed over the sketch to Israel, and in exchange he was 
removed from Israel's most-wanted list.) 


The need to eliminate Al-Mabhouh, however, has only intensified over time, not 
just out of a desire to avenge the deaths of the two soldiers but because of 
his longtime role in the militant activities of Hamas—financing and planning 
suicide bombings in Israel and the trafficking of huge amounts of rockets and 
sophisticated weaponry into Gaza, which have been used to devastating effect 
since the start of the second intifada in 2000. Support for Hamas's terrorist 
activities has come largely from the extremist Quds Force (part of Iran's 
Revolutionary Guard), with whom Al-Mabhouh has formed closer and closer ties 
over the years. In the mind of Mossad chief Meir Dagan, liquidating Al-Mabhouh 
is worth the risk of sending such a large team on a mission into a hostile 
country, though the wisdom of this choice will be severely questioned in the 
aftermath of the job. 


* Israel has not confirmed—nor has it denied—that this mission was carried out 
by the Mossad, though no one seriously doubts that to be the case. The sequence 
of events described here is based largely on the exhaustive investigation 
conducted by the Dubai chief of police, Lieutenant General Dhahi Khalfan Tamim. 
In-depth interviews were conducted with former and current members of the 
Mossad and with high-ranking intelligence experts in Israel and Europe. The 
Mossad, in response to the long list of questions submitted formally by GQ, 
stated that it does not comment on its activities or those attributed to it. 


In 1997 the Mossad tried to assassinate Khaled Mashal, the political leader of 
Hamas, by spraying a chemical agent on his ear as he walked down a street in 
Amman, Jordan. The mission failed—and the two Mossad members were captured—when 
Mashal turned in the street to greet his daughter at the moment the assassins 
sprayed the poison. In order to win the release of their operatives, Israel 
handed over the antidote to the poison and also freed from prison the spiritual 
leader and founder of FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.221 – Jan 16 – 2011 - 
page 32 


Hamas, Sheikh Yassin. In a humiliating blow to the agency, Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu was forced to admit that the Mossad plot had been a terrible 
failure. For the next several years, morale within the agency plummeted, and 
its reputation for daring and success was tarnished. 


Then, in 2002, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon tapped Dagan, a former military 
commander with a reputation for ruthless, brutal efficiency, to restore the spy 
agency to its former glory and preside over, as he put it, "a Mossad with a 
knife between its teeth." "Dagan's unique expertise," Sharon said in closed 
meetings, "is the separation of an Arab from his head." Dagan immediately 
announced that the Mossad would devote most of its resources to what he 
considered the two key threats to Israel's survival: the Iranian nuclear 
program and terrorism from the Iranian-supported groups Hezbollah, Hamas, and 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad. 


The number and frequency of covert operations increased dramatically. There 
were several acts of sabotage of the Iranian nuclear program: two mysterious 
crashes of Iranian aircraft associated with the program, fires breaking out at 
two important laboratories, damage inflicted upon Iranian nuclear centrifuges, 
and the disappearance of two Iranian scientists and the killing of a third. 
There was also a mysterious explosion at a Syrian plant where Scud missiles 
were being fitted with chemical warheads, and the Mossad is credited with the 
discovery of a nuclear reactor in Syria, built with North Korean assistance, 
whose existence the Syrian authorities had managed to conceal for over five 
years. (The Syrian nuclear facility was subsequently destroyed by the Israeli 
Air Force in September 2007 after the United States proved reluctant to do so.) 


The number of complex targeted assassinations carried out by the Mossad also 
increased under Dagan. The most high-profile of these was the elimination in 
Damascus of Imad Mughniyeh, Hezbollah's military chief. Among other terrorist 
acts, Mughniyeh was responsible for the bombing of the U.S. embassy and the 
Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, and the bombings in Buenos Aires of the 
Israeli embassy in 1992 and a Jewish cultural center in 1994. In February 2008 
his head was blown off by an explosive device that had been planted in the 
driver's-side headrest of his rental car. Dagan's Mossad is also believed to be 
responsible for the death of General Mohammed Suleiman, a close aide of Syria's 
President Bashar Al-Assad, who headed that country's nuclear program and 
handled military cooperation with Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah. Suleiman was 
killed in the Syrian city of Tartus in August 2008 by a sniper's bullet that 
hit him as he stood on his balcony after his daily swim. (According to other 
reports, he was shot by the sniper as he swam in the sea with his bodyguards.) 


