The Impasse in the Ivory Coast

*Dr. Gary K. Busch*

The electoral standoff between President Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara in 
the Ivory Coast is far more than just a typical electoral conflict 
between African candidates. It exemplifies and dramatizes some of the 
root conflicts which beset Africa, It is a paradigm case of self-serving 
ignorance on the part of an international community; the woeful 
inadequacies of the United Nations and its peacekeeping efforts; and the 
generational splits within African political leaderships which entrench 
oldand compromised leaders in positions of power, trading on stories of 
old victories and sacrifices and, thus, effectively shutting the door to 
the rise of younger talent within their parties.

There is a great deal of reference made to the actual results of the 
second round of the election. There were egregious lapses in the process 
in the rebel-held areas of the North and, if the observers are to be 
believed, irregularities as well in the South. Just how these two match 
up to each other in terms of numbers has never been tested by any 
outside party. The Electoral Commission improperly gave its verdict on 
incomplete and untested tallies and the Constitutional Council 
overturned these tallies in one day of consideration. In fact, as far as 
anyone knows for sure, and the African Union has produced an internal 
memo which states the same thing after its examination, no one really 
knows who was the victor and who can say so with authority. However, the 
Constitutional Council was empowered by the Ivoirian Constitution to be 
the final arbiter of all electoral decisions and it was they who 
announced the victory for Gbagbo.

Democracy cannot work without sovereignty because without sovereignty an 
elected government has no foundation for its laws, policies and court 
decisions. This why a Constitution is so critical to any democracy as it 
codifies the rules under which the citizens subsume their individual 
power into a common weal. Without reference to a Constitution, 
government is illegitimate and there is no agreed common weal. And, if 
for some reason, sovereignty is tainted or diluted, democracy cannot 
function in anything but a trivial manner. These are all descriptors of 
the political situation in the Ivory Coast.

It might be useful to examine the fundamental concerns of the Ivoirian 
citizens in these matters, as opposed to the narrower interests of the 
politicians.

*Legitimacy: *

President Gbagbo and his FPI Party won the election of 2000. They then 
formed a government and attempted to govern. There was resistance to the 
Gbagbo administration by the PDCI and the RDR, as the FPI began to 
remove some of the remaining vestiges of Houphouetism which had survived 
the military rule under Guei. Among these was the derogation of much of 
the Ivoirian national powers to the former French colonial power. The 
Pacte Coloniale, which had tethered the economy, trade, finance and 
military structures to France was carried out in every Ivoirian 
ministry, bank and institution by the hundreds of French nationals sent 
to the Ivory Coast as 'advisors' under the French Ministry of 
Co-operation. In some Ministries there was one Frenchman for every 
Ivoirian. Ivoirian sovereignty was demeaned by the presence of the 
French 'co-operants' who made many of the actual decisions in running 
the country. French soldiers and police were based in the Ivory Coast 
and were responsible for the training, equipping and deployment of the 
Ivory Coast forces; indeed they were also responsible for the promotions 
given to Ivoirian officers.

French business was given the right to operate monopolies in crucial 
sectors of the economy. French companies control water, electricity, 
construction, port operations, transport, a dominant part of the oil and 
gas industries and much of the food trade. Under the new Gbagbo 
government this tight control was relaxed as far as possible. When a new 
bridge was to be built in Abidjan the French quoted a very high price. 
The Chinese offered to build a two-level bridge on the same site for 
about half the price tendered by the French. The co-operants in the 
ministries assured that there was no acceptable technical specification 
which would allow the Chinese to win the right to build the bridge. The 
bridge wasn't built.

The Ivoirian economy was operated under French control and guidance. The 
use of the CFA franc meant that 85% of the cash flows of the Ivoirian 
economy were banked in Paris under the control of the French Treasury, 
after passing through a central BCEAO bank in Senegal. This was 'flag 
independence' with a vengeance. The Ivory Coast had a flag, a national 
anthem and a seat at the UN. The French controlled almost everything 
else. The sovereignty of the country was founded in law but handled, in 
reality, much as it had been under colonial rule. When the FPI and 
Gbagbo moved to shake off these shackles they were also attempting to 
assert the sovereignty of the Ivory Coast and the primacy of the 
Ivoirian Constitution. That is what gave them their legitimacy.

