Tuesday, January 18, 2011 Tunisia's revolution and the Islamists http://leninology.blogspot.com/2011/01/tunisias-revolution-and-islamists.htm l
Soumayya Ghannouchi, the Guardian columnist and daughter of the Tunisian An-Nahda leader Rachid Ghannouchi, argues for a coalition of socialists, liberals and Islamists to overthrow the Tunisian state. Rachid himself argues for exactly this approach in his interview with the FT: We cannot bring out a democratic system out of this corrupt, dictatorial system. We have to put an end to the authoritarian system and start a new one. Basing this transition on Article 56 or 57 is a continuation of the old system. The constitution was a tyranny, the state was reduced to one man, who had in his hands the executive, judicial and legislative powers and was not accountable to anyone. How can such a constitution point towards building a democratic system, even as a starting point. The first step of building a democratic system is to build a democratic constitution. For this we need a founding council for rebuilding the state, one in which political parties, the trade unions and the civil society join. This council will rebuild the democratic constitution and will be the basis for building the democratic system. Now, the fact that Ghannouchi is speaking from exile is not irrelevant here. Most of the leadership of the An-Nahda party is exiled in London, following from a period of repression in the early 1990s. Indeed, there's an article in Foreign Policy almost gloating about the Tunisian revolution being "Islamist-free". So, there's a real question of just how much influence the Islamists can really have. At one time, they were a serious political force in Tunisia. In the 1989 general election, their candidates - standing as 'independents' - officially received 14% of the vote. According to Francois Burgat and William Dowell's study, (The Islamic Movement in North Africa, University of Texas Press, 1993), the real figure was plausibly closer to 30-32%. The regime rigged the elections, of course, so there would no way to know for sure. Subsequent repression, combined with a period of sustained economic growth that diminished the social base for the Islamists among the petite bourgeoisie and the rural poor, reduced the weight of An-Nahda as a serious opposition force so that today it's tempting to dismiss them. But is the revolution "Islamist-free"? Can it be? Before going any further with this, it's worth saying something about who the Islamists in Tunisia are and how the came to prominence in the first place. The origins of Tunisia's Islamist movement are in the crisis of the Seventies. In that period, a movement among the intelligentsia toward reviving Islam as a basis for politics and culture, against the alienating Euro-secularism of the Bourguibist regime, found expression in a review called Al-Ma'rifa, and at the Zaytuna University. This coincided with a similar sense of dissatisfaction among the rural poor, where Islamic traditions were not as cheerfully downplayed as they were among the regime's elite. The material background was that Israel's humiliation of Egypt and its allies in 1967 had raised serious questions about Arab nationalism, while economic crisis was de-legitimizing Bourguiba's corporatist progressivism. The state's turn toward economic liberalisation in the same period saw a sudden sharp increase in returns for private capital, while the incomes of the public sector salariat stagnated. For the Islamist intelligentsia, some of whom had been on the Left previously, all of this betokened not merely a material problem that they could struggle over - as the radical Left was doing at just that time. It was a profound spiritual crisis. Somehow the influx of cultural influences form the imperialist world, the economic crisis, the turn toward neoliberalism and its corrupting effects, the defeat of the Arab countries, the authoritarianism of the state, and their own diminished status were related to the decline of Islam in public life. As far as Tunisia went, the root and cause of the problem was that Bourguiba's state was built on an attempt to impose on a Muslim population a template of secular republican nationalism drawn from Europe. Indeed, the convulsions that had engulfed France in the late Sixties and early Seventies proved that its model could hardly be one worthy of emulation. By the end of the Seventies, a coherent Islamist movement had emerged, the Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI) - the tendency which Ghannouchi co-founded. It did not seek to bring about an 'Islamic state', if such a thing could exist. This is not to say that such a goal might not come to the fore if the movement acquired a mass base, but it has not been a goal of the MTI, and its successor, the An-Nahda party, since its inception. Rather, it saw its remit as being to