Because of these successes, Dagan's tenure as director of the Mossad was 
repeatedly extended, most recently by Benjamin Netanyahu in October 2009, and 
today he is one of the longest-serving directors in Israel's history. Notorious 
for his aggressive, verbally abusive style of leadership, he is an 
ideologically rigid man who, according to several people inside the 
organization, shows the door to anyone who dares to voice an opinion different 
from his. As one Mossad veteran told me, "It is extremely difficult to get your 
opinion heard in his presence, unless it supports his. He is unable to accept 
criticism or even another opinion. It's almost as if he treats his opposition 
like an enemy." Dagan is also reported to have stated on several occasions that 
he does not believe there is anyone within the Mossad today who is worthy to 
replace him. 


Several Mossad operatives who have attended meetings in Dagan's office describe 
a ritual that he goes through when preparing a team for a dangerous mission. 
During the meeting, Dagan points to a large photograph hanging on his office 
wall of a bearded Jew wrapped in a prayer shawl, kneeling on the ground with 
his arms in the air. The man's fists are clenched, and his piercing eyes look 
straight ahead. Next to him stand two German SS officers, one holding a club 
and the other a pistol. "This man," Dagan says, "was my grandfather, Dov 
Ehrlich." He then explains that shortly after the photo was taken, on October 
5, 1942, his grandfather was murdered by the Nazis along with his family and 
thousands of other Jews in the small Polish town of Lukow. 


"Look at this photograph," Dagan tells the Caesarea fighters. "This is what 
must guide us and lead us to act on behalf of the State of Israel. I look at 
the picture and vow that I will do everything I can to ensure that something 
like this will never happen again." 


Tuesday, January 19, 2010. Before dawn 


The mission will be run by operatives working under the assumed names Gail 
Folliard, Kevin Daveron, and Peter Elvinger, who arrive in Dubai in the very 
early hours of the nineteenth. They immediately go to separate hotels, where 
Folliard and Daveron pay for their rooms in cash, but most of the other team 
members are using a prepaid credit card called a Payoneer, a fact that will be 
significant to the investigation to come. Counting the unsuccessful attempt to 
poison Al-Mabhouh in November, this is the team's fifth trip to Dubai in the 
past nine months. The purpose of the other trips was to do surveillance and to 
verify beyond any doubt that the man they intend to kill is indeed Mahmoud 
Al-Mabhouh. This is not a simple matter. Back in July 1973, a Caesarea hit team 
on a mission to liquidate the head of the Palestinian terrorist organization 
Black September—the group responsible for the FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - 
no.221 – Jan 16 – 2011 - page 33 


murders of eleven Israeli team members at the Munich Olympics—mistakenly killed 
a Moroccan waiter in Lillehammer, Norway. The killers were caught and spent 
years in jail, and the Israeli government paid substantial damages to the 
victim's family. The reputation of the Mossad—and of Israel—was badly harmed by 
the botched mission, and since then the agency has implemented complex 
mechanisms to ensure that they never make such a mistake again. 


Israeli spies have been monitoring Al-Mabhouh's e-mail and online activities 
through a Trojan horse planted on his computer (and possibly through a human 
source who has betrayed him, though Hamas rejects this theory), and they know 
he will be arriving in Dubai later today. At ten thirty, Elvinger strolls 
through a Dubai mall, where he is soon joined by five other team members. A 
little more than an hour later, their meeting breaks up and the group 
disperses. The only thing they can do until Al-Mabhouh's arrival is review 
plans and contingencies and wait to see how their target's movements unfold. As 
one veteran of Caesarea field operations told me, "In this type of 
assassination, when the target is not in his home base and is not following a 
daily routine, it is the target who dictates to the killers how and when he 
will be killed." 


As far as the Mossad is concerned, there are two types of countries in the 
world. There are "base countries" (essentially, the West), in which the Mossad, 
like most other intelligence agencies, is able to operate with relative ease. 
In these countries, operatives have access to multiple getaway routes in case 
of emergency (and there are Israeli embassies to escape to as a last resort); 
it is assumed that if a Mossad spy is caught in a base country, a discreet 
solution can likely be found with the assistance of the local intelligence 
services—an option referred to in the Mossad as the "soft cushion"). "Target 
countries," however, are enemy states in which operating undercover is 
significantly more dangerous. There are no easy escape routes (and no friendly 
embassy to run to), and being caught in these countries will almost certainly 
result in physical torture and either a protracted jail term or, quite 
possibly, death. Given that Al-Mabhouh is based in Syria and that the countries 
he regularly visits are Iran, Sudan, and China, it makes sense that Dubai, 
while undeniably a target country, is the location of choice for such a 
mission. 