*Ivoirite:*

There is a great deal of propaganda being circulated that the Gbagbo's 
FPIis a regional partywhich is hostile to the North, particularly tothe 
immigrant Muslim populations from Burkina Faso and Mali who have settled 
in the Ivory Coast. This is not true. It was the government of Henri 
Konan Bedie, the PDCI successor to the long-time leader, 
Houphouet-Boigny, who exiled and drove from the Ivory Coast more than 
12,000 Burkinabes as soon as he took office. This was not the FPIs 
doing; it was done by the PDCI opposition who now attack the FPI for 
being hostile to the North. Foreigners may be impressed but no one in 
the Ivory Coast with even a short memory is fooled.

This hypocrisy is even more pronounced over the issue of Article 35 of 
the Constitution. The rebels and the two opposition parties of the South 
(the PDCI and the RPR) made the issue of Ivorian parenthood a major 
impediment in the search for peace. The main candidate of the RPR, 
Alessane Dramane Ouattara, a former Prime Minister, had been prohibited 
from standing for the Presidency because his father came from Upper 
Volta (now Burkina Faso) and Ouattara, himself, travelled on a Burkina 
Faso passport... This prohibition derived from Article 35 of the 
Constitution. It is Gbagbo who is being blamed for this. However, the 
truth is very different. This Constitutional amendment to Article 35 
which advanced the notion of 'Ivoirite' was voted upon and ratified by 
the country in a referendum and was supported by both the RPR and the 
PDCI. They both had major national campaigns seeking a 'yes' vote on the 
proposed Constitution; both Bedie and Ouattara personally campaigned for 
a ratification of the Constitution. This was not a Constitution of the 
FPI or Gbagbo; it was a reform Constitution of Guei in consultation with 
the RPR and the PDCI. They lived to regret it but it was their creature.

When the parties at the Linas-Marcoussis negotiations raised the 
amendment of this Article 35 as an issue it was not opposed by the 
Gbagbo Government. In subsequent negotiations, Gbagbo agreed to put this 
as a bill in front of the National Assembly. The National Assembly met 
and voted to repeal those sections of Article 35; there was no 
controversy. There was no impediment raised to Ouattara running for 
President. Indeed, the shock was that the PDCI, the party which banned 
Ouattara from running, was locked in an electoral alliance with Ouattara.

*The Rebellion:*

On the Wednesday, in September 2002, when the rebellion began, there 
were about 650 rebels holed up in Bouake. These were Guei appointees who 
had been purged from the Army. They had little equipment and ammunition, 
as they had expected a conflict of no more than five days. President 
Gbagbo was in Rome, meeting the Pope and the rebels felt sure that the 
coup could take place quickly with the President out of the country.

Fortunately for Gbagbo, his loyalist Army was led by his Minister of 
Defence, Moise Lida Kouassi; a former cellmate of Gbagbo's when they 
were jailed under Houphouet-Boigny. The internal security was in the 
hands of another cellmate, the Minister of the Interior Emile Boga 
Dougou. The team of the President and his two Ministers represented a 
powerful force for change in the Ivory Coast and had substantial support 
from the Ivory Coast population... The Gbagbo government had 
demonstrated, during its short term in power, a spirit of nationalism 
which had mobilised the population.

As the coup began in the second largest town, Bouake, the loyalist 
troops under Lida Kouassi responded. They were able to surround the 
rebels, trapping them in the city, and killing about 320 of them. They 
were positioned for a final onslaught on the remaining 300 rebels but 
were suddenly stopped by the French commander of the body of French 
troops stationed in the Ivory Coast. He demanded a delay of 48 hours to 
evacuate the French nationals and some US personnel in the town. The 
loyalist army demanded to be allowed to attack Bouake to put down the 
rebels but the French insisted on the delay. As soon as there was a 
delay, the French dropped parachutists into Bouake who took up positions 
alongside the rebels. This made it impossible for the loyalist troops to 
attack without killing a lot of Frenchmen at the same time.

During those 48 hours the French military command chartered three 
Antonov-12 aircraft which were picked up in Franceville in Gabon. These 
Ukrainian-registered aircraft were filled with military supplies stocked 
by the French in Central Africa. Two of the planes started their journey 
in Durban where Ukrainian equipment and military personnel were loaded 
on board. The chartered planes flew to Nimba County, Liberia (on the 
Ivory Coast border) and then on to the rebel areas in Ivory Coast 
(Bouake and Korhogo) where they were handed to the rebels. Busloads of 
troops were transported from Burkina Faso to Korhogo dressed in civilian 
clothes where they were equipped with the military supplies brought in 
by the French from Central Africa and the Ukraine.

