Mackenzie Briefing Notes
P.0. Box 338, Adelaide Station Toronto, Ontario M5C-2J4 Tel: 416-686-4063 E-Mail [email protected] Is Iran Getting Ready to Light the Fuse? Issue #31 -- April 2011 John C. Thompson This Briefing Note follows upon a Briefing Note The Coming War: An appreciation of the Intentions of Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas (Issue # 30 -- July 2010): issued last year. Although we didn't make firm predictions, the paper illustrates the hazard of even coming close to it. Within a few weeks, the Stuxnet virus threw an unexpected spanner into Iran's nuclear weapons program and Hizbollah started showing signs of an accelerated transition from a terrorist group towards becoming more of an organized criminal society. However, as ever in the Middle East, situations can rapidly change and prudence demands once more that we issue some cautious predictions. This paper also draws upon comments made in our Commentary 1103 "Jihad in a Year of Revolutions" where the saliency of this year's food crisis in Middle Eastern unrest was discussed. Briefly, food prices are at an all-time high, and climbing still. Like sulfur added to the saltpetre of institutional grievances and the charcoal of aspirations, fear of hunger - rather than hunger itself - has sparked more than a few revolutions. This year is no different from 1789, 1848, or 1917 in that regard. Compounding a Year of Turmoil The ancient game of chess was developed in India and rapidly spread to Sassanid Persia where it took a familiar form in the years before the Muslim conquest. Persian players got in the habit of saying 'Shah!' where we say 'Check' and 'Shah-mat' ('The king is dead') which time has corrupted into 'Checkmate!' Chess began as a war-game, which is why it still readily lends itself to being used as an analogy for politics, strategy and tactics. Players of the game of course realize that, just like competent politicians and generals, they need to get their pieces into position, use deception and feints, and make sacrifices before closing in for an attempted kill. After closely watching the Revolutionary government of Iran under Khamenei/Ahmadinejad for some years, it seems they are getting ready to push a major gambit. This is a dicey year in the Middle East. Record high food prices around the world are causing fear, especially for people who spend much of their income on food. Fear translates to anger, which is directed against corrupt and inefficient governments (and the Middle East has no shortage of these). The global economic slump has led to even higher unemployment rates, and unemployed youth are also very common in the Middle East. These are prime conditions for a year of revolts and unrest. Iran, like most other countries in the region, is also exposed to unrest particularly as the regime's cruelty and corruption has alienated the Revolutionary Council and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from the Iranian people. The Iranian leadership consists of aging revolutionaries who want to both spread their ideology and secure regional hegemony for their country. Despite the many failings of the Iranian economy, significant expenditure has been made on arms - including their nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Iran's leaders need successes to achieve their long-standing ambitions and to possibly unite the country behind them. There is, however, an illogical and messianic impulse at play as well. Ahmadinejad and some of the other senior figures in the Iranian regime belong to the Haghani circle influenced by Ayatollah Yazdi. This is a particular Shiite sect that holds the arrival of the Mahdi, the 12th Imam, is imminent. The Mahdi is the messianic figure whose return will herald a new era of 'justice and peace' (although Iranian concepts of these are harsh), the restoration of the Caliphate and the global triumph of Islam. Ahmadinejad often publically refers to the coming of the Mahdi. By way of a troubling parallel, imagine - for example - that there is an American president from an obscure Pentecostal sect which is obsessed with the Book of Revelations and believes that it has to provoke a crisis to set the events in the book in motion. For those Westerners who believe Ahmadinejad's references to the Mahdi are playing to an internal audience, they should be aware the sect he belongs is a minor one with which most Iranian Shiites disagree. A recent video which has been widely distributed in mid-March 2011 to top Iranian officials, Revolutionary Guardsmen and military officers demonstrates Ahmadinejad's adherence to the Haghani circle. Looking at this year's events in the Middle East so far, the video claims that the return of the Mahdi is at hand and it is time to set events in motion (the video, all 28 minutes of it, was posted to <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wwiadyt-n9k> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wwiadyt-n9k). Iran seems set on provoking a major war in the Middle East this year. It