Afternoon 


Al-Mabhouh is expected to land in Dubai at 3 p.m. At 1:30, Kevin Daveron leaves 
his hotel and heads to the team's designated meeting place—the lobby of a 
different hotel, where none of the team members is staying, that was selected 
in advance for its convenient location. On the way to the meeting, he walks 
through the lobby of a third hotel and enters the restroom. When he emerges, he 
is no longer bald but now has a full head of hair and is wearing glasses. The 
security camera outside the entrance to the men's and women's bathrooms was 
recording all of this in real time. Had an alert guard noticed what was going 
on, the mission might have ended quite differently, with the target alive and 
the team members imprisoned in a hostile country. 


Gail Folliard also leaves her hotel and on her way to the meeting uses the same 
restroom entrance as Daveron, from which she too emerges in a wig. Oddly, 
Folliard and Daveron are the only ones at the meeting who have changed their 
appearances. Given that the operatives are under the constant gaze of security 
cameras throughout the city, the "new" Daveron and Folliard run the risk of 
being linked to the "old" Daveron and Folliard through the identity of the 
individuals they've met with and passed by throughout the day—the kind of 
mistake that is almost incomprehensible for an elite Mossad team to make. 


By two thirty, there are surveillance teams located at the entrances to every 
hotel Al- Mabhouh has stayed at on past trips to Dubai. There is also a team 
posted at the airport, ready to follow him into the city. 


Al-Mabhouh is also traveling under a false identity. His Palestinian passport 
(the Palestinian Authority issues travel documents that are not recognized for 
travel to most countries but are valid in Dubai) identifies him as Mahmoud 
Abdul Ra'ouf Mohammed and gives his occupation as a "merchant." 


At three twenty-five, two men standing in the lobby of the glitzy Al Bustan 
Rotana Hotel, dressed in tennis gear and holding rackets, report to the command 
team that their target has arrived and is checking in. The news of his arrival 
is conveyed to all the teams waiting at the other hotels, and they now return 
to the central meeting place. In the Al Bustan, Al-Mabhouh takes the elevator 
to his room, and the two Mossad operatives, tennis rackets still in hand, ride 
up in the same elevator. One of them follows Al-Mabhouh down the corridor at a 
discreet distance, in order to confirm his room number—230—and to get a sense 
of the layout of the hotel floor. 


A little after four o'clock, the command team, with the exception of Elvinger, 
makes its way to the Al Bustan. Elvinger takes a car to another hotel and 
places two phone calls from its business center. The first is to the front desk 
of the Al Bustan, to book a room for the night. He requests room 237, which the 
surveillance team has reported is directly across the corridor from 230. His 
second call is to an airline to reserve a seat on an evening flight to Zurich 
via Qatar. FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.221 – Jan 16 – 2011 - page 34 


In the lobby of the Al Bustan, the surveillance team relays that the target is 
exiting the hotel and heading to a nearby mall, the same one in which Elvinger 
met the group of team members earlier. It is here that the recording of events 
from the Dubai police investigation becomes uncharacteristically vague. Until 
now, the authorities have established a clear, detailed timeline. By studying 
hundreds of hours of closed-circuit security footage, they have meticulously 
reconstructed the movements of the many characters involved in the unfolding 
drama. But when Al-Mabhouh arrives at the mall, the river of information 
suddenly goes dry. What did he do during the next four hours, which were to be 
the last of his life? Where did he go? With whom did he meet? The official 
report does not provide even a sketchy outline of the missing hours. 


According to Israeli intelligence sources, Al-Mabhouh met with a banker who was 
assisting him with various international weapons transactions, and with his 
regular contact from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, who flew in to 
coordinate the delivery of two large shipments of weapons to Hamas the 
following month. The Dubai police had good reason to gloss over this part of 
the narrative, if they were indeed aware of it. Providing details of 
Al-Mabhouh's contacts would have been highly embarrassing to authorities eager 
to paint Dubai as a squeaky-clean international business center. It would also 
have served as a reminder that the victim of this cold-blooded Israeli 
execution had a fair amount of blood on his hands, raising inconvenient 
questions about why Al-Mabhouh was there in the first place—questions that the 
media largely forgot to ask in the furor that erupted after his assassination. 


