http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/awst/2011/03/28/AW_
03_28_2011_p25-301117.xml
<http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/awst/2011/03/28/AW
_03_28_2011_p25-301117.xml&headline=Libya%20Has%20Advanced%20Russian%20SAMs&
channel=awst> &headline=Libya%20Has%20Advanced%20Russian%20SAMs&channel=awst


 


Libya Has Advanced Russian SAMs



Mar 29, 2011 

By David A. Fulghum, Robert Wall
Washington, London      

 

Establishing a no-fly zone over -Libya may not be a massive challenge for
the coalition trying to enforce -United Nations Security Council Resolution
1793, but the operation has nevertheless exposed serious military and
political pitfalls.

One of those surprises is the unexpected and elusive threat from a
sophisticated surface-to-air missile (SAM) that Libya fielded virtually
unnoticed-the NATO-designated SA-24 "Grinch." Its presence on the
battlefield underscores the need for coalition partners to draw on the full
spectrum of electronic warfare capabilities to prosecute their air campaign.
The missile also poses a latent threat to low-flying cargo aircraft once
relief, medical, evacuation and rebuilding missions begin. Expectations are
that these much-sought-after weapons will slip into the black market and
into the hands of lawless groups that will want to stop aid to any of the
sides involved in the Libyan conflict.

The presence-not announced yet-of the jam-resistance weapon was a surprise
to U.S. and international military analysts because there have been only
rumors of a possible Igla-S/SA-24 sale to Libya and no mention of it in
officials sources, such as the U.N. Arms Register. Pictures of the SA-24
have appeared on television since the start of the war, but were not
publicly identified by the intelligence community.

"The SA-24, or Igla-S, is an improved variant of the SA-18 'Grouse'-or
Igla-with better performance, lethality and countermeasures resistance,"
says Douglas Barrie, senior fellow for military aerospace at London's
International Institute for Strategic Studies. "It is believed to have a
maximum slant range of up to 6,000 meters [3.7 mi.] and a maximum engagement
altitude of 3,500 meters. Development of the system appears to have been
completed early in the last decade. The SA-24 represents a credible threat
to aircraft, helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles operating within its
engagement envelope."

There is a question about whether the SA-24 systems sold to the Libyans can
be removed from their small-truck mounts and used as man-portable air
defense systems (manpads), or if they are instead considered part of an
integrated system. From the pictures, the weapon's flexibility is not
apparent.

"If you were to ask me which SAMs are the threat right now, I would say the
unlocated mobile ones [SA-6 'Gainfuls' and SA-8 'Geckos' on tracked vehicles
and SA-24s welded into the beds of pickup trucks] rather than the
fixed-site, easily targeted ones," says a U.S. defense official. "The mobile
ones are extremely dangerous-both radar-guided and manpad-based systems."

Concern over radar-guided, pop-up SAM threats has driven the Pentagon to
operate its EA-18G Growlers over Libya. Italy also has contributed
radar-locating Tornado ECRs to the coalition operation.

The surviving longer-range SAMs are radar-guided SA-6s (7-km altitude) and
SA-8s (5-km altitude). The mobile SAMs are still on the loose, but
radar-guided missile systems and their supporting communications and data
links are being degraded by an active electronic attack campaign that
includes jamming and some cybernetwork penetration activity, say U.S.
officials who are analyzing the campaign on a real-time basis. That leaves
optically guided and infrared-guided weapons as the main threat to coalition
aircraft flying over Libya, which makes the IR-guided SA-24 the most potent
current threat.

"This is not an operation without risk," says the U.S. defense analyst. "We
are putting people in harm's way. [The coalition aircraft] are the only
things in the sky right now, so target de-confliction is not an issue for
the bad guys."

Airborne electronic attack and information warfare are being conducted by
Navy Growlers in a "stand-in" role and by Air Force EC-130 Compass Calls and
RC-135 Rivet Joints. Also participating are EP-3 Aries II and advanced,
specially modified P-3s that were designated as patrol utility units before
being integrated into standard patrol squadrons as an operational disguise.
EC-130J Commando Solo aircraft conduct specialized media broadcasts and
other information operations.

