http://www.caseyresearch.com/premium-publications/caseys-club?redirectId=174

 


Fifty Ways to Leave Your Lender


by Terry Coxon
 
<http://www.caseyresearch.com/crpmkt/crpSolo.php?id=174&ppref=LEW174EM1209A>
Casey Research

 


 

        

 

 

It was Otto von Bismarck who explained that "politics is the art of the
possible." We can thank him for that much, but he didn't tell the whole
story. I'll give you the rest of it. Politics is the art of the possible
fictions you can get away with. 

Politics is mostly dissembling, and the dissembling is mostly about dodging
personal responsibility for the messes governments make. It works out that
way because making messes is most of what governments do. So when we ponder
how the U.S. government will go about defaulting on its debts, a good way to
approach the question is to consider how a default might be presented.

At this point there is no room for doubting that the government will renege
on the commitments it has made to give people money. The $9.2 trillion in
Treasury securities held by the public is just the tip of the iceberg.
Estimates differ, but if you add in the unfunded obligations for Social
Security and Medicare, it's hard to avoid getting a total that exceeds $80
trillion. That works out to $260,000 for every man, woman, and child in the
country, including the two-year olds. It can't be paid, so it won't be paid.


But don't expect any clarity about the matter. Whatever happens, you can
count on it not being called a default. No one in the U.S. government is
going to say, "Tough luck, Treasury bond investors. We're not going to pay
you another dime. Go pound sand." And no politician is going to tell the 51
million Americans on Social Security, "If you're fit enough to pump that
rocker, you're fit enough to work." It will all be done far more
diplomatically.

Entitlement Euthanasia

Defaulting on Social Security is a lesser public relations challenge than
defaulting on U.S. Treasury securities because the promise of a monthly
Social Security check has always been a promise in flux. Payout rates have
been raised repeatedly and now are indexed for inflation. On the other side
of the ledger, the rates and ceilings on FICA tax have been raised
repeatedly, as have the eligibility ages. It's easier to renege on a quid
pro quo when neither the quid nor the quo is ever allowed to come to rest.

Also helping to make a default on Social Security politically manageable is
that each participant has been promised something different. Some people are
owed a lifetime annuity right now. Others are owed something that isn't
scheduled to start until 40 years from now. So the politicians have a way to
focus the default on the groups who aren't inclined to complain too much -
the people who are aren't expecting to receive anything soon.

One way to focus the default on the far tomorrow is to steadily increase the
eligibility age. For example, the eligibility age could be raised by one
month every calendar year.

The government already has some practice at this. When the program began,
the age for eligibility was 65. Now the eligibility age for full benefits
depends on when a person was born. If you didn't open your eyes before 1960,
your eligibility age is 67.

A secular rise in the eligibility age would shrink the government's Social
Security debt to whatever size the government is actually able to pay. It
could even be used, with little pain, to eliminate the program altogether.
You could call it euthanasia for Social Security, although your congressman
surely won't.

The trillions in unfunded Medicare promises can be shrunk to a manageable
size in much the same way - gradually raise the age for eligibility. And it
all can be done in the name of "protecting the system so that the elderly
can count on receiving every dime they have been promised."

Shrugging Off Treasury Debt

Defaulting on U.S. Treasury securities while denying the fact is a bigger
challenge, but it can be done.

One avenue would be default through inflation. Pay all the dollars that have
been promised, but make those dollars smaller and smaller in purchasing
power. That would be simple to accomplish if all the Treasury securities
outstanding were 30-year bonds. Over a period of 30 years, a price inflation
rate of just 10% per year would vaporize 94% of the purchasing power of a
30-year bond. Poof! No more debt problem.

But in fact the trillions in U.S. Treasury securities aren't all 30-year
bonds. The average maturity of Treasury debt (bonds, notes, and bills) is
only six years. As debt comes due, it can be refinanced only by issuing new
bonds, notes, or bills at then current interest rates - which would be
rising to match the market's experience with inflation.

So for the government to default on its debt through inflation, it wouldn't
be enough for the Federal Reserve to engineer a high inflation rate and
stick to it. The default would require progressively higher and higher
inflation rates, to outpace the rise in interest rates that the preceding
year's price inflation would constantly be fueling. 

Eroding the dollar's value may turn out to be an important element in
shrugging off debt, but given an average debt maturity of just six years,
the shrinking-dollar strategy couldn't accomplish enough without pushing
inflation rates toward triple digits. To rely on inflation as the primary
means of default without going near triple-digit territory, the government
would first need to lengthen the average maturity of Treasury debt, for
example by replacing maturing T-bills with long-term bonds. The cover story
would be about the prudence of issuing long-term debt with a fixed, known
interest cost, rather than being subject to the interest rate volatility of
the T-bill market.

Another maneuver to lengthen the maturity of Treasury debt, in preparation
for a slow default through inflation, is for the government to announce that
while it is committed to paying everything it owes, it just can't pay it on
time. But not to worry, because the government will continue to pay interest
- at whatever rate was promised when the security was issued - for as long
as the delay persists. That would in effect turn T-bills and Treasury notes
into long-term T-bonds. That seems heavy-handed, but it still leaves room
for denying the fact of a default. And it's been done before by a number of
countries, under the label of "rescheduling."

A Political Triple Play

If the government decides to take any of these approaches to a deniable
default, it would be politically more advantageous to stiff foreigners
rather than U.S. investors. That would require getting most of the
outstanding Treasury securities into the hands of foreigners. It could be
done.

The U.S. imposes withholding at a rate of 30% on dividends and other types
of investment income paid to non-U.S. investors. But there is a very broad
exemption for interest payments. So under current rules, foreigners can
invest in most types of bonds issued in the U.S. without losing anything to
withholding. 

A simple way to stick foreigners with the pain of a default would be to
extend the withholding system to cover corporate bonds but not Treasury
bonds. Non-U.S. investors would then have a compelling motive to replace
their holdings of U.S. corporate bonds with Treasury bonds. T-bonds would
flow out of the U.S. and corporate bonds would flow in. Most of the
portfolio adjusting would be done within a year or so. Then the government
would change the rules again. Withholding would be extended to Treasury
bonds, at 30%, or at some higher rate, say 40%.

Most of the value (and most of the debt burden) represented by a long-term
bond is in the interest payments, not in the principal. Imposing withholding
on the interest at a rate of 40% comes close to a 40% default on the debt.
It would be done in the name of balancing the budget (everyone's for that)
and as a counterattack on tax havens (where devious rich people hide their
money), and it would be done to foreigners (many of whom are Chinese
exporters that have been taking advantage of the U.S. for far too long). A
political triple play.

  _____  

 



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