Late afternoon 


At four twenty-seven, Peter Elvinger enters the lobby of the Al Bustan carrying 
a small suitcase. He walks over to where Kevin Daveron is sitting, places the 
suitcase beside him, and then heads to the reception desk, where he checks in 
and receives the key to the room that he booked by phone earlier that 
afternoon. He then walks back to Daveron, hands him the key to room 237, and 
exits the hotel without retrieving his suitcase. Elvinger's role in the 
operation is now over. By seven thirty, he will be at the airport preparing to 
leave the country. 


For the next several hours—until the operation is completed—Daveron and 
Folliard are in command. At four forty-five, Daveron crosses the lobby, taking 
the suitcase with him, and rides the elevator up to the second floor. A few 
minutes later, Folliard arrives at the Al Bustan and goes straight up to 237. 


At five thirty-six, another operative arrives in the lobby wearing a baseball 
cap; minutes later, he emerges from the elevator on the second floor wearing a 
wig. He too goes to 237. At approximately six thirty, four more men enter the 
hotel and go up to the room in pairs. Two of the men are carrying bags, and all 
four wear baseball caps that partially conceal their faces. These are the men 
who will carry out the assassination. 


Evening 


Just before six forty-five, the surveillance team in the lobby of the Al Bustan 
is replaced. After sitting for four hours in the lobby, rackets in hand, the 
fake tennis players finally leave the scene. At 8 p.m., the seven-person group 
in 237 makes its move. Daveron and Folliard stand guard in the corridor while 
one of the other operatives reprograms the electronic lock on the door of 230. 
The intention is to rig the mechanism so that the hit men can enter the room 
using an unregistered electronic key while also being careful not to 
accidentally disable Al- Mabhouh's own key. 


There are some questions about timing that are worth pausing over here. Why did 
the assassins wait an hour and a half in 237 before breaking into Al-Mabhouh's 
room? And why did they arrive at the hotel at six thirty, two hours after 
Al-Mabhouh left for the mall and Daveron got the key to room 237? The long 
delay suggests two things: first, that the team knew exactly what Al-Mabhouh's 
schedule was and how long he would be away from the hotel. (Presumably they 
wanted to postpone entry into Al-Mabhouh's room for as long as possible, so as 
not to run the risk of someone else, such as a maid, entering unexpectedly.) 
And second, it suggests considerable confidence in the ability of their 
operative to disable the electronic lock on Al-Mabhouh's door. The speed with 
which he did this indicates that this part of the operation was extremely well 
rehearsed. And since the team did not know in advance which hotel Al-Mabhouh 
would be staying at, one has to assume that as part of his preparation for the 
mission, the lock picker practiced disabling every type of lock in use in all 
the major hotels in Dubai. 


At this delicate moment, as the team is beginning to break into Al-Mabhouh's 
room, they are temporarily disturbed by a hotel guest who steps off the 
elevator on the second floor. The footage from the security cameras shows 
Daveron quickly moving toward him, blocking his line of sight and engaging him 
in idle conversation. When the guest finally walks off, it's clear that the 
lock tampering has been successful. Daveron and Folliard return to 237, and the 
assassins enter 230 to wait for their target. 


At eight twenty-four, Al-Mabhouh returns to the hotel and goes straight to his 
room, passing Daveron in the elevator bank and Folliard in the corridor. He has 
no reason to be suspicious—his key works as FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - 
no.221 – Jan 16 – 2011 - page 35 


it should, and the door bears no visible sign of forced entry. Once he is 
inside, Daveron and Folliard stand guard. 


Twenty minutes later, it is over. The assassins exit room 230, somehow managing 
to leave the room chained from the inside. The team meets briefly in 237, 
presumably to gather their things and report back to the command center outside 
Dubai; then they begin to exit. The assassins are the first to leave. Minutes 
later, Folliard follows arm in arm with another operative, and Daveron is the 
last to emerge from room 237. Within four hours, most of the team has left 
Dubai. 


