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Thirty Years of Conflict
How the US and Morocco seized the Spanish Sahara
Jacob A. Mundy http://www.tlaxcala-int.org/article.asp?reference=790
Last November marked the 30th anniversary of the Sahara crisis, triggered
when Morocco successfully pressured Madrid out of its desert colony in
autumn 1975. Despite the United States denials, declassified records reveal
that King Hassans success was made possible through US intervention.
On October 1975 the International Court of Justice declared - in an opinion
requested by Morocco - that the materials and information presented to it
do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of
Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Hours
later King Hassan claimed the opposite. The Hague, he told his subjects, had
vindicated his irredentism: 350,000 Moroccan civilians would march into the
Spanish Sahara as mujahedin to reclaim it for the motherland.
A flurry of diplomatic activity followed. In Spain, the cabinet fell into
disarray as Franco collapsed into a fatal coma. A power struggle ensued
between those sympathetic to independence (colonial administrators and
elements of the foreign ministry) and those worried about relations with
Morocco (the ultraconservatives of the National Movement). While the latter
pushed for United Nations pressure to stop Hassans Green March, the former
initiated a contrary bilateral dialogue to arrange a mutually face-saving
agreement with Rabat. But all around the leaderless Spanish cabinet feared
that a messy colonial war with Morocco was at hand.
Following Hassans announcement of the march, the Security Council ordered
Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim to consult with the parties. The major
stumbling block was the Western Saharans right to self-determination. Since
the mid-1960s the United Nations had called for the decolonisation of
Western Sahara through a popular vote, and later underscored the territorys
right to independence. In 1974 Spain promised that it would soon hold a
plebiscite, which had triggered Hassans démarche to The Hague. At the time
of the crisis most elements of the Spanish government were reluctant to
abandon the Sahara without either holding a referendum or passing the duty
off to the UN. Morocco, on the other hand, knew that the chances of winning
such a referendum were slim to none. Most observers, including the UN and
the CIA, had already concluded that the territory was manifestly in favour
of independence. Hassans strategy was to intervene before such a vote could
take place.
The march went off without a hitch starting on 6 November, though that same
day a Security Council resolution deplored it. As the Moroccan magazine
Tel Quel recently noted, only small number of Hassans mujahedin penetrated
the territory - and then promptly returned barely threatening the Spanish
line of dissuasion 10 kilometres behind the frontier. Yet unknown to most
of the world, Moroccan armed forces had already stormed into the far
northeast corner of the territory on 31 October, aiming to cut off any
possible Algerian counter-invasion. There Hassans forces met with sporadic
resistance from the Polisario, by then a two-year-old independence movement.
Hassan won the highly scripted game of chicken with Madrid. He recalled his
marchers on 9 November claiming that things had turned out better than
expected. Indeed, on 14 November, representatives of Morocco, Mauritania and
Spain announced that they had reached an agreement that would install a
tripartite administration until Spains formal exit in early 1976.
Self-determination, they claimed, would take place through a simple
consultation with the colonially constituted body of tribal Saharan elders,
the Jamaa. But before that could happen, the Jamaa dissolved itself,
declaring the Polisario the true representative of the Western Saharan
people. Nearly half the indigenous population rallied to the exiled flag of
the Polisario in Algeria, where they remain to this day in four refugee
camps near Tindouf. Self-determination, denied in 1975, is still on hold
even though the UN said in 1991 that it could hold a vote within months.
War and peace
Both King Hassan and the Mauritanian president, Ould Daddah, had greatly
underestimated the Polisarios abilities to wage guerrilla warfare and also
the fury of the Algerian president, Houari Boumedienne. Two features of
Spains abandonment of the Sahara disturbed Boumedienne the most: The map of
North Africa had been redrawn without Algerias consent and western powers
had worked to marginalise Algerian interests during the crisis. A champion
of national liberation movements, Boumedienne could not let this affront
stand unchecked. The regime of Ould Daddah soon fell to the Saharan
guerrillas, and Morocco found itself almost entirely driven out of the
Sahara four years after receiving it from Spain.