All of a sudden there were 2,500 fully armed soldiers on the rebel side 
as mercenaries from Liberia and Sierra Leone were also brought in by the 
same planes... They were equipped with Kalashnikovs and other bloc 
equipment which was never part of the Ivory Coast arsenal. France 
supplied sophisticated communications equipment as well.

Once the rebels were rearmed and equipped, the French gradually 
withdrew, leaving operational control to the Eastern European 
mercenaries who directed the rebels in co-ordination with the French 
headquarters at Yamoussoukro. The French continued to subvert the 
loyalist army at every turn and attempted to purge the army of its key 
officers. The rebels succeeded in assassinating Boga Dougou and taking 
the wife of Lida Kouassi as hostage in a rampage in Abidjan. The French, 
who were bound to defend the legitimate government of the Ivory Coast 
under the same Pacte Coloniale, turned things on their head and armed 
and equipped the rebels. They have continued to support the rebels and 
have provided a protective shield for them by dividing the country in 
two and patrolling the dividing line. The French-sponsored Presidents of 
neighbouring countries (Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso) have assisted the 
French in their support of the rebels, just as they assisted the rebels 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

*Rebel Rule:*

When the French were able to divide the country in two, the inhabitants 
of the North found that they were sheltering foreign mercenaries and 
failed Ivoirian soldiers who had been cashiered from the Army. The civil 
servants in the North left in fright. Doctors, nurses, teachers, 
professionals of all sort fled the North for the safety of the South. 
There was no one of any competence to run the institutions in the North. 
The schools closed; the hospitals shut their doors; civil administration 
came to a close; politics was dominated by the rebellion. Many of the 
rebels quarrelled with each other over 'turf', Soro's plane was shot 
down by a missile and he escaped with his life although his comrades 
were killed. There was no repair of the roads or the infrastructure. 
Rebels and French peacekeepers raided the banks and stole all the money 
that was there. Some of the French peacekeepers were tried and sentenced 
for rape, murder and bank robbery in French courts. The rest walked free.

Most of these rebels were not Ivorian at all. They were the wandering 
mercenaries of the Liberian and Sierra Leone wars who had attached 
themselves to the military coup leader, Robert Guei whom Gbagbo defeated 
in a free election. There were three rebel groups which appeared in 
Ivory Coast: The Ivory Coast Patriotic Movement (MPCI) - which was the 
first to take up arms against the government; The Movement for Justice 
and Peace (MJP); and The Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great West 
(MPIGO). Of these the MPCI had a political base within the Ivory Coast 
formed from Guei supporters and the large immigrant communities of 
Burkinabes, Malians and Guineans who had come to Ivory Coast as economic 
migrants. The other two groups were ad hoc groups of Liberians, defeated 
Sierra Leonean rebels and Guinean dissidents offered shelter and support 
by Charles Taylor of Liberia. The familiar faces from the Liberian civil 
war could be seen in the television clips of the rebels. Moskito 
Bockarie from Sierra Leone was familiar face among the rebels. Ukrainian 
pilots and mercenaries from these wars and the wars in the Congos and 
Angola appeared regularly. A substantial proportion of the rebels spoke 
English with each other rather than French. These parties later 
coalesced into a fragile coalition of 'Houphouetists' for the election

No one in the North paid taxes. No one paid rent (but they did pay for 
protection). No one paid for the utilities provided to the North by the 
South. Education virtually ceased. Soldiers were billeted on a supine 
Northern population. Industry died. Commerce thrived in stealing the 
cocoa, coffee, cotton and hardwoods of the North and shipping them to 
the world market through major French traders operating in the North. No 
customs or excise duties were paid and a small business of importing 
duty-free mopeds became the staple industry of lower-level soldiers. 
Rebel leaders suddenly acquired large sums of money and started buying 
property in Paris and banking their wealth in Ouagadougou.Despite ruling 
the North for almost ten years in safety and impunity these rebels have 
not been able to set up any government, civil service or a political 
infrastructure in the lands they occupy. This is one major reason for 
the citizens in the South to fear the empowerment of the rebels and 
their political godfather, Ouattara, in Abidjan. They have no record of 
any civil achievement nor have they built any structures for 
administering to the needs of the country.

