http://www.defenceiq.com/air/articles/libya-phase-ii-operations-ellamy-and-o dyssey-dawn/
Libya Phase II - Operations Ellamy and Odyssey Dawn Make Way for NATO Contributor: Defence Dateline Group <http://www.defenceiq.com/contributors/1818-defence-dateline-group/> Posted: 03/28/2011 12:00:00 AM EDT | Libya Phase II - Operations Ellamy and Odyssey Dawn Make Way for NATO Libya - As rebel momentum grows, NATO hand-over raises serious strategic questions about continued use of air power After over a week of air strikes against government anti-air facilities and military formations by Coalition forces, the tide has been firmly turned in the battle for Libya. The anti-Gaddafi rebels, advancing in the wake of concerted aerial bombardment, have retaken all of their previous gains. At the time of writing, unconfirmed reports claim the rebels have begun an assault on Sirte, the birthplace of the Colonel himself. This rapid advance comes in the wake of a formal declaration that NATO has created a full operational command for enforcing the no-fly-zone, beginning a three day hand-over process from the ad-hoc Coalition. Yet, despite this increase in momentum, the rebel advance and NATO handover are pushing the uprising, and the UN backed intervention that is de facto supporting it, into new and uncharted territory. Specifically, the continued role of Coalition air-power in readdressing the military balance within Libya is being called into question. Air superiority and anti-armour support As most analysts predicted, the battle for control of the Libyan skies has been short and one-sided. According to US figures, up to 350 aircraft are currently involved in the supply and enforcement of the no-fly-zone and accompanying land attacks. Up to 170 Tomahawk missile strikes, launched from British and US naval vessels, combined with nightly bombing runs by ground attack aircraft, have silenced all Libyan SA-2, SA-3 and SA-5 surface-to-air guided missile sites. Remaining mobile platforms are being destroyed on sight, or remain hidden and out of use. Meanwhile, the interception by French aircraft of a Soko G-2 Galeb ground support jet has been the only incident involving the Libyan air force. Indeed, French strikes on an airbase 155 miles south of the Libyan coastline this weekend have demonstrated the impunity with which Coalition jets can operate. It is clearly a matter of fact, as US Navy Vice Admiral William Gortney has said, that the Libyan air force no longer exists as a military formation. Underneath this umbrella of air superiority, attention has been turned to Gaddafis tank formations. T-72 and T-92 tanks, though poorly serviced and technologically out-of-date, have been the one remaining asset to which the rebels have no answer. Their deployment against the besieged city of Misrata and on the highways outside Ajdabiya previously turned back any potential rebel offensive, whilst covering the reported bombardment of urban areas. These tanks have thus become a priority target. As illustrated by the press uninterrupted airing of RAF footage reminiscent of the First Gulf War, guided air-to-ground missiles have once again demonstrated the extreme vulnerability of tanks in the face of modern aerial attack. Altogether, out of the 1257 sorties flown over Libya since the intervention began, 540 have involved strikes on ground targets - an average strike rate of 49 attacks a day. The intensity of these operations has demonstrably destroyed the physical assets and military morale of the pro-Gaddafi forces. This quick reactive tactic of providing ad hoc close-air support for rebel advances has made their rapid progress west in recent days a headlong pursuit of a shattered army. NATO deadlock The rapid escalation of attacks on the ground coincided for many days with a diplomatic stalemate in the North Atlantic Council (NAC). De facto US command was initially provided as a temporary measure, and Obama has made it clear from day one that he expected NATO to pick up the operational lead. Norways contribution of jets had also postponed arrival until the mission command was clear, whilst the continued use of Italian air bases was also provided on the promise of a NATO mandate. However, a deadlock quickly appeared, revolving around three nations resistance to NATO adopting operational command. Paris has retained its insistence that it would be possible for a French/Anglo-French command to take the role: firstly because Sarkozy genuinely seems to value a personal ownership of command by European actors, and secondly because of concerns over the reaction of Arabic nations to a NATO mission. Turkey remained so concerned about the latter problem that President Abdullah Gül unilaterally declared that Turkey could never condone the pointing of weapons at Libyan targets. Meanwhile Germany, which joined the intervention-sceptical ranks with Russia and China by abstaining from the UN vote, continued to oppose a NATO hand-over, on the grounds that the evolving intervention has proved more militarily aggressive than Resolution 1973 seems to support. The battle between these resistant nations and NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen was so heated in last weeks emergency NAC that their ambassadors reportedly stormed out mid-debate. Whilst hardly existential, it has certainly been the most controversial diplomatic rift since the US invasion of Iraq, with the resistance of Germany and Turkey continuing to illustrate a fundamental rift between themselves and other, more