Saudi, French and US aid reversed this trend for King Hassan, enabling the
monarch to regain much of the territory. Excluding Egypt, Morocco has
received more economic and military aid from the US than any other African
country. By 1988, with the UN again involved in the conflict, Morocco was in
a much better position to negotiate or not negotiate. Though there was a
ceasefire in 1991, Moroccos military hold on the territory is much the same
today, if not stronger.
Not only does Morocco illegally earn billions of dollars each year from the
rich fishing off the coast, but top generals in the Moroccan armed forces
now have controlling stakes in those key industries. The confluence of
economic and military interests in the Sahara is one of the major reasons
behind Moroccos rejectionist attitude when it comes to a referendum. Though
the UN owes the Western Saharans a vote, no member of the Security Council
is currently willing to force Morocco to allow such a plebiscite to take
place. France and the US are more comfortable with a referendum that would
ratify an autonomy agreement amiable to Morocco.
The subject of speculation
The role of the US government in the October-November 1975 crisis has been
the subject of much speculation and little fact. With what scant, and often
circumstantial, evidence has been available, various observers have accused
the US of a range of reactions from passivity to complicity.
Not that claims of complicity were totally baseless. Three years after the
crisis the Spanish parliament held an inquiry into the affair. There several
officials claimed that France and the US had pressured Madrid into meeting
Hassans demands. And the then deputy director of the CIA, Lt-General Vernon
Walters, insinuated that he had intervened on behalf of the US during the
crisis, a claim later echoed by other sources in the New York Times in 1981.
Given Walters close relationship with Hassan, dating from the allied
landing in Casablanca, journalist Bob Woodward once described him as the
monarchs personal case officer at the CIA.
Then there are the memoirs of Daniel Patrick Moynihan, US representative at
the UN during the 1975 crisis. In an oft-quoted passage, Moynihan compared
the once parallel histories of East Timor and Western Sahara: China
altogether backed Fretilin in Timor, and lost. In Spanish Sahara, Russia
just as completely backed Algeria, and its front, known as Polisario, and
lost. In both instances the United States wished things to turn out as they
did, and worked to bring this about. The Department of State desired that
the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it
undertook. This task was given to me, and I carried it forward with no
inconsiderable success.
The US ambassador to Algeria during the crisis, Richard Parker, later wrote
that it is possible that Hassan believed he had received a green light
from the US to take the Spanish Sahara during a meeting with Henry Kissinger
in the summer of 1975, though that may not have been the Secretary of
States intention. Citing the USs lack of support for UN resolutions
against the Green March as kind of circumstantial evidence that lends
credence to the allegation that Washington supported Hassan, Parker still
felt that the official record will never reveal the full truth. He
nevertheless concluded: Anything was possible in that era.
The US response to the crisis
The first sign the US government received that things were about to heat up
in the Sahara was not, however, King Hassans 16 October announcement. Two
weeks earlier the director of the CIA, William E Colby, had issued a
memorandum to Kissinger that bluntly claimed: King Hassan has decided to
invade the Spanish Sahara within the next three weeks. It claimed that
Hassan feared The Hagues opinion might not support Moroccos claim to the
Western Sahara, so a military invasion was being prepared. The monarch was
also confident the Spanish military would not put up much of a fight.
Additionally, as the memorandum suggested, It is possible that Hassan has
concluded that armed intervention will provoke favourable international
mediation. How Hassan might have reached this dangerous conclusion is
explained. A subsequent CIA analysis added: King Hassan apparently is being
egged on by his military commanders.
Kissinger quickly sent a letter to Hassan calling for his restraint, but did
not receive a reply until 14 October. He assured the US government that he
would not attack Spain, though he would not make the same promise for anyone
opposing his ambitions.
The morning after the release of the ICJs opinion and the announcement of
the Green March, Kissinger briefed President Ford and the National Security
Advisor, Lieutenant-General Brent Scowcroft, in the Oval Office:
Kissinger: Morocco is threatening a massive march on Spanish Sahara. The ICJ
gave an opinion which said sovereignty had been decided between Morocco and
Mauritania. That basically is what Hassan wanted.