Even now, their indifference to the needs of their own people is 
evident. The pro-Ouattara coalition Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes 
pour la démocratie et la paix (RHDP) has called for civil disobedience 
to protest the stalemate. In the North those schools which were 
partially resuscitated in 2007 are now closed in response to the appeal, 
according to Save the Children in Côte d'Ivoire, This means some 800,000 
primary-age students are not in school.

*The Condominium:*

Perhaps the most devastating effect of the rebellion was the reaction of 
the French and the international community to the division of the 
country. In an effort to restore order and constitutional rule the 
treaties signed in Linas-Marcoussis, Accra, Pretoria and Ouagadougou 
were designed to restore peace and order in the Ivory Coast; all 
enshrined the notion of condominium. That is, the international 
community insisted that the Prime Minister step down and be replaced by 
an appointee chosen by them and that there were Cabinet posts reserved 
for the ministers appointed by the rebel political parties. Gbagbo and 
the FPI, who had been democratically elected in 2000, had to accept a 
prime minister not of their choosing and a Cabinet made up, in part, by 
rebels.

These new Cabinet ministers demanded large salaries, cars and jobs in 
their ministries for their friends and families. No notion of competence 
or training was used in the selection of the new Cabinet ministers. Only 
that they were chosen by the rebel bands. In fact, few actually showed 
up to work. The civil administration of the country was incoherent and 
conflicted as the national interest took second place to the demands of 
rival Cabinet ministers. The FPI was effectively stymied by internal 
dissent from a Prime Minister who refused to obey the wishes of the 
President and a Cabinet which refused to obey any rule other than the 
Law of the Jungle. The United Nations sought an international agreement 
to beef up the French presence in the Ivory Coast and sent 
'peacekeepers' to the country. These have remained there ever since, 
effectively commanded by the French military which has the 
communications and heavy equipment there. The UN peacekeepers are an 
extension of the French military that have also been transformed into UN 
peacekeepers by UN decree.

In 2006 the International Advisory Group appointed by the United Nations 
decided that the National Assembly should also be abolished because the 
rebels were not officially represented in it. The citizens reacted 
against this demand and took to the streets in protest. The French 
peacekeepers retaliated by destroying the Ivory Coast Air Force. They 
seized the airport and sent a hundred tanks and armoured personnel 
carriers to oust Gbagbo from office by violence. The citizens gathered 
at the Hotel Ivoire which was on the way towards Gbagbo's residence and, 
unarmed and peacefully, they confronted the hundreds of French soldiers 
in their tanks. The French soldiers, following a direct order from 
Chirac and his Minister of Defence Aliot-Marie, opened fire on the 
protestors with automatic weapons and snipers on November 9, 2006 and 
killed 68 unarmed civilians and wounded 1,300 more. The United Nations 
and the French offered no apologies to the Ivory Coast citizens for this 
act of war against the country which widened the distrust of their real 
intentions. The United Nations was seen as an enemy of the Ivoirian 
people and an institution which did not respect the sovereignty of the 
Ivory Coast state.

*Disarmament:*

They key to the Ivory Coast dilemma is that there has been no 
disarmament. Every peace agreement that has been signed, every mediation 
which was accepted by the parties, every political agreement among the 
parties has stipulated that the rebels must disarm. This was agreed by 
them over and over but they have refused to disarm. The terms of the 
election required that at least two months before the election there 
would be a verifiable disarmament of the rebel forces. This was not 
adhered to and the international community has refused to act to make 
the rebels disarm since the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement in 2002. Every 
compromise that the Gbagbo government made under these agreements was 
prefaced by an agreement that the rebels would disarm. The Gbagbo 
government was held to its commitments under these agreements but the 
rebels were left alone.

This question of disarmament is not just a military matter. It has to 
do, as well, with the ability of electoral officials to move freely 
throughout the country to prepare a valid electoral roll. In the absence 
of any civil service infrastructure in the North it became vital to 
allow officials to wander freely in the North to engage in the 
verification of voter's credentials. They could not do this without 
armed guards and protectors because the warlords of the North controlled 
the registration process. It was impossible to prepare a valid and 
reliable electoral roll without disarmament. It was also impossible to 
certify a free and fair election when voters were intimidated by armed 
men patrolling the electoral stations, preventing people from voting, 
and threatening the observers. This is all documented in the AU report.