effect moral and social change. To accomplish this, it sought to ally with the nationalists and even integrate itself with the trade union movement - unlike the majority of Islamists groups who disapprove of trade unionism as a mode of organisation based on class struggle. This position seems to have been genuine and consistent argued, but it was also forced on the movement to some extent. While the MTI articulated a moral and spiritual argument about the sources of Tunisian decline, the 1978 general strike and riots over straightforward class issues marginalised the tendency somewhat, and compelled them to engage in such issues more forthrightly. Ghannouchi himself was insistent that it was "not enough to pray five times a day and fast ... Islam is activism ... it is on the side of the poor and the oppressed". Aside from its dialogue with the poor and oppressed, the movement maintained a consistently pluralist approach to Tunisian politics. Nazih Ayubi's study, Political Islam, argues that unlike the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, the MTI did not "put itself in the position of the exclusive actor with the rights of moral tutelage over society at large", and that this approach enabled the tendency to accept a political pluralism that was inclusive not only of secularists but also of communists. The MTI collaborated with socialists in, for example, organising protests against US and Israeli aggression. The movement constantly assailed the lack of political liberty in Bourguiba's regime, and called for "the end of single-party politics and the acceptance of political pluralism and democracy". Later, Ghannouchi called for a mobilisation of civil society against the state: "There is no place for dominating society in the name of any legitimacy - historic, religious, proletarian, or pseudo-democratic ... Bourguiba put forward the slogan of the state's prestige, but its real content was the monopoly of the party, of the capitalist interests within which power in the country was located, and the monopoly which Bourguiba exercised over this state. The time has come to raise the slogan of the prestige of society, of the citizen, and of the power which serves both." Ghannouchi has also made an attempt to articulate a version of womens' rights consistent with Islamist beliefs, opposing this approach to the "obscure theories of Sayyid Qutb". However, his criticisms of the Personal Status Code, which includes various rights for women, point to the limits of any claim to gender egalitarianism on the part of the MTI. That stance allowed the movement to develop into a serious challenge to Bourguiba's regime, and it came to occupy a disproportionate amount of the ageing dictator's energies. Repression included arbitrary arrest and detention of MTI activists, but also a wider series of measures to curb expressions of religiosity. Insanely Ataturkist laws were passed banning civil servants from praying, excluding women who wore the 'veil' from universities and workplaces, rescinding the licenses of taxi drivers suspected of being Islamists, and so on. Repression against the movement was one of the factors which won it sympathy on campuses, so that it overtook the left among students. Indeed, in this period the typical adherent of the Islamists was below the age of 30, and usually below the age of 25. Moreover, this student layer overlapped with the support from the rural poor, as the youths who supported the tendency typically came from the south and interior, away from coastal Sahel and Tunis. As the movement developed, it did pick up support in urban areas of Tunis, and among some of the professional types that the regime considered its core base. Rashid Ghannouchi was himself to become a target of Bourguiba's drive to "eradicate the fundamentalist poison", as he ended up on trial for plotting with the connivance of the Iranian government to overthrow the Tunisian state. Linda Jones' profile of Ghannouchi for Middle East Report at this time noted that while the MTI was not the "fundamentalist" sock puppet that Bourguiba had demonsied, it had profited indirectly from Bourguiba's war on trade unions and the Left. Nonetheless, Ghannouchi was jailed and sentenced to a life of hard labour on evidence that was persuasive to no one, only to be released by the subsequent Ben Ali dictatorship in its early, liberalising days. In 1989, the movement changed its name to Hizb an-Nahda (Renaissance Party), and contested the elections staged by Ben Ali as part of his promise of liberalisation. The elections, fixed though they were, did disclose a trend which is consistent with what was happening elsewhere at the time. As Fred Halliday explained, again in Middle East Report: "Despite their failure to win any seats in parliament, the Islamist 'independents' won around 17 percent of the vote, displacing the secular left, who