THE THREAT OF ISLAMISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
The Case of Tanzania
By Harvey Glickman
April 2011
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201104.glickman.islamismsubsaharanafrica.html
Harvey Glickman is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Haverford
College and Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is
currently researching Islamism throughout Sub-Saharan Africa.
The states of Africa south of the Sahara, with their large Muslim
populations, certainly are vulnerable to the popular unrest sweeping across
North Africa and the Gulf region since January 2011. These states present a
"backdoor" opening for radical jihadist Islam, which is already a strong
presence in Algeria, Morocco, Egypt and, (if Qaddafi lasts) in Libya. With
about 25 percent of the world's Muslim population living in Africa, the
overall restrictive economic and political conditions, and an expanding
youth population, extrude Islamist ideology as a plausible alternative for
self-styled repressed out-groups. Consequently, Sub-Saharan Africa merits
more attention for signs of more radical, jihadist Islamism.
Islamism is a political ideology, not an offshoot religious cult. Its
strategy ranges from violence as a prime tactic to political militancy, to
competitive political parties that seek local or national representation in
parliaments or local governments. Islamism may spawn violent jihadi groups
that dream of recreating a global Islamic community (umma) or groups
attempting to restore ultra-traditionalist, Salafist tenets of Islam,
similar to what prevails in Wahabbist Saudi Arabia.
This essay examines both the extent and dynamics of Islamism and radical,
violent Islamist groups in Tanzania, the location of the 1998 al Qaeda
bombing. Additionally, the piece considers the appeal and spread of Islamist
ideology, and the "state of play" today. Tanzania is examined here for the
number of Muslims in the population-about a third of the total; for its
proximity to the eastern African cockpit of Islamism-Somalia; and for the
character of its internal politics, a one party-dominant political
system-with the position of its Muslim population emerging as a divisive
political issue.
Thus far, Tanzania harbors a low level of Islamist activity compared to, for
example, Sudan, Somalia, and Egypt. It is representative of countries in
Africa south of the Sahara with significant Muslim populations, whose
cooperation is necessary if global jihadist terrorism is to be controlled
and overcome. Not least is the problem of spillover of sporadic, small scale
wars (Congo, Rwanda and Burundi are western neighbors). Secular nationalism,
a lame parliamentary democracy, slow and uneven economic growth, and
perceived unequal opportunity permit Muslim Africans, in Tanzania, as
elsewhere, to subscribe to an alternative ideology of Islamism.
POLITICS AND RELIGION IN TANZANIA
Of a population of about 42 million today in Tanzania, it is estimated that
about one-third are Muslim, about one-third are Christian and perhaps
one-third are "animist." Muslims in Tanzania live largely along the
pre-colonial and colonial trade routes: coastal north-south, and east-west,
in the past involving slaves, ivory, sisal, coffee and tea. Ninety-nine
percent of the population of the Zanzibar islands, the hub of pre-colonial
trade-about a million people-are Muslim. In the traditional centers of
Swahili culture along the coast, Muslims adhere to Sunni Islam. From the
ninth century, Arab traders married local women; the new culture that
developed combined Persian and indigenous elements. As Islam expanded into
the interior, so did syncretic practices combining Islam and traditional
beliefs, some of which strayed far from the conventional. The Christian
population lives primarily in the southwest and north-central areas of the
country.
The Tanzanian state is officially secular and its constitution guarantees
freedom of religion. The state also prohibits religious political parties.
The ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the direct descendant of the
Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), has held power, by a large margin,
since independence in 1962, changing its name in 1977.
TANU merged with Zanzibar's Afro-Shirazi Party, the victorious party in 1963
after the Zanzibar revolution, which saw the overthrow of the Sultan and an
Arabized elite. The CCM has dominated government on the mainland, but the
Civic United Front (CUF) has gained a substantial following in Pemba Island,
near Zanzibar. The CUF was founded in 1992, with the advent of a multi-party
system. Two movements merged: Kamahuru, a group advocating the
democratization of Zanzibar, with the Civic Movement, a human rights
organization based on the coastal mainland. The CCM gains much support in
Unguja, the main Zanzibar Island, from its resident Africans, while the CUF
is strong on Pemba, the small nearby island, part of the Zanzibar
administrative entity. It is also strong among non-Africans, i.e., those who
identify as "Arab." In 1995 the CUF refused to accept the results of the
national elections, claiming that the vote had been rigged by the CCM. (The
CUF repeated these allegations after the October-November 2000 elections and
boycotted Zanzibar's regional parliament, as well as Tanzania's national
legislature.)