hawkish, NATO powers. The Alliance appears to have expended considerable diplomatic capital in bringing around these defectors, and the process has taken over a week to formalise. Yet finally, on 27 March, Rasmussen announced that command for NATOs Operation Unified Protector would begin "with immediate effect", under the leadership of Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard of Canada. Unanswered questions However, far from resolving the strategic uncertainty of Coalition leadership, the hand-over to NATO command has raised a series of strategic questions about the future of the campaign. These revolve around two key points. Continued US involvement - The move to the back seat envisaged by Obama will soon be a reality. Having a Canadian at the helm, and the participation of Qatar and the UAE as well, is pretty much as far as it is diplomatically possible to go in removing the US stamp from the Libyan operation. However, such political imperatives will have an uncertain effect on the ongoing military operations available assets. Around half of the 350 aircraft involved have been American. In total, 787 of the sorties flown have been USAF, against a total of 470 by the other countries involved. An overwhelming majority of the naval assets involved have also come from the US, as well as the command and control (C2) architecture. NATO will bring with it numerous assets of its own, including its fleet of AWACS aircraft and its sophisticated C2 apparatus, located in existing NATO facilities in Germany and elsewhere. Yet with a majority of available forces coming from the US, it remains unclear how much of the current deployment will remain when NATO takes full control. Some scaling back is a certainty, and if the US perceives a growing decline in domestic support, it could precipitate a more fundamental withdrawal. US engagement is no longer ironclad. The use of air strikes - More worryingly, the compromise NATO agreement secured will apparently lead to a reduction, or even cessation, of air strikes on land targets. Rasmussen has insisted that Operation Unified Protectors mandate did not extend beyond enforcing an arms embargo and the no-fly zone. This, it has been widely speculated, implies that NATO-led sorties will not engage in the kind of aggressive aerial bombardment seen in the past week. Such a change of tactics would certainly explain the falling away of Turkish and German resistance. Video:Us Navy launches Tomahawk missiles on Lybia http://www.defenceiq.com/air/articles/libya-phase-ii-operations-ellamy-and-o dyssey-dawn/ <object style="height: 390px; width: 640px"><param name="movie" value= <http://www.youtube.com/v/2UCt6To1n4U?version=3> "http://www.youtube.com/v/2UCt6To1n4U?version=3"><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"><param name="allowScriptAccess" value="always"><embed src= <http://www.youtube.com/v/2UCt6To1n4U?version=3> "http://www.youtube.com/v/2UCt6To1n4U?version=3" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowfullscreen="true" allowScriptAccess="always" width="640" height="390"></object> Coupled with the reduction in US involvement, this leaves France and Britain, the two remaining hard-kill advocates, in a strategic quandary. On the one hand, earlier experience with a dual mission mandate in Afghanistan (ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom respectively) has demonstrated that a less aggressive NATO-led command can be accompanied by a parallel coalition of the willing, for the pursuit of more aggressive objectives. Yet to continue the current tactic of ad-hoc close-air support for the rebellion without specific NATO backing could bring serious diplomatic consequences. Paris and London may not wish to go out on such a limb for Libya. It is thus uncertain how much longer the rebels can expect air-strikes on tap. The first (or final) nail in the coffin Clearly, the arrival of a NATO mission command raises more questions then it answers. If US involvement does decline drastically, or if ground attacks do indeed cease, the military balance could once again revert to a strategic stalemate between government firepower and rebel urban resistance. Given this, many might suggest that the three day hand-over time given by NATO has been a diplomatically negotiated grace period for the Coalition. In this race against time, they appear to be trying to degrade Gaddafis army sufficiently for the rebels to be victorious, before they are forced to cease. As air strikes continue to swing westward ahead of the advancing rebel column, this certainly seems a reasonable hypothesis. However, even an un-opposed drive west will take significant time and Gaddafi is unlikely to give up Tripoli itself without a fight. The rebels have a daunting task ahead of them, and if the air power umbrella is lifted, they could still fail. Jonathan Dowdall <http://www.defenceiq.com/contributors/1708-jonathan-dowdall/> writes for Defence Dateline Group <http://www.defenceiq.com/air/articles/libya-phase-ii-operations-ellamy-and- odyssey-dawn/> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------------------ -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? Head on over to our discussion list, [email protected]. -------------------------- Brooks Isoldi, editor [email protected] http://www.intellnet.org Post message: [email protected] Subscribe: [email protected] Unsubscribe: [email protected] *** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. 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