i.e. the Iran-NKorean connection...

B


© 2011, Small Wars Foundation January 23, 2011
The Hizballah North Korean Nexus
by Carl Anthony Wege
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/654-wege.pdf

A significant relationship between Hizballah and North Korea, facilitated by 
Iran, has developed over the last two decades. This relationship has changed 
the configuration of Hizballah and shaped it into a more formidable military 
entity. The famed Hizballah Model now includes a North Korean flavor.
In the early twentieth century Paris sought to create a Christian-Arab state1 
in the environs of Mt. Lebanon2 to further French political objectives. Lebanon 
was established with a confessional system3 dominated by a Maronite-Sunni axis 
to the disadvantage of the Shi‟a.
This confessional system stratified Lebanese political institutions and society 
in a way that became increasingly untenable precipitating a civil war in 1975. 
The Lebanese fratricide included Palestinians, Israelis, and Syrians. Clan, 
tribe, and confessional association became more important than any 
intermediating Lebanese political institutions. The outbreak of the war in the 
spring of 1975 was followed by a Syrian intervention in 1976 and Israeli 
invasions in 1978 and 1982.
Among the Shi‟a the 1982 Israeli-Lebanon war catalyzed the emergence of Islamic 
Amal (Amal Al-Islamiyah), led by Hussein Musawi4 when he and hundreds of 
followers from Musa Sadr‟s original AMAL5 organization streamed east to Baalbek 
in Lebanon‟s Bekka valley6 joining Sheikh Subhi Tufayli‟s cadre from Lebanon‟s 
al-Dawah (the Islamic Call). 7 A coalition developed between the Musawi 
organization, the followers of Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli,8 and
1 . This „greater Lebanon‟ (Etat du Grand Liban) created by France would 
encompass areas historically ruled by Fakhr al-Din (Fakhreddine II 1572–1635) 
and Bashir II (1788-1840). See Hanf, Theodor. Coexistence In Wartime Lebanon. 
Oxford: The Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1993, p. 64.
2. Mt. Lebanon was created as a separate administrative region within the 
Ottoman empire at the behest of the European powers following massacres of 
Christians during civil strife in 1860.
3. This confessional system formally as well as informally segregated political 
institutions along sectarian lines based on a single census of questionable 
veracity.
4 . The Musawi clan members in the AMAL movement were more sympathetic to 
Iran‟s 1979 revolution than other Shi‟a clans associated with AMAL.
5. These were primarily al-Dawah members who had infiltrated AMAL before Iran‟s 
Revolution intending to maneuver the organization in an Islamist direction.
6. Hussein and his followers left the AMAL center in Beirut and seized AMAL 
offices and ordinance depots in the Bekka valley town of Baalbek.
7. Originally an Iraqi Shi‟a Islamist organization created by Baqr al-Sadr (a 
cousin of Musa Sadr) in 1958, Lebanon‟s al-Dawah (the Islamic Call) was formed 
in the late 1960s. Lebanon‟s al-Dawah officially dissolved itself in 1980 in 
response to Khomeini‟s admonitions concerning Western style party organization. 
In practice this had little impact as al-Dawah‟s members were subsumed into the 
larger Hizballah movement. Those retaining less formal adherence to Dawah 
ideology tended to follow Hussein Fadlallah. They were heavily penetrated by 
Syrian intelligence by the late 1990s although they continued training at 
Hizballah camps until they created their own facilities in 1996. See 
Intelligence Online 19 February 1998.
8 . Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli commanded the operational headquarters of Hizballah 
in Baalbek in close coordination with the Pasdaran. See Ranstorp, Magnus. 
“Hizbollah‟s Command Leadership: Its Structure, Decision-Making and 
Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions.” Terrorism and Political 
Violence 6 (3), pg. 305. Tufayli was later Secretary General of Hizballah but 
was ultimately expelled in 1998 over his opposition to Hizballah‟s more 
moderate course. He then created a „Revolution of the Hungary‟ (Thawrat 
al-Jiya‟) from his bastion in the Brital region of the Bekka in 1999 but the 
movement failed and Tufalyi was marginalized as the century closed. See 
Shahanon The Shi‟a of Lebanon, pg. 123.