In January 2001 violence broke out when police fired into a crowd of CUF
protesters, who were flouting a ban on protesting, killing thirty-three.
During the 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections the opposition
claimed that the CCM used illegal and unethical means in their campaign.
Opposition politicians and supporters also reported being beaten and
tortured. In addition, the CUF claimed that the electoral commission was
influenced by the ruling party.
Although bloody demonstrations occurred in 1995 and in 2000, the CUF has
maintained that it does not use or condone violence as a means of gaining
power, preferring to operate through legitimate, democratic means. Yet, it
has not totally dismissed the use of violence as a means for establishing
itself in Zanzibar, especially if political corruption and marginalization
continue to occur there.
The CUF organized a cadre of young men, called the Blue Guards, to protect
CUF party leaders, despite the law against alternative police forces.
Members of the Blue Guards said their goal was to "release Tanzanian society
from the dictatorship of Christianity"; the goal of CUF is to make Zanzibar
an Islamic state. [1] The political struggle between the CUF and CCM in the
past two decades has created new distinctions between Muslims and
Christians. During the early years of one party socialist rule, President
Julius Nyerere was adamant about creating a nation free of racial and
religious divisions. The demise of ujamaa ("community") socialism that had
tried to create national unity, as well as the rise of the multi-party
system, permitted region and religion to divide the population. In
particular, "the contested nature of the Zanzibar state makes it very
appealing to politicians to resort to the politicization of racial identity
in order to claim legitimacy to rule." [2] Ethnic differences and
overlapping religion have become rallying points in the search for the
"true" identity of Zanzibar, which have faint echoes on the mainland.
Religion has become a salient issue, especially in Zanzibar, as has the
future of the union of the mainland and the offshore islands. "[...] people
at the grassroots level advance religious identities in pursuit of their
interests in regard to spiritual, material, and political interests" all
across Tanzania. [3]
MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN RELATIONS
Religious tensions have risen in Tanzania. Since the end of socialist rule
in the 1990s, people claiming Zanzibari Arab identity have alleged that the
government of Zanzibar, directed by the ruling CCM party, discriminates
against them, denying access to government jobs, housing, and business
licenses. Similar dissatisfaction has spread to the mainland among the
coastal Swahili and "Arab" population. Frustration with the state has
manifested itself in attacks upon Christians. Muslims have always been able
to hold key governmental positions, but many people perceive the governing
elite as Christian. The presidency has unofficially rotated between a
Christian and a Muslim. The rise in tension also parallels the rise in
political visibility and assertiveness of the Muslim community in the past
decade. This has also raised an issue historically undebated in Tanzania:
the nature of the state-partly Arab or African, Muslim or Christian,
Zanzibar vs. Tanzania. At risk is the unity of the manufactured state that
stitched together the two independent former colonies, Tanganyika and
Zanzibar.
There have been several instances in the past two decades that have fueled
Muslim fears of marginalization. In 1992, the government announced that in
order to reduce public spending, it would transfer the country's health and
education system to the country's powerful Catholic Church. In December
2002, the Tanzanian government signed The Prevention of Terrorism Act into
law, largely under pressure from the United States. Criticism of this act,
especially from Muslims, asserted that the law specifically targeted them.
Critics noted that this law borrowed heavily from the U.S. Patriot Act, the
British Prevention of Terrorism Act and the Suppression of Terrorism Act of
apartheid South Africa. [4] Additional dissatisfaction is leveled against
the police. In Muslim areas the police are often Christians and they
disregard local customs, alienating residents. The government-sponsored
Islamic association, the Supreme Council of Muslims in Tanzania, attracts
limited legitimacy. Marginalized Muslims seek alternative associations, some
of them extremist, as Islam can act as an ideology of protest.
THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL AND ISLAMISM IN TANZANIA
Zanzibar Archipelago is the name that combines two Indian Ocean Islands
(Unguja or Zanzibar and Pemba), as well as several smaller islands. Zanzibar
became a British protectorate in 1890 after centuries of rule by Omani
Arabs. As Zanzibar moved toward independence in the 1950s, two groups found
themselves at odds; the "Arab" settler class, supporting the Zanzibar
Nationalist Party (ZNP) and the "African" laboring class, supporting the
Afro-Shirazi party (ASP). (Both classes crossed lines and inter-married, but
neither could overcome a certain mutual hostility as a result of the Arab
slave-holding past.) The indigenous peasantry was split between the two
parties, with the pro-ZNP dominating Pemba. In the election immediately
after independence in 1963, the ZNP coalition narrowly defeated the ASP. The
Zanzibari revolution in 1964 represented an uprising of African laborers and
ex-soldiers that mushroomed into an anti-Arab revolution, overthrowing the
ZNP government and the Sultan, as well as the whole enterprise of
constitutional monarchy. Abeid Karume, the ASP coalition leader, ruled by
decree, warding off any group challenges to the new regime. Three months
later, Karume and Tanganyikan President Nyerere united Zanzibar and
Tanganyika. (The designation Tanzania came later as a result of a contest to
name the new country.) The rapid pace and questionable constitutionality of
these beginnings remains a background factor to the increasing demands for
autonomy. In 1994, the CUF raised the issue of separation from the mainland,
but the CCM condemned this claim and refused to act upon it.
On the Zanzibar islands, Muslim religious scholars are becoming more
influential in setting rules for social behavior-such as enforcing a dress
code and attempting to shut down establishments that serve alcohol. A
Western-focused tourist industry is small and vulnerable. Since the 1980s,
wealthy individuals from the Gulf States have funded mosques, madrasahs,
health clinics, and secondary schools on Zanzibar. Saudi Arabia alone spends
about $1 million a year building mosques, madrasahs, and Islamic centers.
[5] In addition, young Zanzibari men receive scholarships to study in Medina
and Khartoum. Two of Zanzibar's universities are Islamic, funded by Saudi
Arabians and Kuwaitis. Teachers come from Pakistan, Sudan and other East
African countries. Zanzibar University is funded by Darul Iman Charitable
Association, registered as a charity in Canada. Chukwani College of
Education offers classes in Islamic studies and Islamic education.
High levels of poverty on the islands continue to contribute to political
discontent. Zanzibar has fallen behind the mainland in economic growth;
economic liberalization in the 1990s seems to have hit Zanzibar particularly
hard.
Three factors have helped an Islamic revival in Tanzania. First, the demise
of the one party state allowed for alternative forms of association. Groups
formerly prohibited have emerged to proselytize for a more purified Islam.
Second, new Islamic organizations are opposing formerly state-sanctioned
groups. This Muslim revival is part of "reconnecting" with the Muslim world
after years of isolation. It parallels the availability of new Islamic
satellite television channels in Tanzania. Third, the country still remains
relatively poor. Muslim traditions are now presented as threatened by a
secularist state, requiring a return to basics. The revival includes all age
groups and socioeconomic classes. On the Zanzibar islands, the revival is
directed toward Muslims who are munafik, "Muslims in name only," and the
Sufi brotherhoods, which grew strong in the nineteenth century. On the
mainland it is directed toward Christians. Islamist ideas do not rest on
their instant identical reproduction in different contexts, but instead on
their ability to adapt to different contexts. While concerned with the
"onslaught and failure" of Western values, the revival in Tanzania also
concerns the lack of good government in the country, as well as a widespread
dissatisfaction with government in the Muslim population. The revival groups
offer an alternative to the older, state-sanctioned Muslim identity.
The translation of the Qur'an into Swahili has ensured that the established
Arabic-speaking scholars no longer have a monopoly on its interpretation. In
addition, there is currently an abundance of Islamic literature, tapes, CDs,
DVDs, in Arabic, English, and Swahili. These products are widely available
in bookstores, streets, and outside Mosques, after Friday prayers, further
aiding the individualization of Islam, allowing more freedom of
interpretation of the religion through expanded access. Thus, the revival is
not just directed at the state, but also toward those Muslims perceived as
being a part of the state apparatus, mainly an older group of Muslims who
worked within the state's conception of a rather passive Muslim identity.