The international community cannot complain that the election was not 
free and fair when it was they, for almost ten years, which allowed the 
rebels the freedom not to disarm and to achieve impunity from any 
sanction. The Ivoirian people asked how it was possible to have a proper 
election in a country divided in two parts and where a fully-armed rebel 
force was allowed to continue to retain its weapons in defiance of every 
agreement it had made.

*The Military:*

There have been many observers who have noted that the Ivory Coast 
military remains loyal to President Gbagbo. This is not really 
surprising as each soldier and officer took an oath which pledges them 
to the defence of the Constitution. Since President Gbagbo is the 
constitutional president it is no mystery. Perhaps more importantly, 
when the rebellion took place those who sympathised with the rebels 
deserted the Ivory Coast army and fled north. The army was purged of 
dissidents and became much more homogeneous of the ethnic groups of the 
South. This was not entirely true of the police and gendarmes.

When the hostilities ended there was an effort by the United Nations to 
integrate the rebels with the regular army. This was an impossible task. 
The rebels demanded that they keep their rank and pay in the new army 
and demanded to be paid their wages for the period in which they were in 
rebellion. They demanded to retain their own chain of command and 
armour. This was clearly a non-starter with the loyalist army command 
and troops. They said they would explore integrating some units, but 
only after they disarmed. The rebels refused to disarm and participated 
in seven attempted military coups against the Ivory Coast state since 
2004, led by French officers sent directly from France for this purpose 
and Burkinabe and Malian mercenaries provided by the Mali and Burkina 
Faso governments.

Clearly there is no basis for the integration of the two opposing forces 
and no wishful thinking of the United Nations will make it otherwise. 
However, if the United Nations and the French decided not to assist the 
rebels the loyalist forces of the Ivory Coast would be able to destroy 
the rebel forces throughout the country in less than a month. That is 
why they demand UN protection and ECOWAS troops to do the fighting for 
them. Although there is a sanction in place by the UN in the acquisition 
of the Ivory Coast military to acquire weapons there is no effective 
balancing sanction against the rebels. This situation has made it more 
difficult for the loyalist forces but has not proved to be a major 
hurdle. The three hundred rebels and their hired security mercenaries 
which are sitting around the Golf Hotel protecting Ouattara have been 
armed by the United Nations and are wearing UN uniforms and identifying 
badges.

*The Demographics:*

A vital dimension to this conflict is the fact that most of the Ivory 
Coast population is under 26 years of age. There is a great gap between 
the population and the group of geriatrics which run the political 
structures in the country. In reality, there are very few people in the 
country who want either Ouattara or Gbagbo. Ouattara is not popular 
because he is considered the "Godfather of the Rebellion" and a Black 
Frenchman. His loyalties lie with the IMF, the World Bank and his 
friends in France. He remains a symbol of "Francafrique". On the other 
hand there are very few citizens who like Gbagbo. Since 2006 he has 
effectively renounced his opposition to French neo-colonialism. He 
renewed many of the French contracts which maintained the monopoly of 
France in the Ivory Coast economy without any transparency or 
competitive bidding. He renewed all the contracts for electricity, 
telephone and water. He gave Bollore the control of the new container 
terminal in the port of Abidjan and new construction contracts to Mr 
Fakhoury. He allowed Total to build a new refinery and pipelines and 
gave Total a new oil lease on the border with Ghana. He turned on his 
former friends in the labour movement and consolidated power, and its 
rewards, in his own hands and those of his cronies.

The problem for the electorate in the Ivory Coast is that they are 
stuck. They must choose between two unsavoury candidates. Younger, more 
dynamic leaders in the ranks of the national parties are stifled by the 
dead hand of the gerontocracy and kleptocracy which rules the political 
scene. There are trained and competent potential leaders in the FPI and 
the PDCI and RDR parties who can unite to bring about some progress. 
Right now the electorate refuses to support Ouattara because he is the 
leader of the rebels; not because he is not competent. They do not want 
the rebels to duplicate in the South what they have destroyed in the 
North. They support Gbagbo because he is the constitutional leader and, 
at least for the moment, seems to have given up the notion that he could 
become the fair-haired boy of Francafrique. He is taking a nationalist 
view which is very popular. The UN has made it clear that without Gbagbo 
there is only Ouattara, the French and the rebels. That is not a choice 
they want to make. The young people of the Ivory Coast have shown over 
and over that they want to see a leadership which asserts Ivoirian 
sovereignty in the face of external powers seeking to dominate them. 
This is the twenty-first century; colonialism is dead and should be 
buried. If there is an end to the neo-colonialism and an ascendance of 
real Ivoirian sovereignty then democracy will stand a chance. They can 
use the levers of power to oust the gerontocracy and build a better 
tomorrow for a united Ivory Coast.

