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The Moscow Attack and Airport Security


January 27, 2011 | 0954 GMT 

By Scott Stewart

The Jan. 24 bombing at Moscow
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110124-update-russian-airport-bombing>
's Domodedovo International Airport killed 35 people and injured more than
160. The attack occurred at approximately 4:40 p.m. as passengers from
several arriving international flights were leaving the airport after
clearing immigration and customs. The attacker (or attackers; reports are
still conflicting over whether the attack was conducted by a man or a man
and a woman together
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110126-above-tearline-challenges-investi
gating-terrorist-attacks> ) entered the international arrivals hall of the
airport, a part of the facility that is outside the secure area and that is
commonly packed with crowds of relatives and taxi and limo drivers waiting
to meet travelers. 

Once the attacker was in the midst of the waiting crowd and exiting
passengers, the improvised explosive device that he (or she) carried was
detonated. It is not clear at this point whether the device was
command-detonated by the attacker as a traditional suicide bomb or if the
device was remotely detonated by another person. The attack was most likely
staged by Islamist militants from Russia's Northern Caucasus region who have
conducted a long series of attacks in Russia, including the Aug. 24, 2004,
suicide bombings that destroyed two Russian airliners
<http://www.stratfor.com/russia_chechen_women_suspected_crashes> . 

The Domodedovo attack serves as a striking illustration of several trends we
have been following for years now, including the difficulty of preventing
attacks against soft targets, the resourcefulness of militants in
identifying such targets and the fixation militants have on aviation-related
targets.


Soft Targets


By definition, soft targets are those targets that are vulnerable to attack
due to the absence of adequate security. Adequate security may be absent for
a number of reasons, including disregard for the threat and lack of
competent forces to conduct security, but most often soft targets are "soft"
because of the sheer number of potential targets that exist and the
impossibility of protecting them all. Even totalitarian police states have
not demonstrated the capability to protect everything, so it is quite
understandable that more liberal democratic countries do not possess the
ability to provide airtight security for every potential target. 

Moreover, some measures required to provide airtight security for soft
targets are often seen as intrusive by citizens of countries where personal
freedom is valued and the financial cost associated with providing such
security measures is often seen as excessive. There is an old security
truism that states: "If you try to protect everything all the time you will
protect nothing." Because of this reality, policymakers must use
intelligence gained from militant groups, along with techniques such as risk
assessment and risk management, to help them decide how best to allocate
their limited security resources. While this will help protect the targets
the government deems most sensitive or valuable, it will also ensure that
some things remain unprotected or under-protected. Those things become soft
targets. 

While most militants would prefer to attack traditional high-profile targets
such as embassies and government buildings, those sites have become far more
difficult to attack in the post-9/11 world. At the same time, the relentless
pursuit of terrorist operatives by the United States and its allies has
resulted in the degradation of the capabilities and reach of groups such as
al Qaeda. Today the threat posed to the West stems primarily from grassroots
militants and jihadist franchises
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110120-jihadism-2011-persistent-grassroo
ts-threat>  rather than the al Qaeda core. While this has broadened the
threat, it has also made it shallower, since grassroots operatives are far
less capable of spectacular and strategic attacks
<http://www.stratfor.com/al_qaeda_and_strategic_threat_u_s_homeland>  than
the professional terrorist cadre of the al Qaeda core. 

The combination of increased security at hard targets and the reduced
capabilities of militant operatives has resulted in militant planners
shifting their targeting toward softer targets, which are easier to attack.
As a result of this shift, targets such as hotels have replaced embassies
and other hardened sites
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090901_security_militant_threat_hotels>
in militant target selection. 

Generally, militants prefer to attack soft targets where there are large
groups of people, that are symbolic and recognizable around the world and
that will generate maximum media attention when attacked. Some past examples
include the World Trade Center in New York, the Taj Mahal Hotel in Mumbai
and the London Underground. The militants' hope is that if the target meets
these criteria, terror magnifiers like the media
<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20101229-separating-terror-terrorism>  will
help the attackers produce a psychological impact that goes far beyond the
immediate attack site - a process we refer to as "creating vicarious
victims." The best-case scenario for the attackers is that this
psychological impact will also produce an adverse economic impact against
the targeted government. 

Unlike hard targets, which frequently require attackers to use large teams
of operatives with elaborate attack plans or very large explosive devices in
order to breach defenses, soft targets offer militant planners an advantage
in that they can frequently be attacked by a single operative or small team
using a simple attack plan. The failed May 1, 2010, attack against New York
<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100505_uncomfortable_truths_times_square_a
ttack> 's Times Square and the July 7, 2005, London Underground attacks
<http://www.stratfor.com/tactical_realities_counterterrorism_war>  are prime
examples of this, as was the Jan. 24 attack at Domodedovo airport. Such
attacks are relatively cheap and easy to conduct and can produce a
considerable propaganda return for very little investment. 


