http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/world/asia/13qaeda.html?tntemail1=y <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/world/asia/13qaeda.html?tntemail1=y&_r=1&; emc=tnt&pagewanted=print> &_r=1&emc=tnt&pagewanted=print
Signs of Leadership Void as al-Qaeda Pushes On By SCOTT SHANE <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/s/scott_shane/in dex.html?inline=nyt-per> WASHINGTON - When Al Qaeda <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/a/al_qaed a/index.html?inline=nyt-org> 's online propaganda arm sought to rally supporters this week after the killing of Osama bin Laden <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/world/asia/osama-bin-laden-is-killed.html _> , it did not hint that the network had a major terrorist plot in the works. Instead, it proposed do-it-yourself terrorism, urging militants around the world to come up with their own attacks, however modest. "We say to every mujahid Muslim, if there is an opportunity, do not waste it," said the statement Monday from Al Fajr Media Center, the terror network's online voice. "Do not consult anyone about killing Americans or destroying their economy." The message praised Bin Laden for his "long-term planning and vision," but proposed exactly the opposite: "We also incite you to carry out acts of individual terrorism with significant results, which only require basic preparation." The message implicitly acknowledged that the demise of Al Qaeda's founder leaves its core in a weakened position. Even before Bin Laden's death, the rise of affiliates, notably Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/a/al_qaed a_in_the_arabian_peninsula/index.html?inline=nyt-org> in Yemen <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/ye men/index.html?inline=nyt-geo> , had shifted attention and energy away from the parent organization in Pakistan <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/pa kistan/index.html?inline=nyt-geo> . Now, with a handful of flawed or little-known candidates ready to succeed Bin Laden, but no one with his status and charisma, the future of the network's old hub is uncertain. Some American intelligence analysts believe that the fact that more than 10 days have passed without the announcement of a successor could be a sign of a power struggle. "The core is diminished by Bin Laden's death - it's a big blow," said Daniel L. Byman, a former Central Intelligence Agency and 9/11 Commission staff member, now at Georgetown University. Intelligence analysts from the C.I.A. and a half-dozen other agencies poring over the computer files and documents seized from Bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, have been impressed by the degree to which he stayed in touch with underlings in Pakistan and affiliates abroad, said officials briefed on the assessment. The material so far has not yielded leads on plots, said a senior law enforcement official, but it has given greater insight into Bin Laden's role. He mused in a notebook containing a dozen handwritten pages about new ways to attack the United States, including targeting trains and trying to recruit among American ethnic minorities. On dozens of thumb drives and CDs and 10 hard drives, analysts are finding years of letters of instructions to subordinates and spinoffs, which were then e-mailed by couriers from Internet cafes. It is not always clear that the instructions were received or obeyed. "Bin Laden was issuing directives in detail to his deputies and to the affiliates - actions to take, thoughts on who should be leaders," said an official familiar with the intelligence. "He was very much trying to exercise control." Whether a replacement can exercise the same influence is in question. "Bin Laden was the only person with the stature that when he spoke, the affiliates would listen," said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. "It's unlikely that they will listen to the same degree to any of the others." Ayman al-Zawahri, the Egyptian doctor who had long been Bin Laden's deputy, is widely viewed as a divisive figure whose ascent to the top position could further weaken the hub of the network. "There's an understanding inside Al Qaeda that Zawahri is not nearly as respected or admired as Bin Laden," said one official. But under intense pressure both from the C.I.A.'s drones <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/u/unmanned_aer ial_vehicles/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier> and the stepped-up hunt for Qaeda operatives after the assault on Bin Laden's compound, it will be difficult for any lesser-known leader to establish himself, Mr. Byman said. "You have to press the flesh," he said. "You have to hold meetings. That's not easy if you're busy trying to stay alive." Some military and counterterrorism officials believe the competition for leadership of the global jihadist movement is up for grabs, with possible candidates far from Pakistan's tribal area. Among the names mentioned are the leader of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Nasser al-Wuhayshi, a Saudi who served as Bin Laden's personal secretary in the 1990s and who has overseen attacks against both Yemen and the United States. Mr. Wuhayshi posted his own eulogy for Bin Laden on the Web Tuesday, one of numerous bids for the spotlight in recent days. "Let the Americans know that the ember of jihad is glowing stronger and brighter than it was during the life of the Sheikh," he wrote. Some American officials also believe that Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-born cleric now hiding with the Qaeda branch in Yemen, could fill some of the void left by Bin Laden's death. Mr. Awlaki's fluent English, knowledge of the United States and Web prominence are in his favor, though some experts on Yemen question his stature within the organization. In Pakistan, American officials believe a younger generation of operatives is emerging to challenge the authority of the group's old guard, including Mr. Zawahri. The officials said that a charismatic pair of Libyan men, Atiya Abd al-Rahman and Abu Yahya al-Libi, who escaped from the prison at Bagram <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/b/bagram_air_b ase_afghanistan/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier> in Afghanistan in 2005, are now believed to be Qaeda's senior operational planners. Their ascendance came after a drone strike in 2010 killed Sheikh Saeed al-Masri, who has been the group's third-ranking operative, a slot associated with a notoriously short lifespan. Another prominent figure is Ilyas Kashmiri, a Pakistani veteran of the Soviet-Afghan war who was accused in 2009 of conspiring with two Chicago men to attack a Danish newspaper that had published a cartoon of the Prophet Muhammad. And there is Adnan el-Shukrijumah, a Saudi-born Qaeda operative who lived for years in the United States and has been indicted on charges involving the foiled 2009 plot to blow up part of the New York City subway with backpack bombs. All of those names and many more are now being run through the Bin Laden archive, officials said, including at the Defense Intelligence Agency's National Media Exploitation Center, which specializes in rapid searches of electronic data. The goal is to find hints about the Qaeda figures' roles in the organization - or their whereabouts, with the hope of capturing or killing the network's next generation. 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