SMALL WARS JOURNAL
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other Shi‟a factions. The Sepahe al-Quds (Jerusalem) elements of Iran‟s 
Pasdaran (Padan-e Inqilal-e Islami or Revolutionary Guards) in coordination 
with the Iranian Embassy‟s in Beirut and Damascus,9 deployed in the eastern 
Bekka in July of 1982, built on this and Hizballah10 was born.11
IRAN’S BOOK OF VICTORY
The deployment of the Pasdaran in Lebanon furthered Tehran‟s foreign policy 
goals by promoting an Islamic Republic in Lebanon. In the early 1980s many 
Pasdaran fighters were familiar with Lebanon having received their initial 
guerrilla training there under PLO auspices in the struggle to overthrow the 
Shah12. This history facilitated Pasdaran relations with various Islamist 
elements within the Bekka‟s Shi'a community.13 In 1983 and 1984 Hizballah 
developed regional organizations first in the Bekka (particularly in Brital, 
Hermel, and Baalbek), then Beirut, and finally in the south of Lebanon.14 
Hizballah initially included elements of clan based criminal networks15 but, in 
the absence of state institutions, Hizballah both rendered a form of justice 
and was a source of social services.
The end of Lebanon‟s civil war saw Hizballah engage a two track policy in 
Lebanon. Hizballah‟s military wing, the Islamic Resistance, continued 
operations aimed at the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon and provided armed 
protection for the Shi‟a community in Lebanon. The second track saw Hizballah 
enter Lebanese parliamentary politics abiding by the political norms 
established with the 1989 Peace of Ti‟af.16 With Ti‟af Hizballah compromised 
its earlier vision of an Islamic Republic outlined in the 1985 “Open Letter to 
the Oppressed of the Earth.” This compromise was manifested in Hizballah‟s 2009 
manifesto that committed the organization to consensus democracy in Lebanon. 
Nonetheless, Hizballah arms, allied with Iran and coordinated with Syria, 
continued to dominate the Lebanese arena.
Iran has maintained diplomatic relations with the DPRK since 1973 but it‟s 
alliance with North Korea, which began during the Iran-Iraq War17, is currently 
anchored in Tehran‟s intent to
9. See Aboul-Enein, Youssef and Rudolph Atallah. “Hizballah: A Discussion of 
Its Early Formation.” Infantry, 94 (3) May / June 2005 pg, 24. See also 
Al-Muharar, Lebanon 28 July 1989. Iranian Ambassador to Damascus Mohammed 
Hassan Skhtari was instrumental in building Hizballah on the ground in the 
Bekka.
10. Iran decided to foster an Islamist organization using the Pasdaran rather 
than working with the more secularly oriented AMAL.
11. "Islamic Jihad Seen As Pro-Iran" New York Times 19 April 1983, p.12. The 
first Iranian volunteers were apparently sheltered at the Imam al-Mahdi school 
in Baalbek with an Iranian communications center in Ballbeks al-Khayyam hotel 
before the Guard acquired their better known bases in the valley. See Miller, 
Judith. God Has Ninety Nine Names. New York: Touchstone Books, 1996, pg. 282.
12. North Korean aid to Palestinian factions in Lebanon, no doubt in the 
service of Soviet interests goes as far back as the early 1980s. See “Presence 
of North Koreans in Southern Lebanon” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Voice of 
Lebanon 24 June 1981.
13. It is perhaps worth noting that Fatah historically had good relations with 
and some association with the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood. It is therefore not too 
extraordinary that they would make some common cause with Islamists among the 
Shi‟a opposition. Arafat had previously co-opted Musa Al-Sadr and convinced him 
to allow Fatah to train early AMAL cadre. This even though the 1980s would also 
see Palestinian-Shi‟a conflicts during the so-called war of the camps.
14. See Shanahan, The Shi‟a of Lebanon, pg. 114
15. In this organizational sense they shared some characteristics with mid-20th 
century La Costa Nostra families.
16. The Peace of Ta‟if (the Wathiqat al-Mithaq al-Watani) was signed in the 
Saudi port of Ta‟if in October of 1989 under Saudi and Syrian tutelage. It made 
some adjustments to Lebanon‟s pre civil war political system while maintaining 
the characteristic allocation of political power along confessional lines.