Shifting Fire


In Russia, militants from the Northern Caucasus have long attacked soft
targets
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110125-north-caucasus-militant-attacks-r
ussia> , including buses, trains, the Moscow Metro, hotels, a hospital, a
theater, a rock concert, shopping centers, apartment buildings, a school and
now the soft side of Domodedovo airport. 

In the case of Domodedovo, the past two attacks involving the facility are a
clear illustration of the process by which militants shift to softer targets
in response to security improvements. In August 2004, Chechen militants were
able to exploit lax security on the domestic side of Domodedovo in order to
smuggle two suicide devices aboard two targeted aircraft, which they used to
blow up the planes. In response to that attack, security at the airport was
increased. The Jan. 24 Domodedovo attack seems to have confirmed the
effectiveness of these security improvements - the militants apparently
believed they could no longer smuggle their suicide device aboard an
aircraft. However, they adjusted their targeting and decided to conduct an
attack against a vulnerable soft spot - the arrivals hall - located in the
midst of the hardened airport target. 

>From a tactical standpoint, the attack at Domodedovo was a logical response
to increased security designed to keep explosives off aircraft. This attack
also demonstrates, significantly, that the militants behind it maintained
the intent to hit aviation-related targets, a fixation we have discussed
<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20101123_aviation_security_threats_and_reali
ties>  for some time now. One reason for this fixation is the impact that
aviation-related attacks have on terror magnifiers. This was seen in the
international response to the Domodedovo attacks, which was much larger than
the response to twin suicide bombings
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100329_red_alert_bombing_moscow_special_
intelligence_guidance>  of the Moscow Metro in March 2010. Even though the
Metro bombings produced more fatalities, they did not resonate with the
international media as the airport attack did. This media response to the
most recent Domodedovo attack was presumably enhanced by the fact that it
killed several foreigners.

This difference in international reaction is significant, and will certainly
be noted by militants planning future terrorist attacks. In all likelihood,
it will also serve to solidify their fixation on aviation-related targets
and on soft targets such as arrival halls that are located in the midst of
harder aviation targets. It must be noted, however, that this concept is not
altogether new: Militants have long targeted the soft area outside airports'
security hardlines. Ticket desks were attacked by the Abu Nidal Organization
in Rome and Vienna
<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100526_failed_bombings_armed_jihadist_assa
ults>  in December 1985, and more recently the El Al ticket desk at Los
Angeles International Airport
<http://www.stratfor.com/attack_new_york_lone_wolf_threat>  was attacked by
a gunman in July 2002 and an unsuccessful car bomb attack
<http://www.stratfor.com/u_k_plotters_al_qaeda_links_not_likely_useful>
against the main entrance of the international airport in Glasgow, Scotland,
was conducted by a grassroots jihadist in June 2007. 

In the wake of the Domodedovo attack, security has been increased in the
arrival halls of Russian airports - a step that has been instituted
elsewhere in order to make the traveling public feel secure. However, such
measures are costly and will tie up security personnel who will then be
unavailable to protect other sites. Because of this, these measures will
likely be short-lived, and airports will return to "normal" in a matter of
months. Furthermore, even when security is increased in areas such as
arrival halls, the very nature of airports dictates that there will always
be areas outside the rings of security where people will congregate - either
to meet travelers or as they wait to clear security screening. While the
threat can be pushed away from the airport building, in other words, it
cannot be completely alleviated. Because of this, there will always be soft
areas that are impossible to protect using traditional security measures.
However, facilities that employ non-traditional security measures like
protective intelligence and countersurveillance
<http://www.stratfor.com/themes/surveillance_and_countersurveillance>  will
be able to protect this type of soft area far more effectively than
facilities relying solely on physical security measures. 

The bottom line for travelers and security managers is that plots to attack
aviation-related targets will continue and the array of aviation-related
soft targets such as ticket desks and arrival halls will remain vulnerable
to attack. A persistent, low-level threat to these targets does not mean the
sky is falling, but it should prompt travelers to take some simple steps
that can help minimize the time spent on the soft side of the airport
<http://www.stratfor.com/travel_security_self_preservation_techniques_airlin
e_passengers> . And, as always, travelers should practice an appropriate
level of situational awareness
<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100609_primer_situational_awareness>  so
they can see trouble developing and take measures to avoid it.

 

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STRATFOR, at the beginning or end of the report.

"The Moscow Attack and Airport Security
<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110126-moscow-attack-airport-security>  is
republished with permission of STRATFOR."



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