http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/10/world/americas/10venezuela.html?_r=1&ref=w
orld?src=ISMR_AP_LI_LST_FB

 

May 10, 2011


Venezuela Asked Colombian Rebels to Kill Opposition Figures


By SIMON ROMERO
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/r/simon_romero/i
ndex.html?inline=nyt-per> 


CARACAS, Venezuela — Colombia’s main rebel group has an intricate history of
collaboration with Venezuelan officials, who have asked it to provide urban
guerrilla training to pro-government cells here and to assassinate political
opponents of Venezuela
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/ve
nezuela/index.html?inline=nyt-geo> ’s president, according to a new analysis
of the group’s internal communications. 

The analysis contends that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/r/revolut
ionary_armed_forces_of_colombia/index.html?inline=nyt-org> , or FARC, was
asked to serve as a shadow militia for Venezuela’s intelligence apparatus,
although there is no evidence that President Hugo Chávez
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/c/hugo_chavez/in
dex.html?inline=nyt-per>  was aware of the assassination requests or that
they were ever carried out. 

The documents, found in the computer files of a senior FARC commander who
was killed in a 2008 raid, also show that the relationship between the
leftist rebels and Venezuela’s leftist government, while often cooperative,
has been rocky and at times duplicitous. 

The documents are part of a 240-page book on the rebel group, “The FARC
Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archive of Raúl Reyes
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/r/raul_reyes/ind
ex.html?inline=nyt-per> ,” to be published Tuesday by the International
Institute for Strategic Studies <http://www.iiss.org/>  in London. While
some of the documents have been quoted and cited previously, the release of
a CD accompanying the book will be the first time such a large number of the
documents have been made public since they were first seized. 

The book comes at a delicate stage in the FARC’s ties with Venezuela’s
government. Mr. Chávez acknowledged last month for the first time that some
of his political allies had collaborated with Colombian rebels, but insisted
they “went behind all our backs.” 

The book contradicts this assertion, pointing to a long history of
collaboration by Mr. Chávez and his top confidants. Venezuela’s government
viewed the FARC as “an ally that would keep U.S. and Colombian military
strength in the region tied down in counterinsurgency, helping to reduce
perceived threats against Venezuela,” the book said. 

The archive describes a covert meeting in Venezuela in September 2000
between Mr. Chávez and Mr. Reyes, the FARC commander whose computers, hard
drives and memory sticks were the source of the files. At the meeting, Mr.
Chávez agreed to lend the FARC hard currency for weapons purchases. 

A spokesman for Mr. Chávez did not respond to requests for comment. 

Venezuela’s government has contended that the Reyes files were fabrications.
In 2008, Interpol dismissed the possibility that the archive, which includes
documents going back to the early 1980s, had been doctored. 

Moreover, data from the archive has led to the recovery of caches of uranium
in Colombia and American dollars in Costa Rica, and has been the basis of
actions by governments including Canada, Spain and the United States. Such
uses constitute “de facto recognition” that the archive is authentic, the
institute said. 

“We haven’t begun the dossier with the words ‘J’accuse,’ ” said Nigel
Inkster, one of the book’s editors. “Instead we tried to produce a sober
analysis of the FARC since the late 1990s, when Venezuela became a central
element of their survival strategy.” 

Recently, Venezuela seems to have cooled toward the FARC, conforming to a
pattern described in the book of ups and downs between Mr. Chávez and the
rebels. In April, his government took the unusual step of detaining Joaquín
Pérez, a suspected senior operative for the FARC who had been living in
Sweden, and deporting him to Colombia. 

This move came amid a rapprochement between Mr. Chávez and Colombia’s
president, Juan Manuel Santos
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/s/juan_manuel_sa
ntos/index.html?inline=nyt-per> , as a response by Mr. Chávez to Colombia’s
claims that the FARC was operating from Venezuelan soil. 

The archive, which opens a window into bouts of tension and even loathing
between the FARC and Mr. Chávez’s emissaries, shows that Mr. Chávez has
sided with the Colombian government on other occasions, especially when he
stood to gain politically. 

In November 2002, the book reports, before a meeting between Álvaro Uribe
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/u/alvaro_uribe/i
ndex.html?inline=nyt-per> , then Colombia’s president, and Mr. Chávez, the
FARC asked the Venezuelan Army for permission to transport uniforms on a
mule train through Venezuelan territory. The Venezuelan Army granted
permission, then ambushed the convoy, seized eight FARC operatives and
delivered them to Colombia, allowing Mr. Chávez to inform Mr. Uribe of the
operation in person. 

Such betrayals, as well as unfulfilled promises of large sums of money,
generated considerable tension among the rebels over their relationship with
Mr. Chávez. 

A member of the FARC’s secretariat, Víctor Suárez Rojas, who used the nom de
guerre Mono Jojoy, once called Mr. Chávez a “deceitful and divisive
president who lacked the resolve to organize himself politically and
militarily.” 

Still, periods of tension tended to be the exception in a relationship that
has given the rebel group a broad degree of cross-border sanctuary. 

In some of the most revealing descriptions of FARC activity in Venezuela,
the book explains how Venezuela’s main intelligence agency, formerly known
by the acronym Disip and now called the Bolivarian Intelligence Service,
sought to enlist the FARC in training state security forces and conducting
terrorist attacks, including bombings, in Caracas in 2002 and 2003. 

A meeting described in the book shows that Mr. Chávez was almost certainly
unaware of the Disip’s decision to involve the FARC in state terrorism, but
that Venezuelan intelligence officials still carried out such contacts with
a large amount of autonomy. 

Drawing from the FARC’s archive, the book also describes how the group
trained various pro-Chávez organizations in Venezuela, including the
Bolivarian Liberation Forces, a shadowy paramilitary group operating along
the border with Colombia. 

FARC communications also discussed providing training in urban terrorism
methods for representatives of the Venezuelan Communist Party and several
radical cells from 23 de Enero, a Caracas slum that has long been a hive of
pro-Chávez activity. 

The book also cites requests by Mr. Chávez’s government for the guerrillas
to assassinate at least two of his opponents. 

The FARC discussed one such request in 2006 from a security adviser for Alí
Rodríguez Araque, a top official here. According to the archive, the
adviser, Julio Chirino, asked the FARC to kill Henry López Sisco, who led
the Disip at the time of a 1986 massacre of unarmed members of a subversive
group. 

“They ask that if possible we give it to this guy in the head,” said Mr.
Reyes, the former FARC commander. 

The book says there was no evidence that the FARC acted on the request
before Mr. López Sisco left Venezuela in November 2006. 

Less is known about another assassination request cited in the book,
including whom the target was or whether it took place. 

But the book makes it clear that the Colombian rebels sometimes found their
Venezuelan hosts unscrupulous and deceitful. 

In one example, Mono Jojoy, who was killed in a bombing raid last year, had
harsh words for Ramón Rodríguez Chacín, a former Venezuelan naval officer
who has served as a top liaison between Mr. Chávez and the FARC, calling him
“the worst kind of bandit.” 

 



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