17. It was North Korean, as well as American and Israeli, supplied arms that 
made Iran‟s successful 1987 offensive against Iraq possible.
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acquire and deploy a nuclear deterrent serving the twin aims of safeguarding 
Irans Islamic Revolution and achieving regional great power status. North 
Korea, desperate to maintain its neo-Stalinist tyranny, will engage in any 
activity18 that will provide hard currency19. Mercenary adventures and criminal 
enterprise became significant sources of income for Kim Jong Il‟s regime. The 
mutually beneficial relationship that developed between Iran and North Korea 
secondarily benefits Hizballah with Iran financing North Korean efforts that 
strengthen Iran‟s Lebanese ally. Hizballah receives assistance from North Korea 
that could not be readily furnished otherwise by Iran thus furthering Tehran‟s 
interests in Lebanon.
NORTH KOREAN ARMS AND TRAINING
North Korean arms reach Hizballah through the good offices of both Iran and 
Syria.
While arms transfers from North Korea to Hizballah have been significant they 
are focused primarily on components for improved versions of Syrian produced 
Katyushas, Grads, and other rockets. Even with rudimentary targeting systems 
and small warhead these weapons are quite difficult to suppress and can be 
fairly disruptive to life in the enemy camp when fired in large numbers as the 
citizens of Northern Israel can attest. Iran likewise proffers military support 
of Hizballah both directly and via Syria. Iran and North Korea, for example, 
jointly produce the 300 km range M600 series rockets with a fraction of the 
production supplied to both Syria and Hizballah20. Otherwise, the methods 
apparently used by Tehran to subvert various UN sanctions and embargo regimes 
are straightforward if not terribly efficient. Iran simply uses a complex of 
shell companies, vendors, multiple purchases, and transfer modalities to 
acquire arms and other prohibited materials under for itself and its proxies 
such as Hizballah.21 The recipients of the purchase orders engage in varying 
degrees of acquiescence in the subterfuge with the DPRK acting as a full 
partner in the enterprise. North Korea has institutionalized an arms smuggling 
system22 using seaports favored by arms smugglers such as Hong Kong and 
Singapore and similarly favored countries in the Near East including Lebanon 
and Cypress.23 A North Korean defector managing the illicit trade outlined for 
the Chosun Ilbo a system wherein cadre from the Korean People‟s Army who have 
been trained at Pyongyang University of Foreign Studies work with “forwarders” 
from foreign states. Containers are moved across the Yalu river into China a 
third or half full of weapons. In China the containers are transshipped to a 
third country and filled with unrelated freight while relevant paperwork is 
completed. In this instance there is no need for false end user certificates 
since the arms are never acknowledged. Nonetheless moving
18. This includes straightforward criminal enterprise taken to the point of 
becoming institutionalized through the Central Committee Bureau 39 of the 
Korean Workers Party as far back as 1974. It is thought to be headed by Kim 
Tong-un, a former industrialist, supervising a headquarters staff of roughly 
130. See Kan, Paul Rexton, Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr. and Robert M. Collins 
“Criminal Sovereignty: Understanding North Korea‟s Illicit International 
Activities,” Strategic Studies Institute March 2010 
www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil accessed March 2010. See also “North 
Korean Dollar Store” Vanity Fair 5 August 2009.
19 . Arms sales provide about a billion dollars per year to the North Korean 
regime.
20. “IDF reveals intel on huge Hezbollah arms stockpile in Southern Lebanon” 
Ha‟aretz 8 July 2010. An alternative modality has the M600 technology 
originating in China and moving from there to Iran and Syria.
21. The result of the emergent „cat and mouse‟ game is full employment for 
those collection disciplines involving in situ and remote sensing. U.S. 
authorities attempt to track arms transfers and alert local governments most 
likely to act and the DPRK attempts to evade said surveillance.
22. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874, passed in 2009 along with 
previously passed resolutions, has attempted to end arms transfers from North 
Korea to other states.
23. “The covert arms trade: The second oldest profession.” The Economist 12 
February 1994, pg. 21. Less frequently such arms are moved by air as in the 
case of the Georgian registered Illyushin IL-76 originating in Pyongyang 
interdicted with 35 tons of weapons following an emergency landing in Bangkok. 