is a faith-based decision, not a rational one. Rationalism will not address their motives, but it can guess at their intentions. So what will Iran do? Iran's conventional military forces are much improved over the last 20 years. The 230,000 man army and 190,000 men of the IRGC are heavily mechanized with plentiful artillery. However, the latter group is heavily tasked for internal security and the Army would be hard-pressed to watch Iran's frontiers by itself. A major call-up of lightly armed Basij militia would be necessary to conduct offensive actions. This hasn't happened yet. The 38,000 men of the Navy and the IRGC naval forces have few major assets except a plentiful supply of small light boats and anti-ship missiles and mines. They can plug the Straits of Hormuz for a while, but would be unable to secure naval superiority anywhere for very long. The Air Force has some 340 elderly combat planes and a variety of anti-aircraft weapons that permit Iran to defend a number of points against air attack. However, like the Army and the Navy, their forces are barely enough to do more than defend some key target clusters - like Tehran or major nuclear sites. Projecting significant force abroad is unlikely. The leadership of Iran is clearly aware that they could be toppled by a revolt and internal security is the main role of the IRGC. Conventionally, they can plug the Straits of Hormuz through which much of the world's oil runs for a few weeks; can posture or threaten with conventional forces, and can make incursions into Iran and its airspace more difficult. This first option has the potential to significantly drive up the price of oil around the World for weeks. Iran's main instrument of external force is through the IRGC Qods Force, with a main focus on liaison with terrorist organizations. The Qods Force is also prepared for unconventional external operations and has long experience with them. The statements of Ahmadinejad tell us that Iran - like many Islamic radical groups - contemplates two targets. One is Israel; the other constitutes the existing governments and power-elites of the Middle East, particularly on the Arabian Peninsula. Against Israel Iran has spent years developing and supporting Hizbollah - but this force increasingly has a life of its own and never was an Iranian sock puppet to begin with. As a surrogate for Iran, they can engage Israel in a '4th Generation'-style of war, much as they did in 2006. They can bombard Israel with artillery rockets (having tens of thousands of these) and enmesh any Israeli Army response in carefully constructed field defences; all the while pumping out contrived footage and news reports to turn global public opinion firmly against Israel. However, Hizbollah has become both a globalized criminal empire and the de facto (but not de jure) government of much of Lebanon. Its entry into Latin America and growing role in narcotics distribution is making it wealthy. Moreover, its virtual control of Lebanon is giving Hizbollah immunity from international legal ramifications. War with Israel would threaten much of this and, besides, senior figures in Hizbollah have been building new estates for themselves in Lebanon's choicest locations. IDF smart bombs through the roof would be an inconvenience. Hezbollah's full participation in whatever grand scheme Iran is enacting is not guaranteed, but if Israel is beset from many sides then their Lebanese frontier will catch fire too. Another long-term ally of uncertain character is Syria. Bashar al-Assad has maintained tight family links in the state's security apparatus and military; yet sometimes assumes a more diplomatic mien than his father did. He cheered on Hizbollah in its 2006 War with Israel, while very carefully steering clear of the conflict. He lets the Qods Force personnel in Syria provide support for Hamas, but the Muslim-Brotherhood, which is behind Hamas, is firmly suppressed it Syria itself. The upper echelons of the Assad government are Alawite Shiites and would be presumably sympathetic to Iran's championing of Shiite causes; especially as the majority of Syrians are Sunnis and view the Alawites as being particularly heretical. However, Syrian forces have come off the worst in every engagement they fought with the Israelis and one can get the sense that Bashar al-Assad does not want to pay the full price for being involved in any Iranian-sponsored recklessness. Politics makes for strange bedfellows, and Middle Eastern politics make for some truly bizarre combinations. The Palestinian Authority (once a creation of the Muslim Brotherhood) and Hamas (likewise, but with closer ties) have squabbled with each other; and both are supposed to despise Shiites - although this naturally comes second to their hatred of Israel. Yet Iran and the Qods Force have their linkages, particularly with Hamas. The Iranian anti-Israeli messages resonate on two levels with many Palestinian Arabs. They appreciate an ally, certainly. The arms are welcomed by the more irrational or