Britain also dispatched several high-end, intelligence-gathering
systems-including the Sentinel R1 ground surveillance and Nimrod R1 signals
intelligence aircraft-to support the operation from RAF Akrotiri, Cyprus.
All these assets aided in destroying Libya's fixed, air-defense force of
SA-2 "Guideline," SA-3 "Goa" and SA-9 "Gammon" SAMs by providing precision
targeting for more than 160 Tomahawk and several Storm Shadow cruise
missiles. U.S. officials indicate the campaign against fixed sites has been
successful; and Air Vice Marshal Greg Bagwell, the RAF officer in charge of
the air operations, says the Libyan air force is effectively destroyed.

While states are supposed to report the transfer of man-portable missiles to
the U.N. Arms Register, many do not and they are not in violation of
national or international law. Also, transfers can been made through third
parties.

Questions raised by the photos involve identifying who sold the systems to
Libya and when.

Matt Schroeder, director of the arms-sales-monitoring project for the
Federation of American Scientists, says there is no record of such an arms
transfer in the U.N. registry. "One of the key concerns regarding the SA-24
missiles and launchers is their utility to terrorists who tend to favor man-
or crew-portable systems over vehicle-mounted systems should the weapons be
diverted to the black market," he says. "It's not clear whether [the Libyan
missiles] fit that description.

"We must first identify the model of the SA-24 missile launcher and whether
it can easily be taken off the light truck on which [it is] currently
mounted and used as a stand-alone weapon by a small, autonomous crew of
dismounted infantry," Schroeder says. Another key question is "whether the
SA-24s used with the [truck-mounted] launchers can be used with man-portable
gripstocks. If the answer to both is 'no,' then the danger of the system
being acquired and used by terrorists is significantly diminished.

"If the answer to either question is 'yes,' then more questions follow,
including when were the systems transferred, since manpad transfers were not
required to be reported before 2003 and submissions for 2010 have not been
published yet," he says. Yet another determinant would be whether "they come
directly from Russia or were they transfers [from an intermediate buyer]?"
Venezuela, for example, is buying thousands of SA-24s, and international
watchdog groups worry that they will end up in the hands of
narco-traffickers and insurgent groups.

There will be ample need for political after-action fine-tuning of the
coalition. Although France and the U.K. pushed no-fly zone approval through
the U.N., and France kicked off the air campaign with attacks near Benghazi,
the bulk of the operational heavy-lifting was initially carried out by the
U.S. France-only recently re-admitted fully into the alliance-has been
positioning itself to take the helm. Germany, for its part, has decided to
stay entirely on the sidelines and withdrew from enforcing NATO's arms
embargo. Arab state contributions that were to provide political top cover
have been slow to emerge. Qatar's four Mirage 2000s were not scheduled to
begin operation until late last week. The campaign also has exposed fissures
over how the long-term enforcement action should be directed.

Strike aircraft involved in the early operations against Libya included B-2
stealth bombers from the 509th Bomb Wing at Whiteman AFB, Mo.; F-15Es from
the 492nd and 494th Fighter Sqdns. from RAF Lakenheath, England; and F-16CJ
Wild Weasels from the 480th FS at Spangdahlem AB, Germany. The B-2s struck
Ghardabiya Airfield in Libya.

The U.K. initially participated with submarine-launched Tomahawks and
Tornado GR4s firing Storm Shadow cruise missiles. The Tornados then switched
focus to direct-attack roles using Paveway IV laser/GPS-guided bombs and
dual-mode Brimstone weapons. The U.K. also employed the Raptor
reconnaissance pod. The aircraft-from RAF Marham, England-redeployed as part
of the 906 Expeditionary Air Wing based at Gioa de Colle in southern Italy,
which was already hosting the RAF's Eurofighter Typhoons. The Typhoons, in
their first combat missions, flew air patrols.

France has been operating Mirage 2000s and Rafales. It also began operations
from the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier for both reconnaissance missions
and no-fly-zone enforcement. French aircraft employed Scalp EG cruise
missiles, AASM air-to-ground modular weapons and GBU-12 precision guided
bombs Other allies have been weighing their contributions. Norway and the
Netherlands late last week were readying their F-16s, pending assignment of
missions by NATO. Canada and Spain are contributing F-18s, while Sweden may
dispatch 6-8 JAS39 Gripens.

The single coalition aircraft destroyed so far is an F-15E that suffered
mechanical problems. The pilot and weapon systems officer were rescued. A
MiG-23 flown by the Libyan rebels was shot down near Benghazi by friendly
anti-aircraft fire. The third air casualty was a Libyan air force G-2 Galeg
trainer. 

Photo: Agence France Presse 



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