See “North Korean plane carrying smuggled arms seized in Thailand” Sunday 
Guardian 13 December 2009.
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the cargo through ports in Asia and the Near East thought to be lax in illegal 
arms interdiction efforts decreases the chance for the undeclared arms to be 
discovered. After being filled with said unrelated freight in the third country 
the cargo is again mixed with additional innocuous freight in Hong Kong or 
Singapore before shipment to the Middle East24. In furtherance of this illicit 
arms trade the North Koreans have developed some expertise in reverse 
engineering and then producing foreign military hardware. The primary 
manufacturing facility for this enterprise is the Kanggye General Tractor Plant 
number 26 in North Korea‟s Jagang province25. Syria‟s Scientific Study Research 
Center26, for example, entered into an agreement with North Korea‟s Mining 
Development Trading Corp. (KOMID)27, to reverse engineer and produce the 
Russian made Kornet28 antitank missiles used so successfully by Hizballah 
against the IDF during the Summer War.29 KOMID was superseded by Green Pine 
Associated Corporation in 2009 as the major entity involved in illegal arms 
trading on behalf of North Korea.
Syria established diplomatic relations with North Korea in 1966 and began 
receiving some of its own military equipment from the DPRK in the 1980s. Bashar 
Assad, assuming power following his father‟s death in June of 2000 entered into 
a much closer relationship with North Korea than had previously existed. 
Whereas Hafez Assad, the well-known Lion of Damascus, was careful to keep Iran, 
Hizballah, and North Korea at arm‟s length Bashar embraced them in full-fledged 
alliances30. By 2006 Syria was receiving nearly a quarter of its own military 
hardware from North Korea.31 Iran finances many of these Syrian arms purchases 
strengthening its deterrence against Israel, Syria gets a portion of the 
shipments and Hizballah again gets a share.
Some Hizballah cadre received military training by the North Koreans as far 
back as the later 1980s and early 1990s32. Intelligence Online reported Hassan 
Nasrallah himself, as well as Mustafa Badreddine, the organizations counter 
espionage chief during the Summer War, and Ibrahim Akil spent months training 
in North Korea.33 A more substantial North Korean contribution to Hizballah‟s 
order of battle has been the military training provided by Pyongyang to a 
steady stream of senior and command level Hizballah cadre.34 Following the 2006 
war,
24. “How North Korea Goes About Exporting Arms” The Chosun Ilbo 10 March 2010.
25. Ibid. The plant employs upwards of 10,000 workers and is also believed 
involved in chemical weapons production.
26. The Scientific Studies and Research Center included the Syria Higher 
Institute of Applied Science and Technology and the Electronics Institute and 
National Standards and Calibration Laboratory as subsidiary entities.
27. North Korea changed the name of KOMID to Kapmun Tosong Trade following the 
imposition of UN sanctions in 2009. Chasongdang Trade, Heungjin Trading 
Company, and Chongsong Yonhap are North Korea companies likewise involved in 
illicit arms trading. See “N. Korea Fakes Trade Documents to Export WMDs” 
Dong-A Ilbo 1 September 2010.
28. The Kornet E is the model generally used for export was developed by KBP 
instrument Design Bureau based in Tula, the Russian Federation. Eight copies 
were shipped to North Korea by freighter. See Kyodo news agency 2 June 2009.
29. “N. Korea to mass-produce Syria-provided missle” Associated Press, 2 June 
2009.
30. Bergman, Ronen The Secret War With Iran New York, London, Toronto, and 
Sydney: Free Press, 2007, pgs. 354 -355.
31. Shichor, Yitzhak “Evil from the North: The DPRK-Syria Axis and its 
Strategic Dimensions” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol. XIX, No.4, 
Winter 2007, pg. 79.
32. The quality of instruction at facilities popularly designated as terrorist 
training camps varies tremendously. Camps maintained by various Palestinian 
factions in Lebanon over the years focused more on indoctrination and 
inculcation of the faction‟s behavioral norms than on military skills. Training 
provided the Palestinian‟s under Syrian auspices were intended to further 
Syrian foreign policy objectives as was training provided in the old Soviet 
bloc. Iran has developed a more germane and effective camp system for training 
terrorists in relevant military skills and clandestine operations. The North 
Koreans historically were involved in training foreign terrorists to pay for 
Soviet aid to Pyongyang and have continued to engage in the practice to raise 
hard currency since the Soviet aid cutoff in the early 1990s.