won around 3 percent, as the main opposition. Given that around 1.2 million of those of voting age were not registered, and given the almost complete control which the ruling party has in the rural areas, the real Islamist strength is no doubt considerably greater than 17 percent: in the Tunis area, the figure was around 30 percent." However, the Islamists' support was broader than it was deep. As a movement, it was a relatively new arrival compared to its equivalents in North Africa and the Middle East, and its handling of religious and moral issues, though in one light relatively open and progressive, could also characterised as cautious and timid. A subsequent wave of repression in 1991 and 1992, centred on legal witch hunts for 'terrorism', decimated the Islamists' organisation and sent much of the leadership into exile. This was followed by a series of economic transformations. Among these was the restructuring of class relations in the countryside. For example, following the advice of the World Bank, the government turned over state-owned agricultural cooperatives to large landowners. While this tended to concentrate wealth among the agrarian rich, it did unleash a wave of capital accumulation and growth that undercut support for the Islamists. The privatization of public services also reduced the scale of the public sector salariat, and profoundly altered the class structure in those newly private industries. The tax codes were restructured to give the bourgoisie a lift, and entice foreign direct investment with the promise of more repatriated lolly. This combination of reforms not only enhanced the power of the ruling class, but it also gave some middle class layers a sudden income boost while also producing sufficient growth to persuade some of those who lost from the process that they had a stake in preserving the neoliberal compact. In other words, the same combination of political repression and ensuing class restructuring, did for the Islamists as had done for the Left. Contrary to what has sometimes been implied, the An-Nahda did not subsequently disappear as a movement. Its activists continued to be convenient scapegoats, continued to suffer repression and were to be the bearers of the 'Al Qaeda' stigma once the 'war on terror' was under way. But just as the secular left has been almost invisible in Tunisia for a generation, so the An-Nahda's influence has been much diminished, and practically subterranean since 1992-3. The current revolt is not hegemonised by parties of the Left or by the Islamists. At its heart is the trade union leadership, whose outlook is social democratic. But, like it or not, An-Nahda leaders have been returning to Tunisia to participate, and will in all likelihood gain some sort of audience. As they are less sectarian than some of the cretins in this country who denounce them as far right totalitarians, (and whom it is my vocation to wind up when they start woofing and foaming at the mouth), they will probably find willing allies as well. Just as they did when they were able last able to organise as a tendency in Tunisia. To describe the revolt as "Islamist-free", therefore, is almost to miss the point. The revolution, if it advances at all, is going to have to at minimum include a general amnesty toward political exiles, which means the An-Nahda will return. As Marc Lynch points out, it's hard to see what kind of genuine democracy could obtain without this step. And if the regime, entrenched as it has been since 1956, is to be defeated, then in all likelihood it will involve some configuration of the broad coalition that both Ghannouchis, pere et fille, are calling for. ................................................................. Tuesday, January 18, 2011 Tunisia's 'unity government' already imploding. http://leninology.blogspot.com/2011/01/tunisias-unity-government-already.htm l Several ministers have withdrawn from the 'unity government' led by the Prime Minister and now acting president Mohammed Ghannouchi, due to the inclusion of several hacks from the former ruling party, the Rassemblement constitutionnel démocratique (RCD), in the government. The ministers who have left are three UGTT leaders, apparently under pressure from protesters demanding an end to the RCD's role in government. The significance of this is clear. The political elite, the ruling class it is integrated into, and in all probability a phalanx of EU and US diplomats, wanted a constitutional lash-up that would preserve the same basic pyramid of control with some more inclusive, and slightly more representative, structures. The trade union federation, once it showed its ability to act independently, defy the paramilitaries and win over at least the rank and file of the army, was always going to be essential to that. The ruling class is clearly weak and divided, its institutions of repression unable