http://www.defenceiq.com/air/articles/libya-phase-ii-operations-ellamy-and-o
dyssey-dawn/ 


Libya Phase II - Operations Ellamy and Odyssey Dawn Make Way for NATO


Contributor: Defence Dateline Group
<http://www.defenceiq.com/contributors/1818-defence-dateline-group/> 
Posted: 03/28/2011  12:00:00 AM EDT  |  

Libya Phase
II - Operations Ellamy and Odyssey Dawn Make Way for NATO

Libya - As rebel momentum grows, NATO hand-over raises serious strategic
questions about continued use of air power

 

After over a week of air strikes against government anti-air facilities and
military formations by Coalition forces, the tide has been firmly turned in
the battle for Libya. The anti-Gaddafi rebels, advancing in the wake of
concerted aerial bombardment, have retaken all of their previous gains. At
the time of writing, unconfirmed reports claim the rebels have begun an
assault on Sirte, the birthplace of the Colonel himself. This rapid advance
comes in the wake of a formal declaration that NATO has created a full
operational command for enforcing the no-fly-zone, beginning a three day
hand-over process from the ad-hoc Coalition.

 

Yet, despite this increase in momentum, the rebel advance and NATO handover
are pushing the uprising, and the UN backed intervention that is de facto
supporting it, into new and uncharted territory. Specifically, the continued
role of Coalition air-power in readdressing the military balance within
Libya is being called into question.

 

Air superiority and anti-armour support

 

As most analysts predicted, the battle for control of the Libyan skies has
been short and one-sided. According to US figures, up to 350 aircraft are
currently involved in the supply and enforcement of the no-fly-zone and
accompanying land attacks. Up to 170 Tomahawk missile strikes, launched from
British and US naval vessels, combined with nightly bombing runs by ground
attack aircraft, have silenced all Libyan SA-2, SA-3 and SA-5 surface-to-air
guided missile sites. Remaining mobile platforms are being destroyed on
sight, or remain hidden and out of use.

 



 

Meanwhile, the interception by French aircraft of a Soko G-2 Galeb ground
support jet has been the only incident involving the Libyan air force.
Indeed, French strikes on an airbase 155 miles south of the Libyan coastline
this weekend have demonstrated the impunity with which Coalition jets can
operate. It is clearly a matter of fact, as US Navy Vice Admiral William
Gortney has said, that the Libyan air force “no longer exists as a military
formation”.

 

Underneath this umbrella of air superiority, attention has been turned to
Gaddafi’s tank formations. T-72 and T-92 tanks, though poorly serviced and
technologically out-of-date, have been the one remaining asset to which the
rebels have no answer. Their deployment against the besieged city of Misrata
and on the highways outside Ajdabiya previously turned back any potential
rebel offensive, whilst covering the reported bombardment of urban areas.
These tanks have thus become a priority target.

 

As illustrated by the press’ uninterrupted airing of RAF footage reminiscent
of the First Gulf War, guided air-to-ground missiles have once again
demonstrated the extreme vulnerability of tanks in the face of modern aerial
attack. Altogether, out of the 1257 sorties flown over Libya since the
intervention began, 540 have involved strikes on ground targets - an average
strike rate of 49 attacks a day. The intensity of these operations has
demonstrably destroyed the physical assets and military morale of the
pro-Gaddafi forces. This quick reactive tactic of providing ad hoc close-air
support for rebel advances has made their rapid progress west in recent days
a headlong pursuit of a shattered army.

 

NATO deadlock


The rapid escalation of attacks on the ground coincided for many days with a
diplomatic stalemate in the North Atlantic Council (NAC). De facto US
command was initially provided as a temporary measure, and Obama has made it
clear from day one that he expected NATO to pick up the operational lead.
Norway’s contribution of jets had also postponed arrival until the mission
command was clear, whilst the continued use of Italian air bases was also
provided on the promise of a NATO mandate. However, a deadlock quickly
appeared, revolving around three nation’s resistance to NATO adopting
operational command.


Paris has retained its insistence that it would be possible for a
French/Anglo-French command to take the role: firstly because Sarkozy
genuinely seems to value a personal “ownership” of command by European
actors, and secondly because of concerns over the reaction of Arabic nations
to a NATO mission. Turkey remained so concerned about the latter problem
that President Abdullah Gül unilaterally declared that “Turkey could never
condone the pointing of weapons at Libyan targets”. Meanwhile Germany, which
joined the intervention-sceptical ranks with Russia and China by abstaining
from the UN vote, continued to oppose a NATO hand-over, on the grounds that
the evolving intervention has proved more militarily aggressive than
Resolution 1973 seems to support.