33. “Hezbollah a North Korean-Type Guerrilla Force” Intelligence Online 7 
September 2006
34 . The majority of Hizballah guerrillas are, of course, trained in Iran. 
Since the Summer War roughly 300 per month travel from Beirut to Tehran for 
three month training cycles. See “Hizbollah turns to Iran for new weapons and 
training” Independent London 8 April 2008.
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Iran‟s Pasdaran negotiated agreements with Pyongyang to provide training 
courses in North Korea for approximately 100 Hizballah field commanders. That 
training apparently included advanced commando training with North Koreas 
Special Forces as well as intelligence and counter espionage training.35 Arab 
armies have historically suffered from deficiencies in military discipline and 
command and control. North Korea‟s People‟s Army lacks many things but it does 
not lack discipline or command and control. Hizballah, since its founding has 
been relatively well disciplined and North Korean trainers have been able to 
accentuate and focus that discipline in a way that significantly improved 
Hizballah military potential and it‟s resilience under IDF assault. In the 
1990s most Hizballah training in North Korea was likely carried out through the 
VIII Special Corps of the Korea People‟s Army. Joseph Bermudez argued that 
North Korean terrorist training was carried out by the VIII Special Corps of 
the Korea People‟s Army36 as well as the Reconnaissance Bureau operating under 
the General Staff and State Security Department Staff. While in Pyongyang those 
foreign trainees were generally segregated in the Chol Bongri district. There 
were two basic cycles for foreign terrorists being trained in North Korea. A 
three to six month short course has a focus on typical military skills 
traditional to guerrilla forces. A longer twelve to twenty four month course 
had focus on command, intelligence, communication and related skills. It would 
be this longer course that would have been of greater value to Hizballah 
commanders as basic guerrilla training can be done more readily in Iran.37
In 2009 North Korea‟s Reconnaissance General Bureau (also called unit 586) was 
reorganized under Kim Young-chol in a way impacting Hizballahs relationship 
with the DPRK. The espionage departments of the Korean Workers Party, the 
operational military reconnaissance units, and “room 35” managing international 
intelligence were merged within this reorganized Reconnaissance General Bureau 
now reporting directly to the National Defense Commission.38 The current Bureau 
Three under the larger Reconnaissance Bureau is a reconfigured variant of Room 
35 dealing with overseas intelligence (although historically Room 35 had little 
presence in the Near East). Bureau Five of the Reconnaissance General Bureau is 
apparently tasked with information technology operations39 which may include 
number 110 Research Center. The 110 Research Center in addition to employing 
500-600 computer hackers also encompasses overseas branches.40 Given Hizballahs 
notably improved SIGINT capacity evidenced during the Summer War and its 
reportedly improved cyber capabilities there is a reasonable possibility that 
110 Research Center has played a role in Hizballah – North Korean training 
exchanges. To the extent that North Korean personnel have acted as trainers or 
advisors to Hizballah on the ground in Lebanon, Syria, or Iran it is likely 
they were personnel from Bureau Two of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, which 
includes the sniper brigades (an elite special operations force)41 sometimes 
deployed outside North Korea.
35. “Hezbollah Training in North Korea” Intelligence Online 25 April 2007
36 . The VIII Special Corps was created in 1969 and headquartered at Tokchon-up 
with facilities in Wonhung-ri, Yongbyon, Sangwon Haeju, Nampo, and Wonsan. 
Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., editor of KPA Journal, thoughtfully advises that in 
roughly the 1990s time frame VII Special Corps was superceeded by the Light 
Infantry Training Guidance Bureau.
37. Bermudez, Joseph S. North Korean Special Forces Naval institute Press: 
Annapolis, Maryland, 1998, pgs 140-141.
38.”N. Korea‟s Command Center of Clandestine Operations” Chosun IIbo 21 April 
2010.
