Inside the Mind of the Mastermind, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

Posted By Seth Mandel On May 24, 2011 

The killing of Osama bin Laden, and the ensuing nationwide expressions of
joy and relief, stand in stark contrast to the reaction to the 2003 capture
of “superterrorist” Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. A simple thought experiment,
says Richard Miniter, should correct that imbalance: imagine bin Laden were
the one caught in 2003 instead of KSM, as he is known.

“KSM is different than bin Laden in that he can dream up major attacks, and
while running the organization he would have access to its resources, its
trained personnel—we would have seen many more 9/11-style attacks. I don’t
mean the same technique, but the same lethality,” Miniter said in an
interview this week. Miniter is the author of the new book Mastermind: The
Many Faces of the 9/11 Architect, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed.

In speaking to analysts, Miniter said, KSM’s capture was always referred to
as a war-winning moment—former House intelligence chairman and later CIA
chief Porter Goss even compared it to the liberation of Paris in World War
II.

“I don’t think the public really sees the value in capturing KSM, that’s one
of the reasons why I wrote this book,” he said.

Indeed, in the book Miniter recounts the first meeting between KSM and bin
Laden. “After the small talk, KSM presented a battery of outrageous ideas to
bin Laden: another plan to kill the pope, this time in Africa; a plan to
hijack planes and fly them into buildings on America’s two most populous
coasts; plans for London, Paris, Singapore, Hong Kong, and on and on…. After
a few hours, bin Laden politely declined to back any of KSM’s plans but
asked him to join Al Qaeda and move his family from the Baluch region of
Iran to Kandahar, Afghanistan.”

KSM actually declined that invitation, but it gave bin Laden a preview of
what it was going to be like eventually working with a man who was both
ruthless and tactically brilliant. One plan that bin Laden actually liked
was KSM’s idea to recruit a Saudi air force pilot to commandeer a fighter
jet and strafe the Israeli port/resort city of Eilat, possibly killing
hundreds.

“And that plot was relatively uncomplicated, and would’ve succeeded and it
would’ve been devastating and generated headlines throughout the world,”
Miniter said.

The book spends considerable time on an important but often overlooked part
of KSM’s life—his childhood in Kuwait and college education in America. What
may surprise readers is the fact that much of KSM’s radicalization took
place in North Carolina, first at Chowan University and then at North
Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University in the mid-1980s. KSM
was actually already inclined toward the most severe interpretations of
Islamic law (he wouldn’t even allow himself to be photographed), but his
lack of English skills and the universities’ nonexistent attitude toward
cultural integration led to his alienation from his fellow students. He
spent most of his free time with other Arab immigrants and encouraged the
school’s Muslims to follow his strict version of Islam. He and his friends
were known as “the Mullahs.”

“He may have not known the term at the time, but when he arrived in America
he was a Salafi,” Miniter said. “And so that’s why he felt very comfortable
policing the other foreign students, so they didn’t violate obscure
religious rules.”

He also had a God complex, a lack of interest in any serious philosophical
or political discussions, and a growing resentment toward the Americans who
admired Israel. “He thought he had the truth. And if you were smart you’d
listen to him and if you were not smart he’d kill you—that kind of
approach.” 

And the college’s lack of concern for such self-segregation helped give KSM
the impression that America lacked social cohesion. In fact, once in custody
KSM described the America that he thought he knew—a loose federation of
states with no uniting culture or character. It’s why he thought it would be
so easy to attack the U.S. and get away with it.

“Unlike in Arab lands, he never felt any restrictions,” Miniter said. “We
call that freedom, but he thought that was weakness.”

One thing he did learn about Americans was a willingness to believe in
coincidences—a perception that inspired a strategic trick that became a mark
of KSM’s attacks on the U.S.

The first World Trade Center bombing was plagued by amateurishness. The
vehicle that carried the bomb still had its VIN number on it. One of the
bombers, Mohammed Salameh, reported the vehicle stolen and demanded his
deposit back. When Salameh showed up at the Ryder leasing outfit to claim
his deposit return, the FBI were waiting for him.

“That,” Miniter writes, “was what [WTC bomb planner] Ramzi Yousef wanted.
His capture would be another helpful distraction.”

The subsequent investigation avoided the question of whether there may have
been a broader conspiracy or a foreign source of money funding the attacks.
It helps you avoid the extra scrutiny, Miniter said, if you look like
unsophisticated amateurs.

“We are naïve enough to believe that there are coincidences, that there are
people who simply wake up one morning and say: You know, I’m tired of
America and I’m going to let them have it,” he said. “That’s just really not
the way it works—all of these things involve training, planning, targeting.”

Miniter also said that one lesson from KSM’s experience was that America
behaves as though the world is “a schoolyard without a bully,” when in
reality the world has several. “And bullies multiply when they get away with
it.”

One consequence of this is that states like Pakistan harbor our bitterest
enemies, such as Osama bin Laden, even though they are ostensibly our allies
in the war on terror. “They don’t fear us,” Miniter said. “They do fear the
various terror networks operating inside their country.” For good reason:
Miniter points out that Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari’s late wife was
Benazir Bhutto, who was assassinated by Islamist terrorists in 2007.

Miniter also covers new ground in the book; for example, two al-Qaeda terror
plots that were foiled but never made public. And he fleshes out a
compelling case that KSM was behind the murder of Jewish Defense League
founder Rabbi Meir Kahane. Miniter talks about what went wrong with Daniel
Pearl’s kidnapping and how it led to one of the biggest scoops of all time
for al-Jazeera. And the American intelligence work that led to the capture
of several high-value detainees reads like a spy novel—and is a reminder
that truth is often stranger than fiction.

The fortuitous timing of the book will also encourage those celebrating bin
Laden’s death to appreciate the significance of the man we’ve had in custody
now for eight years: the Mastermind.

Seth Mandel is a writer specializing in Middle Eastern politics and a
Shillman Journalism Fellow at the Horowitz Freedom Center.

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Article printed from FrontPage Magazine: http://frontpagemag.com

URL to article:
http://frontpagemag.com/2011/05/24/inside-the-mind-of-the-mastermind-khalid-
shaikh-mohammed/

 



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