Whereas, in a country like Senegal, politics reflects a type of Muslim
hegemony, and in a country, such as Nigeria, there is continuous strife
invoking Muslim-Christian differences, in Tanzania religion has taken a
subservient position to the unifying nationalist agenda of the dominant
political party. As a response to transferring control of the nation's
education and health administration to the Catholic Church in 1992, a group
called the Council for the Propagation of the Qur'an (commonly known as
Balukta) accused the Tanzanian government's National Muslim Organization
(Bakwata) of corruption, temporarily seizing its headquarters. This was
Tanzania's first militant Islamist group, but its actions were short-lived.
President Ali Hassan Mwinyi expelled them from the Bakwata headquarters, and
the group was banned in 1993. [6]
Tanzania's major simmering conflict is the political struggle between the
Tanzanian mainland and Zanzibar, which reflects the "shotgun marriage"
between two separate, former dependencies of Britain. Despite efforts to tie
Zanzibar to the mainland, largely by granting considerable autonomy to the
administration of Zanzibar, separatist sentiments never died in the offshore
islands. Because many Zanzibaris identify culturally with their supposed
Arab ancestry from across the Indian Ocean, rather than the African
mainland, the question of Zanzibari sovereignty remains a political issue.
ISLAMISM'S FUTURE IN TANZANIA
A history of cooperation in the name of nationalism has mitigated religious
conflict in the country. Indeed, "while there are some ethnic identities and
geographic areas that coincide with a certain religious tradition, often
other identities, such as class divisions or support for political parties,
are cross-cutting and do not reinforce these religious divisions." The
legacy of the unifying mission of TANU in the drive toward independence,
inter-religious cooperation, has, for the most part, endured. Yet, in the
past decade circumstances have changed.
As mentioned earlier, Tanzania remains plagued by poverty. Despite mineral
discoveries, its economy relies on agriculture, but only a small portion of
its land is subject to sustainable cultivation. Comparatively paltry
resources, combined with failed economic programs since independence, have
translated into an $800 per capita GDP, with 36 percent of the population
below the poverty line. [7]
In recent years, expatriate Wahhabis from Saudi Arabia have been active in
Muslim charitable organizations and in schools. Diplomats in East Africa say
the Saudis' influence in the region is still minimal but growing.
Fundamentalists have, on occasion, taken over 30 of the 487 mosques in Dar
es Salaam and have begun bombing bars, as well as beating women who go out
without being fully covered. According to a Western intelligence report, the
Saudis are spending about $1 million a year in Tanzania to build new mosques
and buy influence with the ruling CCM. "We get our funds from Yemen and
Saudi Arabia," says Mohammed Madi, an activist. "Officially the money is
used to buy medicine, but in reality the money is given to us to support our
work and buy guns." [8] Zanzibar also is home to an Islamist preacher,
Sheikh Ponda Issa Ponda, leader of the Islamist organization Simba wa Mungu
(God's Lion), which has forcibly taken over mosques in Dar es Salaam and
violently targeted tourists. Ponda preaches jihadi Islamism and is reputed
to have ties to al Qaeda officials. [9] Several Islamic groups, associated
with a loosely organized movement, Ansar al-Sunnah, seek a purified Islam.
Other revivalists are critical of Ansar, saying it is too closely linked to
Salafism, Wahabism, and Hanbalism, conservative Muslim religious movements.
Ansar has recently grown more visible, in small towns, as well as in larger
cities in Tanzania. A second potentially Islamist movement is Tablighi
Jamaat. Its main aim is to improve the morality of Muslim society by
improving behavior as Muslims. Instead of pointing a finger at the West or
Christians for the current ills that have befallen society, adherents
believe that they should start with themselves, calling for living by the
rules of Shar'ia.
So far these trends, Ansar and Tablighi, are largely ripples on the surface
of theology and social life across the whole country. Sufi Islam and Islamic
traditions remain mixed with local tribal customs, creating a formidable
barrier to reformists, whose ideas of purification of Islam would undercut
Sufi influences.