39. “Reconnaissance General Bureau is heart of NK terrorism” Korea Herald 26 
May 2010.
40. “N. Korea Hacks into S. Korea-U.S. Defense Plans” Chosun IIbo 18 December 
2009. This would presumably be differentiated from Reconnaissance General 
Bureau department six with technical and signals responsibilities.
41. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. “A New Emphasis on Operations Against South Korea” 
38 North, U.S. Korea Institute at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, June 11, 2010.
6 smallwarsjournal.com
UNDERGROUND FORTIFICATION
North Korea historically excelled at tunneling and underground bunker systems. 
In the decades following the Korean War the Korean People‟s Army developed 
tunneling and underground bunker systems in terms of both the particularized 
subterranean engineering skills and a military doctrine to utilize it. The Viet 
Cong applied a number of North Korean lessons in their own tunneling efforts 
during the Indochina conflict in areas like the Cu Chi military district within 
a dozen miles of Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City). Hizballah has likewise applied 
such practices for use against a technologically and numerically superior IDF 
through Tehran‟s relationship with Pyongyang.
In the aftermath of the 2006 Summer War Hizballah both expanded its military 
infrastructure into the Northern reaches of the Bekka Valley and developed a 
more extensive tunnel and bunker system42 in the Eastern Bekka along the border 
with Syria.43 The tunnel and bunker system that so shocked the Israelis44 
during the Summer War was built under North Korean direction locally 
coordinated through General Mir Faysal Baqr Zadah of the IRGC, primarily in 
2003 and 2004. The configuration and parameters of the tunnel system closely 
mirror the layout of such tunnels in the DMZ separating North and South Korea45.
In the region south of the Litani river there were upwards of 600 ammunition 
and weapons bunkers. The Islamic Resistance fighters in south Lebanon‟s Shi‟a 
villages were assigned one primary and two reserve munitions bunkers with local 
Hezbollah commanders knowing only the location of bunkers in their area of 
operations. Hizballah command bunkers were generally constructed to a depth of 
40 meters. The construction process itself across south Lebanon involved a 
large number of successful deception operations. Bunkers constructed at 
locations identified as monitored by Israeli drones and those built under the 
observation of local Lebanese known by Hizballah to be compromised to Israel 
were generally decoys. Hizballah successfully concealed the construction of 
most of their active bunkers throughout the theater of operations46. Bunker 
systems in the Bekka Valley also created with the assistance of the Pasdaran 
included entire underground weapons warehouses at a depth of eight or more 
meters as well as an alleged central operations room under the joint 
supervision of four Pasdaran and four Hizballah officers47. The North Koreans 
helping to build the underground system were apparently secreted into Lebanon 
using the guise of „domestic workers‟ for Iranian diplomats.48 The North 
Koreans were assisted by Iranian engineers in constructing far-reaching tunnel 
and
42. IDF nomenclature sometimes refers to these as „nature reserves‟
43 . “Targeting Iran‟s tunnel builders” UPI 9 March 2009.
44. It probably also surprised the analysts at the Underground Facility 
Analysis Center in the United States whose job it is to map and analyze such 
facilities primarily in the context of nuclear weapons but also terrorist 
organizations. It is likely that analysts at the U.S. center had not 
successfully mapped or understood the system (or, if they did, it didn‟t make 
any difference in the war). The Israelis never knocked the bunker system out 
and Hizballah‟s command and control never broke down indicating the Israeli 
AMAN SIGINT unit 8200 likewise failed to listen in on relevant communication. 
Prior to the conflict Israel had managed to “paint” some of these bunkers with 
chemicals to assist the IAF in targeting but the bunker system ultimately could 
not be eliminated by the IAF.
45. See “The North Korean Connection” Jerusalem Post 21 May 2010.
46. See Lindermann, Captain Marc “The 2006 Lebanon War and the Evolution of 
Iranian Guard Tactics” Military Review May-June 2010, p. 107.
47. “Iranian officer: Hezbollah has commando naval unit” Sharq al-Awsat 29 July 
2006. It is worth noting in this context that the United States Army spent an 
inordinate amount of time during the Vietnam conflict chasing the ever 
ephemeral COSVN (Central Office South Viet Nam) thought to be in command of the 
communist war effort in the south. No such office was ever found.