*West African Conflict and the Jihad*:

One of the most important aspects of this conflict is largely overlooked 
but is crucial to understanding the consequences of this conflict. Since 
the days of the Liberian and Sierra Leone civil wars Al-Quaeda has 
increased its presence and influence in West Africa. In the weeks 
preceding the 9/11 attacks in New York, the representatives of Al-Quaeda 
completed a US$20 million 'blood diamonds' deal with the RUF in Sierra 
Leone According to official reports the Lebanese diamond trader, Aziz 
Nassour,used his couriers toexchange US$300,000 a week for blood 
diamonds every week for almost ten months ending September 2001. The 
couriers took scheduled flights from Brussels (the heart of the diamond 
trade) to Abidjan. They then took smaller planes on charter from Wesuwa 
Air to fly to Monrovia and Freetown where they picked up the diamonds 
from the RUF. The Al-Quaeda operatives set up safe houses in Monrovia 
and Freetown to trade diamonds for arms for the rebel movements. Two of 
them, Samih Ossaily and his mistress. Nora, were arrested and jailed. 
Several others were freed, but the operation has grown and spread. These 
were mainly Sunni Muslims. However they were soon joined by 
Iranian-backed Shia. Hezbollah now has offices and trading spots across 
West Africa and the DRC.

The bulk of the traders and carriers are Lebanese. These are not the 
traditional Lebanese in West Africa who were primarily Maronite 
Christians. These have been supplanted by Lebanese Shia Muslims attached 
to Hezbollah and Amal. They act as the arm of the Iranians and their 
Revolutionary Guards. Wherever there are problems in West Africa one can 
find Shia Muslims trading guns for diamonds and gold. A recent case was 
discovered in Nigeria with a shipment of weapons from Iran. These 
Al-Quaeda and Shia traders are the main suppliers of weapons to rebel 
movements across Africa. The RUF rebels in Sierra Leone transplanted 
their affinities to the Ivory Coast when they went to fight as 
mercenaries in the rebellion in the North.

In Mozambique there are several training camps for West African 
jihadists. They arrive from Pakistan or the Gulf through Kenya and are 
flown down, business class, to Mozambique. They then disappear for a 
period of months. They then appear as graduates and, with pockets full 
of cash; they try to make their way home. Many are picked up by the 
Mozambique authorities and put in camps. Periodically the Mozambicans 
gather them together and deport them to their home countries. There have 
been flights of Guineans, Malians, Burkinabe and Senegalese from 
Mozambique to their home countries. Once home they are theoretically 
jailed. In fact most are soon released.

This accounts for a large and growing group of jihadists across West 
Africa, especially in the Muslim north of most sub-Saharan countries 
with a border on the Sahara or the Sahel. These groups have been active 
in creating an Al-Quaeda movement in the region and have been active in 
insurgencies, kidnapping of French technicians and rearming a wide range 
of rebel groups. The Al-Quaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM) are a 
source of equipment and markets and operate their own airline. They use 
around eleven aircraft (Boeing 727s and some Antonov) and fly throughout 
the region from Algeria and the Sahel.

In addition they work closely with the burgeoning cocaine trade from 
Colombia into West Africa which uses smaller airports in Mauretania, 
Mali, Sierra Leone and the main drug importing country of Guinea- 
Bissau. There is a synergy between the Al-Quaeda operators and the drug 
barons. There is a giant and profitable trade in diamonds, gold and 
cocaine throughout West Africa run by drug lords and jihadists. The 
Western powers, especially the US DEA have these under surveillance and 
US Special Forces have set up military training programs, JCET 
(/Joint/Combined Exchange Training/) with the African militaries to 
combat these.

That is why it is such a mystery to understand why, in the face of this 
Muslim radicalism which is sweeping West Africa that the Western powers 
and the UN are fighting to impose a Muslim rebel leader as head of the 
Ivory Coast. To most military officers this is madness. In Nigeria when 
Goodluck Johnathan consulted with his generals (many of whom now come 
from the Middle Belt, not the North) they said to him "After Jos and 
Abuja do you really want us to shoot Christian civilians to put the 
Muslims in charge of Ivory Coast?"

