FYI: Ralph Langner is considered to be the world expert on Stuxnet by many
in the field.


How to Hijack a Controller


Why Stuxnet Isn't Just About Siemens' PLCs


01/13/2011

http://www.controlglobal.com/articles/2011/IndustrialControllers1101.html?pa
ge=full

 

By Ralph Langner

 

So many speculations and hot air surround Stuxnet that it can't hurt to
check for some hard evidence in order not to get lost in fiction and FUD.
The best source for information is Stuxnet itself and the attack code that
is loaded to the controllers.

 

Stuxnet's controller attack code is loaded on target controllers by the
rogue DLL s7otbxdx.dll, which wraps the legitimate vendor DLL. It contains
three 64-bit-encrypted Step7 code sets. These code sets are decrypted and
loaded by the rogue DLL when connected to matching targets, where matches
are found by digital fingerprinting.

 

The three malicious Step7 code sets can be further subdivided into two code
sets that load on S7-315 controllers and one code set that loads on S7-417
controllers. For readers not familiar with the Siemens product line, the
S7-315 is a small general-purpose controller with 256 KB of memory, while
the S7-417 is the top-of-the-line product with 30 MB of memory. The latter
is available in redundant and failsafe variants and is used, among other
applications, in power plant turbine control. The two code sets for the 315
basically do the same thing and vary only in detail. Since they are so
similar in structure and functions, they will be treated in this article as
one routine. The 315 and 417 attack routines, however, are considerably
different.

 

A Stealth Control System

 

In a nutshell, Stuxnet can be thought of as a stealth control system that
resides on its target controllers along with legitimate program code. The
ultimate goal of the attack is not the controller; it is what the controller
controls. Attack code analysis reveals that the attackers had full knowledge
of project, installation and instrumentation details. The attackers took
great care to make sure that only their designated targets were hit. It was
a marksmen's job. On target, the attack is surgical and takes advantage of
deep process and equipment knowledge. The attack is not performed in a
hit-and-run style, where it would be executed immediately after attaching to
the controller or at the next best opportunity. Instead, the attack code
carefully monitors the hijacked process for extended periods of time before
executing the strike. Outputs are then controlled by Stuxnet, with neither
legitimate program code nor any attached operator panel or SCADA system
noticing. Stuxnet combines denial of control and denial of view, providing
for the ultimate aggressive attack.


The hackers concieved the most aggressive cyber attack on a controller:
denial of control combined with denial of view. The controller is no longer
controlling I/O, but doesn't recognize that. The same is true for the HMI
and for operators. In the meantime, Stuxnet writes to outputs at its
discretion. 


DEADFOOT


The 315 attack uses approximately 3000 lines of Step7 STL code and four
small data blocks (DB 888...891).  Rogue STL code is logically structured in
function calls (FC). Two of these functions, namely FC 1865 and FC 1874, are
injected into OB 1 and OB 35, respectively, which also check for the
infamous "Deadfoot" condition that is returned by the FCs mentioned. (The
attackers actually used the term DeadF007, but this appears to be leetspeak
for Deadfoot.) On any S7 controller, OB 1 is the main sweep that is
continuously executed. OB 35 is the 100-msec timer.

 

During the Deadfoot condition, which may take up to 50 minutes, control is
taken away from the legitimate controller program by simply calling a
conditional block end (BEC) directive instead of passing control flow on to
legitimate code. In effect, execution of legitimate controller code is
simply halted during the Deadfoot condition, which must have been
unrecognizable to both the legitimate code and any attached SCADA software,
and also to any human operators in the proximity.

 

Another noteworthy attack technique in the 315 attack code that tells
researchers a lot about the attackers' capabilities is an intercept of the
DP_RECV system function. On an S7 controller, this function is called to
read the process image of a specific Profibus network. The 315 attack code
hooks this function, which few people knew is technically possible, and
monitors process variables from the attached devices by calling the original
DP_RECV, which is renamed by the attack code. In addition to monitoring the
values from up to 31 devices in up to six Profibus networks, they are passed
along unchanged to legitimate code. Changing values during the attack is not
necessary because the legitimate code is no longer in control anyway. During
the attack-which, remember, can take up to 50 minutes-fixed values stored in
DB 888 are written to the attached actuators.

 

The 417 attack routine is much more complex. It consists of approximately
12000 lines of Step7 STL code and accesses a total of 10 data blocks. Two of
the data blocks (DB 8062, 8063) are statically loaded from the rogue DLL;
one is dynamically loaded from the rogue DLL (DB 8061); and seven are
dynamically created at runtime by the rogue STL code (DB 8064.8070).
Especially noteworthy is DB 8063, with a size of 26,790 bytes, containing a
16-kbyte array. Again, rogue STL code is grouped into logical FCs. The entry
point to these functions is provided by a code injection in OB 1, the main
sweep.