RADICAL ISLAMISM IN TANZANIA
The bombing of the U.S. embassy in Dar es Salaam in 1998, which killed
eleven people and injured eighty-five, revealed the existence of a cell of
jihadi terrorists. The bombing was not a plot planned by Tanzanian Muslims,
although two Zanzibari were implicated. The attack was orchestrated by a few
Somalis: al Qaeda operatives and sleepers, with regional links to cells in
Tanzania and Kenya, and planned outside. These extremists, based in Nairobi,
began in 1993 to use the trade in diamonds, tanzanite, and rubies to render
the al Qaeda cells in Tanzania self-sufficient. The Saudi charity,
al-Haramain Islamic Foundation in Tanzania, now shut down, supplied funds.
[10]
Uamsho, an NGO, began by offering public lectures on Islam in the 1990s. It
later became interested in Muslim rights. It employs the language of human
rights and good governance in its critique of the government, which is
unique for an Islamic group. Supporters accuse the government of intervening
in religious affairs, which would go against Article 19 of the Constitution.
They also claim that government corruption has led to the moral decline of
the country. Finally, they claim that there are laws in Tanzania regulating
dress codes and alcohol, but the corrupt government does not enforce them.
The government of Zanzibar has claimed that this group has fundamentalist
views. In addition, various Western groups and think tanks have accused this
group of contemplating terrorist attacks against the tourist industry in
Zanzibar. Yet an inquiry by the British, American, and Danish embassies
found it to be non-violent. [11]
Overall, Tanzania remains vulnerable to radical Islamists. Tanzania has a
low capacity government, in a large territorial expanse (the size of France
and Germany combined). Thirty six percent of the population is below the
poverty line. With rudimentary border controls, a wide open coastline and
troubled neighbors, such as Somalia, Tanzania's large coastal trade and much
smuggling provide excellent logistical cover for extremists. (The
neighboring countries of Kenya and Uganda have each suffered violent jihadi
attacks.) Small arms and other weapons are readily available on the black
market in East Africa. The police are unable, and sometimes unwilling, to
provide even the most basic public safety services, as major crimes often go
unsolved. The Tanzanian National Security Service is more capable than the
police force, but it is better suited to spying on political opponents,
since that has been their training. These security weaknesses make Tanzania
a relatively soft target. Currently, the Muslim population, taken as a
whole, has not succumbed to extremist rhetoric. The small and weak
Islamists, and radical elements within them, concentrate on bringing their
co-religionists in Tanzania more in line with fundamentalist Islamic
practices. Tanzania faces the dilemma of post-authoritarian states in
Africa: a tropism toward official blandishments or outright control of
associations once prohibited under one party rule. Ironically, the more
moderate groups, who offer no structural challenge to the system, are more
likely to be candidates for co-optation. Radicals, even at the level of
ideas, are forced to work outside the system. Thus, the government risks
pushing Islamist believers in more radical directions by sheer
clumsiness-such as election rigging in Zanzibar.
The Islamic revival thus far has not instigated a wave of Islamist
radicalism. Most revivalists have been critical of anti-government
fundamentalists. But the Islamic revival has opened new sources of
information on Islam, beyond the leading clerics inside the country. The way
is open for simplistic and politicized interpretations to capitalize on
local grievances, such as the integrity of the federation of the mainland
and Zanzibar, and interpret that as a Muslim-Christian matter or a matter of
the relative weight of Zanzibari opinion within the overall politics of the
union.
LOOKING AHEAD
Tanzania's so-far successful pattern of political co-optation was reflected
in the conduct of its fourth multi-party general elections on October 31,
2010. The ruling CCM party faced its most serious competition in the
multi-party era, but President Kikwete was re-elected with 61 percent of the
vote, reduced from 80 percent in 2005. The Chadema party-the perennial
territorial opposition since the end of one party rule-for the first time
received the most opposition votes. Chadema's presidential candidate,
Willibrod Slaa, took 27 percent, while CUF's Ibrahim Lipumba received 8
percent. This marked a decline in CUF's salience in national politics, for
the first time in decades. Voter turnout, at 42 percent, was, however the
lowest in Tanzanian history; previously, at least 70 percent of registered
voters had cast ballots. Although the elections were conducted without major
disturbances or irregularities, Chadema officials complained about voting
and tabulation procedures, as well as the constitutional prohibition on
challenging presidential election results after their formal announcement.