The President: What is likely to happen?
Kissinger: Spain is leaning to independence. That is what Algeria would
like. I will talk to the Moroccan Ambassador today.
The court, as noted above, had said something quite the opposite. Perhaps
the only other person in the world who shared Kissingers highly partisan
reading of the ICJs opinion was Hassan.
Following Hassans announcement of the Green March, Spain asked the Security
Council to stop Hassan. The response, considered weak by the Spanish
government, had forced Madrid to pursue a bilateral dialogue with Morocco.
Visiting Hassan on a pre-scheduled trip to discuss the Arab-Israeli
conflict, the Assistant Secretary of State, Alfred Atherton, reported on 22
October that Morocco and Spain had reached a mutually face-saving agreement
to allow a march. They would then to use the UN to legitimate a Moroccan
takeover through a controlled plebiscite, thereby allowing Spain to
gracefully bow out.
In search of a formula
Even Kurt Waldheim was in on it. Speaking with Moynihan on 29 October,
Waldheim said he had proposed a solution based on the West Irian
precedent. (In 1961 Indonesia invaded Western New Guinea, now West Irian
Jaya, before the Dutch colony could achieve independence. The territory was
placed briefly under UN administration in 1962, and passed to Indonesia in
1963. A controversial self-determination referendum formalised Indonesian
sovereignty in 1969.)
Morocco would abandon the march if Spain agreed to withdraw in early 1976;
then an interim UN administration would then organise a referendum. Waldheim
admitted that it would be difficult to find some formula regarding
consulting the people agreeable to Hassan, but as a CIA brief noted at that
time, The Secretary General reportedly had earlier thought that Morocco
would acquiesce to his proposal provided the UN trusteeship were
manipulated so that the territory would soon be turned over to Rabat and
Nouakchott.
On the morning of 3 November Ford, Scowcroft and Kissinger met in the Oval
Office where, among other issues, the impending Green March was discussed.
At this meeting it appears that Ford finalised the basic outline of US
policy towards the brewing crisis based on a proposal made by Kissinger:
Kissinger: ... On the Spanish Sahara, Algerian pressure has caused the
Spanish to renege. Algeria wants a port and there are rich phosphate
deposits. The Algerians have threatened us on their Middle East position. We
sent messages to the Moroccans yesterday. I think we should get out of it.
It is another Greek-Turkey problem where we lose either way. We could tell
Hassan we would entirely oppose him; that might stop it but it would make us
the fall guy. Or we could force Waldheim forward.
President: I think the UN should take on more of these problems. God damn,
we shouldnt have to do it all and get a bloody nose.
Kissinger: The UN could do it like West Irian, where they fuzz the
consulting the wishes of the people, and get out of it.
President: Lets use the UN route.
The morning after Ford apparently set US policy, Kissinger presented a very
short brief on the Sahara crisis to the same audience:
The Sahara is a mess. The Spanish Army is reluctant to appear being kicked
out. Juan Carlos said Morocco could have the Sahara if they would call off
the march, but they couldnt.
On 5 November, the eve of the march, Kissinger and his staff discussed the
crisis at an early morning meeting. Atherton began by summarising the latest
diplomatic activity and started referring to a Spanish proposal. He was cut
off before revealing the substance of the reasonable suggestion. Kissinger
interrupted to say, Just turn it over to the UN with a guarantee it will go
to Morocco. The Assistant Secretary of State for European affairs, Arthur
Hartman, then mentioned a proposal to escort some of the marchers across
the border, only to have Atherton jump in to give these instructions: Let
the marchers go into it ten kilometres, and let a token go all the way to
[Al-Ayun], and having done this, turn around and go back. This has been
carried back to Hassan.
Noting that it is coming down to the crunch, Atherton went on to hint that
this arrangement might not satisfy all Moroccans. Hassans problem,
Atherton explained, is that if he seems to cave very much, he is in
difficulty at home, of course. Kissinger then asked, But he is going to
get the territory, isnt he? To which Atherton replied,
Well, he wants it 100 percent guaranteed. I think he is getting less than
that - but he is getting probably the most he can hope for now in the
position that the Spanish have taken. He may ...