Man in the Middle


The most noteworthy technical feature of the 417 attack is a full-blown
man-in-the-middle attack on the controller. Rogue code intercepts physical
I/O and provides the legitimate program running on the controller with
"normal" input patterns that are actually pre-recorded by Stuxnet. It's
similar to what you've seen in Hollywood movies. During the heist, the
observation camera is fed with unsuspicious footage, keeping the guards
happy.

 

This is not an analogy. It is exactly how Stuxnet does it. In order to do
that, Stuxnet has changed the controller program at configuration time to
disable automatic updates of input process and output process
images-something that is configurable on S7-400 controllers. Add to that the
fact that the input process image is read/write instead of read-only. Then
you can conceive the most aggressive cyber attack on a controller: denial of
control, combined with denial of view. The controller is no longer
controlling I/O, but doesn't recognize that. The same is true for the HMI
and for operators. In the meantime, Stuxnet writes to outputs at its
discretion.

 

Even though Stuxnet is not a generic attack, several parts of the attack, in
fact, are generic and easy to copy. With these generic attack techniques at
his or her disposal, a follow-up attacker may not only implement a similar
targeted and surgical strike, but may choose to create widespread, random
havoc. 

 

Some have speculated that the attackers' goal might have been to send out a
message, such as, "You are vulnerable. We can take over control if we
wanted." From code analysis, this theory can be ruled out, since the
attackers could have achieved this goal with far fewer man-months of effort.
For example, a simple code injection in OB 1 would have been enough to make
that point clear, perhaps with a string-coded message such as "gotcha." Code
analysis makes it clear that Stuxnet is not about sending a message or
proving a concept. It is about destroying its targets with utmost
determination in military style. 


A Generic Attack


Another assumption about Stuxnet that should be corrected is that it would
require extreme insider knowledge to repeat a Stuxnet-like attack. For
control system engineers, it is easy to understand why this does not hold
true. Even though Stuxnet as such is not a generic attack on control
systems, several parts of the attack in fact are generic, and these generic
parts are easy to copy. With these generic attack techniques at his or her
disposal, a follow-up attacker may not only implement a similar targeted and
surgical strike, but may choose to create widespread, random havoc, using
any vendor's controller. In order to understand how this could be done,
let's look at the generic attack parts in detail.

 

First of all, there's the code injection. It is the major prerequisite for
hijacking a controller. We would not need to care much about the other
attack techniques if the code injection didn't work, because rogue code
would never be called, even after having made it onto the controller. A
would-be attacker who studies Stuxnet long enough will be able to determine
how the code injection is done. After being able to inject code into any of
the operation blocks, the attacker is in business. Injected code may now
perform specific process disruptions using insider knowledge, as in
Stuxnet's case. However, it may also perform a generic attack with zero
insider knowledge. For example, injected code may simply delay or stop the
process, for example, based on timer triggers or just randomly.

 

Second, there are the system function hooks. Hooking functions such as
DP_RECV can be used for some very nasty attacks that can be extremely
difficult to detect. For example, an attacker can simply modify values that
are then passed along to the legitimate program some of the time-either
triggered by a specific time of day or randomly, causing legitimate process
logic to respond to false process values.

 

This is not done by Stuxnet, but Stuxnet demonstrates how the system
functions can be abused. Before Stuxnet, few people would have even thought
about illegitimate code in controller system functions.

 

Third, and most important, there is the full-blown, man-in-the-middle attack
on the 417. It works on any S7-400. This attack alone, without any further
targeted output manipulations, would cause havoc in most installations,
since the legitimate program would no longer respond to sensor value
changes. Alarms will not be triggered, and operators will not take action
until disaster has struck. The man-in-the-middle attack should be reason
enough for all asset owners to thoroughly re-check their safety instrumented
architectures.

 

Once that these generic attack techniques are implemented in exploit tools,
which are sometimes referred to as "penetration testing frameworks," all
bets are off. Mitigation of any of these exploits is very difficult, and
this is perhaps the worst news about Stuxnet. Protecting against
Stuxnet-inspired attacks takes time, effort and money.

It has often been argued that a defense-in-depth approach would be the best
mitigation. While defense-in-depth certainly doesn't hurt, it must be
acknowledged that it does not help to prevent or even recognize controllers
compromised by authorized engineering stations. The most effective
prevention of controller hijacking would be digitally signed controller code
and configuration. With today's technology, this can be implemented easily.
It can be expected that controller vendors will see this as a major business
opportunity because the outlook to replace millions of controllers before
end-of-lifetime with upgraded product versions means a multi-million dollar
market. Less efficient, but much cheaper solutions have just become
available that detect and report configuration and code changes of
network-attached S7 controllers.

  _____  

size=2 width="100%" align=center> 

Ralph Langner is the principal at Langner Communications,  Hamburg,Germany,
www.langner.com/en.



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