As expected, CCM retained its absolute majority in Parliament, with nearly
80 percent of the seats. With a total of 47 seats-24 elected and 23 "special
seats" for women-Chadema displaced CUF as the official territorial
opposition and selected its Chairman, Freeman Mbowe, as opposition leader.
The new Parliament selected Anne Makinda as Tanzania's first woman Speaker
of Parliament.
Self-governing Zanzibar (3 percent of Tanzania's population) displayed
relative calm. Serious irregularities and sporadic violence had marred every
election in Zanzibar since 1964. However, after years of abortive
negotiations, the CUF and the ruling party reached a power-sharing
agreement. The outcome of the July 31, 2010 referendum set the stage for
peaceful general elections on October 31 in Zanzibar. The deal eliminated
the winner-take-all system for Zanzibar, giving the losing side one of two
vice president slots and ministerial positions in proportion to the seats it
holds in the Zanzibar House of Representatives. On October 31, Zanzibar CCM
presidential candidate Ali Mohamed Shein won with 50.1 percent of the vote,
while runner-up Civic United Front (CUF) presidential candidate Seif Sharif
Hamad received 49.1 percent. Shein selected Hamad as his First Vice
President and Seif Ali, the former Union Deputy Foreign Minister, as his
Second Vice President. [12]
Despite major opposition in confederated Zanzibar, Tanzania provides a
degree of comparative calm in East Africa, a region facing increasing
spillover possibilities from Somali pirates, Islamist propaganda, and
systemic instability sweeping over North Africa and the Middle East. The
United States is well-advised to cultivate official Tanzanian friendship and
"bank" good relations in the face of a regional future of uncertainty.
Thanks are expressed to Sean Stambaugh, research assistant, Haverford class
of 2009 and Caila Heyison, research assistant, Haverford class of 2011; also
appreciation to Haverford College for financial support of this research,
and to scholar Richard Mshomba for helpful critiques.
Notes
1. [Text] Barbara G. and Deo S. Mshigeni Brents, "Terrorism in Context:
Race, Religion, Party, and Violent Conflict in Zanzibar," The American
Sociologist, Summer 2004, p. 62.
www.unlv.edu/faculty/brents/research/terrorZanzibar.pdf accessed July 25,
2010.
2. [Text] Bernadetta Killian, "The State and Identity Politics in Zanzibar:
Challenges to Democratic Consolidation in Tanzania," African Identities, 6,
2, May 2008, p. 115.
3. [Text] Roman Loimeier, "Perceptions of Marginalization: Muslims in
Contemporary Tanzania," in Rene Otayek and Benjamin F. Soares, eds., Islam
and Muslim Politics in Africa, NY: Palgrave, 2007, p. 138.
4. [Text] Andre LeSage, "Terrorism Threats and Vulnerabilities in Africa,"
in Andre LeSage, ed., African Counterterrorism Co-operation: Assessing
Regional and Subregional Initiatives. Washington, DC: National Defense
University Press, 2007. p. 87.
5. [Text] Simon Turner, "`These Young Men Show No Respect for Local Customs'
-Globalization and Islamic Revival in Zanzibar," Journal of Religion in
Africa, 39, 2009, p. 259.
6. [Text] Jeffrey Haynes, "Islamic Militancy in East Africa," Third World
Quarterly, 26, 8, 2005, p. 1330.
7. [Text] Central Intelligence Agency, "Tanzania," World Fact Book, online,
accessed July 24, p. 2010.
8. [Text] Lisa Beyer "Inside the Kingdom," Time Magazine, September 15,
2003, www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1005663-8.00.html, accessed
July 26, 2010.
9. [Text] Peter Kagwanja, "Counter-terrorism in the Horn of Africa: New
Security Frontiers, Old Strategies," African Security Review, 15, 3, 2006,
p. 77.
10. [Text] David H. Shinn, "Al-Qaeda in East Africa and the Horn," Journal
of Conflict Studies, Summer 2007, p. 37.
11. [Text] Turner, Op. Cit., 242.
12. [Text] B. James and B. Lugongo, "Tanzania: Is Democracy, Political
Competition Under Threat?" allafrica.com/stories/201008310556.html; also
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Background Note:
Tanzania. www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2843.htm, Dec. 13, 2010;> accessed March
22, 2011.
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