What occurred in room 230 during those twenty minutes? How did Mahmoud 
Al-Mabhouh die? It's impossible to know for sure. As in the attempt on 
Al-Mabhouh's life two months earlier, the Mossad wanted his death to appear to 
be due to natural causes. This was critical, as it would buy the Caesarea 
fighters precious time to leave the emirate before the alarm was sounded. A 
"noisy" kill would set off a wide-scale manhunt that would result in the 
temporary shutdown of Dubai International Airport (and of air traffic in and 
out of Dubai in general), trapping the Mossad operatives inside the country. 
With nowhere to hide and no way to escape, they would almost certainly have 
been apprehended. And once in the hands of the Dubai police, there would have 
been considerable pressure on the authorities to punish them to the full extent 
of the law, which in Dubai would have likely meant death sentences for at least 
some of those involved. There would have been little the Mossad or Israel could 
have done to save its operatives. 


According to the official police report, the killers first injected Al-Mabhouh 
with a poison, then smothered him with a pillow. Saeed Hamiri, M.D., of the 
Dubai forensic lab, said the crime- scene investigators found a trickle of 
blood on Al-Mabhouh's pillow, bruises on his nose, face, and neck, and an 
injection mark on his right hip. Along with signs of struggle in the room—a 
damaged headboard, for example—these details would seem to suggest that the 
target was smothered to death. But one has to wonder about the plausibility of 
these conclusions. (The Dubai chief of police did not respond to several 
requests from GQ for an interview.) 


Given how vital it was to this mission that Al-Mabhouh's death appear natural, 
it's doubtful that the Caesarea fighters would have planned to smother him in 
his room. If indeed there was a struggle—and the chronology of events raises 
serious doubts about the details in the police report—the question is whether 
it occurred before the poison was administered or while it was taking effect. 
The drug purportedly used was succinylcholine, which, if administered in a 
large enough dose, leads to total muscular paralysis and, once the muscles 
necessary for breathing cease functioning, to asphyxia and death. According to 
toxicology experts I spoke with, however, the drug is also detectable in the 
body long after death, and it's hard to believe that the Mossad operatives 
wouldn't be aware of this. If they were and chose to use the drug anyway, it 
speaks perhaps to their assumptions about what type of investigation they 
expected would take place, or if one would take place at all. 


There is good reason to believe, however, that to this day the Dubai police are 
not sure how Al-Mabhouh died. In terms of their forensic medical evidence, they 
may in fact be unable to prove he was murdered. Their investigation, after all, 
was triggered not by autopsy findings—which, according to sources connected to 
the Dubai police, were inconclusive—but by the evidence contained in CCTV 
footage. 


When Al-Mabhouh's body was discovered by a hotel maid, at around one thirty the 
following afternoon, roughly seventeen hours after he'd been killed, there was 
at first no reason to suspect foul play. Because he had been using a false 
passport, the police had no initial inkling of who he really was. It was only 
when Al-Mabhouh failed to contact his headquarters in Damascus that his Hamas 
colleagues began to suspect something was wrong and sent one of Al-Mabhouh's 
men to the Dubai city morgue, where he was shocked to discover his commander's 
body. 


It was at that point, approximately a week after his death, that the Hamas 
leadership in Damascus contacted Lieutenant General Dhahi Khalfan Tamim, chief 
of the Dubai Police, and informed him that they believed Al-Mabhouh had been 
killed by the Mossad. According to European intelligence sources, Tamim's 
initial reaction was to rage at them on the phone, verbally abusing senior 
Hamas officials for using Dubai as a battleground for espionage and terrorism. 
"Take yourselves and your bank accounts and your weapons and your forged 
fucking passports and get out of my country," he reportedly shouted. Once he 
calmed down, though, a cursory review of the hotel-security footage from the 
cameras outside room 230 at the time of Al-Mabhouh's death convinced Tamim that 
he needed to open an investigation immediately. 


So it may well be that the authorities first arrived at the conclusion that 
Al-Mabhouh was assassinated and only then revisited and adjusted their 
pathology findings so as to avoid admitting to the world that, despite their 
massive investment in the state-of-the-art security systems that blanket the 
country, they were unable to say with any certainty how Al-Mabhouh had died. In 
a press conference held on February 15, Tamim announced that Al-Mabhouh had 
been killed by a hit squad and announced that FRINGE INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - 
no.221 – Jan 16 – 2011 - page 36 


their forensic tests indicated that he'd been suffocated. Lab tests, he said, 
were still under way. Nearly two weeks later, on February 28, he announced the 
discovery of the exact cause of death. That Al-Mabhouh's body was reportedly 
sent back to Syria on January 28, however, and buried after a big funeral 
procession on January 29, calls into question these findings. 