hate-driven than usual. Others, particularly older West-bank Palestinians, quietly harbour some reservations particularly if any likely conflict escalates to the point where ballistic missiles start flying about. Chemical weapons and radioactive dust do not recognize borders, and Scud-derived ballistic missiles are not that accurate. Islamic radicals do not weep for Muslims who die as bystanders in their attacks, often arguing that the fallen are now Shaheed too and entitled to a better afterlife. There are some Palestinians who wonder just how careful Iran's targeting will be if they don't worry overmuch about collateral damage. Turkey and Iran have an old history. The Turks and the Persians fought repeated wars for 350 years from the re-emergence of Persia under the first Safawid ruler in 1500. The European imperial high tide brought things to a close (particularly when the British and Russians started meddling), but after 1945 the frontier continued to be occasionally uneasy. This was particularly true when Ankara and Tehran used the Kurds as their proxies, each cheerfully abetting regional Kurdish insurgencies in the others' territory. The Erdogan government in Turkey has been increasingly leading the country deeper into Islamic Triumphalism, but has also rekindled Turco-Persian rivalries. Some interpretations see this as two non-Arab nations vying over the leadership of the Arab World. Under Erdogan, Turkey's once warm relationship with Israel has become quite chilled and Islamic Fundamentalists in Turkey (through the use of an Islamic front charity, the IHH) played a key role in the 2009 attempt to run the Israeli blockade on Gaza. The next attempt to run the Israeli blockade is planned for May 9th 2011 (the anniversary of Israel's independence); and this next run may be even more of a provocation than the last one. For a start, Iran apparently plans to become heavily involved. Since the end of the Mubarak Government in Egypt, pressure on Israel has increased significantly. Rocket bombardment has resumed from out of the Gaza Strip, made easier now that Egyptian authorities are maintaining their part of the blockade in a half-hearted manner. Moreover, Egypt let a suspected arms shipment for Hamas from Iran pass through the Suez Canal. The Israelis intercepted the shipment without incident - but the load included a set of Silkworm anti-ship missiles and their guidance material. Silkworm anti-ship missiles in Gaza represent a quantum leap in the threat that Hamas offers - tantamount to letting a local street gang armed with pistols and shotguns get their hands on a 20mm Vulcan cannon. Worse still, Iran prepositioned two of its naval vessels in the Mediterranean in late February 2011. Alvand is an Iranian frigate, armed with anti-ship missiles, torpedoes and a 114mm gun; it is accompanied by Kharg; a replenishment vessel that also carries three helicopters. These two vessels are currently docked at a Syrian naval port. In the passive-aggressive setting Iran may be contemplating, these two vessels might accompany the next Gaza Convoy. In order to be valid under international law, a naval blockade must be enforced. A nation that is not prepared to use force to maintain one - even against other warships - cannot sustain it. Sending a warship to break a blockade is an exercise in high-tension brinksmanship, where the nerve of relatively junior naval officers may catapult the involved countries into a state of war. If Iran sends its two naval vessels to participate in the next attempt to force the Gaza blockade, it may be the most critical encounter the world has seen since Soviet merchant vessels alone tested the resolve of the US Navy in the Cuban Missile Crisis; if they had been escorted by Soviet surface warships the tensions would have been even higher and the risk of a war between two nuclear superpowers that much greater. As it was, a Soviet submarine nearly torpedoed a US destroyer... if its commander hadn't been overruled, a full nuclear war might have been inevitable. In the waters of Gaza, one undeclared nuclear power and a state that has openly and avidly pursued nuclear arms might be about to confront each other. The stakes are almost the same. Iran has little to immediately lose in such a confrontation. It will no doubt portray Kharg's role as purely humanitarian (and may ramp up the tensions by attempting to fly off its helicopters towards Gaza); while Alvand is a frigate tailored for combat with other surface vessels. If the Israelis flinch, Iran wins. If they open fire, Iran has a provocation it can use as a casus belli if they wish, or an excuse for some pre-planned spontaneous-demonstration-of-outrage by its proxies. In an Iranian war with Israel, unless ballistic missiles start flying, neither country can do little direct harm to each other; but Iran has its proxies in the region. Whether they are enthusiastic or not - Israel simply cannot ignore them. Hizbollah can bombard the northern half of Israel with tens of thousands of rockets and Hamas