48 . Ibid.
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bunker system that meandered for 25 kilometers49. The IRGC defector Ali Nuri 
Zadah, described parts of the system as having some openings of 12 to 18 square 
meters, mobile floors with each element of the system having four openings 
allowing the free movement of fighters.50 Some of the border bunkers, 
particularly the command bunkers, were of poured concrete at 40 meters below 
the surface.51 Apparently there were ten or more tunnel and bunker networks 
spread across south Lebanon. One such network publically identified covered 
roughly two square kilometers with dozens of command bunkers inside the network 
divided into two or three rooms each52. Elements of South Lebanons operational 
bunker system were lined with painted steel plates and power cables. Likewise 
Hizballah rocket firing positions were sometimes associated with these bunkers 
with one example showing a pair of firing pits at a depth of roughly five 
meters with foot thick poured concrete frames reinforced with Hesco blast walls 
and covered with sand bags. These well camaflouged firing pits allowed rockets 
to be fired with minimal heat signatures, further limited by themal blankets, 
rendering the positions nearly invisible to Israeli airborne sensors.53
CONCLUSIONS
Hizballah relations with North Korea are different than were the relations 
between the Palestinians and their many sponsors. North Korean interests are 
purely mercenary whereas Syria and other powers favored various Palestinian 
factions and promoted one over another in furtherance of competing national 
interests. The Palestinians never formed a coherent military threat against 
Israel. Fatah, the PFLP, and the amalgam of Palestinian factions were trained 
and supported by states with mutually antagonistic interests respecting each 
other as well as Israel. The Palestinians were united ethnically and 
politically in their grievance against Israel but militarily they were 
scattered to the winds. Hizballah, though catalyzed by Iran, grew organically 
from Lebanon‟s Shi‟a community and became ethnically, politically, and 
militarily coherent.
The nexus between Hizballah and North Korea is enabled by Iran as Tehran inches 
toward regional great power status. Iran‟s classical Safavid‟s aspirations for 
greatness saw echoes in Khomeini‟s Velayat-e Faqih. Hizballah, as the dominate 
actor in the confederation forming the Lebanese government, is now as much ally 
as asset to Tehran. North Korea meanwhile, is less an ally to Iran or 
Hizballah; but rather a state with limited interests corresponding to Tehran‟s 
national interests. Iran‟s facilitation of North Korean assistance to 
Hizballah, as well as Syria, is a move furthering Iran‟s aspirations as a 
regional great power. The Persians played chess before the Arabs and centuries 
prior to the Europeans. They understand the complexities of the game. Iran‟s 
deft use of North Korea in support of Hizballah may maneuver opponents of 
Tehran‟s great power status into checkmate.
Bibliography
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Formation.” Infantry. 94 (3) May / June 2005: pgs. 21-26.
49. The major firms owned by the IRGC and specializing in underground 
engineering include Fater Engineering Institute, Imen Sazen Consultant 
Engineers Institute, and the Makin and Rahab Institutes. All are subsidiaries 
of Khatam al- Anbia. See “Targeting Iran‟s tunnel builders” UPI 9 March 2009.
50 . “Mining for trouble in Lebanon” Jerusalem Post 29 October 2007.
51 . “IDF: Hizbullah built mass bunker network” Ynet News 20 July 2006.
52. “Israeli troops use truce to hunt Hezbollah tunnels” Khaleej Times 28 
August 2006.
53. “Inside Hizballah‟s Hidden Bunkers” Time 29 March 2007.
8 smallwarsjournal.com
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Kan, Paul Rexton, Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr. and Robert M. Collins “Criminal 
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Military Review May-June 2010: 105-116.
Miller, Judith. God Has Ninety Nine Names. New York: Touchstone Books, 1996.
Ransthorp, Magnus “Hizbollah‟s Command Leadership: Its Structure, 
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Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions.” Terrorism and Political 
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Shahahan, Roger. The Shi‟a of Lebanon: Clans, Parties and Clerics. London
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Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol. XIX, No.4, Winter 2007: 71 – 92.
Carl Anthony Wege is a Professor of Political Science at the College of Coastal 
Georgia and has previously published a variety of materials on Hizballah.
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