The rest of the investigation that Tamim conducted, however, was meticulous and 
efficient in a way that no one, least of all the Mossad, had expected. A source 
close to the investigation said that the moment Tamim concluded that Al-Mabhouh 
had not died of natural causes, he ordered his people to search Dubai's 
extensive databases and identify everyone who had arrived in the emirate 
shortly before the killing and left soon after. This list was then cross- 
referenced against the names of visitors who had been in Dubai back in 
February, March, June, and November of 2009, all the times of Al-Mabhouh's 
previous visits. The short list that emerged was then checked against hotel 
registers, and footage from hotel security cameras at the times these 
individuals checked in made it possible to put a face to each name. Tamim then 
compared these visual identifications to the footage from the Al Bustan Hotel 
at the time of Al-Mabhouh's death, which gave him the names of the assassins. 
And searching databases of financial transactions gave him the identities of 
the rest of the team, all of which Dubai authorities posted online for the 
world to see. 


Tamim also turned out to be extremely media-savvy. He presided over 
well-planned press conferences, carefully doling out information in a manner 
guaranteed to keep viewers—especially in the Arab world—coming back for more. 
He publicly called for the arrest of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 
and of Meir Dagan, whom he challenged to "be a man" and take responsibility for 
the assassination. More realistically, perhaps, he called for international 
arrest warrants for all members of the hit squad, which caused considerable 
diplomatic embarrassment for Israel. When asked by an interviewer what the hit 
team's biggest mistake was, Tamim answered that the presence of two men waiting 
for hours in the lobby in tennis gear with uncovered rackets was so bizarre 
that it instantly raised suspicion. 


The laughable attempts of the Mossad operatives to disguise their appearance 
made for good television coverage, but the more fundamental errors committed by 
the team had less to do with cloak-and-dagger disguises than with a kind of 
arrogance that seems to have pervaded the planning and execution of the 
mission. 


Despite the fact that Dubai is a hostile environment—a distant Arab state with 
ties to Iran—many details of the mission suggest the Mossad treated it as if 
they were operating inside a base country. The use of Payoneer cards is one 
obvious example. For the most part, prepaid debit cards are only used 
domestically within the United States, and while Payoneer does issue debit 
cards that are valid internationally, these are relatively rare. That several 
of the team members were using the same type of unusual card issued by the same 
company—one whose CEO, Yuval Tal, is a veteran of an elite Israeli Defense 
Force commando unit—gave the Dubai police a common denominator to connect the 
various members of the team. 


It has also become apparent that in order to avoid calling one another's cell 
phones directly, the operatives used a dedicated private switchboard in 
Austria. Any operative trying to reach a colleague—whether in the hotel down 
the street or at the command post in Israel—dialed one of a handful of numbers 
in Austria, from which the call was then rerouted to its destination. But since 
dozens of calls were made to and from this short list of Austrian numbers over 
a period of less than two days, the moment that the cover of a single operative 
was blown and his cell phone records became available to the authorities, all 
others who called or received calls from the same numbers were at risk of being 
identified. 


It gets worse. One of the most serious mistakes made by the planners of the 
operation—certainly the one that caused the greatest embarrassment to the 
Mossad and to Israel—involved the use of forged foreign identities. 


When it comes to false identities and false passports, the Mossad has a unique 
problem, one that most Western intelligence services do not face. When the CIA 
or the British SIS (or MI6, as it is commonly known) send an operative into the 
field, they can usually provide him or her with a valid U.S. or U.K. passport 
issued in whatever false name and identity the individual will be using. But an 
Israeli spy cannot use an Israeli passport, since the most important targets 
for Israeli espionage are in countries that do not maintain diplomatic 
relations with Israel. For this reason, the need for foreign documentation has 
always been an acute one in the Mossad, which has historically resolved this 
problem by forging what it needed. Naturally, this is done without the 
authorization of the countries involved. 