Secretary Kissinger: He is getting the most he can hope...
Atherton: In the way of a promise that it will come out in the end the way
he wants, after going through the UN procedure. It isnt a 100 percent
guarantee. But I dont see that there is any more he can hope for or will
have any support from anybody else.
A highly scripted affair
Hartman then referenced a cable in which the Spanish government was very
explicit about what they would do in influencing a referendum (ie, in
Moroccos favour).
That the march went forward without a snag, and that Spain never raised the
issue of Moroccos military invasion in the northeast of the territory,
points towards a highly scripted affair. For Washington, however, there was
some question as to whether or not things would turn out in Hassans favour.
The day after Hassan announced the withdrawal of his marchers from the
Spanish Sahara, Kissinger, Scowcroft and Ford met in the Oval Office in the
morning of 10 November. According to the notes of the meeting, Kissinger
told them,
Hassan has pulled back in the Sahara. But if he doesnt get it, he is
finished. We should now work to ensure he gets it. We would work it through
the UN [to] ensure a favourable vote.
The meeting notes do not register a response from either Ford or Scowcroft.
Given Moynihans memoirs, we know what happened next.
At a similar meeting on the following day, 11 November, the following
exchange took place:
President: How is the Spanish Sahara going?
Kissinger: It has quieted down, but I am afraid Hassan may be overthrown if
he doesnt get a success. The hope is for a rigged UN vote, but if it
doesnt happen...
Unfortunately for Kissinger, the UN was unable to hold a rigged vote
during the tripartite transitional administration, which saw half the
indigenous population flee into the desert before Spains withdrawal in
February 1976. Denied ballot box, the Polisario attempted to achieve
self-determination through the gun.
In 1991 the international community again promised the Western Saharans a
chance at self-determination. Though this time Hassan attempted to rig the
vote by flooding the polls with non-Saharans. Rather than force his
successor, King Mohammed, to accept that this effort had failed, the US
supported James Bakers 2003 proposal to allow Moroccan settlers to
participate in the vote. Unwilling to trust even its own citizens, Morocco
rejected this proposal. Again denied their birthright, the occupied Western
Sahara saw the largest pro-independence demonstrations yet, followed by a
harsh crackdown. Recent secretary-generals reports note increased
cease-fire violations on both sides.
A month after the crisis, Kissinger met with Algerian foreign minister-now
president-Abdelaziz Bouteflika. He explained the paradox of US foreign
policy to Bouteflika, who he called an enfant terrible. To prevent the
Green March, Kissinger explained, would have meant hurting our relations
with Morocco, in effect an embargo. Bouteflika countered, You could have
done it. You could stop economic aid and military aid. Kissinger offered a
rejoinder: But that would have meant ruining our relations with Morocco
completely. Bouteflika persisted, and insisted that the US government
favoured one side. I dont think we favoured one side, Kissinger said. We
tried to stay out of it. But, as he added, To take [your] position, we
would have had to reverse positions completely.
In 1976 the renowned scholar of international law, Thomas Franck, rightly
described US policy during the crisis as an act of political expediency
grounded in East/West political alliances. Much the same could be said
about USs neutral policy towards the Western Sahara conflict today, if
not other conflicts involving suppressed national self-determination. The
only difference between 1975 and 2005 is the justificatory geo-political
context, from cold war to war on terror, where we are led to believe that
our avowed neutrality is a luxury we cannot yet afford. But the persistence
of the Western Sahara conflict demonstrates the shortcomings of USs
neutral Saharan policy. Not that Washington has realised this in the past
30 years.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Courtesy of LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE
Source: http://mondediplo.com/2006/01/12asahara
Publication date of original article: 01/01/2006
URL of this page: http://www.tlaxcala-int.org/article.asp?reference=790
Tags: Western Sahara | United States of America | Morocco | Spain
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