to keep control. In some cities, the population has been able to effectively take full over. No government that does not include organised labour in some capacity will have any legitimacy. It seems unlikely that the mere inclusion of a couple of mainstream social democrats, such as Najib Chebbi (Progressive Democratic Party) and Mustafa Ben Jabar (Union of Justice and Labour), will be sufficient to do the trick. So the class character of the revolt is coming more clearly to the fore. The New York Times reports that the character of the protests has been changing, as middle class layers have accepted the new situation and celebrated a 'new freedom', while those still protesting are "more working class". But this is also a blow to imperialism, in the sense that it will prove difficult to impose a regime that simply cleaves to the solutions of the IMF and EU. This is precisely one of the reasons why the working class protesters want the RCD out. Which is not to say that the IMF and EU will lose their leverage over Tunisia. Nor is it likely in the immediate term that Tunisia would withdraw from its treaty commitments to Africom, and thus from its role in the wider structure of US imperial control in the African continent. But if, as seems increasingly possible, the revolt spreads and takes down some other pro-American regimes in Egypt, Jordan or Algeria, then Obama has problems. One can well imagine him, despite his ongoing commitment to aggression in Afghanistan and Pakistan, going down as a Carter-style weakling if a few US embassies in the region start to look vulnerable. Which is why I would expect some sort of panicked intervention by the US and its local proxies to be going on even as you read. ....................................................................... What the Arab papers say Jan 17th 2011, 15:21 by The Economist online http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/01/tunisias_revolution_arab_pre ss THE Arab press has been awash with responses to the protests in Tunisia deposing Zine el-Abedine Ben Ali. Their views range from from elation at the fall of Tunisia's president, to concern over how the power vacuum will be filled and speculation about which corrupt Arab leader could be next to fall. In al-Sabah, a Tunisia daily, Mohamed al-Taweer revels in patriotic pride: ..the sons of our nation have demonstrated to the world once again that, by its peaceful nature which rejects all violence and extremism without exception, nothing can stop the desire of the people for freedom, democracy, and social justice. Salih Atiya, also writing in al-Sabah, praises Mohammed Bouazizi, the man who sparked the protests by setting himself on fire, and the other protesters as martyrs, marvelling at the fact that Mr Ben Ali really is gone: May we dare dream? But then, doesn't every reality start as a dream? "Should the people one day truly aspire to life, then fate must needs respond"! These last lines are from the final verse of the Tunisian national anthem, which has been widely quoted in newspaper editorials, in tweets and on Facebook pages throughout the Arab world since Mr Ben Ali's expulsion. In the Lebanese opposition newspaper, al-Akhbar, John Aziz suggests some lessons to be learned from the uprising in Tunisia: All the blood, sweat and bullet-torn flesh have demonstrated how the neo-conservative model was wrong, how democracy can come about without foreign fleets, without the imposition of the star-spangled banner, without the smiling faces of Jay Garner and David Petraeus. Second, democracy can grow out of cultures of military repression without resorting to Islamic radicalism and without devolving into a situation of "one man, one vote one time!" Third, not only has America failed to promote democracy in this region, it has actually propped up regimes which stifled its flowering. Abdel Bari Atwan, editor-in-chief of al-Quds al-Arabi, a pan Arab daily, congratulates the Tunisians on the ouster of Mr Ben Ali: Thank you to the Tunisian people. Thank you to the martyrs whose sacred blood helped achieve this supreme victory. Thank you to the army for turning their backs on the tyrants and siding with the people, upholding the security and stability of their country over all else. In Dar al-Hayat, a London-based Arabic newspaper, Mostapha Zayn criticises Mr Ben Ali for his failures as a leader: The Tunisian government could have been a model for the Arab world. And indeed it was, albeit a model of oppression and martial law in a region already infamous for oppression and martial law. In Saudi Arabia, which offered refuge to the fleeing Mr Ben Ali to the bemusement of many of its citizens, Qaynan al-Ghamidy controversially compares democracy in the West to democracy in the Arab world, writing in al-Arabiyya: Are the Western values of justice, freedom, and democracy suitable for Arabs? There can be no denying that they are. As the second caliph Umar bin al-Khattab is said to have asked: "How can you enslave people when their mothers bore them as freemen?"