Whenever the Mossad is found out, as has happened from time to time, a major 
diplomatic scandal erupts. In the summer of 1986 an Israeli intelligence 
courier in West Germany left a bag containing forged British passports in a 
phone booth. The British government was outraged, and for a long time FRINGE 
INTELLIGENCE - year 10 - no.221 – Jan 16 – 2011 - page 37 


afterwards all ties between the British and Israeli intelligence services were 
cut. They were renewed only in the mid-1990s, after the Mossad and SIS signed a 
memorandum stating that neither would operate without consent on each other's 
soil or work against each other's interests. Historically speaking, though, the 
practice of forging passports was relatively simple, and usually went 
undiscovered. Rafi Eitan, now in his 80s, was at one time one of the Mossad's 
master spies. He famously led the team that captured Nazi war criminal Adolf 
Eichmann in Argentina in 1960. "In the past it used to be so easy for us to 
assume new identities and to invent cover stories," Eitan told me. "There was 
no Internet and there were no computers, and so no real possibility of checking 
who and what you were. We used to say that it was possible to forge a passport 
of a country that doesn't exist!" 


For this mission, all but one of the team members was traveling with a forged 
passport. The one passport that wasn't forged belonged to "Michael 
Bodenheimer," a member of the team and supposedly a German national. Once the 
Dubai authorities made public the names and nationalities under which the 
operatives had traveled, the German Federal Police opened an investigation into 
the provenance of Bodenheimer's passport. What they soon found out (as was 
reported in the German magazine Der Spiegel) was that a valid German passport 
had been issued in June 2009 to a Mossad operative—using the name Michael 
Bodenheimer—who claimed German citizenship through his "father." (The "father," 
also an Israeli, had recently claimed that he was "Hans Bodenheimer," born in 
Germany and a victim of the Holocaust, and he was granted immediate citizenship 
under a provision of the German constitution that allows for such cases. A real 
Holocaust survivor named Hans Bodenheimer did in fact exist, but it was not the 
man who applied for German citizenship.) 


What the blown identities of the operatives illustrate more than anything is 
the now seemingly insurmountable problem posed by twenty-first-century 
counterespionage systems. False identities and cover stories are no longer any 
match for well-placed security cameras, effective passport control, and 
computer software that can almost instantly track communications and financial 
transactions. 


Why did the Mossad permit things to go so wrong in Dubai? In a word, the answer 
is leadership. Because Dagan refashioned the Mossad in his own image, and 
because he drove out anyone who was willing to question his decisions, there 
was no one in the agency to tell him that the Dubai operation was badly 
conceived and badly planned. They simply did not believe that a minnow in the 
world of intelligence services such as Dubai would be any match for Israel's 
Caesarea fighters. As one very senior German intelligence expert told me: "The 
Israelis' problem has always been that they underestimate everyone—the Arabs, 
the Iranians, Hamas. They are always the smartest and think they can hoodwink 
everyone all the time. A little more respect for the other side—even if you 
think he is a dumb Arab or a German without imagination—and a little more 
modesty would have saved us all from this embarrassing entanglement." 


The Dubai fiasco caused a great deal of damage to Israel, to the Mossad, and to 
its relations with other Western intelligence organizations. It led to 
unprecedented revelations of Mossad personnel and methods, far more than any 
previous bungled operation. A number of states who believe that their passports 
were forged or otherwise misused by the agency have expelled Mossad 
representatives. The British response in particular was furious. And Israel's 
long-standing security-and-intelligence cooperation with Germany has also been 
dealt a hugely damaging blow. In early June, the head of the Caesarea unit in 
the Mossad—who had been considered the leading contender to eventually replace 
Dagan—offered his resignation. As for Dagan's future, before Dubai he had hoped 
that the liquidation of Al-Mabhouh would ensure yet another extension of his 
tenure as director of the agency. But that has not come to pass. At the time of 
this writing, it is assumed that he will not continue. And so the Mossad "with 
a knife between its teeth" likely is entering another period of confusion and 
self-doubt. 


"There is no doubt Dagan received an organization on the verge of coma and 
brought it back to its feet," one Mossad veteran of many years told me. "He 
increased its budget, won great successes, and most important, he rebuilt its 
pride. The problem is that multiplying its volume of activity many times over 
came with the price of compromising on security protocols. And along with 
success came hubris. Together, they brought the Dubai debacle. And now, in some 
areas, his successor will find a Mossad even worse off than Dagan found in 
2002."



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