will no doubt add its tuppence with Grad artillery rockets and mortars bomb it gets as 'humanitarian aid.' Israel also cannot ignore the possibility that chemical agents and/or radioactive dust can be stuffed in the noses of some rockets that might come across its northern border. Focused on the Saudis The Wahhabi monarchs of Saudi Arabia are the least enjoyable allies the Western World has kept company with since Churchill and Roosevelt had to go arm in arm with Stalin against Hitler. They supply us with oil and use some of the profits to fund the missionaries of the Dawa movement that radicalize Muslims around the world. They occasionally do favours for us (often with their own self-preservation in mind), but it is hard to declare ourselves as fighting for human rights and freedom with the Saudis standing behind us. But the world is what it is and the world needs Saudi Arabian oil... for now. Moreover, the Saudis are not revolutionaries. They export the worst of their Wahhabis partly to keep their own rule safe, while the Iranians are bent on exporting their Islamic Revolution. The Saudis and most other Arab rulers have been suppressing their Shiite minorities for centuries; although that suppression has become more urgent since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Beyond that, the Persian Gulf has seen quarreling between Persians and Gulf Arabs for centuries. The British were adapt at playing the Gulf Arabs - who were poor, backward and badly organized -- against the more sophisticated Persians through much of the 19th and early 20th Centuries. Iranian national pride and prestige presages the Iranian Revolution, and Iran had a long-standing interest in being the major regional power well before the Shah was toppled. There are plenty of reasons for enmity across the Persian Gulf, but the Shiites of the Arabian Peninsula have been preparing for the day they assert themselves for 30 years now. Many, particularly from Yemen, have taken training in Iran and Iranian weapons and money have been finding their way into a number of the Gulf kingdoms. In the video circulated by Ahmadinejad in March 2011, it was clear that - for the sake of the Mahdi - Iran has an eye on more than gaining prestige by causing grief for Israel. Among other things, a reward of 2.2 million dollars was promised for whoever assassinates the Saudi king. The video was not meant for public consumption: If it was, a formal war between Saudi Arabia and Iran would be hard to avoid. In the Islamic World, much credibility defaults to whomever controls Mecca. The Hashemite Clan is an ancient one that claims as their ancestor Mohammed's own great-grandfather, Hashim ibn Abd al-Manaf. Hashemites were often in control of Mecca, as was Sharif Hussein bin Ali (memorably played by Alec Guinness in the film 'Lawrence of Arabia). What Western movie watchers don't recall is that Hussein bin Ali's independent Post-war kingdom of Hejaz, which included Mecca and Medina, was conquered by the Saudis in 1925. This war was barely noticed in the West and is not well documented, but the Wahhabi terror ushered by the Saudis may have killed hundreds of thousands of people (Shiites particularly) as they forged Saudi Arabia. Abdullah II of Jordan is a great-great grandson of Sharif Hussein bin Ali; and it is sometimes noticed that the flying of the Jordanian flag is a sign of protest in northwest Saudi Arabia. In any event, the Saudi rule over Mecca is not widely seen as a permanent fact. Iran is hoping that it can be wrestled away, although it is pinning its hopes on another proxy; the Houthi Clan of northern Yemen. The Houthi are Shiites and can, like most of their brethren on the Saudi Peninsula, look back at a long history of repression. The latest in a series of insurgencies began in 2004 when the Houthis started to receive aid from the Qods Force and Hizbollah. The fighting has cost thousands of lives. The Houthi have succeeded in creating a sanctuary area, first raided into Saudi territory in November 2010 (earning a severe response), and may be emerging as a new node along the old Hizbollah model on the Yemeni-Saudi Frontier. Ahmadinejad's 'Mahdi Video' alleges that Mecca will be liberated by forces from the south. The video seems to be citing prophecies and Hadith that have are well outside centuries of conventional Muslim scholarship and hopes to encourage the Houthi and whatever allies they can muster to get busy. In the annals of military history lightly armed insurgents have won great victories over powerful kingdoms and gone on to conquer vast areas -- which is exactly what the Muslims did in the years following Mohammed's death. More usually, however, they get massacred when they venture out of their familiar surroundings. The Mahdi is also supposed to come when the Earth is filled with corruption; which is an easy charge to make so far as the Saudi royal family is concerned. Of course, given the nature of Iran's Bonyad cleric-run business networks, Ahmadinejad should be careful about making