*Why Do The Western Powers Support Ouattara?*

Aside from the fact that the French have a vested interest in keeping 
the Ivory Coast as a colony and not allowing the Ivoirian defiance to 
spread to its other neo-colonial enterprises, there is still a question 
why the US, Britain and the EU go along with France in this policy. The 
UN is easy to understand. One should not expect any more from an 
incompetent and ignorant Secretary-General and his political fixer who 
doubles as his personal envoy to the Ivory Coast. They are reacting to 
an affront to their dignity. They found they cannot order member states 
about and reacted when opposed. They are no threat except for the media. 
This doesn't explain why the Western countries can be so openly 
hypocritical in their singling out of the Ivory Coast as an example.

There are seventeen more elections to go this year in Africa and most 
will be as rigged and divisive as the Ivory Coast election. Most of the 
African Presidents on whom they are relying on to kill Ivoirians for 
them are illegitimate, corrupt and often murdered their predecessors 
before taking office or were elected by rigged ballots. This cannot be 
any kind of a principled defence of democracy; especially as they 
overlook other recent ballots (Burma, Belarus, etc.) which were 
egregiously rigged. The answer is more likely to be economic.

One of the most significant events in West Africa last year was the 
purchase of the Swiss oil trading company Addax by the Chinese firm 
Sinopec. Addax was a frequent deliverer of oil to the Ivory Coast and 
was a major player in the West African oil mafia. The loss of a key 
player to the Chinese was seen as a real threat. Since then the French 
oil companies have been buying up oil assets in the region using obscure 
shell companies. The Western oil companies seem to be using the Ivory 
Coast as the first battle against the Chinese moving into the oil and 
gas business in the region.

The Gulf of Guinea is rapidly becoming a major international oil play. 
Abidjan has a good refinery and will soon have another. Looking through 
the list of vessels delivering crude to the SIR refinery in Abidjan more 
than half were Addax vessels. Now they are Addax/Sinopec vessels. This 
has frightened the oil companies, especially Total. They do not have the 
money to compete with the Chinese and now Russian companies like Lukoil 
are entering the Gulf of Guinea market in a big way as well. The only 
way the French can compete is to try and maintain control of the strings 
of power in the Ivory Coast to find ways to delay or deter the Chinese 
and Russian invasion in what they thought of a their patch. The US and 
European countries share this ambition. Perhaps that is their reason for 
their blind and self-destructive policy in the country.

*The Way Forward:*

It should be abundantly clear to everyone that this impasse is not going 
to be solved by additional pressure on Gbagbo. Each day his support 
grows and each day that Ouattara is holed up in his tent at the Hotel 
Golf costs the UN a lot of money and face. The ECOWAS countries are 
unwilling and incapable of putting together an invasion force. Moreover 
it would likely impinge on their nationals residing in the Ivory Coast. 
Despite the provocations of the rebel band in Abidjan life there is 
pretty calm and uninterrupted. No one is being threatened except when 
the people in Abobo or similar enclaves are agitated by the rebels and 
attack the police. There has been a substantial rearmament of the 
loyalist forces by other, friendly African states and whoever is sent to 
fight will know he has a war on his hands. The 50-odd present of the 
population which voted for Gbagbo will not just roll over and disappear. 
The war will go on for a long time once it is started and civilian 
casualties will be high. There is every likelihood of African states 
with very powerful armies entering the fray on behalf of Gbagbo.

The way forward seems clear. There will never be a resolution of who won 
this last second round of the election no matter how many times the UN 
says so. The answer is to send Ouattara back home to the North and to 
prepare for a new election which is monitored. First, however, the UN 
forces must insist that the rebels disarm. That would finally be a 
useful project for the UN. If there were disarmament there could 
actually be a free and fair election. Perhaps it would be possible to 
persuade Gbagbo to allow the FPI to choose another candidate. That would 
save face for the international community and would almost certainly 
lead to a better democracy than the tainted version being peddled by Ban 
Ki-Moon and his friends. It has been Ouattara's candidacy and his ties 
with the rebels which has sustained Gbagbo in power for so long. His 
candidacy is what has prevented the FPI from choosing a new candidate. 
Perhaps the international community can be persuaded that real democracy 
is a positive choice in this business. If not it will be the Ivory 
Coast's poor citizens who will continue to pay the price.

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