...If an iconic figure like Umar promoted such values values as freedom, justice, and accountability, do the Arabs really need to imitate the West? But whereas the West translated these values into tangible laws and civil institutions, the Arabs and Muslims merely touted them without following their spirit. And this is the fundamental difference between Western and Arab civilization. But now, with the Tunisian uprising, no one knows what direction their compass will point them. In any case, those Arabs who sincerely care for their country should study what is happening in Tunisia and do what needs to be done immediately to recreate the same set of facts in their own land. The editor-in-chief of al-Watan, a Saudi paper, argues that the protests are not just about food prices, but injustice, making many other regimes ripe for change: Any observer of the scene from non-Arab nation would note that while the issue of bread prices ostensibly set the spark for these protests, there were already fires smoldering under the ashes. In every country witnessing demonstrations protesting living standards, the focus has quickly shifted towards civil freedoms and corruption. ...It appears that most regions are poised to undergo an orange revolution if conditions continue on their current trajectory. Burhan Ghalyoun, a Syrian writer based in France, analyses Ben Ali's failed strategy in a Tunisian newspaper, El-Chourouk: The Tunisian uprising which has been raging for the past month wasn't a surprise to anyoneanyone, that is, except the ruling elites, who had complacently believed that they had found the magic formula that would allow them to stay in power for the rest of time and stave off the change so urgently hoped for since the downfall of President Habib Bourguiba. This formulaapplied by most Arab regimesis derived from the Chinese model, which combines two elements: first, cordoning politics from the public sphere by prohibiting even civil society activism, much less direct political action; and second, taking control of the economy, whether through direct foreign investment, accumulating wealth by means fair or foul, or outright expropriation. Tariq al-Hameed cautions that initial excitement may be misplaced in an editorial in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, a widely read pan-Arab newspaper: What makes these unfolding events so serious is that, because of the closed nature of Tunisia's repressive society, no one knows if the protests which have swept the streets are organized or spontaneous. We don't know if this is going to end in the replacement of one dictatorship for another, if this is a true revolution riding the wave of popular discontent, or whether it will result in any real improvement. We don't know if the inscrutable Tunisia of yesterday has emerged from its closed doors or whether it has only plunged deeper into the unknown depths, adding just one more tragedy to the endless tragedies of the Arab world. Muhammad Ya`qouby in the Algerian Echorouk Online compares Tunisia's revolution to that of Algeria over two decades ago: Granted, Tunisia is lagging 23 years behind Algeria's 1988 revolution, assuming of course that there is a single, uniform path to democracy But Tunisia could become a shining model for the Arab world if it manages to avoid the pitfalls of its neighbour's experience and take the right approach to democracy, avoiding the demagoguery and lack of foresight which marred out our political transition. The Algerians took to the streets in 1988 to demand lower prices, an end to corruption, and an end to discrimination. Twenty three years later, they are still seeking the same things. On the other hand, Wa'il al-Qandeel of an independent Egyptian newspaper, al-Shorouk, predicts that Tunisians will succeed in forging a truly democratic future: I don't think that these downtrodden Tunisians are going to accept anything less than complete concession to their demands. The time for incremental gains is past; the name of the game now is comprehensive change. If this comes to pass, verdant Tunisiathat enchanting little country on the Mediterraneanwill become the role model for a brave new Arab world. For full translations and commentary, visit Meedan.net [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------------------ -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? Head on over to our discussion list, [email protected]. -------------------------- Brooks Isoldi, editor [email protected] http://www.intellnet.org Post message: [email protected] Subscribe: [email protected] Unsubscribe: [email protected] *** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. 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