this accusation. The other proxy that Iran is pushing forward is in Bahrain. The tiny island nation has a Wahhabi Arab ruling class where over half the population are foreigners working on contract, and two thirds of the natives are Shiites. Despite the many guest workers, unemployment is high among the Shiites and the 2011 Food Crisis is hitting hard. Additionally, long-standing grievances have been barely addressed. Protest this year was inevitable, and Iran was eager to stir the pot. This rapidly drew in a coordinated Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) response, and troops from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates rapidly turned up to help suppress the demonstrations. Like all of the Middle Eastern protests this year, the issue is not resolved and things could easily be rekindled. Saudi Arabia faces internal dissent, not least from its Shiites. An initial protest by Saudi Shiites in early March 2011 resulted in a major series of arrests; and the Saudis are expecting more trouble. Separate from the Saudi military, the Saudi National Guard tends to be drawn from the tribes closest to and most loyal to the Saudi Royal Family. Given the current state of tensions in the country, they have just called up another 10,000 personnel to augment the 125,000 on active service. Whatever Iran may hope to achieve with the restless Shiites of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Kingdoms, they are not likely to rise. If they do, it could be a reprise of the White Terror of the 1920s in which the great grandfathers of today's Saudi National Guardsmen murdered so many of the great grandfathers of today's Saudi Shiites. On Balance Iran faces serious internal challenges and its revolutionary leaders are aging. They also know what likely fate awaits them if overthrown. They are desperate to achieve long-standing Iranian regional goals by damaging the Saudis, securing a leading role for their co-religionists in more Middle Eastern nations, garnering prestige by harming Israel, and spreading their revolution. Those are rational or at least mostly rational goals for such men. The irrational aspect of the current crisis comes from Ahmadinejad's apparent belief that the time for the return of the Mahdi is at hand and history is full of examples of desperate men grasping at desperate hopes and seeing optimism in various signs. One could, for instance, recall the embunkered Hitler's reliance on his astrologer and his brief hopes in the death of President Roosevelt in April 1945. The distribution of a video from the Haghani circle declaring that events of 2011 decree that the arrival of the Mahdi has arrived strongly imputes that Ahmadinejad and other Iranian leaders are sincere in their beliefs. This also suggests that irrationality may rule their future actions. To draw a comparison to Hitler in his bunker in April 1945 once more, there was his insistence that weak armies of under-armed and badly supplied men were the equal of the formidable legions he had sent forth to conquer. Ahmadinejad may be just as madly optimistic about the loyalty of Hizbollah, the willingness of Bashar al-Assad, or the prowess of the Houthi Tribe of Yemen. But in a year as troubled as this, mad optimism might be catching, particularly so far as the enemies of Israel are concerned. The one sure way to deter the attention of the Arab Street and gain instant credibility is to threaten harm to Israel. Hitler, while lodged in his bunker, had his vengeance weapons as another source for mad optimism. The V1s and V2s were no longer being manufactured and could never reach Moscow or London in April 1945, but he had high hopes for new missiles and aircraft he'd seen on the drawing boards. Iran has sacrificed much to produce weapons of mass destruction and the temptation to employ them somehow will only grow stronger. The world will not easily forgive the first nation to use nuclear weapons in anger, or which openly uses weapons of mass destruction on a major city. Iran has to be careful as to how it would employ these weapons; but it is reasonable to look at their moves in the coming weeks as part of a gambit to legitimize their use. This is not going to be an easy year to navigate successfully, and the maintenance of a stable international order may take more statecraft than we currently have a right to expect. The Mackenzie Institute The Institute was formed in 1986 to provide research and comment on such diverse subjects as terrorism, organized crime, political extremism, propaganda, conflict and other such matters. It does not shy away from controversy. The Institute holds to the proposition that our democratic institutions need to be defended and enhanced, and works to do what it can to protect the stability of Canadian society. Those who support its purposes are invited to become Friends of the Institute, and those who contribute $60 (or more) to it, receive its publications for the next twelve months. 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