The battle between these resistant nations and NATO Secretary General Anders
Fogh Rasmussen was so heated in last week’s emergency NAC that their
ambassadors reportedly stormed out mid-debate. Whilst hardly existential, it
has certainly been the most controversial diplomatic rift since the US
invasion of Iraq, with the resistance of Germany and Turkey continuing to
illustrate a fundamental rift between themselves and other, more hawkish,
NATO powers. The Alliance appears to have expended considerable diplomatic
capital in bringing around these defectors, and the process has taken over a
week to formalise. Yet finally, on 27 March, Rasmussen announced that
command for NATO’s Operation Unified Protector would begin "with immediate
effect", under the leadership of Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard of
Canada.


Unanswered questions


However, far from resolving the strategic uncertainty of Coalition
leadership, the hand-over to NATO command has raised a series of strategic
questions about the future of the campaign. These revolve around two key
points. 


Continued US involvement - The “move to the back seat” envisaged by Obama
will soon be a reality. Having a Canadian at the helm, and the participation
of Qatar and the UAE as well, is pretty much as far as it is diplomatically
possible to go in removing the US stamp from the Libyan operation.


However, such political imperatives will have an uncertain effect on the
ongoing military operation’s available assets. Around half of the 350
aircraft involved have been American. In total, 787 of the sorties flown
have been USAF, against a total of 470 by the other countries involved. An
overwhelming majority of the naval assets involved have also come from the
US, as well as the command and control (C2) architecture.


NATO will bring with it numerous assets of its own, including its fleet of
AWACS aircraft and its sophisticated C2 apparatus, located in existing NATO
facilities in Germany and elsewhere. Yet with a majority of available forces
coming from the US, it remains unclear how much of the current deployment
will remain when NATO takes full control. Some scaling back is a certainty,
and if the US perceives a growing decline in domestic support, it could
precipitate a more fundamental withdrawal. US engagement is no longer
ironclad. 


The use of air strikes - More worryingly, the compromise NATO agreement
secured will apparently lead to a reduction, or even cessation, of air
strikes on land targets. Rasmussen has insisted that Operation Unified
Protector’s mandate did not extend beyond enforcing an arms embargo and the
no-fly zone. This, it has been widely speculated, implies that NATO-led
sorties will not engage in the kind of aggressive aerial bombardment seen in
the past week. Such a change of tactics would certainly explain the falling
away of Turkish and German resistance.

 

Video:Us Navy launches Tomahawk missiles on Lybia

http://www.defenceiq.com/air/articles/libya-phase-ii-operations-ellamy-and-o
dyssey-dawn/

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Coupled with the reduction in US involvement, this leaves France and
Britain, the two remaining “hard-kill” advocates, in a strategic quandary.
On the one hand, earlier experience with a dual mission mandate in
Afghanistan (ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom respectively) has
demonstrated that a less aggressive NATO-led command can be accompanied by a
parallel “coalition of the willing”, for the pursuit of more aggressive
objectives. Yet to continue the current tactic of ad-hoc close-air support
for the rebellion without specific NATO backing could bring serious
diplomatic consequences. Paris and London may not wish to go out on such a
limb for Libya. It is thus uncertain how much longer the rebels can expect
air-strikes on tap. 


The first (or final) nail in the coffin


Clearly, the arrival of a NATO mission command raises more questions then it
answers. If US involvement does decline drastically, or if ground attacks do
indeed cease, the military balance could once again revert to a strategic
stalemate between government firepower and rebel urban resistance.

 

Given this, many might suggest that the three day hand-over time given by
NATO has been a diplomatically negotiated “grace period” for the Coalition.
In this race against time, they appear to be trying to degrade Gaddafi’s
army sufficiently for the rebels to be victorious, before they are forced to
cease. As air strikes continue to swing westward ahead of the advancing
rebel column, this certainly seems a reasonable hypothesis. 

 

However, even an un-opposed drive west will take significant time and
Gaddafi is unlikely to give up Tripoli itself without a fight. The rebels
have a daunting task ahead of them, and if the air power umbrella is lifted,
they could still fail.

 

Jonathan Dowdall
<http://www.defenceiq.com/contributors/1708-jonathan-dowdall/>  writes for
Defence Dateline Group

 
<http://www.defenceiq.com/air/articles/libya-phase-ii-operations-ellamy-and-
odyssey-dawn/> 




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